State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0844

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Adam David Walker,
Appellant.

Filed April 13, 2026
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-24-1799

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mitchell S. Sell, Eckberg Lammers, Blaine City Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Max B. Kittel, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of misdemeanor trespassing, arguing that his
conviction should be reversed for insufficient evidence. Because the evidence is sufficient
to sustain the jury’s verdict, we affirm.
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FACTS
In March 2024, appellant Adam David Walker received a citation for misdemeanor
trespass—return to property within one year. A jury trial was then held at which evidence
was presented that on March 12, 2024, law enforcement responded to reports of a trespass
at a veterinary clinic. The clinic is located between a fast -food restaurant and a public
library; the library is on the east side of the clinic, and the restaurant is on the west side of
the clinic. In the rear of the clinic property, where the park ing lot ends, there is an area
with trees and brush that is bordered by a residential area to the north of the clinic.
The clinic is separated from the restaurant by a chain-link fence that ends where the
clinic’s parking lot ends, and the tree line begins. There are also fences between the
residences and the wooded area of the clinic property that lies between the clinic’s parking
lot and the residences. But there is a gap at the tree line between the chain link fence that
separates the clinic and the restaurant and the fences that separate the residential area from
the clinic at the northerly end of the clinic property. The boundary between the clinic and
library does not have a specific demarcation.
When law enforcement arrived at the clinic, the responding officer and clinic owner
approached the wooded area and observed an individual in and around a shelter in the
wooded area behind the clinic. The individual was identified as appellant, and the clinic
owner told appellant that he was not welcome on the clinic property. The clinic owner
testified that he had previously seen appellant camping in the “back” of his property near
the library and told appellant to leave because he was on private property . And law
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enforcement records indicate that appellant had been issued a trespass notice for the clinic’s
property prior to March 12, 2024.
The responding officer spoke with appellant and footage from the officer’s body -
worn camera was admitted into evidence. According to the officer, appellant said that he
thought the property line was the tree line. But the officer testified that, “[b]ased on what
the [clinic owner] told us and using a commercial program called onX” that was o n his
partner’s phone, he was able to confirm that the property line was “[b]ehind the tree line.”
Appellant acknowledged at trial that he built a shelter in the wooded area behind the
clinic. But appellant testified that he did not know the wooded area was the clinic’s
property because he believed the property of the clinic ended where “the fence ended” at
the north edge of the clinic’s parking lot. In fact, appellant claimed that the wooded area
does not belong to the clinic. According to appellant, he has had past encounters with law
enforcement in the area and was never told that any of the wooded area belonged to the
clinic. Appellant claimed that, had he known that the wooded ar ea belonged to the clinic,
he would not have gone on that property.
The jury found appellant guilty as charged. The district court then sentenced
appellant to 90 days in jail, with credit for 90 days. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of
misdemeanor trespassing. To determine whether evidence is sufficient to support a
conviction, this court undertakes “a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether
the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient.”
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State v. Jones , 977 N.W.2d 177, 187 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). We carefully
examine “the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn
from them would permit the factfinder to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Waiters ,
929 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). “We assume that the jury believed
the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Friese , 959
N.W.2d 205, 214 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).
Appellant was convicted of misdemeanor trespass – return to property within one
year, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.605, subd. 1(b)(8) (2022). Under that statute, “[a]
person is guilty of a misdemeanor” if he “intentionally . . . returns to the property of another
within one year after being told to leave the property and not to return, if the actor is without
claim of right to the property or consent of one with authority to consent.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.605, subd. 1(b)(8).
Appellant challenges the intent element of the trespassing offense, arguing that “the
evidence presented at trial does not support that [he] intentionally returned to the . . . clinic
property.” Intent is a state of mind that is “frequently proven with circumstantial
evidence.” State v. Irby , 967 N.W.2d 389, 396 (Minn. 2021); see also State v. Johnson ,
616 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Minn. 2000) (noting that intent is “proved circumstantially, by
inference from words and acts of the actor both before and after the incident”). “A jury is
permitted to infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of their
actions.” Johnson, 616 N.W.2d at 726.
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If a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, appellate courts apply the “long-
standing two-step test” that was recently reaffirmed by our supreme court. See State v.
Firkus, 31 N.W.3d 468, 490 (Minn. 2026). The first step of this test requires this court “to
winnow down the evidence presented at trial by resolving all questions of fact in favor of
the jury’s verdict, which results in a subset of facts that constitute the circumstances
proved.” Id. at 492 (quotations omitted) . In identifying the circumstances proved, the
reviewing court is not permitted “to re -weigh the evidence and sit, in essence, as a 13th
juror.” Id. at 479 (quotation omitted). This step “protects th[e] well -established legal
principle” that “the jury is uniquely positioned to assess witness credibility and weigh the
evidence, and that jurors may accept some parts of a witness’s testimony while rejecting
others.” Id. at 480.
Under the second step of the circumstantial -evidence test, this court examines
“whether the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved, when
viewed as a whole and not as discrete, isolated facts, are consistent with the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Id. at
483. At the second step, we give no deference to the jury ’s verdict. Id. “If the
circumstances proved when viewed as a whole, support a reasonable inf erence that is
inconsistent with guilt, the evidence is not sufficient to support the conviction and we must
reverse.” Id. (quotations omitted). A conviction, however, will not be reversed “‘based on
mere conjecture.’” Id. (quoting State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 861 (Minn. 2008)).
Here, the circumstances proved, which are consistent with the jury’s verdict, are as
follows: (1) appellant had previously been trespassed at the clinic property after he was
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found camping in the back of the clinic property on the side near the library; (2) the clinic
property is bordered by a library to the east, a fast -food restaurant to the west, and a
residential area to the north; (3) the northern edge of the clinic property, between the clinic
parking lot and the residential area, includes a wooded area with trees and brush; (4) there
are fences that separate the residential properties and the clinic property at the north end of
the clinic property in the wooded area; (5) there is no demarcation line between the clinic
and the library and there is a chain link fence that separates the restaurant and clinic
properties that ends at the north edge of the clinic parking lot; (6) the fence separating the
restaurant and clinic does not connect with the fences that separate the residential properties
and the clinic property, leaving a gap at the wood ed area; and (7) appellant had built a
shelter in the wooded area at the north end of the clinic property, and was in or near the
shelter when law enforcement arrived at the scene.
Relying on his own trial testimony, appellant asserts that a circumstance proved by
respondent is that “he did not intend to be on the . . . clinic property” and that he “chose
the spot he did [because] he believed it was not on the . . . clinic property.” But in
identifying the circumstances provided, we must winnow down the evidence presented at
trial “by resolving all questions of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 484. Because
appellant’s testimony related to his intent cannot be resolved in favor of the jury’s verdict,
it is not a circumstance proved. See id. at 486-87 (excluding four discrete facts the
defendant argued should be included in the circumstances proved because the jurors were
required to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence, which includes
evidence contradicting these facts) ; see also State v. Hawes , 801 N.W.2d 659, 670 -71
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(Minn. 2011) (stating that defendant’s testimony that conflicts with the state’s evidence
that supports the verdict is not considered when identifying the circumstances proved).
Having identified the circumstances proved, which excludes appellant’s testimony
that he did not intend to be on the clinic property because he did not believe the wooded
area was part of the clinic property, the next step in our analysis is determining t he
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved. See id. at 483.
Appellant contends that a “rational hypothesis” from the circumstances proved is that he
“did not intend to return to the . . . clinic property” because he was “mistaken in his belief
of where the . . . clinic property line was.” We disagree.
Appellant’s defense at trial was that he did not intend to trespass on the clinic’s
property “because he did not know that the property that he was on belonged to the
veterinary hospital.” And appellant specifically testified in support of this defense. But in
finding appellant guilty of the charged offense, the jury specifical ly found appellant not
credible and rejected his defense. A conclusion that there is a reasonable inference other
than guilt because appellant was mistaken in his belief that he w as not on the clinic’s
property would require us to reweigh the evidence and reassess appellant’s credibility,
which is not our role. See id. at 479 (acknowledging that “our precedent does not permit
[an appellate court] to re-weigh the evidence and sit, in essence, as a 13th juror” (quotation
omitted); see also State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 600 (Minn. 2017) (“As the fact finder,
the jury is in a unique position to determine the credibility of witnesses and weigh the
evidence before it.”) ). The circumstances proved by respondent establish that appellant
intended to trespass on the veterinary clinic property, and there is no rational hypothesis
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other than guilt because the jury specifically rejected appellant’s testimony that he did not
intend to trespass on the clinic property. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to support
appellant’s conviction of misdemeanor trespassing.
Affirmed.