In re the Marriage of: Teresa Marie Nordahl v. Steven Edward Nordahl

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0855

In re the Marriage of:

Teresa Marie Nordahl, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Steven Edward Nordahl,
Appellant.

Filed March 2, 2026
Affirmed
Harris, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-FA-15-263

Kay Nord Hunt, Michelle K. Kuhl, Lommen Abdo, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Ryan Anderson, Anderson Family Law, Golden Valley, Minnesota (for respondent)

Jacob M. Birkholz, Birkholz & Associates, LLC, Mankato, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and

Segal, Judge. ∗

SYLLABUS

Employer contributions to an employee’s Employer Stock Ownership Plan that are

not distributed to the employee do not constitute gross income under Minnesota Statutes

∗
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
section 518A.29(a) (2024) because they are not periodic payments received by the

employee.

OPINION

HARRIS, Judge

In this spousal-maintenance dispute, appellant-husband Steven Edward Nordahl

argues that the district court (1) abused its discretion by failing to consider respondent-wife

Teresa Marie Nordahl’s Employer Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) 1 when calculating her

1
Throughout this litigation, husband has frequently referred to wife’s ESOP as a “stock
option plan.” In the district court order that we reviewed in Nordahl II, the district court
similarly referred to wife’s ESOP as an “Employee Stock Option Plan” in its findings. The
district court’s phrasing was not challenged on appeal, and we therefore used the same
language. Nordahl II, 2024 WL 3565645, at *1. Following remand, however, the district
court filed a preliminary order in which it found that it had “erroneously referred to ESOP
as an Employee Stock Option Plan when it is instead an Employee Stock Ownership Plan”
and directed that the plan thereafter be referred to only as an “Employee Stock Ownership
Plan.” Husband has not challenged that finding and in his briefing in this appeal refers to
the plan as an “Employee Stock Ownership Plan.” It is therefore undisputed that wife’s
ESOP is an “employee stock ownership plan.” We note the differences between employee
stock ownership plans and stock options generally. “An employee stock ownership plan—
an ESOP—is a tax qualified retirement plan for employees that is designed to invest
primarily in employer securities.” 1 Michael J. Canan & Charles C. Shulman, Qualified
Retirement Plans, § 3:23, at 186 (2018). Contributions to a qualified retirement plan, such
as an ESOP, are made by the employer on behalf of the employee participating in the plan.
Canan, supra, § 3:1, at 142. The contributions are held in a trust to accumulate for the
benefit of the employee. Id. In contrast, a stock option is “the right to buy shares of a stock
at a specified price within a specified period of time.” 5A William Meade Fletcher,
Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 2137.30, at 71-72 (perm. ed.,
rev. vol. 2004). Stock options give an employee “the privilege of obtaining shares on a
large scale at less than market price.” Id., at 72. Stock options may be vested or unvested,
matured or unmatured, and restricted or unrestricted. Equitable Distribution of Stock
Options, 17 No. 8 Equitable Distribution Journal 85 (Aug. 2000). These distinctions
generally describe when an employee has the right to exercise an option to purchase stock.
Id. Upon exercise, the stock option is treated as taxable income and reported on the
employee’s W-2. Stock-Purchase Plan Agreement—Notice by Employee of Exercise of
Option, 7 Ill. Forms Legal & Bus. § 20:120 (July 2025).

2
gross income, (2) abused its discretion by failing to consider wife’s ESOP as a financial

resource when calculating the amount of maintenance pursuant to Minnesota Statutes

section 518.552 subdivision 2(a) (2024), and (3) erred in its interpretation of the scope of

remand by failing to reconsider his request to modify spousal maintenance. Because we

conclude that ESOP is not a form of periodic payment under Minnesota Statutes section

518A.29(a), we affirm.

FACTS

Husband and wife separated in December 2013 after being married for

approximately 26 years. In 2014, wife petitioned for dissolution of marriage.

The dissolution was finalized in February 2016 when the district court entered its

dissolution decree. The district court awarded wife transitional (formerly known as

temporary 2) spousal maintenance in the amount of $2,500 per month through December

2028. The district court also awarded wife need-based attorney fees. The district court did

not consider wife’s ESOP in its calculation of gross income in its initial support

determination because wife’s interest in the plan was not vested at the time of trial and

would not fully vest until 2021.

Husband moved for amended findings of fact, arguing that it was unreasonable for

the district court to require him to pay spousal maintenance that would allow wife to

increase her 401(k) contributions, particularly when wife held a vested interest in her ESOP

2
“An award of temporary maintenance issued before August 1, 2024, is deemed
transitional maintenance.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 3 (2024). “An award of permanent
maintenance issued before August 1, 2024, is deemed indefinite maintenance.” Id.

3
that (he asserted) she was guaranteed to receive in the future. In April 2016, the district

court entered an amended dissolution decree revising certain dollar amounts but

determined that even with the amended findings, husband failed to meet his burden to

demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances that rendered his spousal maintenance

obligation unfair or unreasonable. The court did not modify wife’s transitional spousal-

maintenance award of $2,500 per month, payable through December 2028, and reaffirmed

its award of need-based attorney fees.

Nordahl I

Husband appealed the district court’s dissolution decree, challenging the award of

spousal maintenance and attorney fees. Nordahl v. Nordahl, No. A16-1020, 2017 WL

1548617, at *2-4 (Minn. App. May 1, 2017) (Nordahl I), rev. denied (Minn. July 18, 2017).

Husband argued, in relevant part, that the district court erred by failing to include wife’s

employer’s contributions to the ESOP when calculating wife’s gross income. Id. at *3.

Husband asserted that the contributions to wife’s ESOP would increase her income in the

future. Id. This court noted that wife’s “interest in the ESOP was unvested at the time of

trial and [would] not fully vest until 2021.” Id. We affirmed the district court’s decision,

concluding that the district court acted within its discretion by not considering the value of

wife’s interest in the ESOP because “any benefit from the ESOP is contingent on future

events.” Id.

Cost-of-Living Adjustments, Spousal Maintenance, and Attorney Fees

In 2018, wife notified husband that the spousal-maintenance award would be

adjusted for cost of living, consistent with the amended dissolution decree. In 2022, wife

4
again notified husband that the spousal-maintenance award would be adjusted to account

for cost-of-living increases. In response, husband filed a motion requesting that the district

court reduce his spousal-maintenance obligation and discontinue further cost-of-living

adjustments.

Wife moved for need-based attorney fees based on husband’s “much-higher income

level, and conduct-based attorney fees, based on his decision to engage in expensive

litigation and discovery processes on nothing more than his ‘belief ….” In response,

husband filed a motion asking the district court to: (1) reschedule the motion for

modification of spousal maintenance, (2) compel wife to comply with husband’s requests

for discovery, and (3) award husband conduct-based attorney fees based on wife’s failure

to comply with husband’s discovery requests. Husband asserted that he met the standard

for modification of spousal maintenance. He argued that wife’s increase in hourly wages

rendered the existing maintenance award unreasonable and unfair and that wife now had

sufficient resources to meet her needs, justifying adjustment or termination of maintenance.

The district court held a motion hearing. Following the hearing, the district court

directed the parties to submit briefs. In his post hearing brief, husband argued that the court

should treat wife’s ESOP as income or a retirement contribution because it was fully vested

and employer funded. Wife responded that the ESOP is an illiquid retirement asset

inaccessible until retirement after age 59.5 or, absent retirement, age 70.5, and further

asserted that husband had ample resources to pay her attorney fees.

The district court held a second motion hearing. Following the hearing, the district

court filed an order denying both parties’ requests for conduct-based attorney fees. In

5
February 2023, the district court filed an order denying husband’s motion to modify

spousal maintenance and wife’s request for need-based attorney fees. The district court

determined that husband demonstrated that there had neither been a substantial change in

circumstances nor that the award was unfair or unreasonable. Specifically with respect to

wife’s ESOP, the district court determined that wife’s ESOP “is not a liquid asset and will

not be used to calculate her annual gross income.” The district court also concluded that,

although husband had the means to pay wife’s attorney fees, wife also had the means to

pay such fees.

Nordahl II

Husband appealed the district court’s February 2023 order, arguing that the district

court abused its discretion by making clearly erroneous findings regarding wife’s ESOP

not being part of her gross income. Nordahl II, 2024 WL 3565645, at *5. On cross-appeal,

wife argued that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motions for need-

and conduct-based attorney fees. Id. We affirmed the district court’s decision to exclude

wife’s bonuses and overtime from her gross income. Id. at *4-5. But we concluded that

the district court abused its discretion by declining to consider wife’s ESOP in calculating

her gross income. Id. at *5. We reasoned that “[t]he district court did not cite a statutory

or jurisprudential basis for this determination, nor are we aware of one.” Id. Thus, we

determined that the district court “misapplied the law and therefore abused its discretion

by excluding the ESOP from [wife’s] gross income for a reason that lacks legal support.”

Id. We also concluded that the district court erred in denying wife’s motion for need-based

attorney fees because the district court’s finding that wife had the means to pay for her

6
attorney fees was not supported by the evidence. Id. at *6. We reversed and remanded

“for the district court to determine whether the ESOP meets the legal definition of gross

income and, if necessary, to reconsider its resolution of [husband’s] motion to modify

spousal maintenance in light of that determination.” Id. (emphasis added). We also

directed the district court to reconsider wife’s motion for need-based attorney fees if the

district court determined that the ESOP met the legal definition of gross income. Id.

District Court’s 2025 Post-Remand Order

In March 2025, the district court held a motion hearing. Following the hearing, the

district court filed an order clarifying gross income. Quoting Haefele v. Haefele, 837

N.W.2d 703, 710 (Minn. 2013), the district court reasoned: “Periodic means ‘marked by

repeated cycles or happening at regular intervals.’” Based on this definition, the court

found that wife’s ESOP did not meet the legal definition of gross income. The district

court also relied on Lee v. Lee, 775 N.W.2d 631, 638 (Minn. 2009), explaining that “the

term ‘payment’ generally means that a benefit must actually be received by the [party], as

opposed to merely vested or owed, in order to constitute income.” The district court found:

“While [wife] is allowed to take a 25% cash out at a significant tax penalty, she is not

entitled to regular, non-penalized payments. Upon retirement, she is eligible for one lump

sum payment. Currently, [the] ESOP is not a payment to [wife].” The district court also

found that wife’s ESOP “is merely vested or owed to her.” Thus, the district court

concluded that because wife did not receive periodic payments from the ESOP, the ESOP

was not gross income and was properly excluded from wife’s gross income calculations.

The district court also denied husband’s motion to modify spousal maintenance. In light

7
of its ruling and because it had already determined that wife’s ESOP was not gross income,

the district court did not reconsider its previous decision about husband’s spousal

maintenance and wife’s need-based attorney fees.

Husband appeals and wife cross-appeals.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it determined that wife’s ESOP was
not part of her gross income for purposes of calculating spousal maintenance?

II. Did the district court abuse its discretion in its interpretation of the scope of remand
by failing to reconsider husband’s request to modify spousal maintenance?

ANALYSIS

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that wife’s
employer’s contribution to her ESOP was not gross income as defined by
Minnesota Statutes section 518A.29(a).

“District courts have ‘broad discretion regarding spousal maintenance’ and an

award ‘will only be reversed on appeal if the court abused its discretion.’” Honke v. Honke,

960 N.W.2d 261, 265 (Minn. 2021) (quoting Lee, 775 N.W.2d at 637). “A court abuses its

discretion if it makes findings of fact that are not supported by the record, misapplies the

law, or resolves the matter in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts on record.”

Sinda v. Sinda, 949 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Minn. App. 2020) (quotation omitted). “A district

court’s determination of income for maintenance purposes is a finding of fact and is not set

aside unless clearly erroneous.” Peterka v. Peterka, 675 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Minn. App.

2004). “Factual findings are clearly erroneous when they are ‘manifestly contrary to the

weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.’” Sinda,

8
949 N.W.2d at 175 (quoting McConnell v. McConnell, 710 N.W.2d 583, 585 (Minn. App.

2006)).

First, husband argues that the district court misinterpreted Minnesota Statute section

518A.29, contending that the statute permits any type of periodic payment and

unambiguously provides that contributions to retirement benefits are not exempt from

inclusion in the gross-income calculation. Second, husband argues that the district court

clearly erred by considering whether wife could access the ESOP funds because access to

the funds is irrelevant under section 518A.29(a). Lastly, husband argues that the district

court erred by concluding that the ESOP contributions were not “periodic payments.”

Because the interpretation of section 518A.29 is central to our analysis, we first address

husband’s statutory-interpretation argument and then consider whether the district court

erred in its findings that wife’s ESOP was not part of her gross income.

A. Statutory Interpreation

“‘Maintenance’ means an award made in a dissolution or legal separation

proceeding of payments from the future income or earnings of one spouse for the support

and maintenance of the other.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3a (2024). The supreme court

has stated that a district court’s calculation of “income” for purposes of spousal

maintenance under chapter 518 is governed by the definition of “gross income” in Chapter

518A. See Lee, 775 N.W.2d at 643 n.5 (“We conclude that the legislature intended section

518A.29’s definition of gross income to apply to chapter 518, which governs

maintenance.”). Minnesota Statutes section 518A.29(a) provides:

9
 Subject to the exclusions and deductions in this section,
gross income includes any form of periodic payment to an
individual, including, but not limited to, salaries, wages,
commissions, self-employment income under section
518A.30, workers’ compensation, unemployment benefits,
annuity payments, military and naval retirement, pension and
disability payments, spousal maintenance received under a
previous order or the current proceeding, Social Security or
veterans benefits provided for a joint child under section
518A.31, and potential income under section 518A.32.
Salaries, wages, commissions, or other compensation paid by
third parties shall be based upon gross income before
participation in an employer-sponsored benefit plan that allows
an employee to pay for a benefit or expense using pretax
dollars, such as flexible spending plans and health savings
accounts. No deductions shall be allowed for contributions to
pensions, 401-K, IRA, or other retirement benefits.
Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a).
Issues of statutory interpretation present a question of law, which we review de

novo. LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W.2d 14, 18 (Minn. 2012). When

interpreting statutes, this court seeks to “effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Id.;

see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2024). In doing so, we first determine “whether the statute’s

language, on its face, is ambiguous.” In re Welfare of J.P.-S., 880 N.W.2d 868, 871 (Minn.

App. 2016). The statutory language is ambiguous if words are susceptible to more than

one reasonable interpretation. Id. “[W]e give words and phrases their plain and ordinary

meaning” and “read the statute as a whole and give effect to all of its provisions.” Graphic

Commc’ns Loc. 1B Health & Welfare Fund “A” v. CVS Caremark Corp., 850 N.W.2d 682,

689 (Minn. 2014). If the statute is clear, this court enforces its plain meaning. Id. To

determine a statute’s plain meaning, we construe its “words and phrases according to the

10
rules of grammar and their common and approved usage. Jones v. Borchardt, 775 N.W.2d

646, 647 (Minn. 2009); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2024).

Husband argues that the ESOP meets the legal definition of gross income because

the language of Minnesota Statute 518A.29 includes the broad phrase “any form of periodic

payment.” Husband points out that section 518A.29 “explicitly states that ‘contributions

to pensions, 401-K, IRA, or other retirement benefits’ are not exempt from inclusion as

gross income.” To the extent that the district court relied on wife’s ESOP being similar to

retirement benefits as justification for excluding it from her gross income, husband argues

that the district court’s analysis is counter to the plain reading of Minnesota Statute

518A.29. Husband argues that the correct analysis regarding whether wife’s ESOP is a

periodic payment concerns “whether the contributions to wife’s plan are ‘marked by

repeated cycles’ or ‘happening at regular intervals,’ and not whether the distributions from

the plan meet those characteristics.”

Wife argues that, when read as a whole, Minnesota Statutes section 518A.29(a)

describes a step-by-step process. First, the district court must determine a party’s gross

income, which includes deciding whether a payment is a periodic payment. After gross

income is determined, the statute provides that no deductions may be made for

contributions to pensions, 401(k) plans, IRAs, or other retirement benefits. Wife further

argues that the statute is unambiguous in defining gross income as “any form of periodic

payment to an individual.” In wife’s view, the prohibition on deductions applies only after

gross income is calculated and does not control whether a payment is gross income in the

first instance.

11
 The district court concluded that the ESOP did not meet the legal definition of gross

income under section 518A.29(a). The district court relied on the statutory language and

caselaw defining a “periodic payment” as “any form of periodic payment to an individual,”

and defining “periodic” as “marked by repeated cycles or happening at regular intervals.”

See Haefele, 837 N.W.2d at 710. The district court relied on caselaw defining “payment”

to mean “that a benefit must be actually received by the [party], as opposed to merely

vested or owed, in order to constitute income.” Lee, 775 N.W.2d at 638. Based on its

interpretation, the district court found that the ESOP, while regularly funded by her

employer, was not a payment to wife. The district court also found that, upon retirement,

wife would receive ESOP distributions in one lump sum, rather than at regular intervals.

Lastly, the district court found that the ESOP was “merely vested or owed to [wife]”

because wife’s ability to access ESOP funds was “very restricted.” Given its underlying

findings regarding the facts of this case, we agree with the district court’s interpretation of

the statute.

As is relevant to this appeal, Minnesota Statutes section 518A.29(a) can be broken

into four clauses: (1) “Subject to the exclusions and deductions in this

section . . .”; (2) “gross income includes any form of periodic payment to an

individual . . .”; (3) “Salaries, wages, commissions, or other compensation paid by third

parties shall be based upon gross income before participation in an employer-sponsored

benefit plan that allows an employee to pay for a benefit or expense using pretax dollars,

such as flexible spending plans and health savings accounts.”; and (4) “No deductions shall

be allowed for contributions to pensions, 401(k), IRA, or other retirement benefits.”

12
 The first clause—“Subject to the exclusions and deductions in this section”—

modifies the determination of gross income by making it subject to the exclusions and

deductions identified in section 518A.29(a)-(h). The second clause—“gross income

includes any form of periodic payment to an individual”—defines gross income as (1) any

form, (2) of periodic, (3) payment, (4) to an individual. This clause requires the district

court to determine what constitutes gross income. A “payment” generally requires that a

benefit be actually received by the individual, rather than merely vested or owed, to qualify

as income. Haefele, 837 N.W.2d at 710 (citing Lee, 775 N.W.2d at 638). A payment is

“periodic” if it is “marked by repeated cycles or happening or appearing at regular

intervals.” Id. (quotations omitted). The third clause—“Salaries, wages, commissions, or

other compensation paid by third parties shall be based upon gross income before

participation in an employer-sponsored benefit plan that allows an employee to pay for a

benefit or expense using pretax dollars”—addresses how the district court is to calculate

the part of an individual’s gross income attributable to that individual’s compensation for

acting as an employee of a company who provides employer-sponsored benefits using

pretax dollars. The fourth clause—“No deductions shall be allowed for contributions to

pensions, 401(k), IRA, or other retirement benefits” specifies that certain deductions from

employment income-related compensation that are common for other reasons (e.g., income

taxes) are not allowed when calculating “gross income” under chapter 518A.

Read as a whole, the statute directs the district court to first determine whether

receipt of payment constitutes a periodic payment to an individual and therefore qualifies

as gross income. After gross income is determined, the statute provides that no deductions

13
may be taken from that gross income for contributions to pensions, 401(k) plans, IRAs, or

other retirement benefits. Husband’s interpretation of the statute would require this court

to expand the scope of Minnesota Statutes section 518A.29 to include payments made by

an employer to wife’s ESOP as gross income. But husband’s interpretation is counter to

the plain reading of section 518A.29, which contemplates only payment received by an

individual as gross income. Husband provides no authority requiring or suggesting that

wife’s ESOP is an “individual” under Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a). In short, because the plain

and ordinary reading of the statute supports only one reasonable interpretation, the statute

is unambiguous.

We therefore conclude employer contributions to an employee’s ESOP that are not

distributed to the employee do not constitute gross income under Minnesota Statutes

section 518A.29(a) (2024) because they are not periodic payments received by the

employee. Now that we have concluded that an employer’s contribution to an employee’s

ESOP that is not distributed to the employee does not constitute gross income under

Minnesota Statutes section 518.29(a), we turn our analysis to whether the district court

abused its discretion and whether there were sufficient facts in the record to conclude that

wife’s ESOP was not gross income.

B. The district court did not clearly err when it determined that wife’s
ESOP was not part of her gross income.

Husband challenges the district court’s determination that wife’s ESOP was not

gross income under section 518A.29(a). Husband argues that the district court erred by

considering whether the ESOP funds were available to wife because the availability of

14
income received was irrelevant to the analysis under section 518A.29(a). Husband also

asserts that the employer’s ESOP contributions are “periodic payments” because the

contributions themselves are “marked by repeated cycles” or “happening or appearing at

regular intervals.”

“A district court’s determination of income for maintenance purposes is a finding

of fact and is not set aside unless clearly erroneous.” Peterka, 675 N.W.2d at 357. “Factual

findings are clearly erroneous when they are ‘manifestly contrary to the weight of the

evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.’” Sinda, 949 N.W.2d at

175 (quoting McConnell, 710 N.W.2d at 585). When applying the clear-error standard of

review, we (1) consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s

findings, (2) refrain from making our own factual determinations, (3) do not reweigh the

evidence, and (4) do not attempt to reconcile conflicting evidence. See In re Civil

Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021); see also Ewald v.

Nedrebo, 999 N.W.2d 546, 552 (Minn. App. 2023) (citing Kenney in a family-law appeal),

rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2024).

Husband argues that the district court’s gross income analysis “focused entirely” on

whether wife could access her ESOP funds. Relying on Haefele, husband asserts that it

does not matter whether the ESOP was actually available to wife for it to be considered as

gross income under section 518A.29(a). We disagree.

As an initial matter, husband’s argument that the district court solely relied on wife’s

ability to access the ESOP is not supported by the record. The district court considered

several factors to determine whether the ESOP constituted a “periodic payment.” For

15
instance, the district court considered a letter provided by wife’s employer detailing the

nature of the ESOP. The employer explained that wife became eligible for distribution

upon retirement or separation, but that the ESOP plan did not allow for monthly payments.

This finding was also supported by a summary guide of the ESOP plan, which states:

“Payment of your vested [ESOP] account will be made in a single lump sum payment.”

The district court also considered whether any benefit was “actually received by [wife], as

opposed to merely vested or owed.” Haefele, 837 N.W.2d at 710. In the above-mentioned

letter, the employer explained: “The ESOP is not a liquid asset that allows for stock to be

‘cashed in’ at any time.” The employer also noted that wife’s ESOP shares were held in a

trust, and although wife was eligible to diversify 25% of these shares, if wife elected to

cash out her shares before she reached the age of 59.5, she would face tax implications and

an early distribution penalty. After reviewing the evidence, the district court concluded

that, based on the employer’s letter, the ESOP did not meet the definition of gross income.

Additionally, husband’s reliance on Haefele is misguided. Haefele is

distinguishable because that case involves gross income as it relates to self-employment or

operation of a business under Minnesota Statutes section 518A.30 (2012), and here wife is

not relying on section 581A.30 because she is not self-employed, rather, she is relying on

gross income under Minnesota Statutes section 518A.29(a). 837 N.W.2d at 710-11.

Husband also asserts that the ESOP was gross income because the employer’s

regular contributions to the ESOP were “marked by repeated cycles” or “happening or

appearing at regular intervals.” This is an incorrect reading of the statute.

16
 Section 518A.29(a) states that “gross income includes any form of periodic payment

to an individual.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a) (emphasis added). Here, while wife’s

employer regularly funds her ESOP, those payments are held in a trust. The ESOP

contributions are not a payment to wife. Additionally, husband’s reliance on the frequency

of the employer’s contributions ignores the fact that “a benefit must be actually received

by [wife]” to constitute gross income. Haefele, 837 N.W.2d at 710. While the employer

regularly funds the ESOP, wife does not actually receive the benefit of the ESOP until she

becomes eligible for distribution upon retirement or separation from the company. Until

then, wife is merely owed the ESOP contribution.

The district court did not err because the record contains sufficient evidentiary

support for its finding that contributions to wife’s ESOP were not made at regular intervals

and, therefore, are not periodic payments for purposes of calculating gross income.

II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in its interpretation of the scope
of remand when it did not reconsider husband’s request to modify spousal
maintenance.

Husband next argues that the district court misinterpreted the scope of remand by

failing to reconsider his request to modify his spousal-maintenance obligation in light of

wife’s increased earnings. 3 We are not persuaded.

3
Relatedly, husband argues that the district court abused its discretion by “completely
fail[ing] to consider whether [wife’s] ESOP is a financial resource.” Husband argues that
when determining whether a party needs spousal support and the subsequent amount of
spousal support, the court must look at the eight factors articulated in the statute, including
“the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance” pursuant to Minnesota Statute
518.552 subdivision 2(a). This argument was not presented to the district court and was
not raised in Nordahl II, 2024 WL 3565645, at *3. For the first time on appeal, husband
asserted that this matter should be reversed and remanded for additional findings on

17
 “On remand, a district court must execute an appellate court’s mandate strictly

according to its terms and lacks power to alter, amend, or modify that mandate.” State by

Smart Growth Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis, 7 N.W.3d 418, 428 (Minn. App. 2024)

(quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2024). But “[w]hen the [district] court

receives no specific directions as to how it should proceed in fulfilling the remanding

court’s order, the [district] court has discretion . . . to proceed in any manner not

inconsistent with the remand order.” Duffey v. Duffey, 432 N.W.2d 473, 476 (Minn. App.

1988). “Appellate courts review a district court’s compliance with remand instructions

under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.” Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, LLP, 704

N.W.2d 759, 763 (Minn. 2005).

In February 2023, the district court filed an order addressing husband’s request to

stop the cost-of-living adjustments and to modify spousal maintenance. As it relates to

spousal maintenance, the district court denied husband’s motion, concluding that husband

failed to demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances that would render the spousal-

maintenance award as unfair or unreasonable. The district court also concluded that wife’s

ESOP was not a “liquid asset” and would not be used to calculate her annual gross income.”

Husband appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by denying his

motion to modify spousal maintenance because wife no longer needed the financial

whether the ESOP constitutes a financial resource pursuant to Minnesota Statute 518.552
subdivision 2(a). We did not address that argument in Nordahl II, and we decline to address
it here. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (“A reviewing court must
generally consider only those issues that the record shows were presented and considered
by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.” (quotation omitted)).

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support. Husband also asserted that the district court overlooked several relevant factors

when calculating wife’s gross income, including her ESOP.

In Nordahl II, we determined that the district court failed to cite a statutory or

jurisprudential basis for determining that the ESOP must be excluded from wife’s gross

income calculation because it was “not a liquid asset.” 2024 WL 3565645, at *5. We

reasoned that the district court should have made findings about whether the ESOP was a

periodic payment to wife. Id. at *6. Thus, on remand, we instructed “the district court to

determine whether the ESOP meets the legal definition of gross income and, if necessary,

to reconsider its resolution of [husband’s] motion to modify spousal maintenance in light

of that determination.” Id. at *6 (emphasis added).

In its post-remand order clarifying gross income, the district court determined that

the ESOP was not a form of periodic payment to wife and therefore did not constitute gross

income. Because wife’s gross income did not change, the district court concluded that an

adjustment to its spousal-maintenance determination was not warranted.

Husband asserts that the district court neglected to reconsider a modification of

spousal maintenance. But reconsideration was necessary only if the district court

determined that the ESOP met the legal definition of gross income, effectively changing

the district court’s prior order modifying spousal maintenance. Because the district court’s

gross-income determination remained the same, and because we are affirming that ruling,

the district court was not required to revisit whether husband’s spousal-maintenance

obligation should be modified.

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 Accordingly, because the district court’s post-remand order complied with this

court’s remand instructions, we discern no abuse of discretion. 4

DECISION

Because Minnesota Statutes section 518A.29(a) requires the district court to first

determine gross income—defined as a periodic payment to an individual—and only after

gross income is determined provides that no deductions may be taken from that amount for

contributions to pensions, 401(k) plans, IRAs, or other retirement benefits, the district court

did not abuse its discretion in concluding that wife’s ESOP was not gross income. The

district court’s determination is supported by the record and reflects a correct application

of the law. In addition, the district court’s application of our remand instruction in

Nordahl II was not an abuse of discretion.

Affirmed.

4
On cross-appeal, wife argues that if this court modifies husband’s spousal-maintenance
obligation, we must remand the issue of need-based attorney fees, because a potential
decrease in spousal maintenance could impact her ability to pay. Wife’s cross-appeal rests
on the premise that the district court was required to revisit the issue of spousal support on
remand. Because we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court as to the scope of
remand, and affirm, we need not address this argument by wife.

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