Mathew Paul Crow v. State of Minnesota

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0872

Mathew Paul Crow, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Appellant.

Filed April 6, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Harris, Judge

Redwood County District Court
File Nos. 64-CR-22-667, 64-CR-22-682

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrew J. Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Shannon Ness, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and Bond, Judge.

SYLLABUS

When a defendant challenges an impermissible consecutive sentence imposed as

part of an agreed-upon sentence in a plea agreement, and a guidelines sentence would alter

the benefit of the bargain, the district court may consider a motion to withdraw from the

plea agreement and is not required to impose a guidelines sentence.
 OPINION

HARRIS, Judge

In this prosecution appeal from the district court’s order granting respondent’s

postconviction petition, appellant argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion

by vacating a sentence that was negotiated as part of the plea agreement when no

compelling or substantial circumstances were articulated to support an upward departure.

Relying on the supreme court’s decisions in Lewis, Coles, and Johnson, appellant argues

that the district court should have considered its motion to withdraw from the plea

agreement instead of concluding that the only remedy was to impose a guidelines sentence.

State v. Lewis, 656 N.W.2d 535, 539 (Minn. 2003); State v. Coles, 862 N.W.2d 477, 481

(Minn. 2015); Johnson v. State, 877 N.W.2d 776, 779 (Minn. 2016). Because the district

court concluded, based on an erroneous view of the law, that imposition of a guidelines

sentence was the only available remedy and that it was not allowed to entertain

respondent’s motion to withdraw from the plea agreement, after the defendant challenged

an impermissible consecutive sentence imposed as part of an agreed-upon sentence in a

plea agreement, we reverse the postconviction order and remand for further proceedings

not inconsistent with this opinion.

FACTS

On October 18, 2022, appellant State of Minnesota charged respondent Mathew

Paul Crow with 24 counts of felony possession of pornographic works involving minors

by a registered predatory offender, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 617.247,

subdivision 4(b) (2018). The complaint alleged that in September 2019, law enforcement

2
located cellphones in Crow’s possession containing several pornographic works involving

minors.

On October 25, 2022, in a separate complaint, the state charged Crow with an

additional 24 counts of felony possession of pornographic works involving minors under

the same statute. The second complaint alleged that in June 2020, law enforcement located

a tablet in Crow’s possession containing several pornographic videos, images, and searches

for similar material.

In February 2023, the parties reached a plea agreement. Crow agreed to plead guilty

to count one in the first file and three counts in the second file. The parties agreed that

Crow would receive consecutive 100-, 84-, 18-, and 18-month executed prison sentences

for a total sentence of 220 months. In exchange for Crow’s guilty pleas, the state agreed

to dismiss the remaining 44 counts in both complaints. In March 2023, Crow pleaded

guilty to all four counts charged, and the district court accepted Crow’s pleas.

At the sentencing hearing, the district court imposed consecutive sentences as

agreed upon by the parties. Specifically, the district court imposed a 100-month executed

prison sentence in the first file based on a criminal-history score of six points. And in the

second file, the district court imposed an 84-month sentence on count one, using a criminal-

history score of seven points, which is the middle of the presumptive range, and two

consecutive 18-month sentences on the remaining two counts, using a criminal-history

score of zero. 1 Both the district court and the parties mistakenly believed that Minnesota

1
Under Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 2.F.2.b, “the court must use a Criminal History
score of 0, or the mandatory minimum for the offense, whichever is longer, to determine

3
Sentencing Guidelines 2.F.2.b, did not apply to separate sentences involving multiple

victims.

Because 84 months was within the presumptive guidelines sentence for a person

with a criminal-history score of seven, the district court did not make any findings on

aggravating factors or state any reasons for an upward departure on the record. The district

court dismissed the remaining charges in both files pursuant to the agreement.

In May 2024, Crow filed a postconviction petition, arguing that the 84-month

consecutive sentence constituted an unlawful aggravated departure. 2 Crow argued that the

only appropriate remedy was to vacate his 84-month sentence and impose the presumptive

guidelines sentence of 18 months, reducing his total sentence from 220 months to 154

months. The state conceded that, based on a mutual mistake of law, the failure to use a

criminal-history score of zero when calculating Crow’s sentence constituted an unlawful

departure from the sentencing guidelines. But the state argued that because Crow’s

challenge implicated the plea agreement, the appropriate remedy was to set the matter for

resentencing, at which the court could consider whether to allow the state to withdraw from

the agreement and move forward to trial.

The postconviction court granted Crow’s petition for postconviction relief, in part,

reasoning that because the state agreed to dismiss over 90% of the charges against Crow

as part of the plea agreement, Crow’s conviction and sentencing were interrelated. Quoting

the presumptive duration. A consecutive sentence at any other duration is a departure.”
Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.F.2.b (Supp. 2019).
2
Crow did not file a direct appeal.

4
the supreme court’s decision in Lewis, 656 N.W.2d at 539, the postconviction court noted

that “when a defendant successfully challenges an agreed-upon sentence that has been

negotiated as part of a plea agreement, ‘the district court should be free to consider the

effect that changes in the sentence have on the entire plea agreement.’” Ultimately, the

postconviction court concluded that by challenging his sentence, Crow implicated the plea

agreement. The postconviction court set the matter for a hearing. The state moved to

withdraw from the plea agreement. Crow appealed the order setting a hearing and we

dismissed Crow’s appeal, reasoning that the postconviction court’s order was not a final

appealable order because the district court had not denied Crow’s petition.

At the hearing, Crow argued that the proper remedy for an unlawful departure from

the sentencing guidelines was for the court to impose a guidelines sentence. He referenced

Williams v. State, 361 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1985), and argued that the general rule is

that if no reasons for departure are stated on the record at the time of sentencing, a departure

is not allowed. Crow noted that Williams failed to identify an appropriate remedy, resulting

in appellate courts inconsistently applying different remedies on remand. He also pointed

out that some appellate court decisions have directed the district court to consider the effect

on the plea agreement and later motions for plea withdrawals, while other appellate court

decisions have directed the district court to remand for imposition of a guidelines sentence.

Crow urged the postconviction court to remand for imposition of the guidelines sentence

following State v. Geller, 665 N.W.2d 514 (Minn. 2003), and its subsequent line of cases.

By contrast, the state asserted that the appropriate remedy was for the court to

consider its motion to withdraw from the plea agreement. It argued that the court should

5
follow Lewis and its subsequent line of cases, which permits the court to consider the entire

plea agreement. 656 N.W.2d at 539; see also Coles, 862 N.W.2d at 481; Johnson, 877

N.W.2d at 779. The state maintained that by challenging his sentence, Crow “repudiated

the terms of his plea agreement,” forcing the state to “disgorge the benefit of its bargain.”

The postconviction court issued an order granting Crow’s petition for

postconviction relief and set the matter for a sentencing hearing. The postconviction court

“[signaled] its intention to vacate [Crow’s] 84-month sentence on Count 1 in [the first file]

and intention to impose an executed consecutive 18-month sentence in its place.” The

postconviction court ultimately found the Geller line of cases more persuasive and agreed

with Crow’s argument. And the postconviction court expressed concern over possible

double-jeopardy implications if it granted the state’s request to withdraw from the plea

agreement and retry Crow on the original charges. The state appeals.

ISSUES

I. Did the postconviction court abuse its discretion by concluding that the only remedy
available in this case was the imposition of a guidelines sentence?

II. Would allowing the postconviction court to consider the state’s motion to withdraw
from the plea agreement and proceed to trial be improper under the Double Jeopardy
Clause?

ANALYSIS

I. The postconviction court abused its discretion when it concluded that the only
remedy available in this case was the imposition of a guidelines sentence.

The state argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion in granting

Crow’s petition for postconviction relief and concluding that a guidelines sentence was the

6
only available remedy when a challenge to a sentence imposed as part of a plea agreement

implicates more than the sentence itself.

We review a postconviction court’s decision to grant postconviction relief for an

abuse of discretion. Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017) (quotation

omitted). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when it has exercised its discretion

in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or

made clearly erroneous factual findings.” Id. (quotation omitted). We review the

postconviction court’s resolution of questions of law de novo, “but our review of factual

issues is limited to whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the

postconviction court’s findings.” Id. (quotation omitted).

The district court must impose a sentence within the applicable range, unless there

are “identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines

2.D.1 (Supp. 2019). “If the court imposes a departure from the sentencing guidelines, the

court must make findings of fact supporting the departure.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03,

subd. 4(c). “If no reasons for departure are stated on the record at the time of sentencing,

no departure will be allowed.” Williams, 361 N.W.2d at 844.

Because the parties disagree on the appropriate remedy, we begin by reviewing the

supreme court decisions in Lewis, Geller, Coles, and Johnson. We then review whether

Geller implicitly overruled Lewis. Next, we review our opinions in Rannow, Amundson,

and Arola Johnson, to determine whether they are inconsistent with later supreme court

authority in Lewis, Coles, and Johnson. State v. Rannow, 703 N.W.2d 575 (Minn. App.

2005); State v. Amundson, 828 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. App. 2013); State v. Arola Johnson,

7
999 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. App. 2023). We then discuss why Amundson and Arola Johnson

involve materially different circumstances than the circumstances before us. Next, we

consider whether Rannow is distinguishable from the facts before us, concluding that it is

not. And to the extent that our decision in Rannow conflicts with Lewis, Coles, and

Johnson, we conclude that the supreme court in Johnson and Coles implicitly overruled

Rannow. Finally, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in granting

Crow’s postconviction petition because it erroneously determined that it was not allowed

to entertain the state’s motion to withdraw from the plea agreement where the challenge to

a sentence imposed as part of a plea agreement implicated more than the sentence.

A. Review of Minnesota Supreme Court decisions in Lewis, Geller, Coles,
and Johnson.

We begin with a review of the supreme court’s decisions in Lewis, Geller, Coles,

and Johnson.

In Lewis, the supreme court considered whether, on remand, a district court may

reconsider the conviction component of a plea agreement if it finds that there is no support

for a departure from the sentencing guidelines for the sentencing component of the plea

agreement. 656 N.W.2d at 538-39. The court held that because the conviction and

sentence in such circumstances are interrelated, the district court “may consider motions to

vacate the conviction and the plea agreement.” Id. at 539. Lewis pleaded guilty pursuant

to a plea agreement that included a stayed sentence longer than the presumptive sentence

under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 536. Lewis appealed, arguing that the

upward departure was not supported by substantial and compelling circumstances. Id. at

8
537. This court affirmed the conviction but reversed the sentence and remanded with

instructions to impose the presumptive sentence, relying on State v. Misquadace, 644

N.W.2d 65, 72 (Minn. 2002). 3 Lewis, 656 N.W.2d at 537. On further review, the supreme

court concluded that this court “read Misquadace too narrowly.” Id. at 538. The supreme

court explained that Misquadace did not address whether, on remand, a district court may

reconsider the conviction component of a plea agreement when no aggravating

circumstances justify a sentencing departure. Id. at 538-39. Because the conviction and

sentencing components of a plea agreement are “interrelated,” the supreme court

determined that the district court should be permitted to consider the effect that

modification of the sentence has on the plea agreement as a whole. Id. at 539.

Six months after its decision in Lewis, the supreme court decided Geller. In Geller,

the supreme court addressed whether a district court may state reasons for departure on the

record after the fact, if it failed to do so at the time of sentencing. 665 N.W.2d at 517.

Geller pleaded guilty to burglary and fleeing charges in exchange for an executed sentence

constituting an upward durational departure. Id. at 515-16. The district court failed to state

the reasons for the departure on the record at the time of sentencing. Id. On remand, this

court ordered the sentencing court to “either state the reasons on the record for the departure

or impose the presumptive sentence.” Id. at 515. The supreme court granted further review

and reaffirmed Williams, 361 N.W.2d at 844, which held that if the district court failed to

3
In Misquadace, the supreme court held that departures from the sentencing guidelines
must be supported by substantial and compelling circumstances, and that a plea agreement,
standing alone, is not a sufficient basis to justify a departure. 644 N.W.2d at 72.

9
state reasons for departure at the time of sentencing, no departure would be allowed. Id. at

516-17. Accordingly, the supreme court held that it was impermissible for the court of

appeals to give the district court another opportunity to state reasons for a sentencing

departure after the fact and remanded the case for imposition of the presumptive guidelines

sentence. Id. at 517.

Next, in Coles, the supreme court considered whether a defendant may challenge an

upward departure under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03 when the sentence

was imposed pursuant to a plea agreement under which the state agreed to dismiss other

pending charges. 862 N.W.2d at 478-79. There, Coles entered into a plea agreement in

which the state agreed to dismiss several charges against him. In exchange, Coles agreed

to receive a sentence for a lesser charge that was an upward durational departure. Id. at

477. The district court accepted Coles’s guilty plea and sentenced him under the terms of

the plea agreement. Id. at 478. Nine years later, Coles filed a supplemental petition labeled

“petition for postconviction relief,” but instead of requesting to vacate his conviction and

set aside the judgment, Coles requested a sentence correction under Minnesota Rule of

Criminal Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9. Id. at 479. The district court construed his

request as a petition for postconviction relief and denied his request as time-barred under

Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4(a) (2012). Id. This court affirmed,

concluding that because Coles’s challenge implicated his conviction, the district court

properly construed his request as a time-barred petition for postconviction relief. Id. Coles

argued that because he was challenging only his sentence, and not the plea agreement or

conviction, his rule 27.03 motion was proper. Id. at 481. The supreme court rejected this

10
argument, reasoning that, where the sentence at issue is imposed as part of a plea

agreement, a motion to change that sentence impacts more than simply the sentence, and

rule 27.03 does not apply. Id. The court stated that “a challenge to a sentence imposed as

part of a plea agreement involves more than simply the sentence,” and that in some plea

agreements, a conviction and a sentence are often “interrelated.” Id. (citing Lewis, 656

N.W.2d at 539). The supreme court also noted that if a defendant succeeds in reducing

their sentence, they would retain the benefit of a reduced criminal charge, leaving the state

without the benefit of a longer sentence. Id. Thus, the supreme court concluded that the

district court “would be free to consider the effect that changes in the sentence have on the

entire plea agreement” if it reduced Coles’s sentence based on improper departure

justifications. Id. (citing Lewis, 656 N.W.2d at 539). Furthermore, the supreme court held

that, when the “district court finds no compelling or substantial circumstances supporting

an upward departure in the sentence that was agreed upon in a plea agreement, it may

consider motions to vacate the conviction and the plea agreement.” Id.

Finally, in Johnson, the supreme court considered whether a defendant could

collaterally challenge his conviction by filing a motion to correct his sentence, where the

sentence was imposed as part of a plea agreement and the requested relief implicated more

than the sentence itself. 877 N.W.2d at 778-80. Johnson entered into a plea agreement in

which he pleaded guilty to one count of aiding and abetting first-degree murder and one

count of second-degree intentional murder in exchange for dismissal of the remaining

charges. Id. at 777. The agreement further provided that if Johnson gave the prosecutor

“useful” information, only the lesser count of second-degree intentional murder would

11
result in a sentence that included an upward durational departure; if the information was

deemed not useful, the state would seek a conviction on aiding and abetting first-degree

murder, carrying a mandatory life sentence. Id. After evaluating whether Johnson

provided “useful” information, the district court convicted him of aiding and abetting first-

degree murder and imposed a life sentence without stating reasons on the record. Id.

Fifteen years later, Johnson filed a motion to correct his sentence under rule 27.03,

subdivision 9. Id. The postconviction court construed the motion as a petition for

postconviction relief under Minnesota Statutes section 590.01 and concluded it was time-

barred and procedurally-barred. Id. at 778. Relying on Coles, the supreme court explained

that where a sentence is imposed as part of a plea agreement, and the requested relief would

alter the benefit of the bargain, rule 27.03, subdivision 9, does not apply. Id. at 779 (citing

Coles, 862 N.W.2d at 481). Accordingly, the supreme court held that because the relief

sought by Johnson “implicates more than simply his sentence,” the postconviction court

correctly interpreted Johnson’s motion as a petition for postconviction relief and properly

dismissed his claim as untimely. Id. (quoting Coles, 862 N.W.2d at 481).

B. Geller does not implicitly overrule Lewis.

At oral argument, Crow appeared to suggest that because Geller was decided just

six months after Lewis, Geller implicitly overruled Lewis. To support his argument, Crow

points to the fact that Geller did not cite Lewis and did not mention Lewis’s alternative

remedy of allowing the district court to consider the effect that changes to an agreed-upon

sentence have on the entire plea agreement. This argument is unavailing.

12
 While Geller does not cite Lewis, Geller and Lewis involve distinct issues arising

from materially different facts. In Geller, the supreme court considered whether, on

remand, a district court may be given a second opportunity to articulate reasons supporting

a sentencing departure after the fact. 665 N.W.2d at 516. By contrast, Lewis addressed

whether, on remand, a district court may reconsider the conviction component of a plea

agreement after determining that there are no substantial and compelling circumstances to

support a departure from the sentencing guidelines. 656 N.W.2d at 538-39. That issue was

neither presented nor discussed in Geller. Because the two decisions concern different

legal questions, we reject Crow’s argument that Geller implicitly overruled Lewis.

C. Review of court of appeals decisions in Rannow, Amundson, and Arola
Johnson.

Next, we turn to this court’s interpretation of Lewis and Geller as reflected in our

decisions in Rannow, Amundson, and Arola Johnson.

In Rannow, we addressed the appropriate remedy when a district court fails to state

any reasons on the record for a sentencing departure. 703 N.W.2d at 580. Rannow was

charged with ten counts of violating a restraining order and one count of harassment. Id.

at 577. Rannow agreed to enter an Alford plea to five of the ten counts, and, in exchange,

the state agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. Id. The district court imposed

consecutive sentences on each of the five counts, constituting an upward departure, without

stating its reasons on the record. Id. On appeal, we determined that the district court abused

its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences without identifying “any aggravating

circumstances justifying a departure from the sentencing guidelines.” Id. at 580. We stated

13
that “because the district court departed from the sentencing guidelines in accordance with

a plea agreement, the facts were more analogous to Misquadace and Lewis than to Geller.”

Id. But we also concluded that the rule in Geller was clear and the most recent holding,

and thus because Geller was decided after Misquadace and Lewis, and because Geller did

not address Misquadace and Lewis in its decision, we must follow the rule in Geller and

remand for imposition of a guidelines sentence. Id.

After Rannow, we considered in Amundson whether the appellant’s consecutive

sentences constituted an illegal sentence and, if so, what constituted the appropriate

remedy. Amundson, 828 N.W.2d at 750. Amundson pleaded guilty to aiding an offender

in exchange for a consecutive sentence that constituted an upward departure from the

sentencing guidelines. Id. The district court imposed the sentence without stating its

reasons for the upward departure. Id. at 752. Amundson properly brought a motion under

Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9, and this court concluded that

he was entitled to a sentence correction. Id. at 751-53. On appeal, the state conceded that

Amundson’s sentence constituted a departure but argued that the case should be remanded

to allow the district court to provide reasons for the upward departure after the fact. Id. at

754. Citing Geller, we concluded that a departure was not allowed if the district court

failed to state its reasons at the time of sentencing, and the only appropriate remedy was to

remand for imposition of a guidelines sentence. Id. at 753-54.

Finally, in Arola Johnson, we considered whether the district court erred by

imposing consecutive prison sentences. 999 N.W.2d at 110. Arola Johnson pleaded guilty

to two counts of criminal sexual conduct pursuant to a plea agreement. Id. at 105. The

14
district court imposed consecutive stayed prison terms that departed from the sentencing

guidelines without stating a reason at the time of sentencing. Id. at 112. Relying on our

previous decision in Rannow, we concluded that we could not remand the case to the

district court for “another opportunity to state the reasons for departure,” and instead, we

must “remand to the district court for imposition of the presumptive guidelines sentence.”

Id. (quoting Rannow, 703 N.W.2d at 580).

D. Amundson and Arola Johnson involve materially different
circumstances from the circumstances before us.

Crow argues that the present case is analogous to both Amundson and Arola

Johnson. In each of those cases, as here, the defendants entered guilty pleas in exchange

for the state’s agreement to dismiss charges or refrain from pursuing additional charges.

Amundson, 828 N.W.2d at 750; Arola Johnson, 999 N.W.2d at 106. Similarly, in all three

cases, the defendants received agreed-upon sentences that ultimately constituted unlawful

departures from the sentencing guidelines. See Amundson, 828 N.W.2d at 753; Arola

Johnson, 999 N.W.2d at 112. And in both Amundson and Arola Johnson, we followed the

remedy outlined in Geller and remanded for imposition of a guidelines sentence rather than

allowing plea withdrawal, which Crow contends supports remanding here for the same

purpose.

However, the present case is materially different. In Arola Johnson, the issue

concerned whether the district court could be given another opportunity to state reasons

supporting the sentencing departure. Here, the state is not seeking to allow the district

court a second opportunity to articulate reasons for departure; rather, it seeks to withdraw

15
from the plea agreement because imposing a guidelines sentence would allow Crow to

retain the benefit of the agreement while depriving the state of the benefit of its bargain.

Similarly, in Amundson, the state requested remand to allow the district court to provide

reasons for the upward departure—a remedy that is not sought in the present case. Unlike

in this case, the state did not seek to withdraw from the plea agreements in Arola, Johnson,

or Amundson. Accordingly, Crow’s reliance on Amundson and Arola Johnson is

unpersuasive.

E. Rannow is not distinguishable from the case before us.

As a threshold matter, we examine whether Rannow is distinguishable from the

present case. It is not. In Rannow, the parties agreed on an aggregate sentence in exchange

for Rannow’s guilty pleas to five counts of violating a restraining order, a departure from

the sentencing guidelines. 703 N.W.2d at 577. The district court followed the terms of the

plea agreement and imposed consecutive prison sentences for each of the five counts

without articulating reasons for the departure at the time of sentencing. Id. After

concluding that the sentence was illegal, the Rannow court considered the appropriate

remedy. It examined Geller, 665 N.W.2d at 517, which directs imposition of the

presumptive guidelines sentence, and Lewis, 656 N.W.2d at 539, which permits the district

court to consider the effect of correcting a sentence on the plea agreement. Rannow, 703

N.W.2d at 580. Although the facts were more analogous to Lewis, the Rannow court

determined that Geller, as the later decision, controlled. Id. Accordingly, it applied the

remedy articulated in Geller and imposed the presumptive guidelines sentence. Id.; see

16
Geller, 665 N.W.2d at 580 (“[A]bsent a statement of the reasons for the sentencing

departure placed on the record at the time of sentencing, no departure will be allowed.”).

Here, like Rannow, the district court departed from the sentencing guidelines in

accordance with the plea agreement. Under Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.F.2.b, “For each

felony offense sentenced consecutively to another felony offense(s), the court must use a

Criminal History Score of 0, or the mandatory minimum for the offense, whichever is

longer, to determine the presumptive duration. A consecutive sentence at any other

duration is a departure.” At the sentencing hearing, and per the plea agreement, the district

court used Crow’s criminal-history score of seven to impose an 84-month consecutive

sentence. Based on a mutual mistake between the parties and the district court, the district

court believed that Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.F.2.b did not apply to separate sentences

involving multiple victims.

Believing that it had followed the sentencing guidelines, the district court imposed

an upward durational departure without making any findings to support the departure. And

like in Rannow, the postconviction court here concluded that Geller controlled, in part

because it was decided six months after Lewis. 4

Because Rannow is a precedential decision and is not distinguishable, it binds this

court and all lower courts. See State v. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn. App. 2010)

(stating that “[t]he district court, like this court, is bound by . . . the published opinions of

4
The postconviction court further reasoned that Geller controlled because, the supreme
court’s decisions in Coles and Johnson did not cite this court’s decisions in Rannow and
Amundson. It relied on that omission as additional support for following Geller.

17
 the court of appeals”), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2010). Thus, we must follow Rannow

and affirm unless we agree with the state that Rannow was implicitly overruled by the

supreme court decisions in Johnson and Coles.

F. Because Rannow is inconsistent with Johnson and Coles, it is implicitly
overruled by these supreme court decisions.

Next, we consider whether the remedy announced in Rannow has been implicitly

overruled by supreme court precedent in Johnson and Coles. The state contends that

following Lewis, Coles, and Johnson, when a defendant challenges a sentence imposed as

part of a plea agreement, the district court is free to consider the state’s motion to withdraw

from the plea agreement and move forward to trial on the original charges. The state urges

us to overrule Rannow, contending that it was decided before, conflicts with, and cannot be

reconciled with Coles and Johnson. Because Coles and Johnson are Minnesota Supreme

Court decisions, the question is not whether this court should overrule Rannow, but whether

those decisions implicitly overruled it.

Rannow concluded that, under Geller, if the district court could not find substantial

and compelling circumstances to support a departure, a reviewing court “must remand to the

district court for imposition of the presumptive guidelines sentence.” Rannow, 703 N.W.2d

at 580. More importantly, Rannow involved a case where there was a plea agreement in

which the state dismissed multiple counts in exchange for a particular sentence. Although

Rannow acknowledged that Lewis allows the district court to consider the effect that changes

in the sentence have on the entire plea agreement, it seemingly rejected this alternative

remedy, believing that it was required to follow Geller as it was decided later in the same

18
year as Lewis. Id. But the conclusion that we reached in Rannow—that the imposition of a

guidelines sentence is the only remedy available—is inconsistent with subsequent supreme

court decisions.

After Rannow, the supreme court clarified that “where the sentence at issue is

imposed as part of a plea agreement, a motion to change that sentence impacts more than

simply the sentence.” Coles, 862 N.W.2d at 481. It explained that the conviction and

sentencing components of a plea are often “interrelated.” Id. (quoting Lewis, 656 N.W.2d

at 539). The court recognized that convictions are part of a negotiated agreement in which

both parties receive significant benefit, and if a defendant succeeds in reducing their

sentence, they retain the benefit of the reduced criminal charge, but the state no longer retains

the benefit of a longer sentence. Id. Because of the interplay between the conviction and

sentencing components, the court concluded that if the district court finds no compelling or

substantial circumstances to support an upward departure in a sentence that was agreed upon

in a plea agreement, the district court may consider motions to vacate the conviction and the

plea agreement. Id.

Adopting the holding in Coles, the supreme court in Johnson similarly concluded

that because the sentencing departure at issue was imposed as part of a plea agreement, and

the appellant’s requested relief—a sentence reduction—would alter the benefit of the

bargain struck, appellant would retain the benefit he received under the plea agreement while

the state would not. Johnson, 877 N.W.2d at 779. The supreme court held that in such a

circumstance, the terms of the plea agreement are “essentially rejected” and that the district

19
court “would be free to consider whether to permit the State to withdraw from the plea

agreement and move forward to trial on [the] original charges.” Id.

As discussed above, Rannow is inconsistent with supreme court’s opinions in Coles

and Johnson. We are bound by supreme court precedent. See State v. Curtis, 921 N.W.2d.

342, 346 (Minn. 2018) (“The court of appeals is bound by supreme court precedent, as it

has repeatedly acknowledged.”); See, e.g., State v. Final Exit Network, Inc., 889 N.W.2d

296, 303 (Minn. App. 2016) (“We are bound by Minnesota Supreme Court precedent.”),

rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 19, 2016); Citizens for a Balanced City v. Plymouth

Congregational Church, 672 N.W.2d 13, 20 (Minn. App. 2003) (“This court is bound by

decision[s] of the Minnesota Supreme Court . . . .”). After Rannow was decided, the

Minnesota Supreme Court issued its decisions in Coles and Johnson, holding that a district

court may consider the state’s motion to withdraw from a plea agreement when a

sentencing departure imposed as part of that agreement is at issue and the defendant’s

requested relief would alter the benefit of the bargain. Coles, 862 N.W.2d at 481; Johnson,

877 N.W.2d at 779. That holding is inconsistent with this court’s conclusion in Rannow

that imposition of a guidelines sentence is the sole remedy where the state dismissed

multiple counts in exchange for a particular sentence. Accordingly, Coles and Johnson

implicitly overruled Rannow.

20
 G. The postconviction court abused its discretion by erroneously
concluding that imposition of a guidelines sentence was the only remedy
available when Crow’s challenge to his sentence implicated more than
the sentence.

Having clarified that to the extent that Rannow is inconsistent with Coles and

Johnson, the supreme court implicitly overruled Rannow, we now turn to the resolution of

this appeal. The state argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion because its

decision was based on an erroneous view of the law—following this court’s reasoning in

Rannow—that the only available remedy was the imposition of a guidelines sentence.

Crow argues that Geller and Lewis, which were decided in the same year, created a split

regarding the appropriate remedy when defendants receive unlawful departures imposed

pursuant to plea agreements. And asserting that Geller, Rannow, Amundson, and Arola

Johnson control, Crow maintains that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

granting his postconviction petition, denying the state’s motion to withdraw from the plea

agreement, and resentencing Crow to a guidelines sentence. We agree with the state that

the postconviction court’s decision was based on an erroneous view of the law.

In its order granting Crow’s petition for relief, the postconviction court rejected the

state’s motion to vacate the plea agreement. Relying on this court’s reasoning in Rannow,

Amundson, and Arola Johnson, the postconviction court concluded that if there are no

reasons for departure stated on the record at the time of sentencing, the only appropriate

remedy was to remand for imposition of a guidelines sentence. As discussed above, that

is inconsistent with supreme court precedent in Johnson and Coles, in which it recognized

21
that a challenge to a sentence agreed upon as part of a plea agreement implicates more than

the sentence.

At the time of the plea, Crow was charged with 48 counts of possession of

pornographic works involving minors in two separate district court files. Pursuant to a

negotiated plea agreement, Crow agreed to plead guilty to four counts of possession of

pornographic works involving minors by a registered predatory offender—between the two

files—in exchange for a specific, agreed-upon prison sentence of 220 months. In return

for Crow’s guilty plea and agreement to the 220-month sentence, the state dismissed the

remaining 44 counts in those two files, as well as another separate file charging Crow with

one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, one count of second-degree criminal

sexual conduct, and two counts of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct.

As in Coles, Crow asserts that he challenges only his sentence and not the validity

of his plea agreement. But his challenge to the sentence imposed as part of this negotiated

plea necessarily implicates more than the sentence alone. See Coles, 862 N.W.2d at 481.

Crow pleaded guilty to a substantially reduced number of charges with the express

understanding that he would receive a 220-month prison term. Permitting Crow to now

reduce that agreed-upon sentence would allow him to retain the benefit of the reduced

charges while depriving the state of the benefit of its bargain—the agreed-upon longer

sentence or convictions for multiple crimes and an even longer prison sentence. This is

precisely the circumstance addressed in Coles and Johnson, in which the supreme court

concluded that, if the district court reduced a sentence due to improper departure

justifications, the court would be “free to consider the effect that changes in the sentence

22
have on the entire plea agreement.” Id. (quotation omitted); Johnson, 877 N.W.2d at 779.

Under Johnson and Coles, imposition of a guidelines sentence was not the only available

remedy. Because the postconviction court “reduced [Crow’s] sentence due to improper

departure justifications . . . the [postconviction] court would be free to consider the effect

that changes in the sentence have on the entire plea agreement.” Coles, 862 N.W.2d at

481. Thus, we conclude that when a defendant challenges an impermissible consecutive

sentence imposed as part of an agreed-upon sentence in a plea agreement, and the

guidelines sentence would alter the benefit of the bargain, the district court may consider a

motion to withdraw from the plea agreement and is not required to impose a guidelines

sentence.

Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in granting Crow’s petition for

postconviction relief because it erroneously relied on this court’s reasoning in Rannow to

determine that it did not have the discretion to grant the state’s motion to withdraw from

the plea agreement and failed to do so.

II. Crow’s double-jeopardy claims are not ripe.

Lastly, Crow asserts that if the postconviction court granted the state’s request to

vacate his plea over his objection and retry him on the original charges, the postconviction

court would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. But because the postconviction court did

not consider the state’s motion to vacate the plea agreement, Crow’s claim is hypothetical

and therefore not ripe for adjudication. See Growe v. Simon, 2 N.W.3d 490, 499 (Minn.

2024) (“Issues which have no existence other than in the realm of future possibility are

23
purely hypothetical and are not justiciable. Such issues are not ripe for adjudication and

so are not justiciable.” (quotation and citation omitted)).

Even if Crow’s double-jeopardy claims were ripe, Crow waived the privilege

against double jeopardy by challenging his sentence. See State v. Montermini, 819 N.W.2d

447, 457-58 (Minn. App. 2012) (holding that a defendant who repudiates the express terms

of a plea agreement waives the protection of the double-jeopardy prohibition). We

therefore decline to consider Crow’s double-jeopardy argument.

DECISION

We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in granting Crow’s petition

for postconviction relief because the court erroneously relied on this court’s reasoning in

Rannow to determine that it did not have the discretion to consider the state’s motion to

vacate the plea agreement. To the extent that Rannow conflicts with the binding authority

in Coles and Johnson, it has been implicitly overruled by that subsequently decided

authority. Consistent with the supreme court precedent in Lewis, Coles, and Johnson, if

the district court does not find substantial and compelling circumstances to support an

upward departure in the sentence that was agreed upon in a plea agreement, it is free to

consider motions to withdraw from the plea agreement. Because the district court abused

its discretion in granting Crow’s petition by failing to consider the state’s motion to

withdraw from the plea agreement, we reverse and remand for proceedings not inconsistent

with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

24