State of Minnesota, Respondent,

1
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0979

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Richard Alan Quarles,
Appellant.

Filed June 8, 2026
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Larson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-24-22377

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Britta Nicholson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Following a jury trial, appellant Richard Alan Quarles was convicted of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct, third-degree criminal sexual conduct, second-degree assault, and
domestic assault by strangulation. On direct appeal, Quarles challenges his convictions,
arguing the district court: (1) abused its discretion when it allowed the state to admit audio
recordings of certain 911 calls; (2) abused its discretion when it allowed the state to admit
an audio recording from a cell phone; and (3) erred when it entered a conviction for third-
degree criminal sexual conduct because it was a lesser-included offense of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct. Quarles also challenges his sentence on the bases that the district
court improperly imposed multiple sentences and the warrant of commitment does not
reflect the district court’s orally pronounced sentence. Because we conclude the district
court erred when it entered a conviction for third-degree criminal sexual conduct and the
warrant of commitment does not reflect the district court’s orally pronounced sentence, we
reverse and remand. We otherwise affirm.
FACTS
The following facts were elicited from evidence presented at a jury trial and
sentencing hearing. Quarles moved into E.K.’s (victim) residence, a duplex, shortly after
they started dating. The pair lived in the bottom portion of the duplex, which included a
basement. Within months, Quarles exhibited violent behavior towards victim. Victim
testified that, on one occasion, Quarles punched her in the face twice for touching his
belongings—causing a black eye and bloody nose. After the assault, Quarles verbally
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threatened to harm victim and her children if she called for help. In another incident,
Quarles beat victim with a belt, leaving welts, after she looked through his phone. Victim
did not report the incidents to law enforcement because she was afraid, but she told her
mother she might need help escaping in the future.
On September 25, 2024, Quarles and victim had a violent altercation in the basement
of the duplex. Quarles strangled victim from behind, and victim feared that she was dying.
Victim “lost feeling in [her] legs and feet,” and her breathing was “cut off.” Quarles briefly
released victim and, before strangling her a second time, he told her she would never see
her children again.
After twice strangling victim, Quarles told her to leave the duplex with his mother.
Quarles kept victim’s phone. While with Quarles’s mother, victim was near her parents’
house but was afraid to go there. Upon returning to the duplex, Quarles returned victim’s
phone. Victim was then briefly alone in the basement with her phone. There, she texted
her children’s father: “If I’m dead, he killed me.”
Quarles joined victim in the basement. Victim described Quarles’s demeanor as
“sinister.” Quarles punched victim in the face, breaking her lip open and giving her a black
eye. Quarles then ordered victim to take a shower. After she showered, Quarles picked up
his loaded gun, pointed it at victim, and talked about killing her. These comments scared
victim. Quarles then put the gun on a nearby dresser, approached victim, and exposed his
erect penis. Victim performed oral sex on Quarles because she was “in fear for [her] life.”
Quarles shoved his penis down victim’s throat to the point that she almost threw up. After
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several minutes, Quarles ejaculated, pulled up his pants, and picked up the gun. Later that
evening, victim took a benzodiazepine, cleaned the basement, and fell asleep.
Victim awoke between 2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. on September 26, 2024, with
Quarles putting his gun to her back. Quarles apologized to victim and then talked about
killing them both. During the conversation, Quarles fired the gun toward the basement
floor. After firing the gun, Quarles told victim that no one could hear her, and no one was
coming to help her. Victim acknowledged that she understood; then, both fell asleep.
Later that morning, victim left the duplex while Quarles slept. Victim met her
mother, and they took photographs of her injuries. Victim called 911 around 2:00 p.m. and
was advised to make a report in person. While at the police station, staff told victim to
return to the duplex to meet with a police officer. When she returned to the duplex, victim
noticed emergency vehicles parked outside. 1 Victim then called 911 a second time, and
she was advised to leave the duplex and call 911 again to meet with a police officer to
provide a full statement.
On September 28, 2024, victim called 911 again because she wanted to get her
belongings from the duplex. Law enforcement responded and spoke with victim. Victim
explained to law enforcement that Quarles choked her, punched her, threatened her with a
gun, and sexually assaulted her. On September 30, 2024, victim provided a formal
statement to an investigator.

1 Emergency vehicles were responding to an unrelated assault on Quarles.
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In an amended complaint, the state charged Quarles with (1) first- degree criminal
sexual conduct—penetration—fear of great bodily harm (count I) , under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342, subd. 1(a) (2024); (2) first-degree criminal sexual conduct—penetration—use
of force (count II), under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(b) (2024); (3) third -degree
criminal sexual conduct—penetration—use of coercion (count III), under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.344, subd. 1(a) (2024); (4) second-degree assault—dangerous weapon (count IV),
under Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2024); and (5) domestic assault by strangulation
(count V), under Minn. Stat. § 609.2247, subd. 2 (2024). Before trial, the state moved to
admit “relationship evidence” under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2024). See State v. Zinski, 927
N.W.2d 272, 273 (Minn. 2019) (noting that evidence offered under section 634.20 is
known as “relationship evidence”). As relevant here, the state sought to admit a five-
minute audio recording captured on victim’s cell phone (the audio recording). Victim
made the audio recording after a previous altercation where Quarles punched and verbally
abused her. Quarles objected to the admission of the audio recording. The district court
acknowledged that the audio recording was inflammatory but ruled that the probative value
of the audio recording was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, and the risk
of prejudice could be mitigated through cautionary instructions.
During the five-day jury trial, victim testified that she called 911 on September 26,
2024, the same day she left the duplex. The record from the investigation did not include
a 911 call from September 26, 2024. After victim’s testimony, the prosecutor emailed the
911 records department, seeking victim’s prior 911 calls. The 911 records department
produced audio recordings from two 911 calls that occurred on September 26, 2024 (the
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911 calls from September 26), and the prosecutor emailed them to Quarles’s defense
counsel.
On the fourth day of trial, the state disclosed the 911 calls from September 26 on
the record. Quarles objected to the state admitting the evidence, arguing the district court
should suppress the evidence due to the late disclosure. The district court ruled that the
911 calls from September 26 were admissible and offered Quarles a one-day continuance
as a remedy. Ultimately, the state moved to admit the 911 calls from September 26, which
the district court granted.
After deliberation, the jury returned a not guilty verdict on count II but returned
guilty verdicts on the other four counts. The district court entered convictions on all four
counts. It then imposed concurrent sentences on three counts: a 27-month prison term for
count V, a 57-month prison term for count IV , and a 306-month prison term for count I. 2
The warrant of commitment listed a 309-month prison term for count I.
Quarles appeals.
DECISION
Quarles raises several challenges to his convictions and sentences. First, he
challenges two evidentiary decisions at trial: (1) the decision to admit the 911 calls from
September 26; and (2) the decision to admit the audio recording. Second, he asserts the
district court erred when it imposed multiple sentences for count I, count IV, and count V.
Finally, Quarles and the state contend that (1) the district court erred when it entered a

2 The district court did not impose a sentence on count III.
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conviction for count III because it is a lesser-included offense of count I and (2) the warrant
of commitment incorrectly reflects a 309-month prison term when the district court orally
pronounced a 306-month prison term. We address these challenges in turn.
I.
We first address Quarles’s evidentiary challenges, which we review for an abuse of
discretion. See State v. Lindsey, 284 N.W.2d 368, 373 (Minn. 1979) (discovery violation);
see also State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004) (relationship evidence). “A
district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the
law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281,
291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). “[W]e largely defer to the [district] court’s exercise
of discretion in evidentiary matters and will not lightly overturn a [district] court’s
evidentiary ruling.” Dolo v. State, 942 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted).
Quarles bears the burden to establish that the district court abused its discretion and that he
was prejudiced as a result. See State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003).
Here, Quarles argues the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the state
to admit the 911 calls from September 26 and the audio recording.
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A. 911 Calls
Quarles contends the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the state to
admit the 911 calls from September 26. Specifically, Quarles challenges the district court’s
decisions that the late disclosure was not a discovery violation and, if it was, the appropriate
remedy was a one-day continuance rather than excluding the evidence.
Prosecutors are required to disclose “material and information in the possession or
control of members of the prosecution staff and of any others who have participated in the
investigation or evaluation of the case and who either regularly report, or with reference to
the particular case have reported, to the prosecutor’s office.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01,
subd. 1a(1). When a prosecutor fails to comply with this rule, it is a discovery violation,
and the district court must determine the appropriate remedy. State v. Freeman, 531
N.W.2d 190, 197-98 (Minn. 1995). Appropriate remedies include allowing additional
discovery, granting a continuance, or entering “any order it deems just in the
circumstances.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.03, subd. 8. When deciding the appropriate remedy,
the district court must assess whether the discovery violation harmed the defendant and
“the extent to which th[e] harm can be eliminated or otherwise alleviated.” Lindsey, 284
N.W.2d at 373. To do so, the district court should consider “(1) the reason why disclosure
was not made; (2) the extent of prejudice to the opposing party; (3) the feasibility of
rectifying that prejudice by a continuance; and (4) any other relevant factors.” Id.
Here, we assume without deciding that the late disclosure of the 911 calls from
September 26 was a discovery violation because, even if it was, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in its selection of the remedy. The record reflects that the district court
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found: (1) the state did not act in “bad faith,” and any discovery violation was inadvertent
because the state learned about the 911 calls from September 26 during victim’s trial
testimony; (2) Quarles suffered minimal prejudice because victim had already testified that
she made the 911 calls on September 26 and Quarles had the opportunity to effectively
cross-examine victim; and (3) a one-day continuance gave Quarles the opportunity to adapt
his trial strategy after the 911 calls from September 26 were disclosed. Thus, the district
court properly evaluated all the relevant factors and, after reviewing those factors,
determined any harm from the late disclosure could be remedied with a one-day
continuance. We further note that the district court’s remedy was consistent with supreme
court precedent cautioning against precluding evidence for minor discovery violations. Id.
at 374 (“Preclusion of evidence is a severe sanction which should not be lightly invoked.”).
For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
determined the appropriate remedy for any discovery violation related to the 911 calls from
September 26 was a one-day continuance.
B. Audio Recording
Quarles argues second that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted
the audio recording. The district court permitted the state to admit the audio recording as
relationship evidence under section 634.20. See Zinski, 927 N.W.2d at 273. Relationship
evidence is “[e]vidence of domestic conduct by the accused against the victim of domestic
conduct.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20. Relationship evidence includes evidence that “illuminates
the history of the relationship between an accused and a victi m,” McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at
161, “and thus contextualize[s] the charged crime,” State v. Boswell, 20 N.W.3d 640, 651
10
(Minn. App. 2025), rev. denied (Minn. June 25, 2025). Relationship evidence is admissible
“unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence” (the balancing test). Minn. Stat.
§ 634.20.
Here, Quarles argues the district court abused its discretion when it admitted the
audio recording because it did not properly apply the balancing test.3 Specifically, Quarles
indicates that the audio recording was unfairly prejudicial because it contained
inflammatory and racially charged language. 4 “Unfair prejudice . . . is not merely
damaging evidence, even severely damaging evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is evidence
that persuades by illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair advantage.” State v.
Schulz, 691 N.W.2d 474, 478 (Minn. 2005).
We discern no abuse of discretion in the manner in which the district court applied
the balancing test. The district court determined the audio recording was highly probative
because it illustrated the relationship between Quarles and victim, demonstrated why
victim feared for her safety, and assisted the jury with evaluating victim’s credibility. See

3 The state asserts that Quarles forfeited this challenge because he did not argue that the
“racially charged language in the recording” prejudiced him before the district court. We
are not persuaded. Reviewing the record, we conclude that Quarles preserved the issue
when he unequivocally objected to the admission of this evidence on the ground that he
was prejudiced. “Parties are allowed to refine their arguments on appeal.” State v.
Lanham, 33 N.W.3d 733, 736 n.2 (Minn. App. 2026).
4 During the audio recording, Quarles verbally berates victim and threatens physical
violence. In some portions of the audio recording, Quarles makes comments about b lack
women and the “ghetto.”
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Boswell, 20 N.W.3d at 653. And the district court concluded that, although the audio
recording was inflammatory, it was not “unduly prejudicial” because it did not persuade
by illegitimate means. See Schulz, 691 N.W.2d at 478. Further, the district court discussed
cases in which other district courts allowed the admission of similar evidence under
section 634.20. And the district court offered cautionary instructions to lessen the
prejudicial impact of the audio recording. See State v. Andersen, 900 N.W.2d 438, 441-42
(Minn. App. 2017) (observing that “cautionary instructions lessened any probability that
the jury would rely improperly on relationship evidence”); see also State v. Matthews, 779
N.W.2d 543, 550 (Minn. 2010) (noting that we presume jurors follow the district court’s
instructions).
In all, the record shows that the district court carefully and explicitly considered the
prejudicial effect of the audio recording and offered cautionary instructions to mitigate any
prejudicial effect. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it allowed the state to admit the audio recording.
II.
Quarles next challenges the district court’s decision to impose multiple sentences
for count I (first-degree criminal sexual conduct—penetration—fear of great bodily harm),
count IV (second-degree assault—dangerous weapon), and count V (domestic assault by
strangulation).
5 He argues that it was unlawful to impose all three sentences because the
crimes arose from the same behavioral incident. See Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (2024).

5 The district court sentenced Quarles in the following order: count V—27 months;
count IV— 57 months; and count I—306 months. In so doing, the district court used the
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Under section 609.035, subdivision 1, “if a person’s conduct constitutes more than
one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of the
offenses.” The statute prohibits “multiple sentences for crimes that arise from a single
behavioral incident.” State v. Bauer, 792 N.W.2d 825, 827 (Minn. 2011). The state bears
the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that multiple “offenses did not
occur as part of the same behavioral incident.” State v. Williams, 608 N.W.2d 837, 841
(Minn. 2000). Whether multiple offenses occurred during “a single behavioral incident is
a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Bakken, 883 N.W.2d 264, 270 (Minn. 2016).
In reviewing the district court’s decision, we review its “findings of fact for clear error and
its application of the law to those facts de novo.” Id.
But section 609.035, subdivision 6, includes an exception to this general rule:
“Notwithstanding subdivision 1, a prosecution or conviction for committing a violation of
sections 609.342 to 609.345 with force or violence is not a bar to conviction of or
punishment for any other crime committed by the defendant as part of the same conduct. ”
(Emphasis added.)
Quarles argues the district court erred when it relied on this exception to impose
multiple sentences because the state did not prove that his convictions met the “with force
or violence” requirement. According to Quarles, because the jury acquitted him of count II

method set forth in State v. Hernandez, 311 N.W.2d 478 (Minn. 1981), to increase
Quarles’s criminal-history score before sentencing the next offense. See Minn. Sent’g.
Guidelines 1.B.10 (2024) (defining “Hernandize” as “the unofficial term for the process
. . . of counting criminal history when multiple offenses are sentenced on the same day
before the same court”).
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(first-degree criminal sexual conduct—penetration—use of force), none of his convictions
met the definition of “force.”6
But we concluded in State v. Yaritz that, in certain cases , the state can satisfy the
“with force or violence” requirement if it proves first-degree criminal sexual conduct under
circumstances where the victim had “a reasonable fear of imminent great bodily harm.”
791 N.W.2d 138, 149 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 23, 2011); see also Minn.
Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a).7 In doing so, we noted that “the plain language of
section 609.035, subdivision 6, does not limit its application to any particular charging
provisions” for first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Id. And we noted that “none of the
charging provisions [for first-degree criminal sexual conduct] . . . uses the phrase ‘force or
violence.’” Id.
Here, the jury found Quarles guilty of count I (first-degree criminal sexual
conduct—penetration —fear of great bodily harm). Thus, the state proved that the
“circumstances existing at the time of the act cause[d] [victim] to have a reasonable fear of

6 In relevant part, Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 3 (2024), defines “force” to mean either:

(1) the infliction by the actor of bodily harm; or (2) the
attempted infliction, or threatened infliction by the actor of
bodily harm or commission or threat of any other crime by the
actor against the complainant or another, which causes the
complainant to reasonably believe that the actor has the present
ability to execute the threat.

7 The statutory language we analyzed in Yaritz is substantially similar to Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342, subd. 1(a). The Minnesota Legislature retained the language from Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342, subd. 1(c) (2008), “circumstances existing at the time of the act cause the
complainant to have a reasonable fear of imminent great bodily harm,” and recodified it at
Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a). See 2021 Minn. Laws ch. 11, art. 4, § 16, at 2038.
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imminent great bodily harm[.]” Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a). Moreover, to obtain
this conviction, the state proved that Quarles both strangled victim and threatened her with
a firearm. Thus, under Yaritz and the facts of this case, we conclude the district court did
not err when it applied the “with force or violence” exception in section 609.035,
subdivision 6, to impose the three sentences.
III.
Finally, Quarles argues, and the state agrees, that we must reverse and remand to
correct two errors. First, both parties agree that the warrant of commitment improperly
reflects a 309-month prison term for count I because the district court orally pronounced a
306-month prison term. Second, both parties also agree that the district court erred when
it entered a conviction on count III (third-degree criminal sexual conduct—penetration —
use of coercion) because it is an included offense of count I (first-degree criminal sexual
conduct—penetration —fear of great bodily harm) under Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1
(2024). We agree with the parties upon our de novo review of both issues. See State v.
Williams, 771 N.W.2d 514, 520 (Minn. 2009) (sentence authorized by law); State v. Cox,
820 N.W.2d 540, 552 (Minn. 2012) (section 609.04, subdivision 1).
With regard to the length of Quarles’s sentence for count I, when there is a conflict
between a warrant of commitment and a clear oral sentencing order, a district court’s oral
pronouncement controls. State v. Staloch, 643 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Minn. App. 2002).
“Clerical mistakes in a judgment, order, or in the record arising from oversight or omission
may be corrected by the court at any time.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 10. Here, the
district court clearly pronounced a 306-month prison term, and the warrant of commitment
15
does not reflect that clear oral pronouncement. Thus, we instruct the district court to correct
the clerical error on remand.
With regard to the conviction entered on count III (third-degree criminal sexual
conduct—penetration—use of coercion), “[u]pon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be
convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both,” provided that
the offenses are alleged to have arisen from the same alleged act. Minn. Stat. § 609.04,
subd. 1; see also State v. Saxton, 331 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Minn. 1983) (holding that
section 609.04 “prevents the state from convicting a defendant twice of the same offense
or of a greater and a lesser-included offense on the basis of the same act or course of
conduct”). The term “included offense” is defined to include “a lesser degree of the same
crime.” Id., subd. 1(1). For this reason, third-degree criminal sexual conduct is an included
offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. State v. O’Brien, 369 N.W.2d 525, 526-
27 (Minn. 1985).
The proper procedure for district courts “when the defendant is convicted on more
than one charge for the same act is for the [district] court to adjudicate formally and impose
sentence on one count only,” retaining the guilty verdicts on remaining charges, but not
formally adjudicating them. State v. LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 1984).
“When [the] official judgment order states that a party has been convicted of or sentenced
for more than one included offense,” we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the
erroneous conviction. State v. Pflepsen, 590 N.W.2d 759, 767 (Minn. 1999); State v.
Crockson, 854 N.W.2d 244, 248 (Minn. App. 2014), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 16, 2014).
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Here, it is undisputed that the jury found Quarles guilty of count I (first-degree
criminal sexual conduct—penetration—fear of great bodily harm) and count III (third-
degree criminal sexual conduct—penetration—use of coercion) based upon the same act.
Accordingly, count III is a lesser-included offense of count I, and we reverse and remand
for the district court to vacate the conviction for count III and to issue a new warrant of
commitment consistent with this opinion. Pflepsen, 590 N.W.2d at 767. Following
LaTourelle, we instruct the district court to preserve the underlying guilty verdict for
count III. E.g., State v. Walker, 913 N.W.2d 463, 469 (Minn. App. 2019).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.