State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0971

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Paolo R Contreras Hernandez,
Appellant.

Filed February 2, 2026
Affirmed
Harris, Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CR-22-1029

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Dawn R. Nyhus, Sherburne County Attorney, George R. Kennedy, Assistant County
Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)

Rodd Tschida, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and
Kirk, Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
This is an appeal from the final judgment of conviction for speeding and driving
while impaired (DWI). Appellant challenges the district court’s pretrial order denying his
motion to suppress evidence and to dismiss the charge s, arguing that the traffic stop was
unsupported by reasonable, articulable suspicion. We affirm.
FACTS
In July 2022, a Sherburne County deputy observed appellant Paolo R Contreras
Hernandez driving 42 miles per hour in a 30- mile-per-hour zone. The deputy pulled the
vehicle over and requested Hernandez’s license and insurance information. While
Hernandez was looking for his insurance information on his phone the deputy asked, “How
much alcohol have you had to drink tonight, Paolo?” Hernandez answered, “ Like three
beers.” The traffic stop turned into a DWI investigation. Hernandez was arrested after
failing the field sobriety test. Respondent State of Minnesota charged Hernandez with two
counts of misdemeanor DWI under Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivisions 1(1),
1(5) (2020), and petty-misdemeanor speeding under Minnesota Statutes section 169.14,
subdivision 2(a)(1) (2020).
Hernandez filed a motion to suppress the evidence and to dismiss the charges
because the deputy lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion for the traffic stop. The matter
proceeded to an evidentiary hearing, where the district court heard testimony from the
deputy who conducted the traffic stop and received the deputy’s body-worn camera footage
and squad-car video footage into evidence.
3
The deputy testified that, based on the speed reading from his radar unit, Hernandez
was driving 42 miles per hour in a 30- mile-per-hour zone. The deputy did not indicate
whether Hernandez was traveling in an urban district. At the end of the hearing, both
parties agreed to submit briefing on whether the deputy had reasonable, articulable
suspicion for the traffic stop. The district court denied Hernandez’s motion to suppress the
evidence.
After Hernandez initially pleaded guilty to two of the charged offenses and was then
permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas, the parties agreed to a stipulated facts and evidence
trial under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 3. 1 Hernandez
stipulated that he drove 42 miles per hour in a posted 30-mile- per-hour zone. The state
also amended Hernandez’s petty- misdemeanor speeding citation, charging it under
Minnesota Statutes section 169.14, subdivision 5 (2020).2 The district court concluded that
Hernandez exceeded the posted 30-mile per hour speed limit, and found him guilty of DWI
and speeding.
Hernandez appeals.

1 Under this rule, by agreement of the parties, “a determination of the defendant’s
guilt . . . may be submitted to and tried by the court based entirely on stipulated facts,
stipulated evidence, or both.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3(a). “If the court finds the
defendant guilty based entirely on the stipulated facts, stipulated evidence, or both, the
defendant may appeal from the judgment of conviction and raise issues on appeal as from
any trial to the court.” Id., subd. 3(f).

2 Minnesota Statutes section 169.14, subdivision 5, provides that “local authorities . . . may
request the commissioner to authorize, upon the basis of an engineering and traffic
investigation, the erection of appropriate signs designating what speed is reasonable and
safe.” And it states that “[a]ny speed limit within any municipality shall be a maximum
limit and any speed in excess thereof shall be unlawful.”
4
DECISION
Hernandez challenges the district court’s pretrial order denying his motion to
suppress the evidence that flowed from the traffic stop. He argues that the district court
erroneously concluded that he was speeding in violation of section 169.14, subdivision
2(a)(1), because there was no evidence to support that he exceeded the speed limit in an
“urban district.”3
When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we independently
review the facts to determine whether, as a matter of law, the district court erred in not
suppressing the evidence. State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). We review
the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal determination that the deputy
had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop de novo. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d
836, 843 (Minn. 2011); State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Minnesota
Constitution guarantee “[t]he right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also
Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. The Fourth Amendment also protects individuals during

3 Hernandez challenged only the validity of the initial stop, not the expansion of the stop.
Because this argument was not raised below or considered by the district court, we refrain
from addressing it here. See Thiele v. Stitch, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating
that appellate courts “consider only those issues that the record shows were presented and
considered by the [district] court in deciding the matter before it” (quotation omitted)); see
also Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996) (holding that in reviewing a district
court’s decision, appellate courts “generally will not decide issues which were not raised
before the district court, including constitutional questions of criminal procedure.”
5
investigative stops by police. Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 87. “[A]rticle I, section 10 requires
application of Terry principles to traffic stops.” State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 363
(Minn. 2004). Under Terry, a n officer may conduct a traffic stop if the officer had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person might be engaged in criminal activity.
Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 842.
“Reasonable suspicion must be based on ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’”
State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 182 (Minn. 2007) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
(1968)). Under this standard, the suspicion must be “something more than an unarticulated
hunch.” Id. (quotation omitted). In each case, “the officer must be able to point to
something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” Id. (quotation omitted). An
officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop a car if they observe a traffic violation,
no matter how insignificant. See State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997)
(“Ordinarily, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the
officer has an objective basis for stopping the vehicle.”). “An actual violation of . . . traffic
laws need not be detectable.” State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn. 1996). An officer
“must only show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity,
but was based upon ‘ specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” Id. at 921–22 (quoting
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).
Here the deputy testified that, based on his training and experience, he believed
Hernandez was driving “at a pace faster than what would appear to be 30 miles an hour.”
6
The deputy testified that he activated his radar unit and determined Hernandez was driving
at 42 miles per hour. The deputy’s observation of Hernandez speeding provided an
objective basis to conduct a traffic stop. See George, 557 N.W.2d at 578; see also State v.
Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 418 (Minn. 2003) (holding that an officer who reasonably suspects
that a driver is speeding can perform a traffic stop). In sum, the deputy provided specific
and articulable facts that supported his reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation.
Both the law and the record support the district court’s determinations that the
deputy had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Hernandez. Because the deputy had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion for stopping Hernandez, the district court did not err in
denying Hernandez’s motion to suppress.4
Affirmed.

4 We note that although Hernandez expressly framed the issue as whether the traffic stop
of his motor vehicle was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion, his briefing
seemed to suggest a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument. This argument was not asserted
before the district court or on appeal. Because we do not consider matters not argued to
and considered by the district court, we refrain from addressing that argument here. See
Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582; see also State v. Anderson, 871 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 2015)
(“An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or
authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless
prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.”).