State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0910

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Juan Ramirez, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed April 20, 2026
Affirmed
Segal, Judge*

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CR-24-2247

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mitchell S. Sell, Woodbury City Attorney, Eckberg Lammers, Stillwater, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Segal ,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Judge
This is a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction for driving while impaired
(DWI). Appellant argues that his rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated by
the admission of witness testimony about a preliminary lab test result without testimony
from the analyst who performed the test. He also asserts ineffective assistance of counsel
in his pro se supplemental brief. Because we conclude that appellant has not demonstrated
that the district court plainly erred by admitting this evidence and cannot review the
ineffective-assistance claim because it is based on information that is outside the record,
we affirm.
FACTS
At around 1:00 a.m. on June 9, 2024, an officer from the Woodbury Police
Department was notified that a nearby car had at least one owner whose license had been
canceled as inimical to public safety. The officer located the car, noticed that its left
taillight was out, and initiated a stop. The officer observed that the driver, later identified
as appellant Juan Ramirez, Jr., had “bloodshot, watery eyes, [and] constricted pupils” and
that his speech was “slow” and “lethargic.” When asked about his destination, Ramirez
responded with confusion.
Based on these factors, the officer decided to administer field sobriety tests. Before
conducting the tests, the officer asked Ramirez whether he takes any prescription
medications. Ramirez stated that he takes methadone, which the officer later testified does
not generally result in symptoms of impairment. The field sobriety test results indicated to
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the officer that Ramirez may be under the influence, and he placed Ramirez under arrest.
The officer then obtained a search warrant that authorized taking a blood sample from
Ramirez for testing by the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA).
The test results showed the presence of amphetamine and methamphetamine in
Ramirez’s blood. Respondent State of Minnesota charged Ramirez with two counts of
DWI, including operating a vehicle under the influence of a controlled substance in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(2) (Supp. 2023), and operating a vehicle with
any amount of a schedule I or II controlled substance in the body in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.20, subd. 1(7) (Supp. 2023).
At trial, the state called a forensic scientist from the BCA as one of its witnesses.
The scientist described the BCA’s procedures for drug testing from a blood sample. She
explained that a “preliminary screening test” is performed, which “helps narrow down the
drug categories that might be present in the sample.” If the screening test reveals the
“presumptive presence” of a drug, then a “confirmatory test” is performed. Even though
the witness was not the scientist who performed the preliminary screening test, she was
asked by the prosecutor about the results of that test. The scientist testified that she
reviewed the results of the preliminary test and that Ramirez’s blood sample was
presumptively positive for four substances, including fentanyl. Ramirez did not object to
this testimony. The scientist then testified that she performed the confirmatory test on
Ramirez’s blood sample and that she only tested for amphetamine and methamphetamine;
she did not test for fentanyl. The confirmatory testing showed the presence of both
amphetamine and methamphetamine.
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At the close of trial, the jury was instructed in connection with the second count of
the complaint—operating a vehicle with any amount of a schedule I or II controlled
substance in the body—that methamphetamine and amphetamine are schedule II controlled
substances. The instructions made no mention of fentanyl.
During deliberations, the jury submitted the following question to the district court:
“Your Honor, is count I [the under-the-influence count] based on being specifically under
the influence of methamphetamine?” The district court responded by advising the jury to
rely on the instructions provided. After additional deliberations, the jury returned a verdict
of guilty on both counts. The district court entered judgments of conviction and sentenced
Ramirez on the first count to a stayed sentence of 364 days imprisonment with credit for
36 days served.
DECISION
I.
We address first Ramirez’s argument that his rights under the Confrontation Clause
were violated because the scientist testified about the results of the preliminary screening
test when she did not perform the test.
Because Ramirez did not object to this testimony at trial, we analyze his arguments
for plain error. State v. Noor, 907 N.W.2d 646, 649- 50 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied
(Minn. Apr. 25, 2018). “In order to meet the plain error standard, a criminal defendant
must show that (1) there was an error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected the
defendant’s substantial rights.” State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn. 2016). “The
party asserting plain error has the burden of establishing all three elements.” State v.
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Hollins, 765 N.W.2d 125, 131 (Minn. App. 2009). “If these three prongs are met, the
appellate court then assesses whether it should address the error to ensure fairness and the
integrity of the judicial proceedings.” State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998).
The Confrontation Clause of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions
provides defendants with the right to confront the witnesses against them. U.S. Const.
amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. In Crawford v. Washington, the United States Supreme
Court held that it is a violation of the Confrontation Clause to admit hearsay statements in
a criminal trial that are “testimonial,” unless the declarant is unavailable for trial and the
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004);
accord Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2013). Subsequent cases have made
clear that the Confrontation Clause applies to testimony about laboratory test reports. See,
e.g., State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 307, 310 (Minn. 2006) (holding that a BCA lab
report, offered at trial to prove that a substance seized from the defendant was cocaine, is
testimonial, implicating the defendant’s confrontation rights under Crawford).
There are “three prerequisites” to establishing a violation of the Confrontation
Clause under Crawford: (1) “the statement in question was testimonial,” (2) “the statement
was admitted for the truth of the matter asserted,” and (3) “the defendant was unable to
cross-examine the declarant.” Andersen, 830 N.W.2d at 9. Applying this three-part test
here, we are unpersuaded that the scientist’s testimony about the preliminary screening test
results w as offered for the truth of the matter asserted —that Ramirez had (or
“presumptively” had) fentanyl in his system. Whether or not Ramirez had fentanyl in his
system is not relevant to the state’s case, which was based exclusively on the presence of
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amphetamine and methamphetamine. Instead, the state argues that the testimony was
provided for the purpose of providing background concerning the procedures typically
followed for drug testing and for selecting the drugs to be tested in the confirmatory test.
It was this confirmatory test, which was performed by the testifying scientist, that was
offered for the truth of the matter asserted—that Ramirez’s blood sample tested positive
for amphetamine and methamphetamine.
Nevertheless, even if we were to assume that Ramirez’s rights of confrontation were
violated by the testimony and that the error in allowing the testimony was plain, we are not
persuaded that Ramirez has established the third prong of the plain-error test—that the
admission of the testimony affected his substantial rights. “With respect to the substantial-
rights requirement, [the defendant] bears the burden of establishing that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect on
the jury’s verdict.” State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 38 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted);
see also Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 741 (describing defendant’s burden as a “heavy” one). To
determine whether an error had a significant effect on the jury, courts may consider “the
strength of the state’s case, the pervasiveness of the error, and whether the defendant had
an opportunity to respond.” Noor, 907 N.W.2d at 657; see also State v. Weaver , 733
N.W.2d 793, 801 (Minn. App. 2007) (articulating these and other considerations), rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 2007).
Here, the state had a strong case against Ramirez for both DWI counts, including:
(1) the uncontested confirmatory lab test results that showed the presence of amphetamine
and methamphetamine, which are both schedule II controlled substances, supported by the
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testimony of the scientist who performed the test; (2) the testimony of the officer who
conducted the traffic stop related to his observations of signs of impairment exhibited by
Ramirez and the results of the field sobriety tests; and (3) the video of the traffic stop and
field sobriety tests that was admitted into evidence, which supported the officer’s
testimony.
In addition, the state’s only mention of fentanyl was in a single sentence of the
scientist’s testimony. Fentanyl was not referenced by the state at any other point during
the trial, including during the state’s closing argument. See Weaver , 733 N.W.2d at 801
(stating that one substantial-rights consideration is whether the error is mentioned during
closing argument). The alleged “error” was thus not pervasive.
Ramirez also had the opportunity to respond to the testimony. Ramirez’s trial
counsel cross-examined the scientist about her testimony. And Ramirez, who testified after
the scientist, chose to describe his previous fentanyl addiction, and he explained that
fentanyl might have been present in the blood sample because he was unknowingly
administered fentanyl as a sedative during a medical procedure that occurred about a week
before the traffic stop.
Finally, Ramirez argues that the question the jury submitted to the district court
during deliberations “suggests it was focused on the fentanyl . . . because the jury asked if
a drug other than methamphetamine could justify Ramirez’s [impairment].” But the jury’s
question was whether “count 1[, the under- the-influence count, was] based on being
specifically under the influence of methamphetamine.” As the state notes, because the jury
was also instructed on amphetamine, the jury could have been asking about that drug. But
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regardless, the jury’s intent in asking the question is at best ambiguous and is not sufficient
to overcome the factors discussed above.
We therefore conclude that, even if the admission of the testimony about the
preliminary screening test was in error, it did not have a significant effect on the jury’s
verdict. Ramirez has thus failed to establish the existence of a reversible plain error.
II.
Ramirez argues in his pro se supplemental brief that the judgment of conviction
should be reversed because of ineffective assistance of counsel. Ramirez, however,
provides us with no record upon which to review this argument. His argument relies on
discussions he had with his trial counsel that are outside the record. We therefore decline
to consider it, but the argument is preserved if Ramirez chooses to seek review of this issue
through timely postconviction proceedings. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 8 (“The
record on appeal consists of the documents filed in the district court, the offered exhibits,
and the transcript of the proceedings, if any.”).
Affirmed.