Lorne Bruce Johnson, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0926

Lorne Bruce Johnson,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed March 9, 2026
Affirmed
Ede, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CV-24-7986

Jay S. Adkins, Godwin Adkins, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Leah Hedman, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Halbrooks,
Judge.
∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
This is an appeal from a district court’s order sustaining the revocation of appellant’s
driving privileges and the impoundment of his license plates. Appellant argues that the

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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district court erred in declining to suppress the evidence underlying his driver’s license
revocation and license-plate impoundment, which he claims is the fruit of law
enforcement’s unconstitutional trespass and violation of his reasonable expectation of
privacy in his home. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Lorne Bruce Johnson petitioned for an implied-consent hearing, seeking
reinstatement of his driving privileges and license plates after he received notice from the
Minnesota Department of Public Safety in October 2024 that his driver’s license and
license plates would be revoked and canceled for three years. The matter proceeded to an
implied-consent hearing, at which a Rochester Police Department officer testified and the
district court admitted several exhibits, including a video recording produced by the
testifying officer’s body-worn camera.1 After the hearing, the district court filed an order
sustaining the revocation of Johnson’s driving privileges and the impoundment of his
license plates. The following summary of undisputed facts stems from the findings set forth
in the district court’s order.
On the evening of October 13, 2024, officers with the Rochester Police Department
responded to a 911 call about a conflict between neighbors. Upon arriving at the scene, law
enforcement was informed by the 911 caller that her neighbor—Johnson— was

1 The district court conducted the implied -consent hearing concurrently with a hearing on
Johnson’s motion to suppress evidence in a parallel criminal proceeding arising from the
same incident underlying this matter. Although the district court’s order addresses both the
implied-consent and criminal matters, this appeal concerns only Johnson’s challenge to the
district court’s order sustaining the revocation of appellant’s driving privileges and the
impoundment of his license plates.
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“intoxicated and confrontational.” The 911 caller explained that the dispute began when
her brother visited the neighborhood and parked in the driveway of a nearby home known
to be unoccupied because of a pending sale. Because Johnson reportedly believed that the
911 caller’s brother should not have parked there, Johnson blocked in the brother’s truck
by positioning his own vehicle in front of the driveway. The 911 caller stated that Johnson
then returned to his home.
Law enforcement observed a vehicle—which they determined was registered to
Johnson—blocking the driveway. The officers spoke with the 911 caller’s brother, who
stated that it was his truck blocked in the driveway by Johnson’s vehicle and that he needed
to leave. The 911 caller identified Johnson’s home, which was across the street from the
driveway. One of the officers observed that Johnson was present in his home and standing
at the front kitchen window, apparently watching law enforcement speak to his neighbors.
The officers went to Johnson’s home to ask him to move his vehicle. The residence
was “a small, rectangular single-family home” with “a front door and two front windows
facing the street, all spaced closely together.” At the front of the house next to the street,
two steps led to a small deck and the front door. The deck did not extend under the two
front windows on each side. One of the officers walked up the steps, rang the doorbell, and
briefly shined his flashlight into the window on the right side of the deck. At the implied-
consent hearing, the officer testified that he used his flashlight “for safety reasons” and that
doing so “was a common practice for him when approaching homes. ” After receiving no
answer, the officer knocked on the door and rang the doorbell three times. The officer also
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stated, “Lorne, it’s the police, open the door please,” before ringing the doorbell two more
times.
When these efforts remained unanswered, the officer left the deck and walked five
steps to the front left window, which was partially open without curtains drawn. The officer
briefly shined his flashlight into the front left window and loudly said, “Lorne, come to the
door, it’s the police.” While shining the flashlight and looking into the front left window,
the officer “did not observe any contraband, evidence, or illegal activity.” A few seconds
later, the officer shouted, “Lorne, if you don ’t come to the door, I’m going to tow your
truck. Come to the door. Can you come out here please, sir?” Johnson responded from
inside the home, “Yeah.”
The officer returned to the front sidewalk that led to the steps, deck, and front door.
Johnson opened the front door and stood in the threshold. The total period between the first
time the officer rang the doorbell and when Johnson opened the front door was under two
minutes. The officer remained on the front sidewalk and spoke to Johnson, telling him that
they needed to talk about his vehicle and that he could not block the driveway. And the
officer asked Johnson to go back into his home, get his keys, and move his vehicle. The
officer reiterated that, if Johnson did not move his vehicle, law enforcement would have to
call for a tow truck.
Johnson replied by asking who would move his vehicle if he gave law enforcement
his keys, and the officer inquired why Johnson could not move the vehicle himself. In
response, Johnson said: “Dude, I’ve had a few too many beers, alright?” He ultimately
provided his keys to law enforcement and answered questions by the officer about the
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altercation with his neighbors, his conduct, and his alcohol consumption. The officer
arrested Johnson for driving while impaired (DWI) and Johnson was later charged with
three DWI-related offenses.
After the Minnesota Commissioner of Public Safety revoked Johnson’s driving
privileges under Minnesota Statutes sections 169A.50 to .53 (2024) and impounded his
license plates under Minnesota Statutes section 169A.60 (2024), Johnson sought
reinstatement of his driving privileges and license plates by petitioning for an implied-
consent hearing. At the hearing, Johnson explained that the only contested issue was
whether law enforcement had violated his constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures by trespassing on his property. The parties submitted post -hearing
memoranda and the district court took the matter under advisement.
The district court later sustained the revocation of appellant’s driving privileges and
the impoundment of his license plates. In its order, the district court determined that law
enforcement did not violate Johnson’s constitutional rights when the officer entered his
property and spoke with him.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Johnson asserts that the district court erred in declining to suppress the evidence
underlying his driver’s license revocation and license-plate impoundment, which he claims
is the fruit of law enforcement’s unconstitutional trespass and violation of his reasonable
expectation of privacy in his home. We conclude that the evidence for which Johnson
sought suppression is not the fruit of unconstitutional conduct by law enforcement.
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The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures by the government. U.S . Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Under the
exclusionary rule, evidence seized in violation of an individual’s constitutional rights is
inadmissible in implied-consent proceedings. Harrison v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 781
N.W.2d 918, 920 (Minn. App. 2010). The exclusionary rule encompasses evidence under
the “‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine,” which “concerns ‘whether, granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has
been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’” Knapp v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 610
N.W.2d 625, 627 n.4 (Minn. 2000) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488
(1963)); see also Sjodin v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 401 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn. App. 1987)
(explaining that “[t]he ‘fruit[] of the poisonous tree” doctrine excludes evidence obtained
after a violation of the [F] ourth [A]mendment” (citing United States v. Crews, 445 U.S.
463, 471 (1980))). “Whether the exclusionary rule prohibits the admission of evidence in
a particular case is a question of law, which we review de novo.” State v. Maldonado-
Arreaga, 772 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Minn. App. 2009) (citing State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d
353, 359 (Minn. 2004)); see also Harrison, 781 N.W.2d at 920 (explaining that, in an
appeal from an implied-consent proceeding, we review questions of law concerning an
alleged constitutional violation de novo).
Appellate courts examine “several factors to determine whether . . . illegal evidence
taints its fruits.” Knapp, 610 N.W.2d at 628. The Minnesota Supreme Court has referred to
these as “the Warndahl factors,” which include: (A) “the purpose and flagrancy of the
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misconduct”; (B) “the presence of intervening circumstances”; (C) “whether it is likely that
the evidence would have been obtained in the absence of the illegality”; and (D) “the
temporal proximity of the illegality and the evidence alleged to be the fruit of the illegality.”
Id. at 628–29 (quoting State v. Warndahl, 436 N.W.2d 770, 776 (Minn. 1989)).
Johnson contends that “there is no exception to the exclusionary rule in this case
and all evidence must be suppressed because it was obtained after, and as a result of,” law
enforcement’s violation of Johnson’s constitutional rights. Because whether the challenged
evidence is inadmissible under the fruit- of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine is dispositive, we
assume without deciding that law enforcement unconstitutionally trespassed and violated
Johnson’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his home. We next address each of the
Warndahl factors in turn.
A. The Purpose and Flagrancy of the Assumed Misconduct
The purpose and flagrancy of the assumed misconduct does not favor suppression
under the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine.
The undisputed facts establish that the officer’s purpose in approaching Johnson’s
home was only to ask that Johnson move his vehicle so that it would no longer block the
driveway. Before attempting to contact Johnson, law enforcement saw him standing at his
front window watching them speak with his neighbors. The officer walked up the steps,
rang the doorbell, and briefly shined his flashlight into the right- side window “for safety
reasons,” not criminal or regulatory investigative purposes. After knocking on the door,
ringing the doorbell multiple times, identifying himself as law enforcement, and asking
Johnson to “open the door please,” the officer left the deck and walked five steps to the
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front left window, which was partially open without curtains drawn. When the officer
briefly shined his flashlight into the front left window, again identified himself as a police
officer, and told Johnson to “come to the door, it’s the police,” the officer “did not observe
any contraband, evidence, or illegal activity .” And when the officer still received no
answer, he did not threaten to arrest Johnson or enter the home, but rather addressed
Johnson as “sir,” asked him to “come out . . . please,” and informed him that, if he did not
come to the door, the officer would tow Johnson’s vehicle. After Johnson responded by
saying, “Yeah,” the officer returned to the front sidewalk while Johnson opened the front
door and stood in the threshold. Less than two minutes elapsed between the first time the
officer rang the doorbell and when Johnson opened the front door.
The events that followed Johnson’s appearance at the door also show that law
enforcement’s purpose was merely to get him to move his vehicle from its position
blocking the driveway. The officer remained on the front sidewalk, told Johnson that he
could not block the driveway, asked him to move his vehicle, and reiterated that he would
otherwise have to call for a tow truck. Even the question that precipitated Johnson’s
admission to impairment—the officer’s inquiry as to why Johnson could not move the
vehicle himself in response to Johnson’s question about who would move his vehicle if he
gave law enforcement his keys— was related to moving the vehicle.
Under these circumstances, in which the purpose of the assumed misconduct was to
ask Johnson to move his vehicle and any flagrancy was limited by the brevity and scope of
the intrusion, we conclude that this factor does not favor suppression under the fruit-of -
the-poisonous-tree doctrine.
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B. The Presence of Intervening Circumstances
The presence of intervening circumstances does not favor suppression under the
fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine.
Johnson’s voluntary decisions to come to the door, to ask who would move his
vehicle if he gave law enforcement his keys, and to admit in response to the officer’s
question from the front sidewalk that he had “ had a few too many beers” are intervening
circumstances that weigh against suppression. As the district court explained in its order,
Johnson voluntarily opened the door, stood in the doorway and
conversed with the officers. The officers did not make a
warrantless entry into . . . Johnson’s home, nor were they let in
by a third party. They did not order . . . Johnson to come to the
door under threat of warrantless entry or threat of
arrest. . . . Johnson chose to engage with the officers.

. . . Johnson’s vehicle was illegally parked on a public
roadway and was additionally preventing a civilian from
leaving the area; the officers had the legal right to tow
it. . . . Johnson could have chosen to continue preserving his
privacy remaining in his home and allowing the officers to tow
the truck. He chose not to do so.

On appeal, Johnson makes no argument that any of his choices during the incident were
involuntary.
Indeed, it is undisputed that the officer “did not observe any contraband, evidence,
or illegal activity” while he was near the front of Johnson’s home —including when the
officer was at the front door and front left window, as well as when he briefly shined his
flashlight inside. Law enforcement obtained the challenged evidence only after the officer
returned to the front sidewalk, Johnson chose to come to the front door, and Johnson
decided to answer questions by admitting to alcohol consumption. In other words,
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Johnson’s admissions were not “come at by exploitation of . . . [any assumed] illegality”—
i.e., the officer’s presence at Johnson’s front door and front left window, and his brief uses
of his flashlight to look inside —and “instead [were obtained] by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the [assumed] primary taint” —i.e., Johnson’s voluntary
decisions to come to the door and admit to his alcohol consumption and impairment.
Knapp, 610 N.W.2d at 627 n.4 (quotation omitted).
We therefore conclude that these intervening circumstances weigh heavily against
suppression under the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine. See Warndahl, 436 N.W.2d at
776 (concluding that the defendant’s decision to initiate the contact with police, which led
to a statement for which the defendant sought suppression under the fruit-of-the-poisonous-
tree doctrine, was “an intervening circumstance which arguably suffice[d] to erase any
taint”); see also State v. Hoven, 269 N.W.2d 849, 854 (Minn. 1978) (“[A] truly voluntary
confession which is the product of free will is considered untainted by an illegal arrest and
therefore admissible.”).
C. Whether It Is Likely that the Evidence Would Have Been Obtained in
the Absence of the Assumed Illegality

Because it is likely that the evidence would have been obtained in the absence of
the assumed illegality , this factor does not favor suppression under the fruit- of-the-
poisonous-tree doctrine.
Johnson’s voluntary decisions to come to the door and admit to his alcohol
consumption and impairment are not only intervening circumstances but also show that
law enforcement would have obtained the challenged evidence regardless of the officer’s
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presence at Johnson’s front door and front left window, as well as his brief uses of his
flashlight to look inside. In Warndahl, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the
defendant’s decision to initiate contact with police, which led to a statement for which the
defendant sought suppression under the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, was not only
“an intervening circumstance which arguably suffice[d] to erase any taint” but also
“indicate[d] that defendant would have given an additional statement to police even if [law
enforcement] had not violated defendant’s right to counsel.” 436 N.W.2d at 776. We reach
the same conclusion here based on Johnson’s voluntary decision to come to the door, to
speak with law enforcement, and to admit to his alcohol consumption and impairment.
This factor does not favor suppression under the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine
because it is likely that the evidence would have been obtained in the absence of the
assumed illegality.
D. The Temporal Proximity of the Assumed Illegality and the E vidence
Alleged to be the Fruit of the Assumed Illegality

The temporal proximity of the assumed illegality and the evidence alleged to be its
fruit favors suppression under the fruit-of- the-poisonous-tree doctrine. The officer’s
presence at Johnson’s front door and front left window, as well as his brief uses of his
flashlight to look inside, immediately preceded Johnson’s decision to come to the door and
to admit to his alcohol consumption and impairment. Because there was a close temporal
proximity between the assumed illegality and the evidence alleged to be its fruit, we
conclude that this factor favors suppressing the evidence under the fruit-of-the-poisonous-
tree doctrine.
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In sum, weighing all the Warndahl factors and assuming “establishment of the
primary illegality,” we conclude that “the evidence to which instant objection is made has
[not] been come at by exploitation of that illegality [but] instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Knapp , 610 N.W.2d at 628 (quotation
omitted). Thus, the district court did not err in sustaining the revocation of Johnson’s
driving privileges and the impoundment of his license plates.
Affirmed.