

*This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).*

**STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0871**

Rashawn Dyrone Price, Jr., petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

**Filed February 9, 2026
Affirmed
Ede, Judge**

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-8449

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Hannah B. Laub, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mitchell S. Sell, Robbinsdale City Attorney, Eckberg Lammers, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Jesson, Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

EDE, Judge

After a jury trial, appellant was convicted of having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of operating a motor vehicle. Appellant did not file a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence but later petitioned for postconviction relief, seeking a new trial and asserting that his right to equal protection under the United States Constitution was violated when the district court denied his challenge to respondent's exercise of a peremptory strike of a potential juror during selection. In this appeal from the district court's order summarily denying his postconviction petition, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion because (1) the court applied deferential review to its decision to deny appellant's challenge to respondent's peremptory strike and (2) respondent's peremptory strike was motivated by racial discrimination and respondent's proffered explanation for removing the potential juror was pretextual. Because we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in denying appellant's petition for postconviction relief, we affirm.

FACTS

Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Rashawn Dyrone Price Jr. with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision 1(1) (2022), and having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of operating a motor vehicle, in violation of Minnesota

Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision 1(5) (2022).¹ The matter proceeded to a jury trial over three days in November 2023, after which Price was convicted of having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of operating a motor vehicle and acquitted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The district court stayed execution of a 30-day jail sentence and placed Price on probation for two years, subject to certain terms and conditions. Although he did not file a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence, Price later petitioned for postconviction relief, which the state opposed and the district court summarily denied.² The following summary of the undisputed facts relevant to this appeal stems from the district court’s postconviction order, which is consistent with the trial record.

During jury selection, the state exercised peremptory strikes of two potential jurors—Juror 6 and Juror 1—each of whom identified as a racial minority. Price objected, contending that the state’s use of two of its three peremptory strikes to remove potential jurors from racial minority groups was improper under *Batson v. Kentucky*, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).³

¹ Although the state also charged Price with additional crimes relating to the underlying incident, the state later dismissed those charges under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 30.01.

² The same district court judge who presided over Price’s jury trial also considered and summarily denied Price’s postconviction petition.

³ In *Batson*, the United States Supreme Court held that “the State’s privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory challenges[] is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause,” which “forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race.” 476 U.S. at 89 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court has explained

As to Juror 6, the state responded to Price’s *Batson* challenge by explaining that it had exercised a peremptory strike “because Juror 6 ‘was on her phone for much of the duration of voir dire and [the state believed] . . . that she [might] not pay attention during trial.’” The district court determined that “this was an adequate, race-neutral reason to exercise the challenge,” and Price ultimately withdrew his *Batson* objection regarding Juror 6.

In response to Price’s *Batson* challenge concerning Juror 1—“who had reported during voir dire that they were ‘excited to be part of the process’ of jury duty, had always wanted to go through the experience, and ‘I like – watch [sic] TV crime shows’”—the state asserted that it had exercised a peremptory strike “because the [potential] juror was excited to be on the jury” and “people who are eager to be on the jury tend to read into things too much.” Referring to convictions for driving while impaired (DWI), the state also

the three-step test for evaluating a challenge to the use of peremptory strikes under *Batson* as follows:

. . . [O]nce the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step one), the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step two). If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful discrimination.

Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 7(3) (codifying the three-step *Batson* peremptory challenge process). Effective March 1 and July 1, 2025, Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.02 was amended. Because these amendments were not effective at the time the district court considered and ruled on Price’s objections to the state’s use of its peremptory strikes during the November 2023 trial, our citations to rule 26.02 herein refer to the version of the rule in existence before the 2025 amendments became effective.

maintained that it sought to remove Juror 1 because she “stated that her husband ha[d] two DWIs.” Price countered that “leaving white persons on the jury panel who may have friends or relatives with [DWI] history rendered the state’s reason a non-race-neutral one.” The state replied by pointing to “a ‘notable difference’ in the lack of statements [by Juror 1] taking accountability or agreement with the [DWIs],” by “specifically compar[ing] the voir dire of Juror 1 with that of at least two other jurors who had expressed remorse for their own alcohol-related offenses,” and by “reiterat[ing] its concerns about a potential juror being ‘eager’ to be on a jury.”

The district court denied Price’s *Batson* challenge as to Juror 1, finding that the state’s “primary reason” for exercising the peremptory strike was that Juror 1 had expressed an “excitedness to be here, which was in contrast to many if not most of . . . the [potential] jurors [who] were here.” And the district court cited the state’s explanation that Juror 1’s excitedness “was something different” that the state was “entitled to consider[,] . . . as long as it’s not an inappropriate reason.” The district court therefore determined that Price “had not proven purposeful discrimination and [had] not established that the race-neutral reasons given by the state were pretextual or that the real reason for the strike was based on Juror 1’s race.”

In his postconviction petition, Price requested that the district court grant him a new trial based on his claim that “his constitutional right to equal protection was violated when the . . . court wrongly denied his *Batson* challenge at trial.”

As mentioned above, the district court summarily denied Price’s petition. In its postconviction order, the district court quoted the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in

State v. Harvey for the proposition that “[a]ppellate courts afford great deference to a district court’s *Batson* ruling because the record may not reflect all of the relevant circumstances that the court may consider.” 932 N.W.2d 792, 811 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).

The district court determined that its “discussion on the record of its ruling did not elaborate on the first *Batson* factor,” but noted that “[a]nalyzing a *Batson* challenge focuses on factors two and three when the district court proceeded to address them.”

As to step two of the *Batson* analysis, the district court ruled that “the record does not indicate the court erred at trial” because the state had “proffered a race-neutral explanation”: Juror 1’s “degree of expressed eagerness to participate in jury duty.” The district court observed that, “[w]hether the State’s reason is persuasive is irrelevant, as they fulfilled their burden of production to provide a race-neutral explanation.”

And on step three, the district court determined that Price “did not demonstrate the state’s reason was a pretext for racial discrimination” because “[t]here are no facts on record compelling an inference of racial discrimination, and the State’s justification for its decision sufficiently supports the Court’s initial ruling on . . . [Price’s] *Batson* defense.” The district court noted that “demeanor can be [a] valid, race-neutral explanation[] for a peremptory strike” and that it had “considered what the [potential] juror stated and the way they expressed themselves about it.” And the district court decided that the state’s election to strike Juror 1, who had “exhibited and expressed a noteworthy distinct demeanor and attitude about being on a jury,” along with “the nature of the description of the [potential] juror’s family member’s DWI history,” did not result in “an explanation so implausible or

fantastical that it suggest[ed] a pretext.” In addition, the district court quoted *Harvey*, 932 N.W.2d at 811 (quotation omitted), in stating that,

[e]ven if . . . [it] could have reached a different impression by finding the state’s reason to be a pretext for racial discrimination, . . . [Price] ha[d] not demonstrated from the record that the court committed clear error overcoming the “great deference” it is granted when reviewing a *Batson* challenge by reaching a different result than that advocated by [Price].

Price appeals.

DECISION

Price contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his petition for postconviction relief because (1) the court applied deferential review to its decision to deny his *Batson* challenge and (2) the state’s peremptory strike was motivated by racial discrimination and its proffered explanation for removing the potential juror was pretextual.

Our review of a postconviction proceeding is limited to determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the findings of the postconviction court. *Scruggs v. State*, 484 N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn. 1992). A “postconviction proceeding is a collateral attack on a judgment which carries a presumption of regularity and which, therefore, cannot be lightly set aside.” *State ex rel. Gray v. Tahash*, 156 N.W.2d 228, 229 (Minn. 1968) (footnote omitted). Appellate courts “review a [district] court’s summary denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion.” *Andersen v. State*, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422 (Minn. 2018). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when it has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of

the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” *Ries v. State*, 920 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts review the district court’s “legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error.” *Rhodes v. State*, 875 N.W.2d 779, 786 (Minn. 2016).⁴

As noted above, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in *Batson* “articulated a three-step process for courts to follow in assessing whether a peremptory strike runs afoul of equal protection principles.” *State v. Lufkins*, 963 N.W.2d 205, 209 (Minn. 2021) (citing *Batson*, 476 U.S. at 96–98) (other citation omitted); *see also* Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 7(3)(a)–(c). “[C]larity at each step of the *Batson* analysis is important because the objecting party has the burden of proving a prima facie case, the proponent has the burden of production of a race-neutral explanation, and the objecting party has the ultimate burden of proving pretext and discriminatory intent.” *Harvey*, 932 N.W.2d at 811 (quotation omitted). “[G]enerally[,] a district court should make its rulings sequentially at the conclusion of its consideration of each prong, including whether the challenger has established a prima facie case, before considering prongs two and three.” *State v. Onyelobi*, 879 N.W.2d 334, 347 n.11 (Minn. 2016).

⁴ A district court must hold an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction petition “[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2024). “In determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required, a [district] court considers the facts alleged in the petition as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the petitioner.” *Andersen*, 913 N.W.2d at 422–23 (quotation omitted). In this appeal, Price does not challenge the district court’s decision to decide his postconviction petition without affording him an evidentiary hearing.

More specifically, “[a]t step one, the party objecting to a peremptory strike has the burden to make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination” by establishing “that one or more members of a racial group have been peremptorily excluded from a jury and that the circumstances of the case raise an inference that the exclusion was based on race.” *Lufkins*, 963 N.W.2d at 209 (citation and quotation omitted).

When an “objecting party makes the required prima facie showing” at the first step, the court’s analysis proceeds to the second step, at which “the burden shifts to the striking party to articulate a race-neutral explanation for exercising the peremptory challenge.” *Id.* at 209–10 (quotation and citation omitted). Although the proffered explanation at the second step “must be related to the particular case to be tried,” as well as “clear and reasonably specific,” it need not be “persuasive, or even plausible,” and it “does not . . . have to be valid in the sense of establishing a reasonable basis for a strike.” *Id.* at 210, 211 (quotations omitted). Courts deem the proffered reason to be “race-neutral unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation.” *Id.* at 210 (quotation omitted).

At the third step, “the district court must determine whether the objecting party has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination” by showing “that the peremptory challenge was motivated by racial discrimination and that the striking party’s proffered explanation was merely a pretext for the discriminatory motive.” *Id.* (quotations omitted). “The objecting party ultimately carries the burden of persuasion to demonstrate the existence of purposeful discrimination; this burden never shifts from the opponent of the peremptory challenge.” *Id.* (quotation omitted).

As the district court observed in its postconviction order, “[a] district court’s ruling on a *Batson* challenge receives great deference because the record may not reflect all of the relevant circumstances that the court may consider.” *Harvey*, 932 N.W.2d at 811 (quotations and citation omitted). While appellate courts will not ordinarily reverse a district court’s *Batson* determination “unless it is clearly erroneous,” appellate courts “examine the record without deferring to the district court’s analysis” when “the district court makes its determinations using the wrong legal standard.” *Id.* (quotations and citations omitted).

The Minnesota Supreme Court has explained, however, that a district court’s failure to rule sequentially at the conclusion of each step of the *Batson* analysis does not require appellate courts to alter the usual deferential standard of review when the district court does not conflate the legal standards for each step. *Onyelobi*, 879 N.W.2d at 347 n.11; *see also Harvey*, 932 N.W.2d at 811 (citing *Onyelobi* for this principle). And we have held that “a district court’s failure to exactly follow the three-step process for analyzing a *Batson* challenge is not a *Batson* violation” and that “[a] district court’s failure to articulate the *Batson*-challenge analysis according to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 7(3) may be harmless error.” *State v. Rivers*, 787 N.W.2d 206, 211–12 (Minn. App. 2010) (citation omitted), *rev. denied* (Minn. Oct. 19, 2010).

With these legal standards in mind, we address each of Price’s contentions in turn.

I. The district court acted within its discretion in reviewing its decision to deny Price's *Batson* challenge.

Price asserts that the district court abused its discretion by applying deferential review to its own *Batson* ruling. He maintains that, because the district court did not make a ruling at each step of the *Batson* analysis when it denied Price's challenge during jury selection, neither the district court nor this court may apply a deferential standard of review. For two reasons, this argument is unavailing.

First, the district court's explanation of its primary bases for denying Price's postconviction petition establishes that it "examine[d] the record without deferring to [its] analysis" in rejecting Price's *Batson* challenge during jury selection. *Harvey*, 932 N.W.2d at 811 (quotations and citations omitted). In its postconviction order, the district court reviewed the record as to all three steps of the *Batson* peremptory challenge process and made determinations on each step that do not reflect deferential review. While the district court did quote the appellate "great deference" standard set forth in *Harvey*, the court only cited *Harvey* and referenced deference in its alternative reasoning on step three of the *Batson* analysis. *Id.* (quotation omitted). Indeed, the district court established that reasoning as alternative by prefacing it with the clause, "[e]ven if the court could have reached a different impression by finding the state's reason to be a pretext for racial discrimination," before quoting *Harvey*, 932 N.W.2d at 811 (quotation omitted), in stating its auxiliary determination that Price had "not demonstrated from the record that the court committed clear error overcoming the 'great deference' it is granted when reviewing a *Batson* challenge by reaching a different result than that advocated by [Price]."

Second, the district court’s alternative reasoning applying deferential review to step three of the *Batson* analysis was not improper. Price mainly relies on the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in *State v. Pendleton*, 725 N.W.2d 717, 727 (Minn. 2007),⁵ for the proposition that, “[w]hen a district court does not make a ruling at each step in the process, the reviewing court must examine the record without deferring to the district court’s analysis.” Although the supreme court did refrain from applying deferential review in *Pendleton*, in which “the district court [had] collapsed the *Batson* analysis into one step,” 725 N.W.2d at 727, the supreme court later distinguished *Pendleton* in *Onyelobi*, in which “the district court did not conflate the three prongs so as to obscure its discrete analysis of each prong,” such that the supreme court did not need to alter the usual deferential standard of review, 879 N.W.2d at 347 n.11. Thus, while the supreme court in *Onyelobi* “reaffirm[ed] that . . . the optimal procedure” is for district courts to rule sequentially at the conclusion of their consideration of each step in the *Batson* peremptory challenge process, the supreme court did not forbid deferential review when a discrete analysis of each prong is apparent from the record. 879 N.W.2d at 347 n.11.

The district court’s postconviction order described the court’s discrete analysis at the third step of the *Batson* process in rejecting Price’s challenge to the state’s exercise of

⁵ Price also cites our decision in *State v. Seaver*, 820 N.W.2d 627, 633 (Minn. App. 2012) (declining to apply deferential review because “the district court did not follow *Batson* precedent or procedure when it did not rule at each step of the *Batson* analysis” (citing *Pendleton*, 725 N.W.2d at 725–26)). For the same reasons as expressed below concerning our analysis of *Pendleton*, we conclude that Price’s reliance on *Seaver* is unconvincing.

the peremptory strike to Juror 1 during jury selection.⁶ As to the third step—whether Price had “carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination” by showing “that the peremptory challenge was motivated by racial discrimination and that the . . . [state’s] proffered explanation was merely a pretext for the discriminatory motive,” *Lufkins*, 963 N.W.2d at 210 (quotations omitted)—the district court found that the state’s explanation that Juror 1’s excitedness “was something different” that the state was “entitled to consider[,] . . . as long as it’s not an inappropriate reason,” and that Price “had not proven purposeful discrimination and [had] not established that the race-neutral reasons given by the state were pretextual or that the real reason for the strike was based on Juror 1’s race.” Thus, consistent with *Onyelobi* and under the unique circumstances of this case, the district court did not base its ruling on an erroneous view of the law by applying deferential review in its alternative reasoning on step three of the *Batson* analysis.⁷ See *Ries*, 920 N.W.2d at 627.

We therefore conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in reviewing its decision to deny Price’s *Batson* challenge.

⁶ Here, we focus our analysis on the third *Batson* step because that was the only step at which the district court applied deferential review in its order denying Price’s petition for postconviction relief.

⁷ For the reasons discussed in section II, below, even if the district court did abuse its discretion by applying deferential review in its alternative reasoning on step three, we would conclude that it was harmless error. See *Rivers*, 787 N.W.2d at 211–12 (concluding that “the district court did not err by denying the *Batson* challenge in this case and that failure to strictly follow the rules was harmless error”).

II. The district court acted within its discretion in denying Price’s postconviction petition.

Price asserts that the district court abused its discretion in denying his postconviction petition because the state’s peremptory challenge was motivated by racial discrimination and the state’s proffered explanation was clearly pretextual. We discern no abuse of discretion by the district court on these bases. Although the district court’s rejection of Price’s *Batson* challenge during jury selection is accorded “great deference” and ordinarily not subject to reversal “unless it is clearly erroneous,” we need not rely on that deference to affirm the district court’s postconviction order given the record before us. *Harvey*, 932 N.W.2d at 811 (quotations and citations omitted).

The district court acknowledged in its postconviction order that its “discussion on the record of its ruling did not elaborate on the first *Batson* factor.” But the district court acted within its discretion in determining that “[a]nalyzing a *Batson* challenge focuses on factors two and three when the district court proceeded to address them.” By addressing the second and third steps of the *Batson* analysis, the district court implicitly determined that Price had met his “burden to make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination” by establishing “that one or more members of a racial group [had] been peremptorily excluded from [the] jury and that the circumstances of the case raise[d] an inference that the exclusion was based on race.” *Lufkins*, 963 N.W.2d at 209 (citation and quotation omitted); *see also Rivers*, 787 N.W.2d at 211 (observing that “the district court implicitly determined that [the defendant] had established a prima facie case by asking the prosecutor whether he could articulate a race-neutral reason for the strike after [the defendant] asserted the

challenge based on the prosecutor’s strike of the only African American on the jury panel”). Consistent with the Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis in *Lufkins*, we “do not consider step one further,” given that any “question as to step one is moot on appeal because the district court proceeded to steps two and three of the analysis.” 963 N.W.2d at 210 (citations omitted).

On step two of the *Batson* analysis, the district court acted within its discretion in determining in the postconviction order that “the record does not indicate the court erred at trial” because the state had “proffered a race-neutral explanation”: Juror 1’s “degree of expressed eagerness to participate in jury duty.” When it denied Price’s *Batson* challenge during jury selection, the district court found that the state’s “primary reason” for exercising the peremptory strike was that Juror 1 had expressed an “excitedness to be here, which was in contrast to many if not most of . . . the [potential] jurors [who] were here.”

The state’s proffered reason—which included its “belief that, ‘in general, people who are eager to be on the jury tend to read into things too much’”—was a “clear,” “reasonably specific,” and “race-neutral explanation for exercising the peremptory challenge” that was “related to the particular case to be tried.” *Id.* (citation and quotations omitted). This is because there is no “discriminatory intent . . . inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation” concerning Juror 1’s desire to serve on the jury in this matter. *Id.* (quotation omitted). And because, at the second step, the state’s proffered explanation did not need to be “persuasive, or even plausible,” and did “not . . . have to be valid in the sense of establishing a reasonable basis for a strike,” *id.* (quotations omitted), the district court did not abuse its discretion by observing in the postconviction order that, “[w]hether the State’s

reason is persuasive is irrelevant, as they fulfilled their burden of production to provide a race-neutral explanation.”

We reach the same conclusion about the district court’s determination in the postconviction order that, on step three, Price “did not demonstrate the state’s reason was a pretext for racial discrimination” because “[t]here are no facts on record compelling an inference of racial discrimination, and the state’s justification for its decision sufficiently supports the court’s initial ruling on . . . [Price’s] *Batson* defense.” During jury selection, the district court denied Price’s *Batson* challenge based on its finding that state’s explanation that Juror 1’s excitedness “was something different” that the state was “entitled to consider[,] . . . as long as it’s not an inappropriate reason,” and that Price “had not proven purposeful discrimination and [had] not established that the race-neutral reasons given by the state were pretextual or that the real reason for the strike was based on Juror 1’s race.”

In its postconviction order, the district court properly noted that “demeanor can be [a] valid, race-neutral explanation[] for a peremptory strike.” *See id.* (observing that “demeanor can be [a] valid, race-neutral explanation[] for a peremptory strike (citations omitted)); *see also Snyder v. Louisiana*, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008) (“[R]ace-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges often invoke a juror’s demeanor . . .”). The district court also appropriately considered “what the [potential] juror stated and the way they expressed themselves about it.” *See Snyder*, 552 U.S. at 477 (noting that, when a juror’s demeanor is offered as the basis for a peremptory strike, “the trial court’s firsthand observations [are] of even greater importance” and the court “must evaluate . . . whether the juror’s demeanor can credibly be said to have exhibited the basis for the strike attributed to the juror by the

prosecutor”). And we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s postconviction ruling that the state’s decision to strike Juror 1 based on the potential juror’s exhibition and expression of “a noteworthy distinct demeanor and attitude about being on a jury” did not render the state’s proffered explanation “so implausible or fantastical that it suggest[ed] a pretext.” Given this record, we cannot say that the district court’s postconviction order reflects an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion, an erroneous view of the law, or clearly erroneous factual findings in determining that Price had not “carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination” by showing “that the peremptory challenge was motivated by racial discrimination and that the . . . [state’s] proffered explanation was merely a pretext for the discriminatory motive.”⁸ *Lufkins*, 963 N.W.2d at 210 (quotations omitted); *see also Ries*, 920 N.W.2d at 627.

⁸ Steps two and three of the *Batson* analysis require evaluation of “a race-neutral explanation for exercising the peremptory challenge.” *Lufkins*, 963 N.W.2d at 209–10 (emphasis added) (quotations and citation omitted). Price has cited no authority requiring appellate courts to evaluate more than one race-neutral explanation in cases concerning multiple proffered reasons for a peremptory strike, and we are aware of none. *Cf. Pendleton*, 725 N.W.2d at 725 n.4 (declining to analyze a basis for a peremptory strike by the state that the district court considered but the state did not offer as a race-neutral reason for the strike). In *Lufkins*, the supreme court explained that “*Snyder* requires that the district court clearly state which of the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral reasons it found to be credible enough to withstand the *Batson* objection.” 963 N.W.2d at 213. The district court’s postconviction order clearly establishes that the court found both of the state’s proffered explanations—Juror 1’s excitedness to serve on the jury and her statements about her husband’s DWIs—to be sufficiently credible for purposes of *Batson*. But because we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in denying Price’s postconviction petition based on its determinations as to the state’s proffered explanation about Juror 1’s “expressed eagerness to participate in jury duty”—the explanation that the court primarily addressed in the “Analysis” section of the postconviction order—we decline to address Price’s arguments about the state’s additional proffered explanation concerning Juror 1’s statements about her husband’s DWIs.

Consequently, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in denying Price's postconviction petition.

Affirmed.