In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: C. H. G. and R. R. G., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0966

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: C. H. G. and R. R. G., Parents.

Filed December 15, 2025
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-JV-25-311

Anne Morris Carlson, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant mother C.H.G.)

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Ashley Turner, Assistant County Attorney,
Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent Clay County Social Services)

Mara Rausch, Moorhead, Minnesota (for Child 1)

Emily Shaffer, Moorhead, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
On appeal from the termination of parental rights (TPR) of appellant-mother, she
argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that (1) the county made
reasonable efforts to reunite mother with her children and (2) termination of mother’s
parental rights is in the children’s best interests. We affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant-mother C.H.G. and her former husband R.R.G. had three children. One
child was born in 2013, and the other two were born in 2016. After the dissolution of their
marriage in 2019, the parents shared joint legal custody of the children, and mother had
sole physical custody. Respondent Clay County Social Services (the county) filed a TPR
petition for both parents in January 2025. Only mother challenged the petition ; father
consented to a voluntary TPR before trial.
On March 1, 2024, the county filed a child-in-need -of-protection-or-services
(CHIPS) petition for the three children. The petition resulted from mother’s ongoing use
of methamphetamine and fentanyl, “inability to maintain sobriety, decline in mental health,
unstable housing, inability to provide food, clothing, and shelter to the children, and
allegations of sexual abuse of [the youngest child].” The allegations of sexual abuse were
against mother’s friend, I.O.Q., a person with whom the family often stayed. The county
attempted to work with mother to implement a safety plan, but mother did not cooperate.
The children were removed from mother’s care the same day that the county filed the
CHIPS petition. The county placed the children with a relative with whom they had lived
before their stay with mother at I.O.Q.’s home.
Over the course of the CHIPS case, two Child Protection Specialists (caseworkers)
worked with the family, but both encountered difficulties working with mother. Both
caseworkers testified that mother’s communication was inappropriate and threatening at
times. And while mother maintained regular contact with the second caseworker,
communication from mother decreased in frequency in the weeks before the TPR trial.
3
The first caseworker worked with mother from March through October 2024. She
created a case plan that stated that the county “will need to see that [mother] addresses her
mental health, chemical-dependency concerns, housing needs, and employment.” The case
plan also required mother to stay in contact with the county, provide updates as requested,
and complete random drug tests. A September 2024 update to the case plan required that
mother “start a chemical dependency program within one month of the signing or provision
of this case plan, whichever comes first.”
The first caseworker testified that her efforts primarily aimed to address mother’s
mental health and chemical dependency, but mother often resisted those efforts. She
testified that mother made little to no progress on her chemical and mental-health goals
during their time together.
The first caseworker testified that mother was already in the process of obtaining
housing when the CHIPS case began. Mother moved into supportive housing in North
Dakota two months later.
1 The first caseworker did not perform a formal assessment on
that home because, generally, the county does not consider trial home visits until the client
maintains steady progress on their case plan. Mother did not demonstrate steady progress
on her case plan.

1 Mother’s testimony described this supportive housing as follows: “They have YWCA
staff on site. They have security . . . . They have services available for the children, and
after school they have events on site. They have trainings and programs available to, you
know, self-enroll for employment. They have [food resources] right next door. They have
a lot of other things, like housing stability, and case plans . . . .”
4
A second caseworker replaced the first caseworker in October 2024. She created a
new case plan set to begin in April 2025. She testified that she tried, unsuccessfully, to
engage mother in the creation of the case plan. The new case plan, like the previous one,
focused on chemical dependency and mental health. It also included goals related to
housing, although the second caseworker testified that these goals were not her “primary
focus” with mother. The second caseworker also testified that she and mother looked for
employment for “a short period of time” and that mother was not eligible for cash-
assistance programming in North Dakota. Mother also testified that she was denied cash-
assistance programming in North Dakota.
Both caseworkers testified that mother’s supportive housing would likely be
suitable for the children if mother made progress on her chemical dependency and mental
health. However, after the children were removed from mother’s care, mother became
ineligible for a voucher for the three-bedroom apartment in which she lived, and the
building had no available one-bedroom units. Mother told the second caseworker about
this issue but did not respond to the second caseworker’s offers to assist her in her search
for new housing. Mother did not notify the county when she moved out of the supportive
housing in March 2025, nor did she tell the county where she went afterward.
Mother did not make significant progress on her mental -health and chemical-
dependency goals with the second caseworker. Her use of mental-health services and
treatments, like medication, was inconsistent. 2 She was also inconsistent with chemical-

2 With respect to taking her prescribed medications, at least some inconsistency was
attributable to issues with insurance coverage.
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dependency treatment. For example, mother had been discharged from one program at the
end of November after attending unsuccessfully for about one month. Mother also began
a program in Minnesota in early January but was discharged after one day because the
program did not accept the health insurance provided to mother through the State of North
Dakota. The second caseworker went to mother’s apartment and, together, they made calls
to several treatment facilities in North Dakota. They made a list of available treatment
programs, but mother did not participate for more than a few days in any program that they
found. Mother also continued to test positive for controlled substances.
The children also have health diagnoses that require ongoing and consistent medical
care. All three children are diagnosed with posttraumatic-stress disorder. The oldest child
is also diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder and major depressive disorder.
Throughout the CHIPS case, the children made varying degrees of progress with their
mental health. The oldest child made significant progress, the middle child had ups and
downs, and the youngest child continued to struggle. The guardian ad litem (GAL) testified
that the role of the children’s caregiver was labor-intensive and that she was “hesitant to
say that [mother] would be a stable caregiver” because of mother’s lack of progress on her
chemical-dependency and mental-health goals. The GAL also testified that, following their
placement with their relative after being removed from their mother’s care a year prior, the
children “made a lot of improvements in school,” including attending more consistently.
When the TPR trial began in May 2025, the children were still in the care of the
relative. Mother testified at the TPR trial that the relative “co-parented” with her “over the
last eight years.” I n May 2023, mother had signed a delegation of parental authority
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(DOPA) to that relative for all three children. 3 The children then lived with the relative
until the fall of 2023, when they joined mother in staying at I.O.Q.’s home. In its TPR
petition, the county stated that it hoped to maintain placement with the relative because
they are “a kin placement [with whom] the children report feeling safe and comfortable.”
The relative is a permanency option for their long-term care and potential adoption.
On June 5, 2025, the district court filed an order involuntarily terminating mother’s
parental rights. It determined that the state proved four statutory grounds for termination
by clear and convincing evidence: (1) mother refused or neglected to comply with her
parental duties, (2) mother is palpably unfit to parent, (3) reasonable efforts had failed to
correct the conditions leading to the children ’s placement outside the home, and (4) the
children are neglected and in foster care, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301,
subdivision 1(b)(2), (3), (4), and (7) (2024). The district court also determined that the
state proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the county made reasonable efforts to
reunite the family and that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the children’s
best interests. It explained that mother “has been unable and/or unwilling to complete”
mental-health or chemical-dependency treatment, did not demonstrate an ability to obtain
sobriety, continued to use controlled substances, and had chemical-dependency and
mental-health concerns “of a duration or nature that renders the parent unable, for the
reasonably foreseeable future, to care appropriately” for the children’s needs. The district

3 Mother testified that she signed the DOPA in response to a CPS investigation to “protect
[her]self and [her] children in case [the county] were to try to take [her] children one day.”
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court added that the children “have continually resided out of [mother’s] care since March
1, 2024.”
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that (1) the
county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family and (2) termination of mother’s
parental rights is in the best interests of the children.
“Parental rights are terminated only for grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare
of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). Termination of parental rights requires
the county prove three elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) at least one statutory
ground for TPR; (2) the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family, or a district
court ruled under Minnesota Statutes section 260.012(a) (2024) that those efforts were not
required; and (3) termination is in the child’s best interests. See In re Welfare of Child of
J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021); see also
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1 (2024) (providing statutory grounds for TPR).
We review the district court’s determinations on the second and third TPR elements
for an abuse of discretion. See In re Welfare of Child of T.M.A., 11 N.W.3d 346, 355-58
(Minn. App. 2024). “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that
are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is
against logic and the facts on record.” Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn.
2022) (quotation omitted).
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I. The district court properly exercised its discretion by determining that the
county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family.

Mother argues that the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence to
support the district court’s determination that the agency made reasonable efforts to reunite
the family. She specifically asserts that the district court’s reasonable-efforts determination
constituted an abuse of discretion “[b]ecause [the county’s] efforts to assist [her] did not
include providing her with necessary financial assistance, assistance in locating
employment, and assistance by [assessing] her [new] home.” We are not persuaded.
Before a district court may terminate parental rights, it must make “findings and
conclusions as to the provision of reasonable efforts” by the county. Minn. Stat.
§ 260.012(h) (2024). Those findings must include “individualized and explicit findings
regarding the nature and extent of efforts made . . . to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the
family.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8(1) (2024). The district court must consider
whether the services provided were:
(1) selected in collaboration with the child’s family
and, if appropriate, the child;
(2) tailored to the individualized needs of the child
and child’s family;
(3) relevant to the safety, protection, and well-being
of the child;
(4) adequate to meet the individualized needs of the
child and family;
(5) culturally appropriate;
(6) available and accessible;
(7) consistent and timely; and
(8) realistic under the circumstances.

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Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h). “In determining reasonable efforts to be made with respect to a
child and in making those reasonable efforts, the child’s best interests, health, and safety
must be of paramount concern.” Id. (a).
Employment and Finances
Mother contends that “the agency’s efforts to assist [her] did not include providing
her with necessary financial assistance” and “assistance in locating employment.” On this
point, the district court found that the county “has made reasonable efforts to provide
remedial services.” This constitutes a factual finding, which we review for clear error. See
J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 600. “A finding is clearly erroneous if it is manifestly contrary to the
weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re
Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted).
The record here supports the district court’s factual finding. First, mother was
denied cash-assistance programming in North Dakota and became eligible for cash-
assistance programming only when she returned to Minnesota in March 2025. However,
the county did not know that mother returned to Minnesota until the first day of trial in
May 2025. The county could not help mother obtain cash-assistance programming if it did
not know of the circumstances that potentially changed her eligibility for that
programming. Second, contrary to mother’s assertion, the second caseworker testified that
she and mother looked for employment together. This court discerns no abuse of discretion
by the district court’s determination that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the
family.

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Housing
Mother challenges the county’s failure to “observ[e] her home the day of trial,” a
home that I.O.Q. owns and lives in, and the home from which the children were removed
over a year before trial. Mother’s argument relies on the proposition that the county could
have observed her home. The district court found that mother did not notify the county
about the home; the county only learned of it on the first day of trial. For this reason,
mother’s argument concerning housing is unavailing.
II. The district court properly exercised its discretion by determining that
termination of mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children.

Mother argues that the district court’s best-interests determination gave “inadequate
weight” to (1) “the children’s stated preference of maintaining a relationship with their
mother” and (2) “ mother’s interests in maintaining the parent-child relationship.” 4 We
disagree.
In TPR proceedings, the district court analyzes a child’s best interests by
considering: “(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the
parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest
of the child.” J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 604 (quotation omitted); see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P.
58.04(c)(2)(ii) (requiring district court to consider factors when addressing whether to
involuntarily terminate parental rights). “Competing interests of the child may include a

4 Mother also argues that the district court’s best-interests determination constitutes an
abuse of discretion “because mother’s housing at the time of the trial was not assessed for
its stability.” As stated previously, the county could not assess a home about which it did
not know.
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stable environment, health considerations, and the child’s preferences.” Id. If the interests
of the parent and the child conflict, the interests of the child prevail. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 7 (2024). “Because a determination of a child’s best interests is
generally not susceptible to an appellate court’s global review of a record and involves
credibility determinations, the district court must explain its rationale in its findings and
conclusions.” In re Welfare of Child of F.F.N.M., 999 N.W.2d 525, 545 (Minn. App. 2023)
(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 5, 2024).
The district court found that “it is clear the children are attached to [mother] and
love [her].” Mother also loved her children and showed an interest in maintaining a parent-
child relationship with them. However, as the district court stated, “it is well understood
that loving a child does not mean that a person is able to adequately parent that child.” See
also In re Welfare of Child. of K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d 656, 668 (Minn. App. 2012) (“[A]
mother’s love and desire to care for her children does not outweigh her children’s needs
for basic care . . . .”). The district court’s TPR order reflects this reality.
The district court provided an inexhaustive list of the children’s competing interests:
(1) the children have been in the legal custody of the county and in the home of their
relative, who is their current foster parent, for over 445 days; (2) the children are receiving
needed mental-health services, “it is imperative to their wellbeing that these services
continue,” and mother cannot ensure that the children get to their scheduled appointments;
(3) “[mother] has not fulfilled the requirements of her case plans and cannot provide the
structure and consistency necessary to serve the children’s well- being and emotional
development”; (4) mother has completed no chemical-dependency treatment, continues to
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use controlled substances, and has shown no “significant period of sobriety over the past
couple of years”; (5) mother “has not received consistent mental health treatment” and does
not take medication as prescribed; and (6) mother is choosing to live with the person who
allegedly sexually abused one of her children, and she has no other long-term housing
option. The district court found that the children would not be safe if returned to mother’s
care. Mother does not dispute these factual findings.
We conclude that the district court’s analysis of the competing interests of the
children is logical and supported by the record, as is its determination that the children’s
competing interests outweigh the interests in preserving the parent-child relationship. We
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that TPR was in
the children’s best interests.
Affirmed.