In the Matter of: Chelsea Boyd Kroes, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0893

In the Matter of:
Chelsea Boyd Kroes, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Paul Joseph Kroes,
Appellant.

Filed December 22, 2025
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-DA-FA-25-1280

Maury D. Beaulier, Jessa A. Carlson, Melchert Hubert Sjodin, PLLC, Waconia, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Michael D. Schwartz, Brandon M. Schwartz, Schwartz Law Firm, Oakdale, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order for protection (OFP), arguing that the
record does not show that appellant committed domestic abuse, and the district court denied
him adequate cross-examination of respondent. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2023, respondent Chelsea Boyd Kroes 1 and appellant Paul Joseph Kroes
dissolved their 15-year marriage. The parties share joint legal custody and joint physical
custody of their two minor children and have a parenting-time schedule.
In March 2025, Chelsea petitioned for an OFP protecting her from Paul. At the OFP
hearing, Chelsea testified that Paul made threats on her life dating back to their marriage.
She read a text-message from Paul that stated: “I have not treated you well for a long
while. . . . I have been selfish and deceitful and done many things that have hurt you and
traumatized you.”
Chelsea testified about traumatizing incidents. She stated that, during the marriage,
Paul had surreptitiously installed a camera in their bedroom pointed at Chelsea’s side of
the bed. When Chelsea found the camera, the webcam was actively streaming on the
internet. During arguments, Paul would tell Chelsea that he disseminated the camera’s
content. Chelsea testified that she recently filed a police report, and there is an open
investigation for invasion of privacy and under the revenge-porn statute.
2 Chelsea stated

1 Because the parties share the same last name, we will refer to them by their first names.
2 See Minn. Stat. § 617.261, subd. 1 (2020).
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that Paul did not want her to talk to the police because his “other criminal activity” could
come to light. He told her that if she talked, he would “f---ing kill” her.
Chelsea also testified that Paul has entered her garage to search her vehicle’s GPS.
The garage is attached to the home, and Chelsea would frequently find her garage door left
open. Chelsea testified that, when the children are not with her, she rarely sleeps at home,
and when she does, she does not sleep in her bedroom because if someone enters her home
“to try to kill [her]” she does not want to be found.
Chelsea testified that Paul has physically harmed her, but it was unintentional. She
stated that Paul “punched [her] in the stomach when [she] was pregnant.” He also
“elbowed” her “really, really hard” when “he was angry,” but she did not think that “the
intent was to cause as much physical harm as he did.” Chelsea stated that Paul “would say
that he would kill [her]. He would hack up [her] body into little pieces. He would dissolve
it in chemicals and then dispose of [her] body in the swamp behind [their] house and then
tell [their] kids that [she] ran away because [she] didn’t love them.” Chelsea testified that
Paul’s threats “[t]errified” her, and she felt that he was capable of following through with
his threats because she believes he is “sociopathic.”
Chelsea testified that she does not have a problem with Paul bringing the children
into her home when he drops them off and she is home. She testified, however, that Paul
has brought the children home early, when she is not home, and entered her home without
her consent. Chelsea testified that she has asked Paul several times not to enter her home
without her consent, but he continues to enter her home.
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Chelsea testified: “I’m very fearful for my physical safety as [Paul] has threatened
to kill me several times, and those threats have been made in the last six months.” She
explained: “He has off and on over the years made threats and then more recently, he said
if his criminal activity came to light, he would f---ing kill me. And that criminal activity
has come to light. So, I’m very fearful as those investigations continue that things will get
worse.”
Chelsea testified that she did not ask for protection for the children because Paul has
not threatened the children, and she does not want to interfere with their relationship. On
cross-examination, Paul’s attorney asked Chelsea if, as part of the judgment and decree,
she stipulated that Paul is a “fit and proper” person to have joint custody of the children.
Chelsea’s attorney objected. Paul’s attorney argued that the question was relevant because
Chelsea described Paul as fit and proper to parent, which conflicts with her description of
him “as sociopathic” and threatening. The district court ruled that the question was
irrelevant because Chelsea was not seeking an OFP on behalf of the children.
At the hearing, Paul admitted that he did not treat Chelsea well and that he
“traumatized” her. Paul admitted that he installed a camera in the bedroom but stated that
it was not up for long. Paul also admitted that he accessed Chelsea’s vehicle’s GPS. And
he agreed that Chelsea asked him numerous times not to enter her home. But he testified
that he never physically harmed Chelsea or threatened to kill her. And he stated that he
only briefly entered Chelsea’s home with the children and when they discovered that she
was not home, they all waited for her in Paul’s vehicle.
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On May 21, 2025, the district court filed an order granting the OFP, determining
that Chelsea met her burden of proving that Paul “committed domestic abuse by inflicting
fear or imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault, and by making terroristic threats.”
This appeal followed.
DECISION
OFP
Paul argues that the district court abused its discretion by issuing an OFP because
Chelsea described past behavior but nothing “imminent” or “immediate.” “We review the
district court’s decision to grant an OFP for an abuse of discretion.” Ekman v. Miller, 812
N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn. App. 2012). “A district court abuses its discretion by making
findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a
decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d
502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). We review the district court’s factual findings
for clear error and will not reverse those findings unless they are “manifestly contrary to
the weight of the evidence.” Ekman, 812 N.W.2d at 895 (quotation omitted). “We defer
to the district court’s credibility determinations and do not reconcile conflicting evidence.”
Butler v. Jakes, 977 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn. App. 2022) (quotation omitted).
Under the Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act , an individual may petition for an OFP
alleging domestic abuse. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 4 (2024). “Domestic abuse” is
conduct “against a family or household member by a family or household member” that
includes, but is not limited to, inflicting “fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or
assault,” and terroristic threats. Id., subd. 2(a) (2024). “Whoever threatens, directly or
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indirectly, to commit any crime of violence with purpose to terrorize another . . . or in a
reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror” is guilty of threatening violence.
Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2024).
A petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate domestic abuse by a preponderance of
the evidence— meaning, the petitioner must show that it is more probable than not that
domestic abuse occurred. Oberg ex rel. Minor Child v. Bradley, 868 N.W.2d 62, 64-65
(Minn. App. 2015). “An overt physical act is not necessary to support the issuance of an
OFP.” Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009). “Present intent to
inflict fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault can be inferred from the
totality of the circumstances, including a history of past abusive behavior.” Id.
Here, the district court found Chelsea credible in describing Paul’s conduct that
caused her to fear “imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault.” See Butler, 977
N.W.2d at 871 (stating that this court defers to district court credibility determinations).
Not only did the district court credit Chelsea’s testimony that Paul made threats during
their marriage, specifically threatening to “hack up [her] body . . . dissolve [her body] in
chemicals and then dispose of [her] body . . . and [] tell [their] kids that [she] ran away
because [she] didn’t love them,” but he also recently threatened to “f---ing kill” her if his
criminal activity came to light. Chelsea testified that law enforcement is investigating Paul.
Thus, the record supports the district court’s finding of fear of imminent harm.
Additionally, Paul suggests that Chelsea cannot fear him because she stated that she
would welcome him into her home when she is there but is only concerned about him
entering her home when she is not there. But Chelsea’s concern about Paul entering her
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home without her consent relates to what he could do while he is unsupervised in her home.
He covertly installed a camera in the bedroom when he lived there. After moving out, he
entered her garage, obtained her GPS data, and left her garage door open and unsecured,
leaving her home vulnerable. So, not only is there concern about what Paul could do while
he is in Chelsea’s home when she is not present to monitor his behavior, there is also the
concern that he will leave her home open and susceptible to other potential criminal
conduct.
Finally, the district court determined that Paul committed domestic abuse by making
terroristic threats. Chelsea testified that P aul threatened to kill her, which qualifies as a
threat of violence. See State v. Rund, 896 N.W.2d 527, 534 (Minn. 2017 ) (stating that
threat to “kill police officers in tweets” fits within terroristic- threats statute prohibition of
terrorizing or exhibiting a reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing). The district court
did not abuse its discretion by granting the OFP because the district court’s findings are
not “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence.” See Ekman, 812 N.W.2d at 895
(quotation omitted).
Admission of Evidence
Paul also argues that the OFP should be reversed because the district court did not
allow relevant cross-examination “on [Chelsea’s] acknowledgement that [he] was a fit and
proper person” to have joint custody of the two minor children to dispute Chelsea’s claims
of “horrific threats.” Essentially, Paul is questioning how Chelsea can stipulate that he is
“fit and proper” to parent their children but also claim that he threatened to kill her and tell
her children she left them because she did not love them.
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The Minnesota Rules of Evidence apply to domestic-abuse hearings. Olson ex rel.
A.C.O. v. Olson, 892 N.W.2d 837, 841 (Minn. App. 2017). We review the district court’s
evidentiary rulings at an OFP hearing for an abuse of discretion. Id. To be entitled to
relief, Paul must demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in its evidentiary
ruling which caused prejudice. See i d. “An evidentiary error is prejudicial if it might
reasonably have . . . changed the result of the [proceeding].” George v. Est. of Baker, 724
N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2006).
The district court ruled that Paul’s question was irrelevant. Relevant evidence is
“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. To be relevant, the evidence that C helsea stipulated that
Paul was fit and proper to be a parent would have to tend to make a fact of consequence to
the issuance of the OFP more probable or less probable. A fact of consequence to the
issuance of the OFP would be whether Chelsea met her burden to establish the existence
of domestic abuse—that Paul committed domestic abuse against Chelsea. The evidence is
not relevant to whether Paul’s conduct caused Chelsea to fear “imminent physical harm,
bodily injury, or assault” because the evidence relates to Chelsea’s belief about Paul as a
parent, not about her fear of his treatment of her. Paul fails to show that the district court
abused its discretion in its evidentiary ruling. Moreover, this record supports the district
court’s grant of the OFP regardless of the outcome of the district court’s evidentiary ruling.
Affirmed.