Tyler Allan Cronquist, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0833

Tyler Allan Cronquist, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed March 2, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Cochran, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-CR-15-66

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant
Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kelsey Hopps, Crow Wing County Attorney, Brainerd, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Schmidt, Judge.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
On appeal from summary denial of a petition for postconviction relief, appellant
argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion when it made adverse credibility
determinations as part of its decision to deny the petition without holding an evidentiary
hearing. Because we conclude that the postconviction court abused its discretion when it
made improper credibility determinations to support the summary denial of the petition,
we reverse and remand for the postconviction court to reconsider the petition applying the
proper standard.
FACTS
The Underlying Charges and Plea Deal
On January 6, 2015, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Tyler Allan
Cronquist with several crimes following the shooting of two individuals. The charges
included: two counts of second- degree murder in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
609.19, subdivision 1(1) (2014); one count of first-degree assault involving great bodily
harm in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.221, subdivision 1 (2014); and one
count of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon in violation of Minnesota Statutes
section 609.222, subdivision 1 (2014).
The complaint alleged the following facts in support of the charges. Two days
before the complaint was filed, Cronquist and Nathan Becker were at C.C.’s apartment
with her. After their arrival, another individual J.K. came to the apartment. When J.K.
walked into the apartment, Cronquist and Becker began “staring [J.K.] down while all four
3
were in the living room.” C.C. then went to the kitchen. While in the kitchen, she heard a
“loud noise” and saw J.K. on the floor in the living room. The complaint further alleged
that Cronquist then walked up to C.C. “and shot her in the head.” At that point, both
Cronquist and Becker left the apartment. C.C. then called 911 and reported the shooting.
When law enforcement arrived, C.C. was still conscious and bleeding from her
head, but J.K. was unconscious and gasping for air. C.C. told the officers that Cronquist
had shot her. Both C.C. and J.K. were transported by ambulance to a medical center before
being airlifted to a hospital, where J.K. died from the gunshot injury. C.C. survived. Police
arrested Becker, and Cronquist later turned himself in to local law enforcement.
After the state filed its criminal complaint against Cronquist, a grand jury indicted
Cronquist on one count of premeditated first-degree murder in violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 609.185, subdivision (a)(1) (2014); and one count of attempted
premeditated first-degree murder in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.185,
subdivision (a)(1), with reference to section 609.17, subdivision 1 (2014). Following the
indictment, the previously filed complaint against Cronquist was dismissed.
Becker was also charged in relation to the shooting. The state charged Becker with
aiding and abetting Cronquist in the shootings of J.K. and C.C.
Becker’s trial occurred before the scheduled start of Cronquist’s trial. At Becker’s
trial, C.C. testified that Cronquist shot both her and J.K. Neither Cronquist nor Becker
testified at Becker’s trial. Becker’s attorney argued that Cronquist alone was responsible.
Becker was found not guilty on all charges.
4
In September 2016, following Becker’s acquittal, Cronquist entered into a plea
agreement with the state. He pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree murder and one
count of attempted second-degree murder. In exchange for Cronquist’s guilty pleas, the
state dismissed the premeditated first-degree murder and attempted premeditated
first-degree murder charges. The district court sentenced Cronquist to consecutive
sentences of 306 months’ imprisonment for second-degree murder and 153 months’
imprisonment for attempted second-degree murder, for a total consecutive sentence of 459
months.
Postconviction Proceedings
On September 14, 2023, approximately seven years after Cronquist pleaded guilty,
Becker informed a deputy at the Crow Wing County Jail that he “wished to confess to a
murder he had committed.” Becker was in jail for unrelated reasons. Becker then gave a
recorded statement. In his statement, Becker told the sheriff’s deputy that he shot C.C. and
J.K. on January 4, 2015, in C.C.’s home with a .45-caliber semi-automatic pistol. Becker
stated that, before the shootings, he and Cronquist went into the bathroom, where he
produced the pistol from his pants. Becker further stated that Cronquist told him “not to
do it,” but Becker went back into the living room and he shot J.K. According to his
statement, he then went into the kitchen and shot C.C. Becker did not divulge his
motivations for the shootings, but claimed “God compelled him to confess.” Becker’s
statement was forwarded to the public defender’s office, who informed Cronquist of the
statement.
5
On February 5, 2025, Cronquist petitioned for postconviction relief pursuant to
Minnesota Statutes section 590.01 (2024), requesting leave to withdraw his guilty pleas to
second-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder. Cronquist also requested an
evidentiary hearing to prove that Becker’s confession exonerates Cronquist and therefore
Cronquist’s guilty pleas are invalid.
In his petition, Cronquist alleged the following facts in support of withdrawal of his
guilty pleas. On the day of the shootings, Cronquist was at C.C.’s apartment with Becker,
C.C., and J.K. While he was there, a conflict broke out between Becker and J.K. —
Cronquist was not involved. Becker then went into the bathroom with Cronquist, and
showed Cronquist that he had a gun. When Cronquist saw the gun, he made Becker
promise not to shoot anyone. Cronquist left the bathroom, went into the kitchen, and called
his friend, D.D., for a ride home. While Cronquist was on the phone with D.D., Becker
shot J.K. Cronquist heard the gunshot and looked up to see Becker coming towards him
with the gun. Cronquist tried to run out of the door of the apartment, but Becker stopped
him and would not let him leave. Becker then shot C.C. in the face, at which point
Cronquist escaped. Cronquist explained that he ran away because he was afraid that Becker
would shoot him.
Along with his petition, Cronquist filed the sheriff’s deputy’s report of Becker’s
confession at the county jail. Cronquist also filed an affidavit from D.D. and an affidavit
from Cronquist himself. The affidavit of D.D. states that he and Cronquist lived together
in January 2015. D.D.’s affidavit also states that Cronquist called D.D. for a ride home on
January 4, 2015 (the day of the shooting), and while he and Cronquist were talking, D.D.
6
heard what sounded like gunshots in the background. According to D.D., Cronquist was
mid-sentence, when D.D. heard the noise.
In Cronquist’s affidavit, Cronquist attested to the version of events outlined in his
petition. Cronquist further explained that he did not know that Becker had a gun or
intended to shoot anyone until Becker showed him a gun while they were in the bathroom
at C.C.’s home. Cronquist also stated that he never talked to police or testified against
Becker because he was afraid of Becker, though he insisted that he told his attorneys that
Becker shot C.C. and J.K. He further explained that his attorneys told him he was likely
to go to prison regardless, and urged him to testify against Becker, which he refused out of
fear. Cronquist also stated that once Becker was acquitted, Cronquist’s attorneys told him
he would likely spend the rest of his life in prison unless Cronquist pleaded guilty. Based
on these allegations, Cronquist requested an evidentiary hearing to prove Becker’s
confession exonerates him and his guilty pleas are not valid.
In his petition, Cronquist acknowledged that the petition was being filed more than
two years after his conviction and sentencing but alleged that the petition meets two
exceptions to the two- year time bar: the newly-discovered-evidence exception and the
interests-of-justice exception. The state filed an answer to the petition, asking that the
petition be dismissed without a hearing as time-barred and arguing that neither exception
applies.
The postconviction court summarily denied Cronquist’s petition without a hearing.
The court concluded that the petition was time-barred under Minnesota Statutes section
590.01, subdivision 4, because more than two years had elapsed since the entry of final
7
judgment. The court further concluded that the newly-discovered-evidence exception to
the time bar did not apply because “Becker’s purported confession is not newly-discovered
evidence.” (quotation marks omitted). The postconviction court also concluded that the
interests-of-justice exception did not apply. In denying Cronquist’s petition, the
postconviction court expressly weighed the credibility of Becker’s confession and D.D.’s
affidavit. It reasoned that “Becker’s purported confession, even if coupled by the new
Affidavit of witness [D.D.], does not meet the trustworthy requirement that is needed in
order to advance to further proceedings in this matter.” It went on to find that “Becker ’s
purported confession is not corroborated by a single shred of trustworthy independent
evidence.” And the postconviction court concluded that Cronquist was not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on his petition for postconviction relief because the “files and records
of the proceeding herein conclusively show that [Cronquist] is not entitled to
postconviction relief.”
Cronquist appeals.
DECISION
A person convicted of a crime may seek postconviction relief by filing a petition
alleging that the conviction “violated the person’s rights under the Constitution or laws of
the United States or of the state.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1). A postconviction
petition must be filed within two years after “the entry of judgment of conviction or
sentence if no direct appeal is filed” unless an exception applies. Id., subd. 4(a)(1).
Relevant to this appeal, section 590.01 provides an exception to the two-year time bar
if: the petition alleges the existence of newly discovered evidence and certain conditions
8
are met, or “the petition is not frivolous and is in the interests of justice.” Id., subd. 4(b)(2),
(5). “Any petition invoking an exception . . . must be filed within two years of the date the
claim arises.” Id., subd. 4(c).
An evidentiary hearing on the petition must be promptly held “[u]nless the petition
and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled
to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2024). When determining whether the
petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court is required to
consider the facts alleged in the petition as true and construe them in the light most
favorable to the petitioner. Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422-23 (Minn. 2018).
“[T]he burden is on a petitioner to show facts entitling the petitioner to relief.”
Allwine v. State, 994 N.W.2d 528, 541 (Minn. 2023).
We review a postconviction court’s decision on a petition for postconviction relief
for an abuse of discretion. Andersen, 913 N.W.2d at 422. “A postconviction court abuses
its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic
and the facts in the record.” Brown v. State, 895 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 2017) (quotation
omitted). A postconviction court’s legal determinations are reviewed de novo, and its
factual findings for clear error. Id.
Cronquist argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion when it made
credibility determinations to support its conclusion that Cronquist’s petition was
time-barred and no exception applied, without first holding an evidentiary hearing. We
agree.
9
As discussed above, the postconviction court must “consider[] the facts alleged in
the petition as true and construe[] them in the light most favorable to the petitioner” in
deciding whether to hold an evidentiary hearing. Andersen, 913 N.W.2d at 422-23. A
postconviction court may not assess an affiant’s credibility in determining whether a
petitioner is entitled to a hearing. Id. at 423. Credibility determinations may be made only
after an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction petition. Id. at 423-24.
In Andersen, the supreme court addressed an issue similar to the issue raised in this
case. There, the postconviction court summarily concluded that Andersen’s petition for
postconviction relief was untimely because the petition was filed after the two -year time
bar and the allegations in the petition and supporting documents did not satisfy the newly-
discovered-evidence exception. Id. at 422. In reaching this decision, the postconviction
court determined that two supporting affidavits filed by the petitioner were “unreliable”
and “dubious.” Id. The supreme court reversed the postconviction court’s summary denial
and remanded, emphasizing that the supreme court has “repeatedly instructed
postconviction courts that they may not find a postconviction affiant unreliable without
first holding an evidentiary hearing to assess the affiant’s credibility.” Id. at 423.
Similar to Andersen, the postconviction court here denied Cronquist’s petition based
on credibility determinations without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. The
postconviction court’s order includes express credibility determinations, like those which
the supreme court has “admoni[shed].” Id. Here, the postconviction court found that
“Becker’s purported confession, even if coupled by the new Affidavit of witness [D. D.],
does not meet the trustworthy requirement that is needed in order to advance to further
10
proceedings in this matter.” It went on to find that the affidavit of D.D. “has no veracity,”
and further found that
it is troubling that Becker has made this confession at a time
when he is protected by the prohibition of double jeopardy (and
thus has nothing to lose by making the confession), and also at
a time when all indications were that he was feeling hopeless
in life (sitting in jail due to his longstanding meth addiction
persisting).

Because the postconviction court made credibility determinations and did not accept the
allegations in Cronquist’s petition and the supporting documents as true, we conclude the
postconviction court abused its discretion when it summarily denied Cronquist’s petition.
To persuade us otherwise, the state argues that any credibility determinations made
by the postconviction court do not require reversal because “the facts alleged in the
petition . . . taken as true . . . are not legally [sufficient] to show that [Cronquist] meets
either the newly- discovered-evidence or interests of justice exceptions” to the two-year
time bar set forth in section 590.01. But the state does not explain why the facts alleged in
the petition, taken as true, are insufficient to meet either of the statutory exceptions. And,
as discussed above, the postconviction court did not make a determination that Cronquist’s
factual allegations and supporting evidence, if true, did not entitle him to relief. Instead,
the postconviction court’s denial of Cronquist’s petition relies on determinations about the
credibility of Becker’s confession and D.D.’s statement in his affidavit. Relying on those
credibility determinations, the postconviction court concluded that neither exception
applied and summarily denied the petition.
11
Abuse of discretion is a deferential standard, but it is not absolute. State v. Warren,
592 N.W.2d 440, 451 (Minn. 1999). And it does not permit a postconviction court to make
credibility determinations in deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on a petition
for postconviction relief. Instead, the postconviction court must consider the facts alleged
in the postconviction petition as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the
petitioner. Andersen, 913 N.W.2d at 422-23.
We therefore conclude that the postconviction court abused its discretion by
impermissibly weighing the credibility of the facts alleged in Cronquist’s petition and the
supporting documents , without an evidentiary hearing, when it summarily denied
Cronquist’s postconviction petition. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the
postconviction court with specific instructions to: assume that the facts alleged in the
petition and supporting documents are true; construe those facts in the light most favorable
to Cronquist; and then assess whether, under section 590.04, subdivision 1, an evidentiary
hearing is required. See id.
Reversed and remanded.