Juan Pachuco Silva, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0932

Juan Pachuco Silva, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed February 17, 2026
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Chisago County District Court
File No. 13-CR-20-915

Juan Pachuco Silva, Brooklyn Center, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janet Reiter, Chisago County Attorney, Thomas A. Gehrz, Assistant County Attorney,
Center City, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this appeal from an order denying postconviction relief after a conviction for
fourth-degree assault, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by
rejecting his claims of prosecutorial misconduct, erroneous evidentiary rulings, and judicial
bias. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Juan Pachuco Silva with
fourth-degree assault of a correctional employee under Minn. Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 3(1)
(2020). The state’s complaint alleged that Silva bit V.A., a correctional officer. From
January 30 through February 1, 2023, the district court conducted Silva’s jury trial, and
Silva represented himself.1 The following summarizes the evidence received during trial.
V.A. testified that, on August 9, 2020, he was checking for contraband inside
inmates’ cells at the Minnesota Correctional Facility in Rush City. When V.A. searched
Silva’s cell, he found “a mixed concoction of what seemed of feces and urine in a cup.” As
a result, V.A. placed Silva on “quiet control status.” 2 V.A. and other correctional officers

1 Before trial, Silva orally waived his right to counsel and completed a signed written
waiver. The district court appointed advisory counsel to assist Silva at trial and during
sentencing proceedings.

2 V.A. testified that quiet control status is when correctional officers “search the cell of an
individual that’s already been placed in segregation. Being that they’ve broken a policy,
we take everything out of their cell. We search that individual again, and we give them the
bare essentials or the bare necessities of what they should have, so nothing extra.”
3
conducted an “unclothed body search” of Silva. When Silva was asked “to hand his
clothes” to an officer, Silva “threw the clothes” and “had to be restrained” by V.A.
V.A. testified that “during that incident Mr. Silva did, did bite me at that time.”
When asked if he felt the bite, V.A. responded, “Not initially, but there was a sting.” V.A.
confirmed that he was in “physical pain.” V.A. reported the bite to his supervisor, and a
nurse later examined and treated V.A., who had “bite marks” that broke the skin and “blood
on [his] arm.” V.A. denied “making this assault up to get Mr. Silva in trouble or otherwise
retaliate against him.”
The jury heard testimony from four other correctional officers —K.S., T.S., T.F.,
and R.K.—as well as the treating nurse, all of whom corroborated V.A.’s testimony about
the assault. The district court received, among other exhibits, photographs of V.A.’s wound
and a video of the assault as recorded by R.K. “with a handheld camera.” Silva testified
and denied biting V.A. According to Silva, the correctional officers “spliced” the video to
hide that Silva was assaulted multiple times by V.A. and to make it “appear as if [Silva]
was resisting the whole time.” Silva also called a fifth correctional officer, K.E., whose
testimony is summarized below in our analysis of the district court’s evidentiary rulings.
The jury found Silva guilty of fourth-degree assault. The district court sentenced
Silva to 12 months and one day in prison. In September 2023, Silva appealed . In
February 2024, this court dismissed Silva’s appeal based on his notice of voluntary
dismissal.
3

3 Silva was initially represented by an attorney on appeal. Shortly after this court dismissed
his direct appeal, Silva moved in district court to discharge his attorney.
4
On September 20, 2024, Silva timely petitioned for postconviction relief, seeking
to overturn his conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct, erroneous evidentiary
rulings, and judicial bias. Silva also submitted affidavits and requested an evidentiary
hearing. The state opposed. On May 8, 2025, the district court denied Silva’s
postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing.
Silva appeals.
DECISION
A person convicted of a crime may seek relief by filing a petition claiming that the
conviction “violated the person’s rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States
or of the state.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2024). A petitioner seeking
postconviction relief “bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence
that his claims merit relief.” Crow v. State, 923 N.W.2d 2, 10 (Minn. 2019). A
postconviction petition “must constitute more than argumentative assertions without
factual support.” Zornes v. State, 880 N.W.2d 363, 368 (Minn. 2016).
Appellate courts review the denial of a postconviction petition for abuse of
discretion. State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013). A district court in
postconviction proceedings abuses its discretion “when it has exercised its discretion in an
arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made
clearly erroneous factual findings.” Ries v. State, 920 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Minn. 2018)
(quotation omitted).
Silva, who is self-represented, argues that the district court abused its discretion in
denying his postconviction petition by rejecting his claims of (1) prosecutorial misconduct;
5
(2) erroneous evidentiary rulings before and during trial; and (3) judicial bias. We address
each argument in turn.4
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying postconviction relief
based on Silva’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct.

“Prosecutors have an affirmative obligation to ensure that a defendant receives a
fair trial.” State v. Jones, 753 N.W.2d 677, 686 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). A
prosecuting attorney engages in misconduct when they violate “clear or established
standards of conduct, e.g., rules, laws, orders by a district court, or clear commands in this
state’s case law.” State v. McCray, 753 N.W.2d 746, 751 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
Prosecutorial misconduct may result in the denial of a fair trial. State v. Ramey,
721 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Minn. 2006).
Silva did not object to alleged prosecutorial misconduct during trial proceedings.
Appellate courts review unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct using a modified
plain-error standard. See id. at 302. Under this standard, the appellant bears the burden of
establishing plain error. Id. “An error is plain if it . . . contravenes case law, a rule, or a
standard of conduct.” Id. (quotation omitted). If plain error occurred, the burden shifts “to
the state to demonstrate lack of prejudice; that is, the misconduct did not affect [the
appellant’s] substantial rights.” Id. The state meets this burden if it shows that there is “no

4 On appeal, Silva does not challenge the district court’s decision not to hold a
postconviction evidentiary hearing. See Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2024) (stating that a
district court must hold an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction petition “[u]nless the
petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is
entitled to no relief”). Therefore, we consider whether the district court abused its
discretion in denying the relief sought in Silva’s postconviction petition.
6
reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in question would have had a
significant effect on the verdict of the jury.” Id. (quotations omitted). If the state does not
meet its burden, the reviewing court considers “whether the error should be addressed to
ensure fairness and the integrity of judicial proceedings.” State v. Parker, 901 N.W.2d 917,
926 (Minn. 2017).
Silva maintains that the prosecuting attorney engaged in three types of misconduct,
which we consider below.
A. Brady Violations

Under Brady v. Maryland, “suppression by the State of material evidence favorable
to the defendant violates the constitutional guarantee of due process.” Allwine v. State,
994 N.W.2d 528, 541 (Minn. 2023) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).
To succeed on a Brady-violation claim, three elements are required: “(1) the evidence must
be favorable to the defendant as either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence must
have been suppressed by the prosecution, intentionally or otherwise; and (3) the evidence
must be material.” Id. at 541-42 (quotation omitted). Silva contends that the prosecuting
attorney committed two Brady violations.
First, Silva argues that the prosecuting attorney failed to send the video recording
of the assault to Silva’s parents and a friend.
5 Silva maintains that this prevented him “from
procuring a video expert to examine the same for splicing and editing.” During

5 Silva asserts that the prosecuting attorney (1) “falsely claimed that [the state] sent a video
download of the alleged assault” to Silva because the email address to which the state sent
the video did not exist and (2) mailed “two blank video discs” to Silva’s parents.
7
postconviction proceedings, the district court rejected this argument, finding that the state
“provided [Silva] with the video evidence, and he had a meaningful opportunity to review
the evidence prior to trial.” On appeal, Silva counters that “[t]his view is inconsequential
to [his] stated intent to have [his] parents and [his friend] receive a copy of the video disc.”
We note that the rules of criminal procedure mandate disclosure to only the
defendant or their attorney if they are represented. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.03, subd. 4
(“Materials furnished to a party under discovery rules or orders must remain in the party’s
custody and be used by the party only to conduct that attorney’s side of the case, and may
be subject to other conditions the court orders.”). The record establishes that the
prosecuting attorney gave the video to Silva. In his petition, Silva conceded that “[w]hile
at the jail I was given access to a laptop so I could view the video disc in question —so I
could work on my case and prepare for trial since I acted pro se in trial.” The district court
also ordered the state to allow Silva to review the video recording in the courthouse before
trial. Because the prosecuting attorney provided Silva with the video evidence, we
conclude that the state did not suppress evidence in violation of Brady.
Second, Silva argues that the prosecuting attorney suppressed incident reports
allegedly prepared by K.S. and T.S., two correctional officers who saw the assault. Silva
maintains that K.S. testified and “admitted to writing a report and claimed she couldn’t
find it.” Silva adds that the prosecuting attorney “attempted to elicit a false admission that
perhaps [K.S.] didn’t write a report.”
8
The district court rejected Silva’s argument during postconviction proceedings:
[Silva] only surmises that the reports actually exist and that
they would be favorable to his defense without any evidentiary
support. The record does not support that the State failed to
disclose incident reports that it had in its possession or control
because there is no showing the reports were ever created or
that the reports were willfully or inadvertently withheld from
[Silva]. It was not established there was plain error in the State
not disclosing incident reports it did not have.

The record supports the district court’s postconviction decision. Although both
correctional officers confirmed that it was customary for officers to prepare reports after
an incident, no evidence suggests that T.S. or K.S. wrote incident reports about this assault.
T.S. testified that she did not “believe” she wrote a report:
Q: [T.S.], did you write a report in this case?
A: I do not believe I did.
. . . .
Q: Can you tell me why . . . you . . . failed to write a report,
pertaining to this incident?
A. That I could not tell you. I can’t say a hundred percent that
I did not write a report. I cannot find my report. I write several
reports a month, so I can’t specifically say I did not write one;
I can’t specifically say I wrote one.

K.S. also testified that she did not find her incident report in the prison records system and
that it was “possible” she did not write one.
We agree with the district court that Silva “only surmises that the reports actually
exist and that they would be favorable to his defense.” Because Silva’s claim rests on
speculation, we conclude that he did not meet his burden to show a Brady violation
occurred. See Zornes, 880 N.W.2d at 368 (stating that a “petitioner’s allegations must
constitute more than argumentative assertions without factual support”).
9
B. Eliciting False Testimony

A prosecuting attorney commits misconduct by knowingly eliciting false testimony.
See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 272 (1959) (reversing a conviction obtained with
the state’s knowing use of false evidence). When a petitioner raises a false-testimony claim
in postconviction proceedings, reviewing courts analyze the claim under the Larrison test.
Gilbert v. State, 982 N.W.2d 763, 769 -70 (Minn. App. 2022), aff ’d on other grounds ,
2 N.W.3d 483 (Minn. 2024); see also Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87-88 (7th Cir.
1928) (establishing test). Under this test, a petitioner is entitled to a new trial based on a
claim of false testimony if
(1) the court is reasonably well- satisfied that the testimony
given by a material witness was false; (2) that without the
testimony, the jury might have reached a different conclusion;
and (3) the petitioner was taken by surprise when the false
testimony was given and was unable to meet it or did not know
of its falsity until after trial.
Martin v. State, 825 N.W.2d 734, 740 (Minn. 2013). “The first two prongs are compulsory,
but the third prong is not required in order to grant a new trial.” State v. Turnage,
729 N.W.2d 593, 597 (Minn. 2007).
“[F]alse testimony is established if a trial witness credibly recants her trial testimony
or makes credible posttrial statements that materially contradict her trial testimony; it may
also be established through other credible evidence that a witness testified dishonestly at
trial.” Gilbert, 982 N.W.2d at 770. But “a statement that merely contradicts earlier
testimony, evidence of a witness’s general unreliability, and a witness’s failure to give a
10
full explanation of her trial testimony are insufficient to establish false trial testimony under
the Larrison test.” Id.
Silva appears to argue that the prosecuting attorney engaged in misconduct by
eliciting “false testimony by six of the state’s witnesses.” Silva urges that the
correctional-employee witnesses had “a pattern of fabricating malicious charges” in
response to Silva suing the Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC). Silva cites his
postconviction petition, which alleged discrepancies between witness testimony about the
assault and related statements in incident reports. Silva maintains that he “cited transcripts
for each lie” and “listed incident reports . . . that further established false testimony.” Silva
asserts that “one prime example is the so-called victim [V.A.], his report says I bit him on
the arm, left tricep. His testimony, he claims I bit him on the shoulder.” In his
postconviction petition, Silva also alleged discrepancies in testimony related to who took
photos of V.A.’s injuries, when V.A. reported the incident to his supervisor, and who was
present during the incident.
The district court in postconviction proceedings determined that Silva’s
false-testimony claim failed to satisfy the Larrison test. The district court explained that
Silva did not “present any evidence to establish that the State’s witnesses falsely testified
except his own self-serving affidavits and arguments,” which the court did not find
credible. The district court also determined that Silva offered “no evidence that a trial
witness recanted their testimony or made any posttrial statements that materially contradict
their trial testimony” and that Silva “provided no credible evidence that the State’s
witnesses testified dishonestly at trial.”
11
The district court’s conclusions are supported by the record, which does not indicate
that any of the state’s witnesses recanted their testimony, were untruthful, or made
contradictory posttrial statements. And the alleged discrepancies outlined by Silva do not
present credible evidence that any witness provided false testimony. See Gilbert,
982 N.W.2d at 770 (requiring credible recantation or evidence of witness dishonesty to
meet the first prong of the Larrison test). Instead, the alleged discrepancies involve the
credibility of the state’s witnesses, which Silva had the opportunity to challenge during
trial.6
At most, Silva establishes inconsistencies between a witness’s testimony and prior
statements in an incident report; these inconsistencies may diminish a witness’s reliability.
Because “evidence of a witness’s general unreliability” does not satisfy the first prong of
the Larrison test, we conclude that the district court did not err by denying postconviction
relief based on Silva’s false-testimony claim. See Gilbert, 982 N.W.2d at 770; Turnage,
729 N.W.2d at 597 (stating that a successful false-testimony claim must fulfill the first two
prongs of the Larrison test).

6 “The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party. . . .” Minn. R. Evid. 607; see
also Minn. R. Evid. 613(a) (allowing a party to examine a witness “concerning a prior
statement made by the witness”); State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 740 (Minn. 1976) (“It
is well established that proper impeachment evidence includes prior inconsistent
statements.”). The fact-finder determines witness credibility and the weight to be given
their testimony. DeMars v. State, 352 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn. 1984). Here, the jury found
that the state’s witnesses were credible, despite any alleged inconsistencies. T his court
defers to the fact-finder’s credibility determination. Griffin v. State, 941 N.W.2d 404, 408-
09 (Minn. 2020).
12
C. Closing Argument Not Based on Reasonable Inferences

A prosecuting attorney’s closing argument “should be based on [the] evidence
presented at trial and inferences reasonably drawn from that evidence.” State v. Bauer ,
776 N.W.2d 462, 475 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted), aff’d, 792 N.W.2d 825
(Minn. 2011); see State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 142 (Minn. 2009) (concluding that an
argument in closing was based on “a reasonable inference” because “some evidence”
supported it). And appellate courts consider “the closing argument as a whole, rather than
just selective phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue
prominence.” State v. Walsh, 495 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Minn. 1993).
Silva appears to contend that the prosecuting attorney committed misconduct by
drawing unreasonable inferences. 7 The state’s closing argument summarized the first
element and the evidence of Silva’s guilt:
As to the first element the state must prove, first, that
Mr. Silva assaulted [V.A.] and inflicted demonstrable bodily
harm. So what evidence do we have that Mr. Silva assaulted
the victim? . . . We have [T.F.]’s testimony that he saw [Silva]
bite [V.A.], and that he saw [Silva] spit bloody saliva onto the
window of his cell after the staff-assisted unclothed body
search was completed. . . . [W]e have video of the event in
Mr. Silva’s cell, which . . . includes video of Mr. Silva spitting
bloody saliva onto the window of his cell after he was released
from handcuffs in his cell.

7 Silva asserts that the district court’s postconviction decision “falsely claims [that the]
prosecutor’s closing argument was not plain error . . . and that evidence of bloody spit
supported the state’s theory of the case.” He maintains that the prosecuting attorney’s
“inference of the evidence was not based on a reasonable inference of the same” and that
“there is no conclusive evidence that supports a bite ever took place.”
13
We understand Silva to argue that the prosecuting attorney’s argument was erroneous
because, according to Silva, evidence of him spitting blood does not support a reasonable
inference that Silva bit V.A.
The district court in postconviction proceedings determined that the “evidence
supported the State’s theory of the case that [Silva] bit the victim and caused a wound to
the victim’s arm that was bleeding and after the bite [Silva] spit bloody saliva onto [the]
window of the door to his cell.” The district court concluded that the prosecuting attorney
“made a reasonable inference from the evidence in this matter that [Silva’s] spit of bloody
saliva was consistent with him biting the victim.”
The record supports the district court’s determination. V.A. testified that Silva bit
him and that he “saw blood on [his] arm.” T.F. also testified that he saw Silva bite V.A.’s
arm. When asked what happened after Silva bit V.A., T.F. testified that correctional
employees completed the unclothed body search of Silva and secured him in his cell. Silva
“then turned back towards to the door and then spat blood against the window.” Thus, there
is direct evidence that Silva bit V.A. and it is reasonable to infer that the blood in Silva’s
spit came from V.A.’s bite wound.
Still, Silva urges that he “proved the bloody spit was from a cut in [his] mouth”
caused by a correctional employee “pressing [Silva’s] cheek into [his] teeth to get [him] to
open [his] mouth.”
8 But Silva did not offer any testimony to this effect at trial. Even if

8 To support this argument, Silva cites the transcript of the video recording of the incident,
in which he says, “Ah,” as correctional employees are telling him to open his mouth. Silva
also cites an incident report stating that “Silva was directed to comply with a mouth check
to which he kept his mouth closed. Touch pressure was applied to gain compliance.”
14
Silva had testified that the bloody spit was from a cut in his mouth, we would nonetheless
conclude that no prosecutorial misconduct occurred. The prosecuting attorney’s argument
does not have to accept a defendant’s version of events. See Bobo, 770 N.W.2d at 142
(determining that it is not error for a prosecuting attorney to question a witness’s credibility
if the argument is supported by evidence). And at least some evidence supports the state’s
inference that the bloody spit was from Silva biting V.A.
Because we conclude that the prosecuting attorney’s closing argument rested on
reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying postconviction relief based on Silva’s claim of prosecutorial
misconduct during closing arguments.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying postconviction relief
based on Silva’s challenges to evidentiary rulings.

A district court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Dolo v.
State, 942 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Minn. 2020). Reviewing courts “afford the district court broad
discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters” and “will not lightly overturn a trial court’s
evidentiary ruling.” State v. Foster, 20 N.W.3d 6, 27 (Minn. 2025) (quotations omitted).
Further, “an evidentiary ruling must be prejudicial” to justify reversal. Shea v. Esensten,
622 N.W.2d 130, 134 (Minn. App. 2001). Silva challenges the p ostconviction court’s
review of two evidentiary rulings.
A. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence

Silva challenges the district court’s exclusion of two exhibits at trial. First, Silva
sought to admit a “notice of filing” of an order to show cause, dated May 12, 2020, in a
15
civil lawsuit between Silva and the commissioner of corrections, a warden, and a sergeant
(exhibit 15). Second, Silva sought to admit a news article from May 23, 2000, titled, “After
Trial, Jurors Ask for Prison Investigation” (exhibit 16). The first paragraph of exhibit 16
stated, “In an unusual ending to the trial of a prison inmate . . . , a Washington County jury
asked for an investigation into alleged abuses at the Minnesota Correctional Facility-Oak
Park Heights.” The article detailed “alleged abuses” that Silva endured while imprisoned.
During trial, the district court sustained the state’s objections to the admission of
exhibits 15 and 16, which were offered during Silva’s direct examination of K.E.:
SILVA: Isn’t it true it was common knowledge at the prison
among staff, that I filed a lawsuit against a warden, a social
warden, and commissioner of corrections?
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Objection. Relevance and
leading. This is his witness, he can’t conduct cross.
THE COURT: Well, I’ll sustain it as to relevance, Mr. Silva,
I’m giving some latitude on asking leading questions. But it is
sustained, so you can move on to the next question.

SILVA: Okay. Isn’t it true this case that we are here for is
retaliation for filing a lawsuit?
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Objection, Your Honor.
Relevance.
THE COURT: I’m going to overrule it on relevance, but you
do need to lay the foundation, Mr. Silva, as to whether this
witness can testify to that.

SILVA: Again, it’s common knowledge at Rush City among
most staff that I filed a lawsuit in the past; is that correct?
K.E.: I was not aware of this until Monday when I was handed
this paperwork to appear today.

SILVA: If I were to show you proof of that, would you then
agree?
K.E.: I would have no way of proving that. That’s all hearsay.
I have not heard any rumors, nor have I had any information.

16
SILVA: Your Honor, I’d like to enter Exhibit 15 to show that
I filed a lawsuit.
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: I object, Your Honor. This is
not relevant. It’s designed to confuse the jury and bring up
issues that aren’t at issue. And this witness does, cannot lay
foundation for it.
THE COURT: That is sustained.

SILVA: Okay. Isn’t it true that it’s common knowledge that
most staff know that, that I filed litigation in the past, and
received reprisals as a result of that?
K.E.: Negative—
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Objection—
K.E.: I do not keep track of anything about that, nor do I hear
any rumors about that. I work in dispatch, and I have never
heard of you filing a lawsuit in the past.

SILVA: I’d like to enter Exhibit 16 as proof of past litigation
and reprisals against the [DOC], news article.
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Objection, Your Honor. It’s
not relevant. There’s no foundation for it. It’s designed to
confuse the issues. I oppose.
THE COURT: Sustained.

The district court in postconviction proceedings rejected Silva’s claim, ruling that
exhibits 15 and 16 were properly excluded as irrelevant, confusing to the jury, and lacking
proper foundation.
9
On appeal, Silva appears to argue that the district court deprived him of his
constitutional right to present a complete defense by excluding relevant evidence. Silva
maintains that exhibit 15 was “relevant to the theory of [his] defense, that [DOC] has a

9 The district court in postconviction proceedings also determined that Silva “was able to
testify himself regarding his lawsuit and the results of his lawsuit.” In short, the district
court determined that any error in excluding exhibits 15 and 16 during K.E.’s testimony
was harmless because Silva testified about his lawsuit. See State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d
801, 812-13 (Minn. 2017) (“When an alleged evidentiary error is harmless, an appellate
court need not address the merits of the claimed error.” (quotation omitted)).
17
pattern of fabricating malicious charges in response to [Silva] suing them.” Silva contends
that exhibit 16 “corroborated the theory of [his] defense since it pertained to a malicious
13 count case that was concocted after [Silva] sued [Oak Park Heights] prison.”
Even if we assume, without deciding, that Silva’s exhibits are relevant to his
defense, relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury.” Minn. R. Evid. 403. A district court may also exclude evidence based on lack of
foundation or personal knowledge of the witness. See Minn. R. Evid. 602 (“A witness may
not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the
witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may,
but need not, consist of the witness’ own testimony.”). K.E. testified that he had no personal
knowledge of either exhibit. Yet Silva’s brief to this court does not discuss the
postconviction reasoning under rule 403 or foundation.
Because Silva does not challenge the district court’s evidentiary reasoning on
appeal, he has forfeited this issue. State v. Butcher, 563 N.W.2d 776, 780 (Minn. App.
1997), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 1997) (stating that inadequately briefed issues are not
properly before this court). Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying postconviction relief based on the exclusion of exhibits 15 and 16.
B. Denied Motion for a Video Expert

Before trial, Silva moved for the district court “to facilitate a video expert to review
and analyze the video of the alleged incident of assault.” Silva maintained that he needed
the video expert “to ascertain whether the video has been tampered with, or any portion
18
thereof edited etc.” Silva explained, “Based upon my recollection of events, I can say with
an absolute certainty that major portions of the video were deleted.” He also argued that
the state edited the video “to keep [him] incarcerated based on a malicious prosecution and
reprisals.” The district court denied Silva’s request for a video expert, explaining that Silva
could “get to whatever [his] concerns are through cross-examination” of R.K., the officer
who recorded the video and laid foundation for its admission.
After the district court’s ruling, Silva cross-examined R.K. about the video:
Q: Isn’t it true no assault ever took place?
A: An assault took place.

Q: Okay. The missing video that was deleted off of the video
that they just saw, wouldn’t that prove otherwise?
A: There was nothing deleted from the video.

Q: Okay. Have you ever recorded any other incidents, strip
searches or seg placements, et cetera?
A: Yes. I recorded multiple.
. . . .
Q: How many other incidents have you turned the camera
away or is this the first one?
A: I do not remember.

Q: You don’t remember. So there’s other, there’s other cases
where you turned the camera away when the officer is
supposedly being assaulted?
. . . .
A: I do not re, I don’t think so.

The district court in postconviction proceedings rejected Silva’s claim for relief,
concluding that “there was no plausible showing that [a video expert] would lead to
evidence favorable to [Silva’s] defense” and that Silva “had the opportunity to cross
examine the State’s witnesses.”
19
On appeal, Silva asserts that “the video should’ve been examined by a videographer
to ascertain splicing of three minutes of video,” claiming that he was “tortured for three
minutes.” Silva cites no legal authority to support his request for the district court to appoint
a video expert.10
An assignment of error in a brief based on “mere assertion” and not supported by
argument or authority is forfeited unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.
State v. Andersen, 871 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). We discern no
obvious error. The record shows no evidence of video tampering. The video was shown to
the jury. And Silva cross-examined R.K. about the alleged ly missing footage. Thus, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Silva’s request for
postconviction relief based on his motion for a video expert.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying postconviction relief
based on Silva’s judicial-bias claim.

Silva argues that the district court in postconviction proceedings erred in rejecting
his judicial-bias claim. Silva contends that the “multiple erroneous factual findings by the
district court exemplifies bias” during district court proceedings. Appellate courts review
de novo allegations of judicial bias. State v. Reek, 942 N.W.2d 148, 156 (Minn. 2020). 11

10We acknowledge that Minnesota Rule of Evidence 706 permits court-appointed expert
witnesses. Silva, however, did not cite rule 706 in district court , postconviction, or
appellate proceedings.

11 Supreme court caselaw suggests that appellate courts review all claims of judicial bias
de novo, even if asserted for the first time on appeal. See Reek, 942 N.W.2d at 155-56
(reviewing de novo a claim of judicial disqualification under the code of judicial conduct,
even though the claim was raised for the first time on appeal). But see State v. Finch,
20
A district court judge must disqualify herself from “any proceeding in which the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Minn. Code Jud. Conduct
Rule 2.11(A); see also Minn. R. Crim P. 26.03, subd. 14(3) (stating that a judge cannot
preside over a criminal proceeding from which they are disqualified under the Minnesota
Code of Judicial Conduct). But Silva identifies no basis on which to reasonably question
the district court’s impartiality. Instead, Silva criticizes the district court’s adverse rulings
and appears to assume that this amounts to bias. “[A] district court judge’s adverse rulings,
without more, are not enough for a criminal defendant to demonstrate that the judge was
biased against him.” State v. Mouelle, 922 N.W.2d 706, 716 (Minn. 2019). Thus, we
conclude that Silva is not entitled to relief on this issue.
For the reasons stated, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Silva’s request for postconviction relief.
Affirmed.

865 N.W.2d 696, 701 n.3 (Minn. 2015) (reviewing a similar judicial-disqualification claim
for plain error).