In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: A. R.-P. and J. O., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0938

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: A. R.-P. and J. O., Parents.

Filed December 1, 2025
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-JV-24-647

Amy L. Senn, Amy L. Senn, P.A., Afton, Minnesota (for appellant mother A.R.-P.)

Kevin M. Magnuson, Washington County Attorney, Erin A. Johnson, Assistant County
Attorney, Stillwater Minnesota (for respondent Washington County Child Protection)

Cynthia Yang, Stillwater, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and
Harris, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
On appeal from the termination of her parental rights, appellant A.R.-P. (mother)
argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that (1) the county made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family and (2) termination of parental rights was in the
child’s best interests. We affirm.
2
FACTS
Mother has one child at issue here, born in 2019. The child was six years old at the
time of the district court’s order terminating mother’s parental rights.
In April 2024, Woodbury police responded to reports that mother was making
suicidal statements and homicidal statements about her child. When the police engaged
with her, mother said that Dakota County social services had ruined her life and said that,
if it did not fix its mistakes, mother was going to kill herself and the child. 1 Mother
acknowledged that she was probably a danger to the child because she was not mentally
stable, and she acknowledged that she had used methamphetamine two days earlier. The
police placed mother on an evaluative hold and transported her to the hospital.
Respondent Washington County Community Services (the county) opened an
investigation the following day. County social workers met with mother. She told them
that she would not actually kill her son but that she made the statements because she was
feeling desperate due to housing issues and lack of money and transportation. She said that
she used methamphetamine daily, including in her garage while the child was in the house,
but denied that it affected her parenting. Mother said that she had diagnoses for several
mental-health issues and was taking medication for those issues.
The county filed a child-in-need-of-protection-or-services (CHIPS) petition.
Following an emergency hearing, the child was placed in foster care, where he remained

1 Dakota County Social Services had initiated a child-protection matter in 2019 when the
child tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. That matter had been closed by April
2024.
3
throughout this case. An out-of-home-placement plan was filed with the district court and
was later updated. In September 2024, the child was adjudicated CHIPS after mother was
found to be in default. In December 2024, the county petitioned to terminate mother’s
parental rights. A trial was held on April 21-22, 2025—a year after the case began.
For the first five months after the case was initiated in April 2024, mother passed in
and out of several chemical-health treatment centers, never staying for more than a few
days. During that time, mother would often become agitated and verbally aggressive with
treatment center staff and county social workers. Mother made death threats against her
mother and a social worker, resulting in two charges of felony threats of violence. In late
September 2024, mother finally committed to inpatient care, and she remained sober and
in treatment until trial. While in treatment, she was diagnosed with generalized anxiety
disorder, major depressive disorder, and PTSD. At the time of trial, she was in a residential
facility to address mental-health issues. H owever, mother denied needing further mental
health treatment.
Upon a referral by the county, mother also participated in a parenting assessment.
In addition, the county referred the child for an early childhood behavior assessment and
then to weekly therapy.
Over the course of the year before trial, m other had difficulties with housing and
transportation. The county provided mother with contact information for Washington
County’s Homeless Outreach support team and attempted to inquire about the loss of her
housing, but mother refused to sign a release. The county arranged transportation to get
mother to assessments and court dates, setting up rides via a rideshare service, treatment-
4
center employees, family members, or county social workers themselves. In one instance,
however, mother missed her appointment for a psychological assessment because she was
living far from the county, and no rideshare driver responded to the request.
Between April 2024 and April 2025, the county tried various approaches to visits
between mother and the child. In May 2024, mother attended two in-person visits with the
child, which were supervised by the county’s social workers. T he first went well. At the
second visit, mother became agitated and insisted that the child had bruises and marks
caused by abuse from his foster family. Social workers examined the child and found no
bruises or marks, but mother maintains that they did not look. During mother’s outburst,
the child asked to leave, ending the visit. Because of mother’s aggressive behavior toward
the social workers, the county sought to use an external agency to supervise future visits,
but mother refused to sign a release for an external agency visitation, so visits with the
child were paused until she entered treatment and demonstrated stability. In late October
2024, after a month in treatment, mother was permitted to resume supervised virtual visits
with the child. Although the visits went fairly well, they remained virtual due to mother’s
continued threats to staff. Visits occurred in this fashion twice a week until trial.
On May 21, 2025, following trial, the district court filed its findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and order involuntarily terminating mother’s parental rights.
Mother appeals.
DECISION
“Parental rights are terminated only for grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare
of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). A district court may terminate parental
5
rights if at least one statutory ground for termination exists, the county either made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family or those efforts were not required, and termination
is in the best interests of the child. In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385
(Minn. 2008); see Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2024) (providing the reasonable-efforts
requirement). The evidence supporting the statutory grounds, best-interests determination,
and any reasonable efforts must be clear and convincing. In re Child. of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d
703, 708 (Minn. 2005). The evidence must address conditions as they exist at the time of
the hearing and show that the current conditions “will continue for a prolonged,
indeterminate period.” In re Welfare of Child. of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901- 02 (Minn.
App. 2011) (quotation omitted).
In reviewing a district court’s order terminating parental rights, appellate court s
review the district court’s findings of underlying or basic facts for clear error. Id. at 901.
But the appellate court reviews the district court’s determinations that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunify the family and that termination is in the child’s best interests
for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 322-23
(Minn. App. 2015) (reasonable efforts); J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905 (best interests). The
appellate court also reviews for an abuse of discretion the ultimate decision to terminate
parental rights. In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn. App. 2021).
In challenging the district court’s decision to terminate her parental rights, mother
argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that (1) the county made
reasonable efforts to reunite her with the child and (2) termination was in the child’s best
interests. We address each argument in turn.
6
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the county
made reasonable efforts to reunify mother and the child.

To terminate parental rights, unless reasonable efforts are excused, the district court
must find “that reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan to reunify the child and
the parent were made.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8 (2024). In determining reasonable
efforts, the district court must consider whether services were:
(1) selected in collaboration with the child’s family and, if
appropriate, the child;
(2) tailored to the individualized needs of the child and child’s
family;
(3) relevant to the safety, protection, and well-being of the
child;
(4) adequate to meet the individualized needs of the child and
family;
(5) culturally appropriate;
(6) available and accessible;
(7) consistent and timely; and
(8) realistic under the circumstances.

Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2024).
Here, the district court reviewed the actions taken by the county, which included
making out-of-home placement plans, referring mother to chemical-health assessments and
multiple chemical-health treatment programs, referring mother for a psychological
evaluation, arranging a parenting assessment, providing transportation to assessments and
treatment programs, setting up in-person and virtual visits with the child, and referring the
child for a behavioral assessment and therapy. It ultimately determined that the county
made reasonable efforts to reunify mother and the child throughout the proceedings.
Mother argues that, for four reasons. the district court abused its discretion by ruling
that the county’s efforts were reasonable.
7
First, mother asserts that she did not have sufficient time to complete the services
that she needed in order to address her chemical-health and mental -health issues and that
the county could have delayed filing its petition to terminate parental rights to give her
more time to complete the services. “Whether efforts are ‘reasonable’ requires
consideration of the length of time the county has been involved with the family as well as
the quality of effort given.” In re Welfare of M.G., 407 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Minn. App.
1987). At the time that the county filed its petition to terminate parental rights, it had been
involved with mother and the child for eight months. Over the first five of those months,
the county referred mother to three different treatment facilities —each of which mother
either voluntarily left or was expelled from. Mother did eventually commit to programs to
address her substance use and maintained her sobriety. But, the district court found that,
even by the time of trial, mother still refused to take responsibility for her actions or
recognize the need for mental-health services or the impact that her mental-health issues
had on the child. The record reflects timely, consistent, and adequate efforts to provide
chemical-health and mental-health services, delayed only by mother’s own actions. See
Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h)(4), (7).
Second, mother argues that the county did not provide the transportation required
for her to attend treatment. Mother’s social worker testified to the transportation issues at
trial. The typical procedure for arranging rides was to make a referral to the child-protection
department, which had a contract with a rideshare company. The department would then
order a ride, which drivers could either accept or decline. Drivers were less likely to accept
rides in the first place because mother chose some of her own treatment centers far away
8
from Washington County. When no driver accepted, treatment-center employees and
mother’s family members helped, each time receiving a gas card from the county. And all
else failing, mother’s social worker would pick her up himself. It is true that mother was
unable to attend a psychological assessment for lack of transportation when no rideshare-
service driver responded. But, overall, the record evidence supports a determination that
the county provided consistent and timely transportation options that were realistic under
the circumstances. See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h)(7), (8).
Third, mother claims that the county did not support in-person visits with the child
and that giving her more time with the child would have helped to achieve reunification.
The county tried several approaches to facilitate visits between mother and the child. It
started with in-person visits but paused them for safety concerns after an incident in which
mother became agitated and verbally aggressive towards staff. The county attempted to
refer visits to an external agency, but mother refused to sign a release of information. Once
mother had been in treatment for a month, the county resumed visits virtually. While the
county contemplated returning to in -person visits, visits remained virtual due to mother’s
continued threats to staff. The child occasionally asked to leave visits early or cancel them
altogether because he did not want to see his mother. The county also observed “disruptive”
behavior in the child following visits, which led them to shorten visit duration. The record
evidence supports a determination that the county made consistent, timely, and realistic
efforts to restore in-person visits, while also considering the child’s wishes and well-being.
See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h)(3), (7), (8).
9
Fourth and finally, mother argues that the county was deficient in helping her obtain
housing. Mother testified that the county “got [her] house taken away” and that, when she
asked a social worker about housing, he responded, “That’s not my job.” But mother’s first
social worker testified that she provided mother with the number for Washington County’s
Homeless Outreach support team on “multiple occasions throughout the case.” She made
this referral because “they have more of an idea as to what is available for as to housing
resources or shelter resources and could have pointed her in a better direction.” Mother
also refused to sit down and discuss the issue or sign a release allowing the county to
inquire about her former housing. In addition, whether efforts are reasonable depends on
the problems presented, In re Child. of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 664 (Minn. 2008), and here,
the county prioritized addressing mother’s substance abuse and mental health before
getting her back into a home on her own. The record evidence supports a determination
that the county’s efforts to provide housing services were reasonably tailored to mother’s
needs and realistic for the situation. See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h)(2), (8).
In sum, the district court’s determination that the county made reasonable efforts to
reunify mother with the child is supported by the record and is therefore not an abuse of
discretion.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination
was in the best interests of the child.

To determine a child’s best interests, the district court must balance “(1) the child’s
interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving
the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child.” In re Welfare of
10
Child of A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d 648, 657 (Minn. App. 2018); see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P.
58.04(c)(2)(ii). “Competing interests include health considerations, a stable environment,
and the child’s preference.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 92 (Minn.
App. 2012). When, as here, a statutory basis to involuntarily terminate parental rights is
present, the child’s interests are paramount and predominate over parental interests. In re
Welfare of Child of R.V.M., 8 N.W.3d 680, 697 (Minn. App. 2024) (citing Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 7 (2022)), rev. denied (July 19, 2024).
Here, the district court determined that both mother and the child have an interest in
maintaining the parent-child relationship. Regarding the child, the district court recognized
that, although the child would get anxious when mother became dysregulated during in-
person visits, he appeared to enjoy his virtual visits with mother. Regarding mother, the
district court recognized that she clearly loves her child; that she continually sought more
visits with him throughout the case; that she sought information about the child’s
educational, medical and therapeutic needs; and that she demonstrated that she can engage
with the child and enjoys playing with him.
The district court then identified the competing interests of the child. The district
court found that, while mother had maintained sobriety, she was still struggling with safety
and stability. It found that mother “escalates to aggressive, insulting, and threatening
behavior” with professionals and family members, failed to regulate her behavior with the
child, still did not take accountability for her current situation, and had recently threatened
to remove the child from foster care. The district court a lso emphasized the impact of
mother’s substance-abuse and mental-health issues on the child. It noted that the child
11
tested positive for controlled substances at birth, was present when mother threatened to
kill him and herself, and likely has trauma and will need mental-health services to support
his emotional, mental, and behavioral health. It found that mother did not recognize the
child’s need for treatment or her own need for therapy. The district court ultimately
determined that the child’s “interest in having a safe, stable, secure caregiver outweighs
any other competing interest.”
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion for two reasons.
First, she argues that she had remained sober and mentally stable for seven months
prior to trial. She asserts that “[t]here is no evidence submitted to question [her] ongoing
commitment to sobriety and managing her mental health.” The record refutes mother’s
argument. At trial, mother denied needing any further mental-health treatment, and blamed
Dakota County and “everybody” for her current situation. Although mother was
consistently sober for the seven months before trial, her mental health remained a crucial
concern to the county. Mother’s mental-health diagnostic assessment in October 2024
identified generalized anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder, and PTSD and deemed
mental-health services “medically necessary.” Several witnesses at trial, including
mother’s social worker, the child’s guardian ad litem, and the parenting-observation
assessor, identified mental health as an ongoing concern that needed treatment, despite
mother’s reluctance to acknowledge this fact. The parenting assessment from April 2025
found it critical that mother take responsibility for the effects of her mental health on her
relationship with the child and recommended weekly individual therapy. This e vidence
provides reason for the district court to question mother’s commitment to managing her
12
mental health and willingness to take accountability for it. The district court did not err in
determining that mother’s mental-health issues were a competing interest.
Second, mother argues that, with housing assistance from the county, she would be
able to provide a home for the child and, as a result, stability would not be a competing
interest. At the time of trial, mother had no home and had been in and out of treatment
since May 2024. Even assuming that she could secure housing immediately, however, all
assessments recommended continued treatment for both mother and the child, and mother
had indicated that if she were reunited with the child, she would take him and “move away,”
detaching them from treatment and support systems. On this record, mother’s argument
that that housing would establish the necessary stability is unconvincing. The district court
did not err in determining that stability was a competing interest.
In sum, the record evidence supports the district court’s determination that the
child’s interests in safety and stability outweigh any other interests. The district court
therefore did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination of parental rights was
in the child’s best interests.
Affirmed.