In re the marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0799

In re the marriage of:

Erica Faith Haines, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Joshua Isaac Haines,
Respondent.

Filed May 4, 2026
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Carlton County District Court
File No. 09-FA-23-1786

Erica Faith Haines, Stratford-u pon-Avon, Warwickshire, England (self-represented
appellant)

Joshua Isaac Haines, Carlton, Minnesota (self-represented respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bond, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Following marital-dissolution proceedings, appellant-mother challenges the district
court’s determinations regarding marital children and property. She also argues that the
district court violated her right to procedural due process. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-mother Erica Faith Haines petitioned to dissolve her marriage with
respondent-father Joshua Isaac Haines in October 2023. The parties had three children:
child 1, born February 2015; child 2, born April 2018; and child 3, born May 2020.
The parties do not dispute that, during their marriage, father worked outside of the
home while mother cared for the children full -time and was responsible for most aspects
of their daily lives, including their home schooling.
In the spring of 2023, father started a new job, the parties sold their home, and the
family moved into a “tiny house.”1 The parties placed the tiny house on the property of
mother’s brother and sister-in-law, who lived and operated a farm on the property. In
exchange, the parties paid monthly rent and performed various farm chores.
In August 2023, mother rented and moved into an apartment in Wisconsin while
father and the children remained in the tiny house in Minnesota. In October 2023, mother
moved to England. Since then, the children have resided with father. Mother did not visit
the children in person until the court trial on her dissolution petition in January 2025.

1 The parties do not provide a definition of the term “tiny house.” Father testified that they
purchased it for $15,000 in December 2022 and that it was less than 300 square feet in size.
3
In the time after moving to England, mother has lived in the home of a person who
employs her. In exchange for housing, mother helped her employer operate the home into
which she moved as a short-term rental property. But they stopped this operation at some
point before the court trial.
At trial, mother testified that she has received no share of profits from the rental
property. She testified that she still lives at the property in exchange for “running” her
employer’s “artwork account” as an “artist manager.” She also works part-time “for a
friend doing cleaning.” The friend pays mother $12 to $15 per hour in cash for her work.
Mother did not provide paystubs, employment contracts, or other legal documentation of
employment to the district court. Other than her testimony, mother did not disclose her
financial information or living expenses to the district court.
After a three-day court trial, the district court entered a judgement and decree (J&D)
dissolving the parties’ marriage. The J&D, in relevant part, (1) awarded father sole legal
and sole physical custody of the children; (2) awarded mother less than 25 percent of the
parenting time with the children; (3) required that all parenting time occur in Minnesota;
(4) valued the tiny house at $10,000; and (5) ordered mother to pay father monthly child
support.
This appeal follows.2

2 Father did not file a brief in this court. By order, this court directed this appeal to proceed
pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 142.03, which provides that, if
the respondent does not file and serve a brief, “the case shall be determined on the merits.”
4
DECISION
Mother’s arguments relate to (1) child custody; (2) parenting time; (3) valuation of
the tiny house; (4) division of a retirement savings plan; and (5) her right to procedural due
process. We consider each of these arguments in turn and then separately address
arguments that fail for procedural reasons as well as lack of support in the record or law.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding father sole legal and
sole physical custody.

Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion because it based its
custody determination on unsupported factual findings. Mother’s argument fails.
“Appellate review of custody determinations is limited to whether the district court
abused its discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly
applying the law.” Kremer v. Kremer, 827 N.W.2d 454, 457 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation
omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 2013). We review factual findings for clear error.
See i d. “A finding is clearly erroneous if this court is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made,” as when the finding is “manifestly contrary to
the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Id.;
Sinda v. Sinda, 949 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Minn. App. 2020) (quotation omitted).
Mother first asserts that the district court’s statement that she had “been absent for
almost half of [child 3’s] life” is erroneous because mother lived with child 3 for “73% of
[child 3’s] life” by the time of trial. The district court’s approximation does not leave this
court “with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made” and therefore is
not clearly erroneous. Kremer, 827 N.W.2d at 457.
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Mother next contends that the district court “misquote[d] the record” by stating:
“When directly asked if she would comply with the [district court’s] order, [mother] did
not provide an answer other than she would follow the order if she agreed with it.” In
support, mother cites a portion of the trial transcript in which she testified about why she
failed to use the parenting time granted to her before trial. This testimony is unrelated to
noncompliance with an order. Mother fails to demonstrate that the district court’s
statement is “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence.” Sinda, 949 N.W.2d at
175 (quotation omitted). We conclude that the statement is “reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole.” Id. (quotation omitted).
In her final custody argument, mother challenges the district court’s finding that she
“is unwilling and unmotivated to ensure that [father’s] relationship with the children is
supported.” She asserts that the district court “misrepresented [her] testimony that she
would hang up” during phone calls with the children, arguing that she did so “only for
safety reasons.” But the district court’s finding implicitly indicates that it found mother’s
testimony not to be credible. And, after weighing the evidence, the district court found that
mother was not willing to foster the relationship between father and the children. This
court does not reassess credibility or reweigh evidence. See Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607
N.W.2d 468, 472, 475 (Minn. App. 2000). We conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by granting father sole legal and physical custody of the children.

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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by departing from the statutory
presumption that a parent receive at least 25 percent of the parenting time.

Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion because it “made no proper
findings” supporting its decision to depart from the statutory presumption that a parent
receive at least 25 percent of the parenting time. We disagree.
This court will not reverse a parenting-time determination “unless the district court
abused its discretion by misapplying the law or by relying on findings of fact that are not
supported by the record.” Suleski v. Rupe, 855 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Minn. App. 2014). We
review factual findings underlying a parenting-time determination for clear error. See id.
In support of its decision to depart from the statutory presumption, the district court
found that mother: (1) “chose[] to live in another country”; (2) “has not made efforts to
have parenting time with the children when it has been offered to her”; and (3) “struggles
with understanding the true [effects] her choices have had on the children or how a
disruption in their schedule now,” as would occur if the children were “shuttl[ed] . . . back
and forth” between England and Minnesota, “would further disrupt the children.” The
record amply supports these findings.
Mother contends that the requirement to exercise parenting time in Minnesota is a
“restriction” under Minnesota Statutes section 518.175, subdivision 1(b) (2024) (providing
that district court “shall restrict parenting time with that parent as to time, place, duration,
or supervision” if it finds that parenting time “is likely to endanger” child). “Restriction”
is a term of art in the context of parenting time. See Suleski , 855 N.W.2d at 336-38.
Subdivision 1(b) of section 518.175 concerns situations in which a district court finds that
7
parenting time would likely harm a child. The district court here did not apply subdivision
1(b), nor did it “restrict” the parenting time that it granted mother.
Mother’s remaining arguments about parenting time concern the district court’s
credibility determinations and weighing of evidence. This court defers to those
determinations. See Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 472, 475.
III. The district court did not clearly err by finding that the fair market value of
the tiny house is $10,000.

Mother next argues that the district court undervalued the parties’ tiny house. We
are not persuaded.
“Determining the specific value of an asset is a finding of fact . . . [that] shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous on the record as a whole.” Maurer v. Maurer, 623
N.W.2d 604, 606 (Minn. 2001) (quotation and citation omitted). “On appeal, a party
cannot complain about a district court’s failure to rule in [their] favor when one of the
reasons it did not do so is because that party failed to provide” the evidence necessary “to
fully address the [issue].” Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk, 668 N.W.2d 235, 243 (Minn. App.
2003), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2003).
Because the parties failed to provide the district court with listings of comparable
tiny houses, the district court had to rely on trial testimony and exhibits to make a finding
on the fair market value of the tiny house. We discern no clear error in the district court’s
valuation of the tiny house.

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IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion by not dividing father’s
retirement-savings plan.

Mother also contends that the district court failed to divide father’s retirement-
savings plan. But mother neither offered evidence nor did she provide testimony about the
plan, only stating, “I believe in [father’s] financials he submitted to the [district court] in
his exhibit there’s a [retirement savings plan].” When the district court asked the parties if
they “want[ed] to take some brief testimony about that” despite it not being “admitted into
evidence,” neither party offered more information. Because mother failed to provide the
district court with the evidence necessary to address this issue, mother is not entitled to
relief on appeal. See Eisenschenk, 668 N.W.2d at 243.
V. The district court did not violate mother’s right to procedural due process.

Mother appears to argue that the district court violated her right to procedural due
process by (1) demonstrating bias against her religion and (2) filing a J&D that mirrored in
part the proposed J&D submitted by father. We are not convinced.
Appellate courts review procedural due process arguments de novo. See Rew v.
Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764, 785 (Minn. 2014).
With respect to mother’s first argument, appellate courts presume that district court
judges perform their duties properly. See Hannon v. State, 752 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn.
2008). Here, the J&D mentions religion three times. It first noted mother’s claim that the
district court violated her freedom of religion during the court trial. It then stated that the
children would benefit from the ability to continue attending the church with which they
are familiar. It last stated that its concerns related to custody were “not about religion or
9
culture,” rather they were “about consistency and stability.” These statements do not
demonstrate bias. Mother also cites as evidence of bias one instance in which the district
court overruled her objection to father’s testimony about his religion and its influence on
his parenting. The district court’s evidentiary determinations in father’s favor do not
independently demonstrate bias. See id.
Turning to mother’s second argument, when a district court adopts a proposed order
verbatim, it is “not reversible error per se.” Schallinger v. Schallinger, 699 N.W.2d 15, 23
(Minn. App. 2005) , rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2005). It only “raises the question of
whether the court independently evaluated the evidence.” Id. A comparison of the district
court’s J&D and father’s proposed J&D shows that the district court independently
evaluated the evidence. See id. The J&D discussed many issues more extensively than the
proposed J&D. The J&D was also nearly twice as long as the proposed J&D. The district
court also declined to include several of the proposed J&D’s factual findings and
conclusions of law. We conclude that the district court independently evaluated the
evidence and therefore did not violate mother’s rights to procedural due process.
VI. The record does not support several of mother’s arguments.

Mother makes several arguments that do not merit relief because they are
unsupported by, or contrary to, the record. See State v. Montano, 956 N.W.2d 643, 651-
52 (Minn. 2021) (holding that self-represented argument unsupported by record does not
merit relief).
Contrary to mother’s assertions, the record reflects that the district court
(1) discussed mother’s previous role as the primary caregiver of the children; (2) required
10
mother to comply with the rules of evidence and did not “curtail[] cross-examination” by
doing so; and (3) did not find that mother “misused” $5,000 that she previously withdrew
from a joint back account.
Three additional arguments are also contradicted by the record. First, the district
court did not “punish[]” mother for complying with an ex parte order. The ex parte order
awarded mother temporary parenting time, to be exercised in Minnesota only. The district
court considered mother’s failure to exercise this parenting time. It did not consider her
“compliance” with the provision of the ex parte order granting father temporary sole legal
and physical custody of the children. Second, the district court did not “contradict[] itself”
by receiving testimony about the children from third parties while also stating that the
children were too young to express their own preferences related to custody. The pertinent
part of the J&D states only that the children’s preferences did not favor either party because
“[t]he children are currently too young to express an independent, reliable preference.”
Third, the record does not support mother’s assertion that the district court relied on biased
testimony. Moreover, a district court’s decision to credit testimony is a credibility
determination to which this court defers. See Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 472.
VII. Mother’s remaining arguments are not properly before this court.

Mother challenges the district court’s child-support analysis and determination. She
asserts that it violated evidentiary rules by excluding an affidavit and takes issue with a
lack of “neutral professional testimony” concerning the children presented at trial. We
decline to address these arguments.
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Arguments are not properly before an appellate court if they are unsupported by
legal argument, cite no relevant legal authority, or are raised for the first time on appeal.
See Scheffler v. City of Anoka, 890 N.W.2d 437, 451 (Minn. App. 2017) (discussing issues
“unsupported by argument or authority”), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 2017); In re E.M.B.,
987 N.W.2d 597, 600 n.5 (Minn. App. 2023) (citing Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582
(Minn. 1988)).
Mother’s arguments related to the district court’s determination of her income for
child-support purposes are unsupported by relevant legal authority or argument. See id.
Mother’s arguments concerning the admissibility of an affidavit under Minnesota Rule of
Evidence 612 and a lack of “neutral professional testimony” were not presented to the
district court. See E.M.B., 987 N.W.2d at 600 n.5. As a result, none of these arguments
are properly before this court, and we decline to consider them. See Scheffler, 890 N.W.2d
at 451.
Affirmed.