Richard G. Perry, et al., Respondents,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0904

Richard G. Perry, et al.,
Respondents,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Department of Natural Resources, et al.,
Defendants,

Bruce Allen Junker,
Appellant.

Filed March 30, 2026
Affirmed
Florey, Judge*

Mille Lacs County District Court
File No. 48-CV-22-1725

Robert L. Russell, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondents)

John E. Mack, New London Law, P.A., New London, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order denying his motion for a new trial,
arguing the court erred in its conclusion that there was a valid establishment of a boundary
by practical location. We affirm.
FACTS
In May 1984, respondents Richard and Shirley Perry (the Perrys) purchased
property in Mille Lacs County (the Perry property). At this time, Thomas Junker and his
brother, appellant Bruce Junker, were in the process of purchasing the property directly
next to the Perry property. Thomas and Bruce Junker (the Junkers) would fully complete
the purchase of the property (the Junker property) in October 1989. Unbeknownst to the
Perrys and the Junkers, the recorded legal descriptions of the Perry property and the Junker
property created an overlap; the legal descriptions of both properties purported to convey
approximately 4.26 feet of the south line and approximately 16 feet along the lake to both
parties (the disputed area).
At the closing of the Perry property purchase, the Perrys and their real estate agent
met with Thomas and Bruce Junker to discuss the location of the shared boundary line.
Bruce Junker pointed to a tree near the shoreline and two trees near the road, stating that
these trees were monuments to the boundary line. These stated monuments identified the
disputed property as owned by the Perrys.
1

1 At trial, Junker denied that this conversation occurred. However, the district court
determined that Junker’s testimony was not credible and concluded, based on the evidence,
3
After the shared boundary-line discussion, the Perrys utilized the disputed area
without seeking permission from the Junkers. Specifically, the Perrys had their children
play in the disputed area, singlehandedly mowed the grass of the disputed area, hung their
wet clothes in the disputed area, their daughter planted trees there, and they parked their
personal vehicles in the disputed area. Additionally, the Junkers and the Perrys
collaboratively built shared shoreline steps and a boat dock that aligned with the
tree-indicated boundary line.
In 1992, the Junkers, the Perrys, and two other neighbors collaboratively paid to
have their properties surveyed to address believed boundary-line inaccuracies. The survey
discovered “areas of concern” regarding all of the boundary lines. The group tried to
address the issue by agreeing to redraw the property lines; however, this agreement fell
through. The Junkers and the Perrys agreed to keep the boundary line the same as prior.
In April 2010, Thomas Junker and his wife conveyed their interest in the Junker
property to Bruce Junker. In 2021, Bruce Junker (Junker) had his property surveyed.
Thereafter, Junker cut down the boundary-line trees, including trees planted by the Perrys’
daughter, and installed a fence on the edge of the disputed property near the undisputed
portion of the Perrys’ property. The Perrys obtained their own survey, which showed that
the original deeds overlapped, causing the disputed area in question.

that the conversation did occur. We grant great deference to the district court’s credibility
determinations, see, e.g., Matter of Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 374 (Minn. 1990),
and will not set aside its factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, see
Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 2013). Junker does not
provide any substantive argument that the district court’s findings are clearly erroneous;
thus, we defer to its factual findings.
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The Perrys filed an application to gain registered title over the disputed area. The
bench trial occurred in November 2024. After the trial, the district court concluded (1) the
Perrys gained title over the disputed area through adverse possession, (2) Junker and the
Perrys entered into an express agreement to a boundary and Junker acquiesced to that
boundary line for over 17 years, establishing a boundary by practical location, and
(3) because Junker acquiesced to this boundary for over 15 years, he was barred from a
right of entry under Minnesota law.
Junker moved the court for a new trial. Junker’s notice of motion and motion
asserted:
1. The evidence was insufficient to ground the findings
of the court.
2. The court committed the following errors of law:
a. Failure to credit the testimony of Bruce Junker.
b. Failure to determine that applicants’ action
was barred by the doctrine of laches.
c. Failure to determine that applicants’
possession of the disputed property was not exclusive.
d. Failure to determine that the Perrys trespassed
on the Junker property occurred through numerous of
the applicants’ acts.
e. Other failures of law.
f. Failure to consider the tax consequence of
applicants’ failure to pay taxes on the disputed property.

At the motion hearing, the district court asked Junker if there was anything he
wanted to add to the motion. Junker verbally raised additional assertions: the court erred
in concluding that the Perrys occupied the disputed area continuously, and regardless of
whether there was an express agreement, it was not in writing and therefore invalid under
the statute of frauds.
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The district court denied the motion for a new trial, concluding that there was “clear,
convincing, positive, and unequivocal [evidence] to justify the [o]rder entered”;
appropriate weight was given to Junker’s noncredible testimony; there is insufficient
evidence to support the assertion that the Perrys trespassed on Junker’s property, or that
the Perrys’ claim was barred by the doctrine of laches; there was sufficient evidence to
support the court’s conclusion that the Perrys’ possession of the disputed area was
exclusive; the matter was a boundary dispute and therefore there is no statutory requirement
that the Perrys pay the real estate taxes to obtain the property through adverse possession;
and the district court would not review any asserted errors not explicitly written in their
notice of motion for a new trial. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Junker challenges the district court’s order denying him a new trial. “We review a
district court’s new trial decision under an abuse of discretion standard.”
Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 892 (Minn. 2010). The district
court’s decision will not be set aside unless its findings of fact are clearly erroneous or it
improperly applied the law. Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008).
Junker argues that the district court erred in concluding there was a valid express
agreement establishing a boundary by practical location. 2 The doctrine of boundary by

2 Junker argues that the district court erred in concluding the matter was a boundary dispute
because the Perrys’ initial filing was an application to register title. A party “may apply
by a duly verified petition to the court to have all or some of the boundary lines judicially
determined.” Minn. Stat. § 508.671, subd. 1 (2024). The Perrys’ filing did not prevent the
matter from being a boundary dispute. Further, boundary-line disputes occur when the
legal descriptions of the properties are imprecise, causing a “ genuine confusion over the
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practical location is a legislatively codified doctrine used to resolve disputes between
private parties where the legally recorded boundary to the properties is so flawed that there
is “hopeless ambiguity in locating the boundary line,” and recognizes the actions of the
parties to determine the boundary. Ruikkie v. Nall, 798 N.W.2d 806, 816 (Minn. App.
2011), rev. denied (Minn. July 19, 2011); see also Minn. Stat. § 508.02 (2024) (statute
codifying practical-location doctrine). It results in one landowner gaining and the other
losing part of the adjoining property. Ruikkie , 798 N.W.2d at 816. One way to prove a
boundary by practical location is showing that an express agreement between the
landowners occurred, setting a precise line, and acquiescence to the agreement for a set
period of time. Id. at 817-18.
Junker first argues that the express agreement was invalid because it was “vague,”
“distant,” “unclear,” and “ancient.” Junker does not provide any argument, beyond this
assertion, showing how the agreement was ambiguous or otherwise unenforceable. Junker
cites Slindee v. Fritch Investments, LLC, stating that an express agreement requires more
than “unspoken and unwritten mutual agreements,” it requires some specific discussion or
action showing the landowners agreed to a specific boundary. 760 N.W.2d 903, 909-10
(Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted). Without more argumentation, we fail to see how
the Perrys’ and the Junkers’ conversation failed to meet this requirement. In essence, we

boundary line between the two properties.” Starbeck v. Gibson, 2 N.W.3d 535, 542
(Minn. App. 2024), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 24, 2024). There was no abuse of discretion
in determining that the matter included a boundary dispute.
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consider such inadequately briefed issues forfeited. See, e.g., Jundt v. Jundt, 12 N.W.3d
201, 204 (Minn. App. 2024), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 31, 2024).
Junker argues that, even if there was express agreement, the statute of frauds prevent
its enforcement. Because Junker did not raise this issue in his notice of motion and motion
for a new trial, the district court did not hear the argument, citing Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 59.01(f). Junker does not challenge the application of rule 59.01(f); instead,
Junker hurdles over the issue and runs straight into arguing why the statute of frauds
applies. We will not review issues not considered by the district court. See Thiele v. Stich,
425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Further, appellate courts are error-correcting courts;
we do not try cases de novo. See In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 374
(Minn. 1990). Junker’s argument is not reviewable.
Lastly, because Junker’s arguments are not reviewable, we must presume that the
district court did not err in its conclusion that the parties established a boundary by practical
location. See Butler v. Jakes, 977 N.W.2d 867, 873 (Minn. App. 2022) (“Appellate courts
cannot presume error by the district court, and the complaining party has the obligation to
provide the appellate court with a record sufficient to show any alleged error.”). Without
an error, the boundary by practical location is sufficient alone to establish that the Perrys
gained possession of the disputed property. See Minn. Stat. § 508.02 (2024); see also
Ruikkie, 798 N.W.2d at 817 n.6 (recognizing practical location doctrine and adverse
possession “are distinct and require proof of different elements”). Thus, we need not
review Junker’s arguments related to adverse possession.
Affirmed.