State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1005

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Dylan Robert Simmons,
Appellant.

Filed June 8, 2026
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Bond, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CR-23-2464

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kevin M. Magnuson, Washington County Attorney, Andrew T. Jackola, Nicholas A.
Hydukovich, Assistant County Attorneys, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BOND, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for second-degree
unintentional murder, criminal vehicular homicide, and second-degree assault, appellant
argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting a video from the victim’s
cellphone and plainly erred by admitting body-worn camera footage from a responding
police officer. Appellant argues that the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of
a fair trial. Alternatively, appellant argues that the sentencing order and warrant of
commitment are incorrect. We affirm appellant’s convictions, but we reverse and remand
for the district court to correct the sentencing order and warrant of commitment.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Dylan Robert Simmons with
second-degree intentional murder (count one), second-degree unintentional murder (count
two), criminal vehicular homicide – leaving the scene (count three), and three counts of
second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon (counts four through six). See Minn. Stat.
§§ 609.19, subds. 1(1), 2(1), .2112, subd. 1(a)(7), .222, subd. 1 (2022). The charges
stemmed from an altercation between two groups of young adults that culminated with
Simmons striking and killing a 17-year-old with his vehicle. The case proceeded to a jury
trial at which the following evidence was received.
At around midnight on July 16, 2023, Simmons was socializing with friends at a
park in Forest Lake. Simmons texted D.V., with whom he had been feuding on and off for
years, to come to the park to fight. D.V. drove to the park with several friends and D.V.’s
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17-year-old sister, the victim in this case. When D.V. arrived, there was an immediate
altercation between D.V.’s group and Simmons’s group. Simmons had a hammer, D.V.
had a knife, and the groups chased one another through the park and engaged in multiple
rounds of fistfights.
Eventually, thinking that the police were coming, the two groups returned to their
respective cars. Simmons did not immediately leave because he had left his car keys in a
different part of the park. As Simmons was sitting in his car, D.V.’s group surrounded the
car and D.V. struck the car’s fender with a baseball bat. After a friend brought Simmons
his car keys, Simmons started his car and drove toward D.V.’s group. D.V. saw Simmons
driving “right at [him],” smiling and laughing. Simmons’s vehicle brushed D.V., who was
scared and jumped out of the way. Simmons then looped around and rear-ended D.V.’s
car. Witnesses thought that it seemed like Simmons was trying to hit the people in D.V.’s
group.
At that point, members of D.V.’s group, including the victim who was recording the
events on her cellphone, again approached Simmons’s vehicle. The victim slapped
Simmons’s passenger window, and Simmons reversed his car so that the car was “point[ed]
. . . right at [D.V.] and [the victim].” Simmons accelerated and D.V. jumped out of the
way. Simmons’s car struck the victim and, according to witnesses, Simmons “press[ed]
on it,” so that the car’s wheels ran over the victim’s body as Simmons drove away.
Simmons returned to the scene shortly thereafter because a witness spoke to the passenger
in Simmons’s car and told them to come back. The victim was pronounced dead at the
scene.
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At trial, the jury heard testimony from 15 witnesses and received 49 exhibits,
including a video from the victim’s cellphone, footage from a responding officer’s body-
worn camera, and surveillance videos from a nearby building showing Simmons’s car
hitting the victim. Simmons stipulated to causing the victim’s death but he disputed that
he intended to kill, arguing that he acted in self-defense.
The jury acquitted Simmons of second- degree intentional murder and found him
guilty of the remaining five counts. The district court adjudicated Simmons guilty of
counts two, four, five, and six, and sentenced Simmons to 234 months in prison on count
two, second-degree unintentional murder.
Simmons appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court acted within its discretion by admitting a video from the
victim’s cellphone.

Simmons argues the district court abused its discretion by admitting a video from
the victim’s cellphone as an exhibit at trial. “Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound
discretion of the district court, and we will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear
abuse of discretion.” State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). “A district court
abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against
logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019 )
(quotation omitted).
Generally, relevant evidence is admissible. Minn. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is
relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
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the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401; see State v. Swinger, 800 N.W.2d 833, 839 (Minn. App.
2011) (“A fact is rele vant if, when taken alone or in connection of other facts, it warrants
a jury in drawing a logical inference assisting, even though remotely, the determination of
the issue in question.” (quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2011). “Rule 401
reflects a minimal relevancy approach.” Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d at 298 (quotation omitted).
Even relevant evidence, however, may be excluded, if “its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 403.
Before trial, the state moved to admit exhibit 108, a 13-minute video from the
victim’s cellphone. The first eight seconds of exhibit 108 contain video from the victim’s
point of view as she approaches, and is then struck by, Simmons’s car. The remaining 12
minutes and 52 seconds contain audio—but no video—of the witnesses’ distraught
reactions and statements to one another and first responders’ actions on the scene.
Simmons objected, arguing that only the first eight seconds were relevant and that the
remainder of the video had no probative value and would inflame the jury’s passions. The
state contended that the entire exhibit was relevant to the charge of criminal vehicular
homicide because it showed that Simmons left the scene after striking the victim.
The district court listened to exhibit 108 and found that, while there were
“prejudicial concerns because it is disturbing,” “there are distinct pieces of probative
evidence within the audio itself.” The court highlighted four points in the audio recording
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of particularly probative evidence, including when witnesses say that Simmons was not
there, “We saw it all,” “Come back to the scene,” and when “the crowd kind of explodes”
apparently reacting to Simmons returning to the scene, which the district court found
probative of the “chronology of events.” The district court determined that the probative
value outweighed any potential for unfair prejudice and granted the state’s motion to admit
exhibit 108. At trial, exhibit 108 was received as an exhibit and published to the jury.
On appeal, Simmons argues that the district court abused its discretion because
exhibit 108 was inadmissible for three reasons.
Relevance
First, Simmons contends that, apart from the first eight seconds of video, exhibit 108
does not contain any evidence relevant to the charged offenses. We disagree. Evidence
has probative value “when it, in some degree, advances the inquiry.” State v. Schulz, 691
N.W.2d 474, 478 (Minn. 2005); see also Minn. R. Evid. 401 (defining “[r]elevant
evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence”). Exhibit 108 contains audio of witnesses’ reactions to
Simmons’s striking the victim with his car and Simmons’s apparent return to the scene.
As the district court found, this evidence had probative value because it helped the jury
understand the sequence of events and who was present at the scene, which was relevant
in particular to the charge of criminal vehicular homicide – leaving the scene.
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As support for his position that exhibit 108 was irrelevant, Simmons cites two
nonprecedential decisions from this court. 1 See State v. Buck, No. A23-1600, 2024 WL
4259304, at *3 (Minn. App. Sept. 23, 2024) ( concluding that a video recorded two years
prior to the charged offense was irrelevant because it only included vague statements that
were not specific to the charged offense); State v. Hatton, No. A23-1881, 2025 WL
1157157, at *4-5 (Minn. App. Apr. 21, 2025) (concluding that a used syringe containing
methamphetamine found in the defendant’s home two days after the charged offense was
irrelevant to prove whether the defendant committed criminal sexual conduct). But unlike
the contested evidence in Buck and Hatton, exhibit 108 is probative of the charged offenses.
Because Buck and Hatton are distinguishable, they are not persuasive and we decline to
rely on them.
Given the minimal relevancy requirements of Minn. R. Evid. 401, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by determining that exhibit 108 was relevant. See Minn. R.
Evid. 401 (stating that relevant evidence must only have “any tendency” to make a fact
more or less probable); Schulz, 691 N.W.2d at 478 (stating that, in order to be relevant,
evidence need only “warrant[] a jury in drawing a logical inference assisting, even though
remotely, the determination of the issue in question”).
Needlessly Cumulative
Second, Simmons contends that, because he did not dispute that he caused the
victim’s death and because other witnesses and other evidence showed that he left the

1 Nonprecedential opinions are not binding authority but may have persuasive value. Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
8
scene, exhibit 108 was needlessly cumulative. See Minn. R. Evid. 403 (providing that even
relevant evidence may be excluded to avoid “needless presentation of cumulative
evidence”). Evidence is not needlessly cumulative when it “offer[s] a distinct perspective.”
See State v. Chauvin, 989 N.W.2d 1, 30 (Minn. App. 2023), rev. denied (Minn. July 18,
2023). While other videos show Simmons’s car hitting the victim, exhibit 108 shows the
circumstances of the offense from the unique perspective of the victim, as well as the
witnesses’ tones of voice and verbal reactions to Simmons’s conduct. See State v.
Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 640 (Minn. App. 2010) (holding that recorded messages were
not needlessly cumulative even when witnesses could testify as to their contents because
such testimony would not capture the tone of voice), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010).
The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in determining that exhibit 108 was
not needlessly cumulative.
Unfair Prejudice
Third, Simmons argues that exhibit 108, even if relevant and not needlessly
cumulative, should have been excluded under Minn. R. Evid. 403 because its probative
value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. “All evidence
offered against defendants in criminal trials is prejudicial to some extent.” State v. Spaeth,
552 N.W.2d 187, 195 (Minn. 1996). Unfair prejudice does not mean “damage to the
opponent’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence.” State v.
Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789, 797 (Minn. 2014) ( quotation omitted). Rather, unfair prejudice
“refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade
by illegitimate means.” Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d at 299 (quotation omitted).
9
Simmons contends that exhibit 108 carried substantial danger that the jury would
convict him out of sympathy for the victim and her family. We recognize, as did the district
court, that exhibit 108 depicts disturbing images and sounds. But otherwise relevant
evidence in a homicide case is not inadmissible solely because it is graphic or emotionally
disturbing. State v. Morton, 701 N.W.2d 225, 237 (Minn. 2005) (stating that photos in a
murder case “are not rendered inadmissible just because they vividly depict a shocking
crime or incidentally tend to arouse the passions and prejudices of the jurors”); State v.
Larson, 281 N.W.2d 481, 487 (Minn. 1979) (concluding that a video recording of a
victim’s dying declaration was admissible because, while it was “emotionally gripping,” it
contained information concerning the type of weapon, the motive, and the chronology of
the offense). Here, the district court listened to the entirety of exhibit 108, identified
specific reasons why it was relevant, and weighed that relevance against the danger of
unfair prejudice. While exhibit 108 was undoubtedly prejudicial, Simmons does not show
that the risk of the evidence persuading by illegitimate or unfair means outweighed its
probative value. See Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d at 299.
On this record, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion by
determining that exhibit 108 was admissible because it was relevant, not needlessly
cumulative, and because its probative value was not substantially outweighed by its
potential for unfair prejudice.

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II. The district court did not plain ly err in admitting body -worn camera footage
from a responding officer.

Simmons argues that the district court plainly erred in admitting e xhibit 105, a
ten-minute exce rpt of footage from a responding police officer’s body-worn camera
showing the officer’s arrival at the scene and life-saving measures being performed on the
victim by the officer and a good Samaritan. Simmons contends that exhibit 105 is
irrelevant and that any probative value is substantially outweighed by danger of unfair
prejudice due to the graphic nature of the video.2
Because Simmons did not object to the admission of exhibit 105, our review is for
plain error. Under the plain-error standard, a defendant must establish (1) error, (2) that
was plain, and (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights. State v. Fraga, 898
N.W.2d 263, 277 (Minn. 2017). An error is “plain” when it clearly or obviously
contravenes caselaw, a rule, or a standard of conduct. State v. Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d 780,
785 (Minn. 2017). If the three plain-error requirements are met, this court may only correct
the error if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 356 (Minn. 2022).
We begin with the first prong of the plain-error test, which requires us to determine
whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting exhibit 105. See State v. Hayes,
826 N.W.2d 799, 808 (Minn. 2013) (declining to consider remaining plain-error steps after

2 The record reflects that when exhibit 105 was played during trial, there was a significant
disruption by spectators in the courtroom that included emotional outbursts, threatening
behavior and, later, a physical altercation in the hallway. The district court paused the
playing of the video, ordered the spectators removed from the courtroom, and closed the
courtroom.
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concluding that “the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged
testimony”); State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211, 230-31 (Minn. 2010) (concluding in
context of plain-error review that “the district court did not abuse its discretion or commit
any error when it granted the State’s motion to exclude the evidence on relevance
grounds”). Simmons asserts that exhibit 105 was plainly inadmissible because it was
irrelevant, arguing that “the only issue in this case was whether Simmons was acting in
self-defense when driving in the parking lot.” The state agrees that “the video is
unquestionably difficult to watch.” But it argues that admitting exhibit 105 was not plain
error because the video allowed the jury to visualize the crime scene and understand the
nature and extent of the harm inflicted on the victim, evidence that was relevant to whether
Simmons acted with intent to kill.
As discussed in the context of exhibit 108, “[r]ule 401 reflects a minimal relevancy
approach.” Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d at 298 (quotation omitted); see Minn. R. Evid. 401
(stating that relevant evidence must only have “any tendency” to make a fact more or less
probable). The supreme court has explained that “it is within the trial court’s discretion to
admit photographs, even ghastly ones, so long as they show something that a witness could
describe and are material to some relevant issue.” State v. Hummel , 483 N.W.2d 68, 74
(Minn. 1992) (affirming admission of multiple photos showing murder victim covered in
blood because the photos “allowed the jury to better visualize the crime scene” and “the
extent and type of harm to the victim is material to the issues of intent and premeditation”).
We agree with the state that exhibit 105 bore at least some minimal relevance.
Exhibit 105 shows the layout of the parking lot, which may have been relevant to
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Simmons’s self-defense claim. It shows the extent of the victim’s injuries, which was
relevant to the charged offenses and to Simmons’s self-defense claim, and the actions of
the police, which Simmons raised as an issue by attacking the investigation as biased and
incomplete. And exhibit 105 also contains audio of witnesses ’ statements such as “He hit
her with a car” and “This is not what this was supposed to be,” evidence potentially relevant
to Simmons’s intent. Given rule 401’s low bar, we cannot conclude that the district court
plainly erred because exhibit 105 lacked “any tendency” to make a fact more or less
probable.
Simmons further argues that, even if relevant, admission of exhibit 105 was plainly
erroneous because any probative value of the video is substantially outweighed by its
graphic nature. Simmons’s argument is unavailing under the caselaw we have already
discussed. See Morton, 701 N.W.2d at 237; Larson, 281 N.W.2d at 487. As the supreme
court has explained:
Photographs are admissible as competent evidence
where they accurately portray anything which it is competent
for a witness to describe in words, or where they are helpful as
an aid to a verbal description of objects and conditions,
provided they are relevant to some material issue; and they are
not rendered inadmissible merely because they vividly bring to
jurors the details of a shocking crime or incidentally tend to
arouse passion or prejudice.

State v. Lee, 645 N.W.2d 459, 467-68 (Minn. 2002) (quotation omitted). Here, the officer
described what was portrayed on the body-worn camera footage, including the victim’s
condition, the parties who were present, and the layout of the parking lot. Exhibit 105
aided the jury’s understanding of the officer’s verbal description of the scene and the
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attempts that were made to save the victim’s life. To be sure, exhibit 105 contains
disturbing images. And, like exhibit 108, it was certainly prejudicial to Simmons. But
Simmons has not established that exhibit 105 persuaded by illegitimate means such that
the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value. See Hallmark,
927 N.W.2d at 299.
In sum, we discern no plain error because the district court acted within its discretion
by admitting exhibit 105. See Hayes, 826 N.W.2d at 807-08. Consequently, we need not
address the remaining prongs of the plain-error test. State v. Webster, 894 N.W.2d 782,
786 (Minn. 2017) (“If we conclude that any of the requirements of the plain-error doctrine
are not satisfied, we need not consider the others.”).
III. Cumulative error did not deprive Simmons of a fair trial.
Simmons contends that, even if the district court’s evidentiary rulings were
individually harmless, the cumulative effect of these errors denied him a fair trial. “An
appellant may be entitled to a new trial in rare cases where the errors, when taken
cumulatively, have the effect of denying the appellant a fair trial.” Fraga, 898 N.W.2d at
278 (quotation omitted). “When considering a claim of cumulative error, we look to the
egregiousness of the errors and the strength of the [s]tate’s case.” Id. For the reasons
discussed above, the district court did not abuse its discretion or plainly err in its evidentiary
rulings. Therefore, there is no cumulative error warranting a new trial.

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IV. The district court erred by listing a conviction for criminal vehicular homicide
on the sentencing order and warrant of commitment.

Simmons argues, alternatively, that the warrant of commitment incorrectly lists a
conviction for criminal vehicular homicide. The state agrees that we should reverse and
remand for correction of the warrant of commitment. We also agree.
Minnesota law provides that, “[u]pon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be
convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.04, subd. 1 (2022). Courts may correct clerical errors in the warrant of commitment
at any time. Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 10.
The jury found Simmons guilty of counts two through six. The district court
adjudicated Simmons guilty on counts two, four, five, and six. Recognizing that counts
two and three—second-degree unintentional murder and criminal vehicular homicide —
were based on “the same offense – or same course of conduct,” the district court did not
adjudicate Simmons guilty of count three, criminal vehicular homicide. Contrary to the
court’s oral pronouncement, however, the sentencing order and warrant of commitment list
a conviction for count three. Generally, appellate courts “look to the official judgment of
conviction in the district court file as conclusive evidence of whether an offense has been
formally adjudicated.” Spann v. State , 740 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn. 2007) (quotation
omitted). But when a district court’s orally pronounced sentence differs from the warrant
of commitment, the oral pronouncement controls. State v. Statloch, 643 N.W.2d 329, 331
(Minn. App. 2002). Because the warrant of commitment erroneously states that Simmons
was convicted of count three, we reverse and remand to the district court to correct the
15
sentencing order and warrant of commitment so they reflect convictions on counts two,
four, five, and six only.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.