In re the Estate of Frank E. Messin, Deceased.
The holding in the court’s own words
We therefore conclude that the district court clearly erred by finding that decedent was domiciled in or owned property in Washington County because it is unsupported by any evidence in the record.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co. 832 N.W.2d 790
- 963 N.W.2d 214 not in our corpus
- Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press 589 N.W.2d 96
- 962 N.W.2d 861 not in our corpus
Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0880
In re the Estate of Frank E. Messin, Deceased.
Filed February 23, 2026
Reversed
Halbrooks, Judge*
Washington County District Court
File No. 82-PR-25-402
John R. Neve, John Hayden, Quantum Lex PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant
Sheila Anderson)
Erik J. Honkanen, Honkanen Law Firm, S.C., Virginia, Minnesota (for respondent Tina M.
Boril)
Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Halbrooks,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant, daughter of decedent Frank E. Messin, challenges a Washington County
District Court order granting respondent’s petition for adjudication of intestacy,
determination of heirs, and appointment of personal representative. Because w e conclude
that the district court erred by finding that venue for the formal testacy proceedings was
proper in Washington County, we reverse.
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
FACTS
The parties dispute the material facts of this appeal. Respondent Tina M. Boril
alleges as follows. In 2009, Boril sued decedent individually and in his capacity as trustee
to compel trust payments based on his son’s failure to pay a child-support obligation to
Boril. In 2010, t he parties executed a settlement agreement in which decedent’s son
assigned to Boril his interest in decedent’s irrevocable trust in the amount of $100,000.
The terms of the agreement specified that the $100,000 would only become payable upon
decedent’s death. Boril agreed to release all claims against decedent, and her suit was
dismissed without prejudice.
Decedent died on October 5, 2023. Boril alleges that appellant Sheila Anderson,
the current trustee of decedent’s irrevocable trust, failed to pay her the $100,000 owed
under the 2010 settlement agreement. Boril moved for entry of judgment against the trust
in a separate action in Chisago County. Boril alleges that decedent’s estate may need to
indemnify the pending trust litigation and, thus, sought to have a personal representative
appointed to decedent’s estate so that it could be joined with the pending trust litigation.
Boril filed a petition for formal adjudication of intestacy, determination of heirs, and
appointment of personal representative. In her petition, Boril alleged that she has a legal
interest in decedent’s estate because she is a beneficiary of the decedent’s irrevocable trust.
Boril also alleged that she believed that decedent owned property and was domiciled in
Washington County at the time of his death. Anderson filed an objection to the petition in
which she denied that decedent owned property or was domiciled in Washington County
3
at the time of his death and asserted, among other claims, that venue was improper in
Washington County.
The district court held a hearing on Boril’s petition. Both Anderson and Boril were
present and represented by counsel. The parties’ counsel presented oral arguments on the
petition. Neither party called witnesses n or sought to introduce evidence into the record.
The district court ordered briefing and took the matter under advisement.
After the hearing, Boril filed a proposed order, and her attorney filed an affidavit in
support. Her attorney’s affidavit attached two exhibits: the Certificate of Trust that was
incorporated into the 2010 settlement agreement between decedent and Boril and the
Certificate of Trust executed by Anderson as successor trustee. No other exhibits were
attached. Anderson filed a memorandum of law and an affidavit in support of her objection
to the petition. Anderson’s affidavit stated, in relevant part, that decedent was domiciled
in Florida at the time of his death and that decedent did not personally own property in
Minnesota.
The district court granted Boril’s petition. In its order, the district court found that
decedent was domiciled in or owned property in Washington County, concluded that venue
was proper in Washington County, and appointed a third-party personal representative to
decedent’s estate.
This appeal follows.
4
DECISION
Anderson argues that the district court erred by determining that venue was proper
in Washington County based on its finding that decedent was domiciled in or owned
property in the county.1
The Minnesota Uniform Probate Code provides that venue for the first formal
testacy or appointment proceedings is proper “(1) in the county of the decedent’s domicile
at the time of death; or (2) if the decedent was not domiciled in this state, in any county
where property of the decedent was located at the time of death.” Minn. Stat. § 524.3-
201(a) (2024).
The venue determination in this case turns on the district court’s factual findings
that Messin was domiciled in or owned property in Washington County. This court reviews
the district court’s factual findings for clear error. Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co.,
832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 2013). Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if “they are
manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn.
2021) (quotation omitted). “If there is reasonable evidence to support the trial court’s
findings of fact, a reviewing court should not disturb those findings.”
Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999). “We will not
1 Anderson also argues on appeal that the district court erred by determining that decedent
died intestate, that Boril was an interested person, that Boril stated a claim upon which
relief could be granted, and by appointing a third-party representative. Because we resolve
Anderson’s appeal solely on the venue issue, we need not consider Anderson’s other
arguments.
5
conclude that a fact[-]finder clearly erred unless, on the entire evidence, we are left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at
221 (quotations omitted).
The district court determined that venue was proper in Washington County based
on its findings that decedent maintained a residence and was domiciled in Forest Lake,
Minnesota, “or otherwise owned property or held assets in Minnesota” at the time of his
death. But the district court also found that decedent’s Forest Lake residence was an asset
of his revocable trust. Anderson contends that the district court’s findings are erroneous
because they are contrary to evidence that decedent was a domiciliary and resident of
Florida at the time of his death. Additionally, Anderson contends that the district court’s
venue determination could not be based on property ownership because decedent’s Forest
Lake residence was titled and held in trust. We agree with Anderson that the district court’s
finding that decedent was domiciled in or owned property in Washington County is not
supported by the record.
The only evidence in the record relevant to whether decedent was domiciled in or
owned property in Washington County is Anderson’s affidavit. Anderson’s affidavit states
that decedent was a domiciliary and resident of Florida at the time of his death.
Additionally, Anderson’s affidavit states that decedent did not personally own any property
in Washington County at the time of his death because “[a] ll real property in Minnesota
was titled and held in [decedent’s] Revocable Trust.”
Boril presented no evidence contrary to Anderson’s declarations. Boril only alleged
in her petition that she believed decedent was domiciled in or owned property in
6
Washington County. But Boril’s petition was never entered into the record as evidence.
See In re Welfare of Child of H.G.D., 962 N.W.2d 861, 872 (Minn. 2021) (citing Minn. R.
Evid. 402) (allegations in petition were not evidence because petition not offered or
admitted into evidence). Boril attached no exhibits to her petition to support her belief that
decedent was domiciled in or owned property in Washington County at the time of his
death. And at the petition hearing, Boril did not testify, present any witness testimony, or
introduce any evidence to support the allegations in her petition. See id. (petitioner’s
allegations would be unproven if petitioner failed to offer evidence, but unrefuted
testimony demonstrated allegations in petition were true and correct). We therefore
conclude that the district court clearly erred by finding that decedent was domiciled in or
owned property in Washington County because it is unsupported by any evidence in the
record. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221.
Thus, because the district court’s conclusion was based on an erroneous factual
finding that decedent was domiciled in or owned property in Washington County, the
district court erred by determining that venue was proper in Washington County.
Reversed.