State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0992

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Thomas Anthony Flowers,
Appellant.

Filed February 2, 2026
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-CR-22-93

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kelsey Hopps, Crow Wing County Attorney, Brent Peterson, Assistant County Attorney,
Brainerd, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Hannah B. Laub, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
On appeal from the district court’s probation-revocation decision, appellant argues
that the district court abused its discretion because its decision lacked supporting evidence,
improperly credited the testimony of the state’s witness, and applied an incorrect legal
standard. We affirm.
FACTS
In February 2022, appellant Thomas Anthony Flowers pleaded guilty to first-degree
aggravated robbery. Flowers requested a downward dispositional departure, arguing that
he is particularly amenable to probation. The district court granted Flowers’s departure
request, staying execution of a 48-month prison sentence and placing Flowers on
supervised probation for five years.
Between April and July 2024, the state filed a probation-violation report and several
addenda, alleging that Flowers failed to: (1) appear for random drug testing; (2) comply
with individual therapy and outpatient chemical-dependency treatment; (3) complete an
updated diagnostic assessment; (4) abstain from alcohol; and (5) remain law-abiding. In
July 2024, the state withdrew one violation, Flowers admitted to the remaining violations,
and the district court reinstated him on probation.
In November 2024, the state filed a second violation report, alleging that Flowers
failed to remain law-abiding because he was charged with felony fleeing a police officer
in a motor vehicle and additional vehicle-related misdemeanors. Flowers later pleaded
guilty to the fleeing offense, which involved a high-speed chase that ended only after police
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used a precision immobilization technique (PIT) maneuver. The state also alleged that
Flowers failed to complete an updated chemical-use assessment and maintain contact with
community corrections. Flowers admitted to all three violations.
At the contested disposition hearing, a probation agent testified about the violations
and opined that the violations were intentional and inexcusable and that the need for
confinement outweighed policies favoring probation given the public-safety concerns.
Because Flowers had for the most part been supervised in other counties, the probation
officer had only met Flowers once and testified largely from his notes. The district court
also heard testimony from one of Flowers’s friends and a dispositional advisor, each of
whom testified about Flowers’s troubled upbringing, the availability and benefits of
additional treatment options, and community support.
The district court found that Flowers’s violations were intentional and inexcusable.
Balancing “[Flowers’s] interest in freedom and the State’s interest in ensuring a
probationer’s rehabilitation and public safety,” the district court (1) determined that the
need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation, (2) revoked Flowers’s
probation, and (3) executed the sentence of 48 months in prison.
This appeal followed.
DECISION
District courts have broad discretion in determining whether there is sufficient
evidence to revoke probation, and appellate courts reverse an order revoking probation
only if the district court clearly abused its discretion. State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246,
249-50 (Minn. 1980). “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on
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an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v.
Fortner, 989 N.W.2d 368, 374 (Minn. App. 2023) (quotation omitted).
When a defendant violates a condition of probation, the district court may revoke
probation and execute the previously stayed sentence. Minn. Stat. § 609.14, subds. 1(a),
3(1) (2024). Before revoking a defendant’s probation and executing the stayed sentence,
the district court must (1) “designate the specific condition or conditions that were
violated”; (2) “find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable”; and (3) “find that
need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d
at 250.
Under the third Austin factor, district courts must balance “the probationer’s interest
in freedom and the state’s interest in insuring his rehabilitation and the public safety.” Id.
To make a finding on this factor, the district court considers three “Modtland subfactors”:
whether (1) “confinement is necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity
by the offender”; (2) “the offender is in need of correctional treatment which can most
effectively be provided if he is confined”; or (3) “it would unduly depreciate the
seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked.” State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d
602, 607 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted). Only one of the Modtland subfactors is
necessary to support revocation. State v. Smith, 994 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Minn. App. 2023),
rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 2023).
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Flowers challenges the third Austin factor, arguing specifically that the district court
abused its discretion in its analysis of the third Modtland subfactor.1 Flowers maintains
that he took accountability for the offense that resulted in the new violation, and he
highlights his difficult childhood, available treatment options, and the housing and support
his friend would provide him if he remained in the community. And he asserts that, because
he received a probationary sentence on the St. Louis County felony-fleeing conviction,
reinstating him on probation would not unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation
of failing to remain law-abiding.
The district court recognized that Flowers had taken responsibility for the fleeing
offense and noted that it “heard testimony regarding [Flower’s] familial connections, the
importance of family, and about the support he would have no matter the outcome of these
proceedings.” But the district court reasoned that “[t]his is not only a matter of
accumulated technical violations, but also a serious concern to public safety” because ,
“[s]ince being placed on probation, [Flowers] has offered a guilty plea and awaits
sentencing on a felony -fleeing charge in a separate case . [Flowers] engaged in a high-
speed chase with police, which only ended when police utilized a PIT maneuver.”
Expressly balancing Flowers’s interest in freedom, public safety, and the state’s interest in
ensuring Flowers’s rehabilitation, the district court determined that it would unduly

1 Flowers also challenges the district court’s findings on other Modtland subfactors.
Because there was a sufficient basis for the district court to revoke Flowers’s probation
under the third Modtland subfactor, and only one subfactor is necessary to support
revocation, we need not address Flowers’s argument on the other Modtland subfactors. See
Smith, 994 N.W.2d at 320.

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depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked. We discern no
abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination.
Flowers challenges the district court’s decision to credit the testimony of the
probation agent—t he state’s sole witness—arguing that the agent lacked familiarity with
Flowers’s case. The record shows that the district court considered the testimony of the
probation agent, as well as the testimony given by Flowers’s friend and the dispositional
advisor. And the district court recognized that “[t]he probation officer who testified has
had limited interactions with [Flowers], as he has largely been supervised out of two other
counties.” It is “the district court’s role . . . to judge the credibility of the witnesses,” and
we must defer to the district court’s credibility determinations. State v. Losh, 694 N.W.2d
98, 102 (Minn. App. 2005), aff’d, 721 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 2006).
Finally, Flowers contends that the district court misapplied the law by focusing on
the seriousness of the underlying crime, in addition to the seriousness of his violations. 2
Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 607 (requiring the district court to consider whether “it would
unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked.”
(emphasis added)). We disagree. While the district court did reference the “underlying

2 Flowers argues that , under recent legislation, probation may only be revoked when all
rehabilitation has failed. See Minn. Stat. § 609.14, subd. 1(a) (2024) (providing that
“[r]evocation shall only be used as a last resort when rehabilitation has failed” (emphasis
added)). In a precedential opinion filed after the parties filed their briefs, we rejected this
argument. See State v. Eastman, __ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2025 WL 3439465, at *8 (Minn.
App. Dec. 1, 2025) (holding that the amended statutory language “does not create a new or
heightened standard that requires a district court, before it may revoke a defendant’s
probation, to make any findings that rehabilitation has failed additional to or different from
those currently required by existing caselaw”).

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crime” in its application of the third Modtland subfactor, it also referenced the violations,
as Flowers acknowledges. Indeed, it is apparent from the district court’s numerous findings
related to the fleeing offense and its implications for public safety that the court’s primary
consideration was the violation. Because the district court did not revoke Flowers’s
probation based on the seriousness of his underlying crime alone, the district court did not
misapply the law. See Fortner, 989 N.W.2d at 376 (observing that the district court “noted
. . . that both the underlying offense and the probation violations were ‘serious’” (emphasis
added)); State v. Marsh, No. A18-1201, 2019 WL 1431926, at *3 (Minn. App. Apr. 1,
2019) (concluding that “[a]lthough the district court did discuss the revocation in the
context of the underlying offenses, the district court also clearly had the violations
themselves under consideration. . . . If the district court had revoked on the seriousness of
[appellant’s] underlying crime alone, it would have abused its discretion. We are satisfied
that this did not occur.”).3
In sum, the district court acted within its discretion by revoking Flowers’s probation.
See Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 607 -08 (stating that, if the district court made findings on
the Austin factors, and the record supports those findings, the district court acted within its
discretion in revoking probation).
Affirmed.

3 We cite nonprecedential opinions for their persuasive value. See Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).