Ellis Scott Tooles, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0810

Ellis Scott Tooles, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed February 2, 2026
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File Nos. 69DU-CR-16-2418; 69DU-CR-17-215

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chelsie M. Willett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Nathaniel T. Stumme, Assistant County
Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES , Judge
Following a conviction of second-degree criminal sexual conduct and third-degree
sale of a controlled substance, appellant argues that the postconviction court abused its
discretion by denying his postconviction petition to withdraw his guilty pleas. We affirm.
FACTS
In June 2016, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Ellis Scott Tooles
with first-degree sale of a controlled substance in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd.
1(1) (2014), second-degree sale of a controlled substance in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 152.022, subd. 1(1) (2014), and child endangerment in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.378,
subd. 1(b)(2) (2014). In January 2017, in a separate case, the state charged appellant with
first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a)
(2014).
In April 2017, appellant entered into a plea agreement with the state to resolve both
cases by pleading to two lesser charges. He pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree
criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2014), and one
count of third-degree sale of a controlled substance in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.023,
subd. 1(1) (2014).
While his criminal cases proceeded in state court, appellant also faced criminal
charges in federal court. Two public defenders represented appellant in state district court,
while a different attorney represented appellant in federal court.
3
At his plea hearing, appellant confirmed that he went through the signed plea
agreement with defense counsel, he had no questions about the pleas, and he understood
the plea agreement. The district court accepted appellant’s pleas at the hearing.
To ensure that appellant’s federal and state sentences ran concurrently, the parties
here agreed to delay sentencing until appellant received his federal sentence. In June 2018,
more than one year after appellant entered his guilty pleas, 1 the district court sentenced
appellant to 51 months in prison for the controlled-substance conviction and 70 months in
prison for the criminal-sexual-conduct conviction. Consistent with the parties’ plea
agreement, the district court ordered the sentences to run concurrent to one another and to
appellant’s federal sentence.
In the summer of 2023, appellant filed a postconviction petition to withdraw his
guilty pleas. The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing, at which only appellant
testified.
Appellant’s testimony included claims that defense counsel coerced him and led
him to believe that, if he did not plead guilty in state court, he would face a life sentence in
federal court. Appellant testified that he expressed concerns with defense counsel about
the plea recommendation and appellant’s lack of access to discovery. Appellant asserted
that, had he known that a life sentence in federal court “wasn’t even on the table,” he would
have gone to trial.

1 Appellant raise d no concerns about his pleas in the year between their entry and his
sentencing.
4
In an affidavit attached to his postconviction petition, appellant also contended that
defense counsel “advised [him] that the sooner [he] signed a plea petition, the less time that
[he] would get because a jury in Duluth, Minnesota would never believe a black drug
dealer, especially when the alleged [criminal -sexual-conduct] victim was a white child.”
At the hearing, appellant testified that, despite his stated desire to go to trial, defense
counsel essentially told him: “[L]isten, man, you’re black. You’re in this. You’re going
to get convicted. It’ll be like, it’s over with. So don’t even try to play with these people.
Go ahead and take the plea.”
Appellant presented an affidavit from his mother and his own testimony in support
of his assertions concerning his mental health and cognitive health. The affidavit stated
that appellant struggled to read and write, experienced attention- deficit/hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD) “as a child,” and that there was “no way” appellant could have
“knowingly signed a plea agreement with his mental health and learning disability.” At
the hearing, appellant testified that he has mental-health and cognitive-health conditions
and that defense counsel knew of these conditions. He contended that he had asked defense
counsel for a psychiatric evaluation because he “was having a mental breakdown,” but
defense counsel never ordered an evaluation. He also testified that he had medical records
of growing up with ADHD and posttraumatic stress disorder but that “it’s been a challenge”
to get them and he “was unable to . . . receive them.” Appellant provided no medical
records, no evidence showing efforts to obtain medical records, and no other evidence in
support of his assertions concerning his health.
5
Appellant testified that “everything was confusing to [him]” during his plea hearing
and that he was being “ping-pong[ed]” between state district court and federal court.
Lastly, appellant testified briefly that he did not receive his discovery until after
sentencing.
The postconviction court denied appellant’s postconviction petition. It determined
that appellant’s testimony “was not sufficiently credible and reliable to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that his pleas were not voluntary or intelligent.”
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellate courts “review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an
abuse of discretion.” See Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). An abuse
of discretion occurs when the postconviction court “has exercised its discretion in an
arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made
clearly erroneous factual findings.” Id. (quotation omitted). Appellate courts apply de
novo review to questions of law and clear-error review to questions of fact. See id. We do
not, however, “disturb credibility determinations on appeal.” Carter v. State, 787 N.W.2d
675, 679 (Minn. App. 2010).
A postconviction court must allow a defendant to withdraw their plea if it is
necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1.
2 A manifest

2 Relying on an exception to the typical two-year time-bar for postconviction petitions, the
postconviction court decided appellant’s postconviction petition on its merits. See Minn.
Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5) (2024). The state does not challenge this determination.
6
injustice occurs when a guilty plea is not constitutionally valid. State v. Raleigh, 778
N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). “To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate,
voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. Whether a guilty plea is constitutionally valid is a question
of law. State v. Jones, 921 N.W.2d 774, 778 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Feb.
27, 2019).
Appellant argues that his pleas were involuntary and unintelligent. We address each
argument in turn.
I. Appellant entered voluntary guilty pleas.
Appellant argues that his pleas were involuntary because defense counsel advised
him that, due to his race, he would be convicted at trial and that a conviction at trial would
lead to a life sentence for any future federal convictions. He also argues that his cognitive-
and mental-health conditions made him especially vulnerable to defense counsel’s
coercion. We are not persuaded.
“To determine whether a plea is voluntary, the court examines what the parties
reasonably understood to be the terms of the plea agreement.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96.
“Whether a plea is voluntary is determined by considering all relevant circumstances.” Id.
“[A] plea is involuntary when it is induced by coercive or deceptive action.” Dikken v.
State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Minn. 2017). When reviewing testimony, we defer to the
postconviction court’s credibility determinations. Jones, 921 N.W.2d at 783.
Appellant argues that defense counsel’s advice concerning the effect of his race on
a trial outcome and a potentially lengthy federal sentence if convicted effectively
“overwhelmed his will.” However, a guilty plea is not rendered involuntary by the mere
7
fact that an appellant faced serious criminal consequences, nor by the fact that the decision
of whether to accept a plea agreement may be stressful. Cf. State v. Ecker , 524 N.W.2d
712, 718-19 (Minn. 1994) (“[A] defendant’s motivation to avoid a more serious penalty or
set of charges will not invalidate a guilty plea.”); Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96 (“Raleigh
offers no further explanation of how stress, irrational thinking, improper pressure, or
coercion influenced his plea decision . . . .”). Moreover, in support of his contentions about
defense counsel’s advice, appellant relies on only his own testimony. The postconviction
court found this testimony not credible, and this court defers to that finding.
Appellant also asserts that he has cognitive- and mental-health conditions that made
him more vulnerable to defense counsel’s coercion. For this assertion, appellant relied on
only his own testimony, which the postconviction court found not credible. Appellant also
does not explain how the conditions rendered his pleas involuntary. Lastly, at the plea
hearing, appellant confirmed that he went through the plea agreement with defense counsel,
he understood the agreement, and he had no questions about the agreement. Appellant has
not established that his health conditions rendered his guilty pleas involuntary.
II. Appellant entered intelligent guilty pleas.
Appellant contends that his pleas were not entered intelligently because (1) his
health conditions made him “unable to fully understand the complexities of his cases and
how his state pleas would affect his federal sentence”; (2) he did not receive a copy of his
discovery until after sentencing and, therefore, “there was a lot of information that he was
not privy to”; and (3) defense counsel’s incorrect advice led appellant to “believe[] that he
8
would receive a life sentence in federal court if he did not plead guilty.” We are not
persuaded.
“[A] guilty plea must represent a knowing and intelligent choice among the
alternative courses of action available.” Dikken, 896 N.W.2d at 877 (quotation omitted).
To assess whether a plea is intelligently entered, this court focuses “on what [a] defendant
knew at the time [they] entered the plea.” Id. “The intelligence requirement ensures that
a defendant understands [(1)] the charges against him, [(2)] the rights he is waiving, and
[(3)] the consequences of his plea.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. If a defendant understood
these three aspects of their plea, they intelligently entered it. Dikken, 896 N.W.2d at 877.
Appellant first contends that he could not understand the charges against him due to
his health conditions. But appellant relied on only his own discredited testimony for this
contention. Furthermore, the plea-hearing transcript shows that appellant confirmed that
he understood the charges against him. The state went through the factual bases for the
pleas, to which appellant orally agreed. Appellant also affirmed each allegation by the
state. Colloquies at plea hearings in which a defendant confirms understanding of the three
aspects of an intelligent plea support the conclusion that they entered an intelligent plea.
See, e.g., id. at 878.
Appellant next contends that his late receipt of discovery materials impaired his
ability to understand the charges against him. As an example, appellant asserts that “once
[he] received his discovery, he realized that there were no search warrants requested to
search his funds, which he said he would have challenged had he known prior to pleading
guilty.” But a search of appellant’s funds was not part of the factual basis of either of his
9
guilty pleas.3 Other than this search warrant, appellant does not share what evidence he
was not privy to or what evidence he might have challenged. Additionally, at his plea
hearing, appellant confirmed that he had talked to defense counsel about his “files . . .
several times.” Ultimately, the record supports the postconviction court’s determination
that any belated receipt of discovery did not justify withdrawal of appellant’s guilty plea.
Appellant also argues that he misunderstood the effect his pleas in state court would
have on his criminal sentence in federal court, thinking that he needed to plead guilty to
avoid a life sentence. But this misunderstanding does not render his plea unintelligent.
When this court refers to a defendant’s understanding of the consequences of their plea,
we refer to the direct consequences of the plea. See Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 823
(Minn. 2016). “Direct consequences are definite, immediate, and automatic and are
punitive and a part of a defendant’s sentence .” State v. Brown, 896 N.W.2d 557, 561
(Minn. App. 2017) (quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. July 18, 2017). By contrast,
collateral consequences “are civil and regulatory in nature.” State v. Crump, 826 N.W.2d
838, 842 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. May 21, 2013).
Examples of collateral consequences include potentially enhanced “sentences for future
convictions” and “a potential probation-violation penalty in an unrelated case.” Id. at 843;
Brown, 896 N.W.2d at 562. “[A] a defendant’s lack of awareness of a collateral
consequence of a guilty plea does not render the guilty plea unintelligent and entitle a

3 The parties do not explain the reason for the search of appellant’s funds. Nor do they
state whether the search was conducted in connection to his state criminal charges, his
federal criminal charges, or both.
10
defendant to withdraw it.” Taylor, 887 N.W.2d at 823. Even misinformation from defense
counsel about a collateral consequence does not automatically render a plea unintelligent.
Cf. Brown, 896 N.W.2d at 563 (“The caselaw does not compel us to conclude that
misinformation about a collateral consequence renders a plea unintelligent and manifestly
unjust.”).
The effect of a defendant’s guilty plea in state court on his criminal sentence in
federal court is a collateral consequence. The effect is not “definite, immediate, and
automatic,” nor is it “part of a defendant’s sentence.” See id. at 561.
Even if the effect of a guilty plea in state court on a criminal sentence in federal
court were not a collateral consequence, this court discerns no grounds upon which to
reverse the district court’s determination. Appellant provided only his own testimony in
support of his contentions about defense counsel’s advice. We defer to the postconviction
court’s finding that this testimony was not credible.
We conclude that the record supports the postconviction court’s determination that
appellant understood the state’s charges against him, the rights he waived by pleading
guilty, and the consequences of pleading guilty. See Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96.
Affirmed.