In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Abdulkadir Elmi Egal.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0927

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Abdulkadir Elmi Egal.

Filed October 20, 2025
Remanded
Bentley, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-MH-PR-25-365

Lauren E. Pockl, Hennepin County Adult Representation Services, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant Abdulkadir Elmi Egal)

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Annsara Lovejoy Elasky, Brittany Dawn
Lawonn, Assistant County Attorneys, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin
County Attorney’s Office)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BENTLEY, Judge
Appellant Abdulkadir Elmi Egal challenges the district court’s determination that
he is subject to civil commitment as a person who poses a risk of harm due to mental illness.
Specifically, he asserts that the record does not establish by clear and convincing evidence
that he “poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to self or others” as shown by “a
recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or others.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd.
17a(a)(3) (2024).
2
Because the district court’s findings are inadequate to facilitate meaningful
appellate review, we remand for additional findings.
FACTS
The following facts are contained within exhibits received by or documents
otherwise submitted to the district court.
Egal has been diagnosed with schizophrenia. His schizophrenia manifests in
symptoms such as delusional beliefs, hallucinations, and disorganized thinking. His
condition has been described by professionals as “refractory or treatment resistant.”
Because of his mental illness, Egal has been subject to prior civil -commitment
orders. Relevant here is his most recent commitment following a 2023 incident when he
allegedly used a knife and a chemical-irritant spray to injure security officers while being
escorted out of a shopping mall. Egal was found incompetent to stand trial on a resulting
criminal charge. The district court then filed a civil commitment order in April 2023, on
the basis that Egal was a person who poses a risk of harm due to mental illness. That order
of commitment was continued in October 2023, and it expired in October 2024.
The record includes evidence indicating that, after the expiration of that
commitment, Egal was decompensating mentally and experiencing heightened paranoia
and an increase in delusional thoughts. He has also exhibited a pattern of noncompliance
with his antipsychotic medication and refusal to see a psychiatrist after his previous one
retired. Egal is diabetic, and the record identifies instances of refusal of insulin and other
related medical care.
3
In March 2025, Egal was again adjudicated incompetent to stand trial on the charges
relating to the incident at the mall. After that adjudication, respondent Hennepin County
Attorney brought the petition for civil commitment that is the subject of this appeal. The
district court held a hearing on the petition in April 2025, at which it admitted case
management notes, records from Egal’s living facility, and additional treatment records.
The parties stipulated to the report of examiner Megan Paris, PsyD, LP, ABPP, which was
also admitted into the record. Dr. Paris’s report was based on many of the documents that
the district court admitted. The report describes Egal’s relevant psychiatric history and
concludes that, because of Egal’s disorder, he poses a substantial likelihood of physical
harm to himself or others. The report found that Egal had not made a recent attempt to
harm himself or others, but it was Dr. Paris’s opinion that there is a substantial likelihood
of physical harm to himself or others because he has “an inability for reasons other than
indigence to obtain necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care as a result of the
impairment.”
After the hearing, the district court filed an order committing Egal as a person who
poses a risk of harm due to mental illness. The district court found that Egal has
schizophrenia with psychotic features, “which is a substantial psychiatric disorder of
thought, mood, perception, and orientation which grossly impairs his judgment, behavior,
capacity to recognize reality, and abilit y to reason or understand.” The district court’s
findings included that , “[a]ccording to the records, [Egal] has a history of physical
aggression, including [through the use of] a weapon, when he becomes psychiatrically
deteriorated.” The district court also found facts relating to Egal’s recent mental decline,
4
increase in symptoms, and refusal of psychiatric treatment and medical care for his
diabetes. And the district court found the report of Dr. Paris “credible and persuasive.” The
district court then concluded that “[t]he record establishes by clear and convincing
evidence [Egal], due to his impairment, poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to
themself or others as demonstrated by a recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or
others” and that there was no less restrictive alternative to commitment.
Egal appeals.
DECISION
Egal argues that the district court erred in concluding that he meets the definition of
a person who poses a risk of harm due to a mental illness under Minnesota Statutes section
253B.02, subdivision 17a(a) (2024). Specifically, he maintains that there is no clear and
convincing evidence of “a recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or others” under
subdivision 17a(a)(3) of section 253B.02, which is the basis on which the district court’s
order rests. He also argues that the record does not support any other basis to conclude he
meets the definition under subdivision 17a(a). See Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17a(a)(1)-
(4). The county asserts, on the other hand, that the record as a whole supports the district
court’s determination and that the order of commitment should be affirmed.
A district court must civilly commit an individual “[i]f the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the proposed patient is a person who poses a risk of harm due to
mental illness” and there is “no suitable alternative to judicial commitment.” Minn. Stat.
5
§ 253B.09, subd. 1(a) (2024).1 There is no dispute here that Egal has a mental illness. The
issue is whether he poses a risk of harm due to that mental illness. The fact that a person
“poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to self or others” may be shown by
(1) a failure to obtain necessary food, clothing, shelter,
or medical care as a result of the impairment;
(2) an inability for reasons other than indigence to
obtain necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care as a
result of the impairment and it is more probable than not that
the person will suffer substantial harm, significant psychiatric
deterioration or debilitation, or serious illness, unless
appropriate treatment and services are provided;
(3) a recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or
others; or
(4) recent and volitional conduct involving significant
damage to substantial property.
Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17a(a)(1)-(4).
The statute also provides that, w hen a district court orders a person to be civilly
committed under section 253B.09, subdivision 1(a), the district court “shall find the facts
specifically, and separately state its conclusions of law.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 2(a)
(2024). “[T]he findings of fact and conclusions of law shall specifically state the proposed
patient’s conduct which is a basis for determining that each of the requisites for
commitment is met.” Id.

1 The statute defines “person who poses a risk of harm due to mental illness” as “any person
who has an organic disorder of the brain or a substantial psychiatric disorder of thought,
mood, perception, orientation, or memory” when that disorder “grossly impairs judgment,
behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or to reason or understand, that is manifested by
instances of grossly disturbed behavior or faulty perceptions,” and because of that
impairment, “poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to self or others.” Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.02, subd. 17a(a).
6
On appeal, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error,
“considering the record in the light most favorable to the findings of fact.” In re Civ.
Commitment of Breault, 942 N.W.2d 368, 378 (Minn. App. 2020) (quotation omitted). “We
review de novo whether there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the
district court’s conclusion that [an individual] meets the standards for commitment.” In re
Thulin, 660 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn. App. 2003).
Here, we cannot determine whether the district court erred in concluding that Egal
is subject to civil commitment because its findings are inadequate. See In re Civ.
Commitment of Spicer , 853 N.W.2d 803 , 811 (Minn. App. 2014), rev. denied (Minn.
Aug 25, 2015) (holding that a district court’s findings may be inadequate if they are not
“meaningfully tied to its conclusions of law”). Contrary to the statute, which requires the
district court to “specifically state the proposed patient’s conduct which is a basis for
determining that each of the requisites for commitment is met ,” Minn. Stat. § 253B.09,
subd. 2(a), the district court set forth factual findings that are not tied to its legal conclusion.
The district court concluded that Egal “poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to
themself or others” because of “a recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or others.”
But its findings do not identify an overt “recent attempt or threat. ” The district court
referenced only that, “[a]ccording to t he records, [Egal] has a history of physical
aggression, including [through use of] a weapon, when he becomes psychiatrically
deteriorated.” If this was a reference to the 2023 incident at the mall, the district court did
not make any findings that the event was “recent” such that it predicts future likelihood of
harm. See In re Commitment of Leach, No. A08-0417, 2008 WL 3291421, at *3-4 (Minn.
7
App. Aug. 12, 2008) (finding it proper to judge whether conduct is recent for purposes of
the statute by “evaluating its value in predicting future harm” (quoting Eric S. Janus, Civil
Commitment in Minnesota 31 (2d ed.1991))).2
The district court’s order also includes other inconsistencies between its findings
and conclusion. For example, the district court found that Dr. Paris’s report was “credible
and persuasive” and stated, “Dr. Paris opined, due to [his] disorder, [Egal] poses a
substantial likelihood of physical harm to themself.” But the district court’s conclusion
rests on a different statutory basis than Dr. Paris’s conclusion did. Dr. Paris’s report states
that there was no “recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or others,” referencing
Minnesota Statutes section 253B.02, subdivision 17a(a)(3); but the district court concluded
that Egal pose d a substantial likelihood of harm because of a recent attempt or threat to
harm. Dr. Paris also concluded that Egal has “an inability for reasons other than indigence
to obtain necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care as a result of the impairment,”
referencing subdivision 17a(a)(2); but the district court made no express findings or
conclusions of law with respect to that subdivision.
Involuntary commitment is a “deprivation of liberty that a governmental entity
cannot accomplish without due process of law.” State ex rel. Doe v. Madonna, 295 N.W.2d
356, 364 (Minn. 1980). And we have established in previous cases that “[t]he drafters of
the Commitment Act clearly intended to require specificity in the findings of the trial
courts,” necessitating “findings on each of the statutory requisites with a clear recitation of

2 This case is nonprecedential and, therefore, not binding. We cite nonprecedential opinions
as persuasive authority only. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
8
the evidence relied upon in reaching the court’s conclusions.” In re Danielson, 398 N.W.2d
32, 37 (Minn. App. 1986). In relying on a different statutory basis for commitment than
the examiner’s report, the district court did “not explain what evidence [it] found most
persuasive or least persuasive, [or] which facts the district court found to be most important
or least important.” Spicer, 853 N.W.2d at 811. The disconnect between the district court’s
findings and legal conclusion hinders our meaningful review. See id. (noting that it is
“particularly important” that the district court explain the evidence and facts on which it
based its decision “[i]f there are inconsistent facts or testimony in the record”).
For these reasons, we remand for the district court to make additional findings of
fact, in accordance with statutory requirements. On remand, the district court may, in its
discretion, reopen the record to allow for the submission of more evidence. We express no
opinion on the ultimate issue of whether Egal meets the statutory criteria for commitment.
Remanded.