State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0873

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jonathan Lee Johnson,
Appellant.

Filed May 26, 2026
Affirmed
Ede, Judge

Roseau County District Court
File No. 68-CR-24-224

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kristy Kjos, Roseau County Attorney, Roseau, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Jesson, Judge.
∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s decision to impose an executed sentence of
144 months’ imprisonment for his conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. He

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
article VI, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution.
2
argues that the district court abused its discretion in declining to grant his motion for a
downward dispositional departure based on his claim that he is particularly amenable to
probation. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Jonathan Lee Johnson with two
counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
609.342, subdivision 1(h)(iii) (2014). Johnson pleaded guilty to one of the counts and the
state agreed to dismiss the other charge.
During his plea colloquy, Johnson affirmed that he had sexual contact with a person
who was under 13 years old. Johnson admitted that, on one occasion, a child had touched
his penis for about 45 seconds and that, on another, Johnson’s penis entered the child’s
mouth while Johnson “pulled up a pornographic video on [his] phone.” After Johnson
pleaded guilty, the district court ordered that he participate in the completion of a
presentence investigation report (PSI) and a psychosexual evaluation.
Johnson later moved for a downward dispositional departure. In his motion, Johnson
asserted: that he was young at the time of the offense (i.e., 27 years old); that his criminal
record was limited to a single driving-while- impaired offense and a vehicle-eq uipment
violation; that he immediately confessed and expressed remorse when confronted by law
enforcement; that he did not violate the conditions of his pretrial release; that he voluntarily
participated in a psychosexual evaluation before pleading guilty and promptly began a
recommended treatment plan; that he had consistently attended and remained an active
participant in sex-offender treatment; and that he was an asset to his treatment community.
3
Johnson also expressed his hope “to be involved in his own son’s [life].” For those reasons,
he requested that the district court “sentence him to 144 months in prison, with execution
stayed for 15 years of supervised probation.”
At the sentencing hearing, the district court received several exhibits introduced by
Johnson: a letter from Beltrami County Health and Human Services; a letter from his sex-
offender-treatment provider; and his psychosexual evaluation. The district court heard
testimony by a witness employed with Johnson’s sex-offender-treatment provider. The
witness described her experiences with Johnson and said that she “wouldn’t have a
concern” that he would succeed in treatment. Johnson also testified on his own behalf,
stating that he felt “disgusted” about his offense, that “[t]his was [his] fault,” and that he
did not blame the victim or anyone else. He said that he was “very committed” to following
probationary conditions and that he had “been trying to be as proactive” as he could. In
addition, the victim’s mother read a victim-impact statement to the district court.
The state opposed Johnson’s motion for a downward dispositional departure and
requested that the district court impose a presumptive guidelines sentence. In particular,
the state asserted “that the mitigating circumstances as argued . . . by the
defendant . . . [did] not justify a departure as compared to the seriousness of the offense
and the harm that it ha[d] caused.”
Before ruling on Johnson’s downward-dispositional-departure motion, the district
court explained that it had reviewed the PSI and then addressed Johnson as follows:
In your own statement, . . . [while] you appear
remorseful and I do believe that you are remorseful today, I
believe that you are still using blaming language on this child
4
who was a child of six or seven years old, and I also want to
point out this happened in 2017. If you felt so bad and you
wanted to address it, seven years later you had not done so.
You had not addressed it. You had not confessed to it and
gotten through the law enforcement system. It was not until
you were confronted with this or until you were charged, that
you started getting treatment.

Now, I do commend you for attempting to begin
treatment, but I do not find that what has been accomplished
here is substantial and compelling enough circumstances that I
should deviate from the normal disposition in this matter, and
I cannot find that you are any more particularly amenable to
probation than others who have been charged with this.

The district court therefore denied Johnson’s motion and imposed an executed sentence of
144 months’ imprisonment, the presumptive duration within the applicable sentencing
guidelines range.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Johnson challenges his 144-month executed sentence, maintaining that the district
court abused its discretion in declining to grant his motion for a downward dispositional
departure based on his claim that he is particularly amenable to probation. More
specifically, Johnson contends that several of the Trog factors1 establish his probationary
amenability. Johnson’s arguments do not merit reversal of the sentence.2

1 See State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) (explaining that “the defendant’s age,
his prior record, his remorse, his cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support
of friends and/or family, are relevant to a determination whether a defendant is particularly
suitable to individualized treatment in a probationary setting”).

2 Respondent State of Minnesota did not file an appellate brief. We decide this case on the
merits. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
5
Appellate courts “afford the [district] court great discretion in the imposition of
sentences and reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.” State v.
Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307–08 (Minn. 2014) (quotation and footnote omitted). A district
court “abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or
is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Glover, 4 N.W.3d 124, 134 (Minn.
2024) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts “will not ordinarily interfere with a sentence
falling within the presumptive sentence range, either dispositionally or durationally, even
if there are grounds that would justify departure.” State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668
(Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Minn.
App. 2011) (“Only in a rare case will a reviewing court reverse the imposition of a
presumptive sentence.”).
The district court’s sentencing discretion is limited by the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines, which “prescrib[e] a sentence or range of sentences that is presumed to be
appropriate.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308 (quotation omitted). “The [district] court must
pronounce a sentence of the applicable disposition and within the applicable range unless
there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a departure.”
Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2015). Here, the district court imposed an executed
sentence of 144 months’ imprisonment —the presumptive duration within the applicable
sentencing guidelines range.
A “downward dispositional departure occurs when the presumptive guidelines
sentence calls for imprisonment but the district court instead stays execution or imposition
of the sentence.” State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016); see also Minn.
6
Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.5.a(2) (2015). “A dispositional departure typically focuses on
characteristics of the defendant that show whether the defendant is particularly suitable for
individualized treatment in a probationary setting.” Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 623 (quotation
omitted). As noted above, “t he defendant’s age, his prior record, his remorse, his
cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or family, are
relevant to a determination whether a defendant is particularly suitable to individualized
treatment in a probationary setting.” Trog , 323 N.W.2d at 31; see also Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.D.3 (2015).
Johnson maintains that, “[a]t the time of his sentencing hearing, [he] met all the
Trog factors” establishing that he is particularly amenable to probation. He specifically
points to: his relatively young age at the time of the offense; his minimal criminal history;
his cooperation and remorse, as shown by his guilty plea early in the proceedings; his active
participation in treatment before pleading guilty; his decision “to be accountable and begin
his rehabilitation through treatment as soon as possible”; and the support of his family and
community. Johnson relies on State v. Wright, in which the Minnesota Supreme Court
concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining “that the
chance[s] that [the] defendant [would] mend his ways and that society’s interests [would]
be safeguarded [were] better if the probationary treatment approach [was] followed.” 310
N.W.2d 461, 463 (Minn. 1981). But Wright does not compel the conclusion that we must
reverse the district court’s exercise of its discretion in denying Johnson’s motion for a
downward dispositional departure. This is because Wright concerned the supreme court’s
affirmance of a district court’s decision to grant a motion for a downward dispositional
7
departure, not the supreme court’s reversal of a district court’s denial of such a motion—
which is what Johnson seeks in this appeal.
“A reviewing court may not interfere with the sentencing court’s exercise of
discretion, as long as the record shows the sentencing court carefully evaluated all the
testimony and information presented before making a determination.” Pegel, 795 N.W.2d
at 255 (quotation omitted). In the present matter, the record reflects that the district court
reviewed the PSI and thoughtfully considered all the evidence presented before sentencing
Johnson. While Johnson claims that he has established his particular amenability to
probation through each of the Trog factors, the existence of “mitigating
factor[s] . . . present in a particular case does not obligate the [district] court to place [the]
defendant on probation.” Id. at 253 (quotation omitted); see also Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d at
668.
Because the district court did not base its decision on an erroneous view of the law,
and because its stated reasoning for the sentence is neither against logic nor the facts in the
record, we discern no abuse of discretion. See Glover, 4 N.W.3d at 134. This is not a rare
case that warrants reversal of a presumptive sentence. See Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 253. The
district court acted within its discretion in imposing the executed sentence of 144 months’
imprisonment.
Affirmed.