State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0839

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Dominic Christopher Olson,
Respondent.

Filed April 27, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-24-530

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Kelly Rodgers, Assistant County Attorney,
Hastings, Minnesota (for appellant)

Anders J. Erickson, Johnson Erickson Criminal Defense, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant State of Minnesota challenges the district court’s order granting
respondent Dominic Christopher Olson’s post-verdict motion for a judgment of acquittal
for felony fleeing a peace officer. The state argues that the district court erred by concluding
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that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Olson was given a signal to
stop by a peace officer. Because the evidence is sufficient to prove that Olson was given a
signal to stop, we reverse and remand to the district court for sentencing.
FACTS
A jury found Olson guilty of felony fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle in
violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.487, subdivision 3 (2022). The following
evidence was presented at trial.1
Officer Testimony
Farmington Police Officer Hagfors testified to the following. While on patrol in the
late afternoon of March 15, 2024, Hagfors was driving his squad car north on a road when
he observed two motorcycles approaching him from the opposite direction, traveling south.
The lead motorcycle was white, and the trailing motorcycle was blue. Because they
appeared to be speeding, Hagfors activated his radar and obtained a reading of 77 miles
per hour in the 50-mile-per-hour zone. Hagfors then activated his “red and blue lights
without the strobes” and pulled over onto the right shoulder. As the white motorcycle
passed Hagfors, Hagfors saw its rider, later determined to be Olson, “look back” at him
before accelerating away. Hagfors turned his squad around and drove after the motorcycles.
The rider of the blue motorcycle pulled over to the side of the road, and Hagfors conducted

1 We note that this case was expunged before the appeal period ended. “Expungement” is
the removal of evidence of a court file’s existence from publicly accessible records. Minn.
Stat. § 484.014, subd. 1(1) (2024). In recognition of the expungement, we limit our
description of the evidence to the evidence that is discussed in the parties’ public filings in
this appeal, but we have reviewed the publicly inaccessible records to ensure that our
recitation of the evidence is accurate.
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a traffic stop. During the stop, Olson called the stopped rider and told him that he had
crashed in a school parking lot about three quarters of a mile away and needed help. The
rider informed Hagfors about the crash, and a second officer responded to the parking lot.
Hagfors thereafter also went to the school parking lot. Olson was behind the school in a far
back corner of the lot. When Hagfors asked Olson why he fled, Olson said that he did not
have a reason for fleeing and claimed that he was pulling over for the officer but then
crashed.
The second officer, Officer Hendrickson, testified as follows. Hendrickson heard
Hagfors’s report and responded to the parking lot. Hendrickson found Olson back behind
the school. Olson was out of view from the main road, and he did not wave Hendrickson
down when Hendrickson arrived at the parking lot.
Video Evidence
Hagfors’s dash-camera video was introduced into evidence. The video shows two
motorcycles approaching the squad car from the opposite direction. Hagfors pulls over to
the shoulder. The motorcycles pass, and Hagfors turns his squad car around to follow. He
activates the car’s siren. The lead motorcycle (Olson) disappears from view. The dash -
camera video does not capture whether Olson looked back at Hagfors or whether Hagfors
turned on his emergency lights.
Both officers’ body-worn-camera (BWC) videos were entered into evidence. The
BWC videos only show the officers questioning Olson. When Hendrickson asks why he
fled, Olson says, “I didn’t try to. . . . I was coming over here to stop.” When Hagfors asks
Olson why he fled, he states, “I don’t have a reason.” After being arrested, Olson tells
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Hagfors, “I wasn’t trying to flee from you. . . . The thought was in my mind, but I had
second thoughts and then pulled over.”
Olson’s Testimony
Olson testified in his own defense to the following. As he was speeding down the
road, he saw a fully marked police car driving toward him from the opposite direction.
They passed each other. He did not see the officer’s lights and did not hear a siren. He did
not see his friend pull over, and he tried to turn around when he realized that his friend was
not with him at a stop sign.
After the jury found Olson guilty, Olson filed a motion for judgment of acquittal.
Following a hearing, the district court granted the motion.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
The state argues that the district court erred by granting Olson’s motion for
judgment of acquittal.
Appellate courts review a district court’s decision on a motion for judgment of
acquittal de novo. State v. DeLaCruz, 884 N.W.2d 878, 890 (Minn. App. 2016). “A motion
for judgment of acquittal is properly denied where the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, is sufficient to sustain a conviction.” State v. Simion, 745 N.W.2d
830, 841 (Minn. 2008). In evaluating that question, the reviewing court “assum[es] the jury
believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any contradictory evidence.” State v. Parker,
353 N.W.2d 122, 127 (Minn. 1984).
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Olson was found guilty of felony fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle. The
statute provides that “[w]hoever by means of a motor vehicle flees or attempts to flee a
peace officer who is acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty, and the perpetrator
knows or reasonably should know the same to be a peace officer, is guilty of a felony.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 3. The statute also states that “flee” means to “increase speed,
extinguish motor vehicle headlights or taillights, refuse to stop the vehicle, or use other
means with intent to attempt to elude a peace officer following a signal given by any peace
officer to the driver of a motor vehicle.” Id., subd. 1 (2022).
In granting Olson’s motion for a judgment of acquittal, the district court ruled that
the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Officer Hagfors signaled Olson to
stop his vehicle. The district court determined that, “[b]y the time Officer Hagfors activated
his sirens and pursuit lights—the signal to pull over—[Olson] was nearly out of sight and
there was another vehicle between him and Officer Hagfors.” Therefore, it reasoned, the
signal “cannot be construed to apply to both motorcycles.” And, without a signal, the
district court concluded, Olson did not “flee” under the statute. Accordingly, t he issue
before us is whether the district court erred in determining that the evidence was
insufficient for the jury to conclude that Olson was given a signal.
As an initial matter, we address the standard of review. Both parties apply the
heightened circumstantial-evidence standard in their briefs. Generally, when a conviction
relies on circumstantial evidence, the circumstantial-evidence standard of review applies.
State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Minn. 2010). Olson argues that the only evidence
supporting the giving of the signal was circumstantial. We disagree ; some of the state’s
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evidence was direct, including Officer Hagfors’s testimony that he pulled his squad car to
the shoulder as the speeding motorcycles approached, activated the squad-car emergency
lights, and followed the motorcycles with his siren on. But we need not determine whether
the direct evidence alone is sufficient to prove that a signal was given if the evidence
satisfies the heightened circumstantial-evidence standard. 2 We therefore apply that
standard.
The circumstantial-evidence standard has two steps. Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478. First,
the reviewing court identifies the circumstances proved by “winnow[ing] down the
evidence presented at trial by resolving all questions of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict.”
Id. (quoting State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 600 (Minn. 2017)). Second, the court
considers “whether the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances
proved, when viewed as a whole and not as discrete, isolated facts, ‘are consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other
than guilt.’” Id. (quoting State v. Smith, 9 N.W.3d 543, 565 (Minn. 2024)) (other quotation
omitted). At the second step, no deference is given to the factfinder. Id. at *9.
Beginning with the first step, the circumstances proved here are the following:
• Olson and his friend were driving their motorcycles above the speed limit.

2 We note that the district court applied the direct-evidence standard of review in evaluating
Olson’s post-verdict motion for a judgment of acquittal . In State v. Firkus, the supreme
court held that a district court should apply the direct-evidence standard of review when
considering a motion for judgment of acquittal that is made before the verdict is returned,
even if the evidence is circumstantial. 31 N.W.3d 468, 493 (Minn. 2026). But the supreme
court noted that “applying the [circumstantial-evidence] standard to a post-verdict motion
after briefing may be reasonable.” Id. at 493 n.20. However, it did not decide the issue
since it was unnecessary to resolve that case. Id.
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• Officer Hagfors saw the motorcycles and confirmed with radar that they were
speeding.
• Olson saw Hagfors’s marked squad car driving in the opposite direction toward him.
• Hagfors activated his emergency lights and pulled over onto the right shoulder.
• Olson and his friend passed Hagfors.
• As Hagfors was turning around to follow the motorcycles, he saw Olson look back
at him and then look forward and accelerate.
• After completing his U-turn, Hagfors began following the motorcycles and activated
his siren.3
• Olson disappeared around the bend.
• Olson’s friend pulled over.
• Olson continued driving for three-quarters of a mile and crashed when trying to turn
around behind a school.
• Officers found Olson behind the school and out of view from the main road.
• Olson told officers that he “was coming over here to stop.”
• When asked why he fled, Olson said, “I don’t have a reason.”

3 The district court found that Officer Hagfors activated the lights and the siren
simultaneously after he made the U-turn, which was after Olson passed him on the road.
But Hagfors testified that he activated his lights before Olson passed him. The district
court’s finding fails to view the evidence in the light favorable to the jury’s verdict . See
Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478 (affirming that, in determining circumstances proved, courts
must “resolv[e] all questions of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict”) (quotation omitted).
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• After he was arrested, Olson said, “I wasn’t trying to flee from you. . . . The thought
was in my mind, but I had second thoughts and then pulled over.”
Turning to the second step, we must examine whether these circumstances proved
are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt. See
id. In so doing, we must review the circumstances as a whole and cannot “analyze and
parse each fact in a piecemeal fashion to conclude that a hypothesis is reasonable.” State
v. Lehman, 3 N.W.3d 875, 878-79 (Minn. 2024) (quotations omitted).
Here, the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt. Olson and his friend were
speeding as they approached a marked police car. It is reasonable to infer that Olson saw
that Hagfors had activated his squad car lights and pulled to the side of the road because
Olson looked back at Hagfors as Olson passed him. In addition, Olson accelerated, did not
stop when Hagfors turned around to follow them and activated the siren, and tried to hide
in the school parking lot, claiming that he was trying to pull over. These circumstances are
consistent with a peace officer giving a signal to Olson to stop.
Olson argues that the circumstances proved are not consistent with Hagfors giving
him a signal to stop because Hagfors was driving in the opposite direction and, after he
made a U -turn, was behind the second motorcycle—thus, the activated lights could only
be a signal to Olson’s friend, not to Olson.4 But Olson cites no caselaw limiting a signal to
the closest vehicle, vehicles traveling in the same direction, or vehicles directly in front of
the officer. While many cases undoubtedly do involve an officer signaling while directly

4 The district court adopted this reasoning in its order.
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behind the defendant, Olson points to none that establish this as an affirmative requirement
for a signal under the fleeing statute. And such a requirement would not be consistent with
other caselaw that recognizes the broad significance of emergency lights and sirens in other
contexts. See State v. Bergerson, 659 N.W.2d 791, 795 (Minn. App. 2003) (discussing in
the context of a seizure the inclination for drivers to pull over “until the officer makes it
clear that either the driver is not the target of interest or the driver’s encounter with the
police has come to a conclusion”); Travis v. Collett, 17 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn. 1944)
(discussing an earlier version of Minnesota Statutes section 169.20, subdivision 5(a)
(2022), which requires nearby vehicles to yield and pull over when a vehicle turns on
emergency lights). Olson points to no authority for the proposition that a signal can only
apply to the closest vehicle directly in front of the officer, especially when there are two
drivers traveling together and both are violating the traffic law.
Olson also argues that, even if the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt,
they are also consistent with the alternative reasonable theory that Hagfors signaled to the
friend to stop and not to Olson. But this theory is not reasonable. The squad car lights were
activated when Olson was speeding past the squad car, and Olson accelerated after turning
back and looking at Hagfors. There is no reasonable explanation for Olson’s conduct of
accelerating away from the officer, going behind the school in the parking lot, and then
telling officers he “pulled over” into the parking lot other than that he was given a signal
to stop. Viewing the circumstances proved as a whole, it is not reasonable to conclude that
Hagfors signaled only the driver of the other motorcycle.
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Because the circumstances proved are consistent with Olson being given a signal to
stop and inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis, the district court erred by
granting the motion for judgment of acquittal. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for
sentencing.
Reversed and remanded.