State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0879

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ricky Allen Severtson,
Appellant.

Filed March 30, 2026
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Mower County District Court
File No. 50-CR-23-1298

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kristen Nelsen, Mower County Attorney, Scott K. Springer, Assistant County Attorney,
Austin, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Gina D. Schulz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M. , Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge;
and Halbrooks, Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant challenges his sentence, arguing that the district court abused its
discretion when it denied his motion for a dispositional departure. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Ricky Allen Severtson was convicted after pleading guilty to first-degree
driving while impaired (DWI) in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20,
subdivision 1(2) (2022), with reference to Minnesota Statutes section 169A.24,
subdivision 1 (2022). On June 26, 2023, Severtson was driving in Austin when police
observed him drift in his lane and make swift, erratic swerves. Officers conducted a traffic
stop and saw that Severtson had bloodshot eyes, spoke rapidly, and was covered in sweat.
Severtson agreed to take field sobriety tests, during which he had an increased pulse, his
hands were twitching, and he had trouble maintaining his balance. Police arrested
Severtson on suspicion of DWI and obtained a search warrant for a blood sample .
Severtson’s blood sample tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine.
At the plea hearing in April 2024, Severtson admitted that the drugs in his system
had adversely affected his ability to drive. Severtson also had three prior DWI convictions
within the last ten years—in 2020, 2021, and 2022—that caused this DWI charge to be
enhanced to a felony. In March 2025, Severtson appeared for sentencing and moved for a
downward dispositional departure, requesting a stayed sentence. The motion included a
letter from Severtson, a copy of an agreement between Severtson and an
ignition-interlock-device company for Severtson’s vehicle, and six letters of support from
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family and friends describing the positive changes they had seen in Severtson since his last
arrest.
Severtson stated that he had participated in intensive outpatient treatment through
Veterans Affairs (VA) for a year and continued to see a VA psychiatrist. He asserted that
he had not used alcohol or drugs since he was arrested and had no ignition-interlock
violations. When asked how he planned to maintain his sobriety, Severtson explained that
he is “gonna’ leave the stuff alone” and that he wants to live as long as possible and “dope
ain’t gonna’ help.” Severtson explained that he had met with his probation officer as
required, had not violated any of his release conditions, and had not failed any urinalysis
test given by probation. But when the district court inquired, Severtson was unable to state
how many days he had been sober.
Severtson is in his seventies and shared information with the district court about a
number of his health issues, explaining that he has leukemia that likely developed as a
result of his military service, it is progressing, and he often suffers from complications. He
also had a knee surgery that caused issues over the last two years. Severtson stated he had
“but one year of good time” left.
Severtson’s sister stated that Severtson ha d been very ill and was often in the
hospital and that she believed he was sober. She stated that she had seen positive
improvement in him and did not believe he would survive for very long if he were
incarcerated.
The state opposed the departure, arguing that Severtson had not taken responsibility
for his actions, pointing to his responses during the presentence investigation when
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Severtson questioned the legality of the stop, denied that any illegal chemicals were in his
system at the time of his arrest, and alleged that he has been sober since 2021 despite his
two DWI convictions since 2021. The state also noted that Severtson had not historically
done well on probation, was currently on probation for drug possession and violation of a
no-contact order, and continued to struggle with methamphetamine use. Severtson’s
probation officer recommended that the district court impose a sentence of 54 months.
Because Severtson was convicted of a crime with severity-level seven and had a
criminal-history score of three, the presumptive sentence was a term of imprisonment
ranging from 46 to 64 months. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.A (2022)
(sentencing-guidelines grid).
The district court determined that Severtson was not particularly amenable to
probation for a number of reasons, including that Severtson did not appear to have many
sober supports, he could not tell the court how many days he had been sober, and his
attitude reflected that he did not understand why he was being punished for this DWI. The
district court acknowledged Severtson’s ailing health, observing, “I’m struggling because
of the health problems. It’s a fifty-four-month sentence, also a life sentence.”
Before it denied the departure motion, the district court identified the factors that
would support a departure, and then it stated, “So I don’t find that there’s been a clear and
compelling reason based on the factors. I can’t depart just ‘cause I feel bad about not
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doing it.” The district court imposed a bottom-of-the-box sentence of 46 months in prison
and five years on conditional release.1
Severtson appeals.
DECISION
Appellate courts review a district court’s decision not to depart from the sentencing
guidelines for an abuse of discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014).
“A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of
the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d 230,
256 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). Because district courts have significant discretion
in imposing sentences, appellate courts rarely reverse deci sions not to depart from the
sentencing guidelines. State v. Walker, 913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018).
“The district court must order the presumptive sentence provided in the sentencing
guidelines unless substantial and compelling circumstances warrant a departure.” State v.
Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted); accord Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.D (2022) (stating that a court has discretion to depart from a presumptive
sentence only when substantial and compelling circumstances are present). “Substantial
and compelling circumstances are those circumstances that make the facts of a particular
case different from a typical case.” State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Minn. App.
2009) (quoting State v. Peake, 366 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Minn. 1985)). “ If departure is

1 “The longest and shortest terms in the presumptive range are commonly called the ‘top
of the box’ and the ‘bottom of the box.’” State v. Morgan, 968 N.W.2d 25, 28 n.2 (Minn.
2021).
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permissible due to compelling circumstances, the [district court] ‘may’ depart.” State v.
Curtiss, 353 N.W.2d 262, 263 (Minn. App. 1984).
“A dispositional departure places the offender in a different setting than that called
for by the presumptive guidelines sentence.” State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn.
2016). In considering a motion for dispositional departure, the district court typically
focuses on whether a defendant’s characteristics show that the defendant is “particularly
amenable to individualized treatment in a probationary setting.” State v. Wright,
310 N.W.2d 461, 462 (Minn. 1981). The “defendant’s age, his prior record, his remorse,
his cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or family” are
nonexclusive relevant factors that may justify a dispositional departure, known as the Trog
factors. State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982); see Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3
(listing nonexclusive factors that may be reasons for departure). These are not the only
factors that a court may consider when determining whether a defendant is particularly
amenable to probation, and a court may decide that not all of these factors are relevant in
any given case. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 310.
Departures “are discouraged and are intended to apply to a small number of cases”
because “[t]he sentencing guidelines seek to maintain uniformity, proportionality,
rationality, and predictability in sentencing of felony crimes.” Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 623
(quotation omitted). Even if there are factors that weigh in favor of a departure, the district
court does not abuse its discretion by denying a departure. See State v. Kindem ,
313 N.W.2d 6, 8 (Minn. 1981) (stating that, “while there may have been arguments for
departing downward,” the decision to depart is discretionary). The mere fact that a
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mitigating factor is present in a particular case does “not obligate the court to place
defendant on probation.” State v. Wall, 343 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Minn. 1984). We will affirm
the district court’s sentencing decision “as long as the record shows the sentencing court
carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before making a
determination.” State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. App. 1985).

Severtson argues that the district court erred by not granting a dispositional
departure based on his poor health, and in the alternative, he asks this court to exercise its
authority to modify his sentence because it is unreasonable.
In support of his argument based on his poor health, Severtson relies on State v.
Kraft, in which the supreme court stated that a “conceivable ground” for modifying Kraft’s
sentence was his physical condition of having leukemia, although it declined to modify
Kraft’s sentence. 326 N.W.2d 840, 842 (Minn. 1982). Severtson also relies on Wright, in
which the supreme court affirmed a departure when the district court found the defendant
would likely be victimized in prison and a different disposition would be better for society.
310 N.W.2d at 462-63. Neither case compels the conclusion that the district court abused
its discretion here.
Caselaw supports that a district court may consider factors in addition to the Trog
factors, which may include a defendant’s physical condition. Trog, 323 N.W.2d at 31
(stating that the factors are nonexclusive); Wright, 310 N.W.2d at 462 (recognizing that the
factors in the sentencing guidelines are nonexclusive). However, a district court is not
obligated to depart merely because a mitigating factor is present. See Kindem, 313 N.W.2d
at 8. Wright stands for the proposition that the district court may grant a downward
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dispositional departure if a defendant has serious health problems; it does not hold that
when a defendant has serious health problems, a district court must grant a downward
dispositional departure. 310 N.W.2d at 462.
The district court considered appropriate factors when it determined that Severtson
has not demonstrated he is particularly amenable to probation. It found that Severtson was
not taking responsibility for his actions and did not have a reliable plan to remain sober.
Moreover, its decision is supported by the record, which shows that Severtson was on
probation at the time of this offense, for both drug possession and violation of a no-contact
order, and that he had three prior DWI convictions in the three years preceding this offense.
The district court considered Severtson’s health conditions, stating, “I’m struggling
because of the health problems,” but concluding, “I don’t find that there’s been a clear and
compelling reason based on the factors. ” The district court then observed, “I can’t depart
just ‘cause I feel bad about not doing it.” The record reflects that the district court carefully
evaluated all the information before it in making its determination; it was not required to
find that Severtson’s health was a substantial and compelling reason to grant the departure,
and it did not abuse its discretion by imposing a sentence within the presumptive range.
Severtson alternatively argues that this cou rt should exercise its authority under
Minn. Stat. § 244.11 (2024) and Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.05, subd. 2, or otherwise determine
compelling circumstances exist to reverse or modify his sentence because his age, status as
a disabled veteran, and cancer diagnosis make his sentence inappropriate and unreasonable.
Severtson further contends that there are many less restrictive ways to render him less of a
risk to society and asserts that the parties anticipated that he would receive a probationary
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sentence but that he did not qualify for sentencing under the veterans’ statute, Minn. Stat.
§ 609.1056 (2022), and his criminal-history score was higher than expected.
Minnesota Statutes section 244.11, subdivision 2(b), states, “On an appeal pursuant
to this section, the court may review the sentence imposed or stayed to determine whether
the sentence is inconsistent with statutory requirements, unreasonable, inappropriate,
excessive, unjustifiably disparate, or no t warranted by the findings of fact issued by the
district court.” Minn esota Rule of Criminal Procedure 28.05, subdivision 2, states the
same. See also State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006) (“Appellate courts
may vacate or modify a sentence on many grounds, including that the sentence is
unreasonable or inappropriate.”).
“This court will generally not exercise its authority to modify a sentence within the
presumptive range ‘absent compelling circumstances.’” State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426,
428 (Minn. App. 2010) (quoting State v. Freyer, 328 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Minn. 1982)), rev.
denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). Only in a “rare” case will a reviewing court reverse the
imposition of a presumptive sentence. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7.
Severtson cites two cases to persuade us that his sentence is inappropriate and
unreasonable: State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 801 (Minn. 1989), which reversed a
presumptive sentence because the appellant wife’s culpability was mitigated when she was
subjected to years of brutal abuse by husband and, following another beating, shot and
killed him, and State v. Christianson, No. A13-0433, 2014 WL 1344203, at *6-7 (Minn.
App. Apr. 7, 2014), which reversed a sentencing increase within the presumptive range
because courtroom-spectator misconduct that is not attributable to the defendant is a
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constitutionally impermissible sentencing consideration. In Hennum, the supreme court
reduced the appellant’s sentence from the presumptive sentence to the sentence
recommended in the presentence-investigation report. 441 N.W.2d at 800-01. The
supreme court explained that, although the jury found she did not establish self-defense,
the appellant’s culpability was mitigated under several guidelines factors. Id. at 801.
Severtson’s case is not analogous to either of the cases he cites. The district court
did not sentence him based on unconstitutional considerations, and although he did not
qualify for sentencing under the veterans’ statute or for probation as the presumptive
disposition as he had hoped, these are not factors that render the presumptive sentence
inappropriate so as to compel a departure. T he sentence imposed— at the low end of the
presumptive range —was not “inconsistent with statutory requirements, unreasonable,
inappropriate, excessive, unjustifiably disparate, or not warranted.” Minn. Stat. § 244.11,
subd. 2(b). This is not the “rare” case in which we will reverse the imposition of a
presumptive sentence. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7.
Affirmed.