In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: K. M. S. and J. J. S., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0988

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: K. M. S. and J. J. S., Parents.

Filed December 15, 2025
Affirmed
Bentley, Judge

Chisago County District Court
File No. 13-JV-25-27

MacKenzie Guptil, Pine City, Minnesota (for appellant-father J.J.S.)

Janet Reiter, Chisago County Attorney, Aimee S. Cupelli, Assistant County Attorney,
Center City, Minnesota (for respondent Chisago County Health and Human Services)

Alfred S. Alliegro, Alliegro Law Office, LLC, Center City, Minnesota (for child)

Bethany Peterson, Stillwater, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Bentley, Judge; and Segal,
Judge.
∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BENTLEY, Judge
On appeal from the termination of his parental rights, appellant-father J.J.S.
challenges the district court’s determinations that the termination is supported by a

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
statutory basis, that respondent-county made reasonable efforts to reunite him with his
child, and that termination is in the best interests of the child. We affirm.
FACTS
This case concerns the termination of father’s parental rights to his 14-year -old
child, born in 2011. 1 The following summarizes the district court’s findings of fact in its
order terminating parental rights (TPR), as well as the procedural history. We supplement
from the record in the district court, including from trial transcripts and exhibits, as
necessary to understand the issues on appeal.
Child and his parents have an extensive history with respondent Chisago County
Health and Human Services (the county) and law enforcement. In the years leading up to
the current proceedings, law enforcement was called to the family home seven times for
domestic disputes between either m other and father or mother and child. On one such
occasion in 2021, father was arrested for and convicted of domestic assault, with law
enforcement reporting that father was heavily intoxicated at the time of the incident. Later
the same month, child called law enforcement reporting that father was arguing with
mother and being physical. Father was under an active domestic-abuse no-contact order
(DANCO) at that time, and mother reported father was drinking, despite being on probation
for the domestic-abuse conviction with a no- substance-use condition. When the police
were called, typically one or both parents reportedly appeared intoxicated.

1 Mother K.M.S.’s parental rights were also terminated. But mother has not challenged that
determination and did not participate in this appeal.
3
Separately, the county received various reports about child from his school, many
of which related to child’s frequent absences. During the 2022-2023 school year, when
child was in sixth grade, child “was only enrolled in school 111 of 186 total school days,
and of those, he only attended 25 days.” That year he failed nearly all his core classes. The
following school year, child had more than 30 unexcused absences between September and
January. In October 2023, child was adjudicated a child in need of protection or services
(CHIPS) as a habitual truant. He was placed on probation and ordered to attend school,
complete a residential evaluation program, and complete a mental-health assessment and
follow all recommendations. His parents were ordered to participate in a parenting course.
As of the TPR trial, neither parent had completed that course.
In early February 2024, the county was granted immediate custody of child because
mother threatened to leave the state with child rather than agree to him entering the
residential evaluation program as ordered, and because child had continued to miss school
after his truancy adjudication. At a hearing, child was again adjudicated CHIPS , and the
district court approved and adopted out-of-home placement plans.
Father’s case plan required that he, among other things, (1) remain sober;
(2) comply with drug testing; (3) “be able to verbally demonstrate insight into the effects
addictive disorders/use has had on himself, his family, and his child”; (4) attend weekly
individual therapy; (5) be able to “demonstrate behavioral changes and insight into the
concerns which brought the family into the Child Protection System”; and (6) “demonstrate
the ability to locate, secure, and/or maintain safe and stable housing for himself and his
child, long-term.”
4
As to the requirements relating to substance use, father completed an assessment
and was diagnosed with moderate opiate use disorder, and it was recommended that he
complete outpatient treatment. Father entered outpatient treatment at Care Crossings and
attended three sessions per week. Additionally, father agreed to participate in various
methods of substance testing. Throughout the CHIPS proceedings, father maintained that
he was sober and had not consumed alcohol since the DANCO was in place in 2021. But
father tested positive for oxycodone more than ten times between March 2024 and
April 2025, and tested positive for alcohol on numerous separate occasions. There was also
evidence that father repeatedly tampered with the testing devices or failed to comply with
testing. When presented with positive tests, f ather denied use. Following positive tests,
father entered sober housing in February 2025, but struggled to pay $888 per month in
“sober fees” that include rent and, in April, he was asked to leave. As of the time of trial,
father had not yet graduated from Care Crossings’ outpatient program.
As to the therapy requirement, father participated in individual therapy for
approximately five sessions but stopped when he got behind in co- pays for the services.
When his case manager became aware of the issue, she organized for the county to pay the
outstanding co-pay balance, but father’s therapist was unwilling to reinitiate services
because of repeated no-call, no-show appointments.
After child was removed from the home, father consistently attended scheduled
visitations and spoke with child on the phone. Visits were twice weekly until June 2024,
when child’s therapist and other service providers determined that visits should occur
through therapeutic coaching because of child’s increased anxiety after their contact.
5
Visitation was paused while that therapeutic coaching was organized. Father and child first
participated in individual therapy sessions and then began joint sessions in November 2024.
The joint sessions continued until January 2025, when they were paused again because
child was having increased mental -health symptoms and began a day-treatment program.
The therapeutic coaching provider attempted to restart sessions in March 2025, but visits
were further delayed because of difficulty reaching father. Sessions between child and
father restarted in early May 2025.
Finally, with respect to housing, father moved out of the family home in January
2025, after mother returned home following time spent in the hospital and a group home.
Father testified that he moved out so that he could get child back. The county provided
father with resources to locate affordable housing and housing assistance. Father stayed
with a friend until he moved into the sober home. In March 2025, father told the case
manager that he found an apartment, but then he kept representing to her that the move-in
date was pushed back. In early April 2025, father told child about the apartment and said
that child could live there with him. C hild was very bonded with his cat, and father said
that child could bring the cat to the apartment. Around that time, the case manager and
father discussed a trial home visit at the apartment, but those discussions were discontinued
when the case manager learned that father actually did not have an apartment and was
living in his car after he had been asked to leave the sober home . At the TPR trial, father
stated that the apartment “fell through.” He submitted into evidence a lease for a different
apartment in St. Paul that began on the last day of trial. The lease listed the monthly rent
as $1,250, mentioned father as the only occupant, and prohibited pets. Father testified that
6
if child lived there with him, he would drive child to and from his current school and pay
rent by picking up extra shifts and working overnight hours.
At the time of the TPR trial, child was 14. Child is diagnosed with autism spectrum
disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and other
specified trauma and s tressor-related disorder. He had not attended therapy before the
county’s involvement but began participating in frequent, regular individual therapy in
May 2024. A major concern reported by many of child’s providers is parentification of
child, which a therapist who testified described as “a dynamic within a family system where
a child assumes the role that often is held for parents.” After child was placed in foster care
and reenrolled in school, he had only six absences, all of which were excused. By eighth
grade, child was on the “A” honor roll.
In January 2025, the county petitioned to terminate both mother’s and father’s
parental rights under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(2), (3), and
(4) (2024), because of the parents’ lack of progress on their case plans, the length of child’s
time out of the home, and child’s need for permanency.
The district court held a three-day trial in May 2025 at which 12 witnesses testified,
including: the child -protection case manager, child’s individual therapist, child’s school
case manager, child’s former guardian ad litem, child’s current guardian ad litem, father’s
treatment counselor, the parenting therapist from the therapeutic coaching sessions ,
mother, and father. The district court also received into evidence over 100 exhibits. At trial,
mother conceded she was unable to care for child and child’s attorney expressed the child’s
desire to live with father.
7
The district court filed a 40-page order with findings of fact and conclusions of law.
In the order, the district court determined that the county established three statutory bases
for TPR under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b). Specifically, the
county established that (1) parents substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or
neglected to comply with the duties imposed on them by the parent and child relationship;
(2) parents are palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship; and
(3) reasonable efforts under the direction of the court have failed to correct the conditions
leading to child’s out-of-home placement. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2)-(4).
It further determined that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family and that
termination was in child’s best interests. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subds. 1(b)(7)-( 8). The
district court therefore granted the petition terminating both mother’s and father’s parental
rights.
Father appeals.
DECISION
Parental rights may only be terminated for “grave and weighty reasons.” In re
Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). To terminate parental rights
involuntarily, a district court must determine (1) that at least one statutory ground for TPR
exists, (2) that the county has made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunify
the family, unless those efforts are not required under the statute, and (3) that termination
is in the child’s best interests. Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.301, subds. 1(b), 7, 8, .317, subd. 1
(2024); see also In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008).
8
Appellate courts review a district court’s TPR decision “to determine whether the
district court’s findings address the statutory criteria and whether the district court’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.” S.E.P., 744
N.W.2d at 385. “A finding is clearly erroneous if it is either manifestly contrary to the
weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re
Welfare of Child. of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660-61 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). In
reviewing the district court’s factual findings, appellate courts “view the evidence in a light
favorable to the findings.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn.
2021) (addressing the clear-error standard of review); In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968
N.W.2d 593, 601 n.6 (Minn. App. 2021) (applying Kenney in a TPR appeal), rev. denied
(Minn. Dec. 6, 2021). When reviewing the district court’s ultimate decision to terminate
rights, “[appellate courts] give considerable deference to the district court’s decision.”
S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385; see also J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 600 (stating that appellate courts
review district court’s ultimate TPR decision for an abuse of discretion).
Father challenges the district court’s determination on each of the statutory criteria
for involuntary TPR: that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite him with child, that
a statutory ground for termination exists, and that termination is in the child’s best interests.
We address each argument in turn.
I
Before terminating parental rights, a district court must find that the county has
made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunify the family or find that
reasonable efforts are not statutorily required. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8; see also
9
Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2024); T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 664. Reasonable efforts are “services
that go beyond mere matters of form so as to include real, genuine assistance.” In re
Welfare of Child. of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotations omitted),
rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007). The efforts “must be aimed at alleviating the conditions
that gave rise to out -of-home placement, and they must conform to the problems
presented.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 88 (Minn. App. 2012).
In determining whether a county’s efforts were reasonable, the district court must
consider whether the services offered were
(1) selected in collaboration with the child’s family and,
if appropriate, the child;
(2) tailored to the individualized needs of the child and
child’s family;
(3) relevant to the safety, protection, and well -being of
the child;
(4) adequate to meet the individualized needs of the
child and family;
(5) culturally appropriate;
(6) available and accessible;
(7) consistent and timely; and
(8) realistic under the circumstances.
Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2024). The district court also weighs “the length of the time the
county was involved and the quality of effort given.” In re Welfare of H.K., 455 N.W.2d
529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). “[W]hat constitutes
reasonable efforts depends on the facts of each case.” J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 601 (quotation
omitted). We review the district court’s determination about the reasonableness of the
county’s efforts for an abuse of discretion and the related findings of fact for clear error.
10
In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 322-23 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied
(Minn. July 20, 2015).
Here, the district court determined that “[r]easonable efforts were made by the
[county] to rehabilitate . . . Father, reunify the child with the parents, and finalize a
permanency plan for the child.” The district court specifically found that the county
provided 18 services to father, including: (1) referrals for mental-health and chemical-
health services for m other and father; (2) referrals for services for child; (3) text, phone,
and in-person contact with mother, father, child, and foster parents; (4) drug testing;
(5) coordination of visitation; (6) housing resources; (7) supervision of phone/video visits;
(8) payment of therapy co-pays for f ather; and (9) consultation and communication with
service providers. The district court also found that the services were offered in
collaboration with the family and child and tailored to the individualized needs of child
and the family. The record supports these findings, and they do not amount to error.
Father argues that the county’s efforts to reunify him and child were unreasonable
because of the limitations that the county placed on visitation and the delays in starting
therapeutic intervention. Specifically, he argues that it was unreasonable for visits with
child to be suspended in June 2024, during the transition to therapeutic coaching. As a
result, father and child did not see each other in-person until November 2024, and early the
next year, visitations were paused again and not restarted until months later. Father states
that the limitations on visitation took an emotional toll on him and made it difficult for him
to complete his other case-plan requirements.
11
We are mindful of father’s genuine desire for more time with child and of the
distress that having that time restricted may have caused him. And yet, the district court’s
finding that the county made reasonable efforts is supported by the record and based on
more than the frequency of visitation . The district court found that the county provided
assistance aimed at multiple elements of father’s case plan, including providing options for
mental-health and chemical-dependency treatment and housing resources. The district
court also addressed father’s argument about visitation in its order, stating that “the pace
of visits and the transition to therapeutic visits were all in response to [child’s] mental
health needs and his requests.” The district court noted, “There were times that more
frequent visits were offered, and [child] requested that they be limited to every other week.
Given [child’s] age and mental health needs . . . it was necessary to be responsi ve to his
needs as it related to visitation.”
The record supports the district court’s findings. Many of child’s providers testified
that the frequency and nature of child’s visits with father were set based on child’s
preferences and accounted for fluctuations in his mental health. Moreover, in determining
whether the county made reasonable efforts, the statute requires the district court to
consider whether the efforts were tailored to child’s individualized needs, whether the
county collaborated with child, and whether services were relevant to the safety, protection,
and well-being of child. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h). The record supports that the district court
considered those factors and, in turn, did not abuse its discretion in determining that the
visitation efforts were reasonable.
12
Father also disputes the district court’s finding that father’s conduct contributed to
delays in therapeutic services. Testimony established that, when switching from regular
visits to therapeutic visits, father did not timely respond to the case manager’s attempts to
contact him about establishing services. And, after child was ready to resume therapeutic
visits after a pause, father did not respond to calls from the provider until the following
month. The district court did not clearly err in finding that father’s actions contributed to
the delay in therapeutic meetings between him and child.
Because the district court’s findings are supported by the record and consistent with
the statute, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father and reunify him with child.
II
To terminate parental rights, the district court must determine that the county
established one or more of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing
evidence. J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 600 . When reviewing the statutory basis for the TPR, we
assess whether the district court’s findings (1) address the statutory criteria and (2) are
supported by substantial evidence. S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. We must “closely inquire
into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether it was clear and convincing.” In
re Welfare of J.M., 574 N.W.2d 717, 724 (Minn. 1998). We review the factual findings for
clear error and the statutory basis for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child. of
J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). “A
district court abuses its discretion if it makes findings of fact that lack evidentiary support,
13
misapplies the law, or resolves discretionary matters in a manner contrary to logic and facts
on record.” In re Welfare of Child of T.M.A., 11 N.W.3d 346, 355 (Minn. App. 2024).
We limit our analysis to the third statutory ground found by the district court, Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), because the record reflects that there is clear and
convincing evidence to support termination on that ground. J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 600.
Because at least one of the statutory grounds found by the district court is supported by the
record, we need not address the remaining statutory grounds for termination. See J.K.T.,
814 N.W.2d at 92 (recognizing that appellate courts “need only one properly supported
statutory ground in order to affirm a termination order”).
Under subdivision 1(b)(4), a district court may terminate a parent’s rights upon a
finding “that following the child’s placement out of the home, reasonable efforts, under the
direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s
placement.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4). This provision presumes that
reasonable efforts have failed upon a showing that: (1) “a child has resided out of the
parental home under court order for a cumulative period of 12 months within the preceding
22 months,” (2) “the court has approved the out-of-home placement plan,” (3) the
“conditions leading to the out-of- home placement have not been corrected” as shown by
the parent “not substantially compl[ying] with the court’s orders and a reasonable case
plan,” and (4) “reasonable efforts have been made by the social services agency to
rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.” Id., subd. 1(b)(4)(i)-(iv).
Throughout its order, the district court made findings on each of the four elements
required to establish the presumption that reasonable efforts have failed. First, the district
14
court found that child had been out of the home for 471 days as of the last day of trial. 2
That finding is reflected in the record. Second, the district court found, consistent with the
record, that “[t]he Out-of-Home -Placement Plans were approved by the Court and
adopted.” Third, the district court found that father’s progress on the case plan was not
meaningful and did not correct the conditions leading to child’s placement. For example,
the record demonstrates that he participated minimally in individual therapy, and although
father presented a lease for an apartment with a move-in date on the last day of trial, he did
not show that he can maintain it. The record also indicates that father did not abstain from
all nonprescribed, mood-altering substances, and has not demonstrated “insight into the
effects addictive disorders/use has had on himself, his family, and his child.” Fourth, as
discussed above, the district court determined that the county made reasonable efforts
toward rehabilitation and reunification, and we see no basis to conclude that this finding
was clear error.
The district court summarized father’s progress on the case plan as follows:
While Father worked many of the tasks associated with
the case plan, his progress was not meaningful and did not
correct the conditions that led to the out-of- home placement.
Father has not graduated from outpatient treatment
programming, only participated in a few individual therapy
sessions, and has not demonstrated safe, stable housing.
. . . Father continues to lack insight into his own chemical
health and mental health, his relationship with Mother, and his
part in creating an unhealthy parent- child relationship with

2 We note that there appears to be a typo in the district court’s order on this point. The
district court stated, “[child] has been in out -of-home placement since February 2, 2025,
471 days as of the last date of trial.” Elsewhere in its order the district court acknowledges
that the county filed for custody on February 2, 2024. We understand the 471-day period
to begin on February 2, 2024, not February 2, 2025.
15
[child]. Despite providing Father with services that could
address these issues, Father’s continued insistence on Mother’s
alcohol use or [child’s] truancy being the reason for removal
has hindered any real progress.

The district court determined that the county proved by clear and convincing evidence “that
reasonable efforts under the direction of the court have failed to correct the conditions
leading to the child’s placement.”
Father argues that the district court clearly erred in its determination that he did not
substantially comply with the case plan. He maintains that the district court did not properly
consider the difficulty of securing housing. He points out that he is no longer living with
mother. And he challenges the district court’s findings about his sobriety and indicates that
he is still in treatment.
Again here, the record supports the district court’s determination. The finding that
father made some effort toward his case plan but that his progress was “not meaningful” is
reflected in the record evidence relating to father’s housing and substance-use issues. As
to housing, the district court acknowledged that father presented a lease at trial but made
adverse credibility findings about father’s ability to maintain stable and safe housing,
stating that father’s housing situation and his plans for child were “misleading and
unrealistic.” Specifically, the district court found:
Father testified that he would be able to get flexibility from his
employer to leave work to transport [child] to school. Father’s
testimony demonstrates that he has an unrealistic and
unreasonable expectation of his ability to manage [child’s]
educational needs. Father works in St. Paul from 6:00 a.m.
until 6:00 p.m. and will reportedly be living in St. Paul.
[Child’s school] is in Lindstrom, 38 miles and an
approximately 1-hour drive from St. Paul. Transporting [child]
16
to and from school each day would take at least 4 hours out of
Father’s workday. Father testified that one of the reasons he
had difficulty paying the sober fees at the sober house was
because of reduced work hours due to participating in services.

Given these findings, we defer to the district court’s credibility determination with respect
to father’s ability to maintain stable housing. See In re Civ. Commitment of Ince, 847
N.W.2d 13, 24 (Minn. 2014) (stating that a fact-finder is in the best position to “weigh the
evidence and assess credibility”).
As to father’s testimony that he is sober, the district court found that “Father’s
testimony regarding his alcohol and substance use is not credible,” and it credited the
results of father’s various substance tests that indicate he was not sober. The district court
acknowledged that father’s treatment counselor testified that she believed he was sober,
but the district court nevertheless found based on the record that he was not. We decline to
reweigh evidence and disturb the district court’s credibility findings. Id.; see also Kenney,
963 N.W.2d at 221-23.
Even if father’s actions did constitute substantial compliance with his case plan, the
district court still may terminate his parental rights if the record contains clear and
convincing evidence supporting termination. See In re Welfare of Maas, 355 N.W.2d 480,
483 (Minn. App. 1984) (affirming that mother’s substantial compliance with court-ordered
parenting sessions, psychological treatment, and sobriety were insufficient to avoid
termination given her poor prognosis for long-term improvement). The critical issue is not
whether the parent formally complied with the case plan, but whether the parent is presently
able to assume the responsibilities of caring for the child. In re Welfare of J.L.L., 396
17
N.W.2d 647, 651 (Minn. App. 1986). Based on its detailed findings, the district court
determined that father is not capable of parenting child now or in the foreseeable future.
The district court’s findings are not clearly erroneous; they are supported by multiple days
of testimony and over 100 exhibits. The district court also properly applied the law and
made findings and conclusions on each of the necessary statutory elements. For these
reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
the county proved this statutory ground by clear and convincing evidence.
III
The child’s best interests are the “paramount consideration” in a termination
proceeding. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7; see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 2(a)
(2024). Even if a statutory basis for termination is present and the county has made
reasonable efforts, a district court may not terminate parental rights if it is not in the best
interests of the child. In re Welfare of the Child of D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 545 (Minn.
App. 2009) . In considering the child’s best interests, the district court balances three
factors: (1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship, (2) the parent’s
interest in preserving the parent-child relationship, and (3) any competing interests of the
child. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii). “Competing interests [of the child] include
such things as a stable environment, health considerations and the child’s preferences.”
J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905 (quotation omitted). We review a district court’s best-interests
determination for an abuse of discretion. Id.
In its determination, the district court recognized child’s expressed desire to live
with his father but found that “the interest in preserving the parent -child relationship is
18
outweighed here by [child’s] interest in achieving permanency, hav [ing] a safe and stable
home, and having a caregiver who can meet his physical, emotional, and educational
needs.” More specifically, the district court found:
[Child] loves both of his parents, and has a relationship
with his two adult half-siblings. [Child] also expressed through
his attorney at trial that he would like to return home and live
with Father. The Court has given some weight to [child’s]
expressed desire, but considers it in the light of the testimony
of both of the mental health professionals who have worked
with [child] in recent months. Both [professionals] testified
credibly that, as a result of the enmeshment and parentification
in the relationship between [child] and his parents, [child] is
likely to feel that he needs to advocate for or stick up for his
parents. While a termination of parental rights will
undoubtedly cause trauma to [child], the need to provide him
with safety, stability, and security outweighs the benefit of
preserving the parent-child relationship.

The district court also found that “it is unlikely that [child] would receive the treatment he
needs for his mental health if he were returned to [parents’] care,” “[b]ased on [their]
inability to participate consistently in their own services.” And it credited testimony of the
guardian ad litem that she believes TPR is in child’s best interests.
Father makes three arguments challenging the district court’s best-interests
determination. First, he argues that the district court improperly relied on information and
testimony from a former guardian ad litem who did not speak with either of child’s parents
during the seven months she was in that role. At trial, both the current guardian ad litem
and a former guardian ad litem testified. The current guardian testified that she thought it
was in child’s best interest for parental rights to be terminated but the former guardian did
not address that question directly. Father takes issue with a different part of the testimony,
19
citing the former guardian’s admission that she never spoke with father or mother, which
the current guardian acknowledged was improper. Even if we assume that the prior
guardian should have spoken with the parents, the district court did not rely solely or even
largely on that testimony. Rather, in its order, the district court found that “[t]he Guardian
ad Litem testified that she believes a termination of parental rights is in [child’s] best
interests.” Given the contents of each guardians’ testimony, and that the district court did
not reference the former guardian, this was likely a reference to the current guardian’s
testimony. She, unlike the prior guardian, testified that she had spoken with father. The
district court also made numerous additional, more detailed findings to reach its best-
interests-of-the-child determination. As such, its guardian ad litem finding would not
amount to an abuse of discretion upon which to reverse the district court’s decision.
Second, father again argues that the district court did not appropriately consider the
county’s delay in visitation services and erroneously found father responsible for delay.
We refer to our discussion of this issue in section one. The visitation schedule was adapted
in response to child’s requests and professional advice. In other words, the schedule was
made in consideration of child’s best interests. For that reason, any delays or gaps in
visitation are not grounds for disturbing the district court’s best-interests findings.
Third, father takes issue with the district court’s determination that is contrary to the
child’s expressed desire to live with father. We recognize, and the record makes clear, that
there is mutual love and affection between f ather and child. We have no doubt that the
interest of each party in maintaining their relationship is significant and that it is likely very
difficult to have the district court rule contrary to child’s stated desires. Even so, we
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conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it deviated from child’s
stated preference. That is one factor that the district court needs to consider in terminating
parental rights, but the district court is not bound to follow it. See In re Welfare of Child of
J.R.R., 943 N.W.2d 661, 669 (Minn. App. 2020) (“The custodial wishes of a 15-year -old
child are a relevant factor to be considered and evaluated.” (emphasis added)). As the
district court correctly pointed out, caselaw establishes that, when analyzing a child’s best
interests, stability receives high priority. See In re Welfare of K.T., 327 N.W.2d 13, 18
(Minn. 1982). The district court found that termination would better serve child’s need for
stability, noting that routine, structure, and support have led to “remarkable improvement”
for child academically. The record supports those findings. And, despite recognizing
child’s preference to live with father, the district court found that child’s preference should
be considered within the context of the unhealthy relationship between child and his
parents, and that he “is likely to feel that he needs to advocate for or stick up for his
parents.” The record also supports that finding.
The district court’s consideration of child’s wishes was consistent with the law and
the record. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that child’s
competing interests outweighed his interest in preserving the parent-child relationship and
that termination of father’s parental rights was in child’s best interests.
Because the district court’s findings address the statutory criteria, are supported by
the record, and are not clearly erroneous, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s order.
Affirmed.