In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1007

In re the Marriage of:

Diana Jakubauskiene, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Robertas Jakubauskas,
Appellant.

Filed April 20, 2026
Affirmed; motion denied
Beane, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-22-5255

Lymari J. Santana, Mack & Santana Law Offices, P.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent/cross-appellant)

Kathryn M. Lammers, Kyle L. Prouty, Heimerl & Lammers, P.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for appellant/cross-respondent)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Beane, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BEANE, Judge
Appellant Robertas Jakubauskas (husband) challenges the judgment dissolving the
parties’ marriage, arguing that the district court (1) clearly erred in determining the value
of certain real property, (2) erred by rejecting his claim to a nonmarital portion of marital
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real property, (3) abused its discretion by denying his request for reimbursement of certain
expenses he incurred during the pendency of the dissolution proceeding, and (4) abused its
discretion by denying his request for conduct-based attorney fees. By notice of related
appeal, respondent Diana Jakubauskiene (wife) argues that the district court abused its
discretion by (1) denying her request for spousal maintenance, (2) retroactively reducing
husband’s temporary child-support obligation, (3) not awarding her half of husband’s 2022
bonus, (4) denying her request to require husband to secure his child-support obligation
with life insurance, (5) not awarding her a marital lien to secure the property-equalizer
payment owed to her, and (6) denying her request for need- and conduct-based attorney
fees. Husband moves to strike wife’s reply argument on the marital- lien issue. We affirm
and deny husband’s motion as moot.
FACTS
Husband and wife married in 2001 and have two joint minor children. In April 2022,
they separated, and wife petitioned for an order for protection (OFP) against husband, on
behalf of herself and both children. The district court granted an ex parte OFP and,
following a June evidentiary hearing, granted a two-year OFP on behalf of wife and the
children. The OFP (and later amendments to it) granted wife temporary sole legal and
temporary sole physical custody of the children, awarded husband temporary parenting
time, and required husband to pay temporary basic child support of $2,182 per month. Wife
initiated this dissolution proceeding in September 2022, and later that year, the district
court granted wife’s request to consolidate the OFP matter with the dissolution proceeding.
3
The district court established November 10, 2022, as the valuation date for the
marital estate and conducted a six-day trial in January and March 2024. During the trial,
the district court received hundreds of exhibits and heard testimony from 22 witnesses,
including both parties, various family members, and numerous real-property appraisers and
financial experts.
The district court thereafter dissolved the parties’ marriage and resolved the various
disputed issues. As to the children, the district court awarded wife sole legal custody,
awarded the parties joint physical custody, and established a parenting-time schedule.
Based on its detailed findings on the parties’ income and expenses, the district court
ordered husband to pay $1,527 in basic monthly child support and denied wife’s request
for spousal maintenance. The district court also granted husband’s request to alter the
temporary child-support obligation established in the OFP, retroactive to February 1, 2023,
when he changed employment.
As to division of the parties’ property, the district court rejected both parties’ claims
to nonmarital interests in certain real properties. The district court analyzed extensive
competing evidence regarding the valuation of the parties’ assets, particularly their
multiple real properties, and allocated those assets between the parties. The district court
denied the parties’ other financial requests, including husband’s request to be reimbursed
for mortgage payments and other expenses he incurred during the pendency of the
dissolution proceeding and wife’s request for half of husband’s 2022 bonus. After
accounting for the property allocation, the parties’ debts, and adjustments for
reimbursements (including reimbursement owed to husband because of the retroactive
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reduction of his temporary child-support obligation), the district court ordered husband to
pay wife a property -division equalizer of $4 47,005 within 30 days after the entry of
judgment.
Wife moved for a new trial or amended findings. Husband opposed the motion
(although he agreed to or requested several clerical corrections) and moved for conduct-
based attorney fees. Husband also sought a stay of the dissolution judgment—specifically,
his obligation to pay the property-division equalizer —pending resolution of wife’s
postdecision motion and any appeal. The district court substantially denied wife’s
postdecision motion; granted husband’s request to correct a clerical error regarding a
property valuation and, consequently, corrected the amount of the property-division
equalizer payment to $411,761; and denied husband’s motions for attorney fees and a stay.
Husband filed this appeal, and wife filed a notice of related appeal. After briefing
was complete, husband moved this court to strike a portion of wife’s reply brief related to
her claim of error in the denial of a marital lien.
DECISION
The parties’ arguments on appeal address four categories of issues resolved in the
dissolution judgment: (1) property division, (2) spousal maintenance, (3) child support, and
(4) attorney fees. Because arguments pertaining to the same aspect of the dissolution
judgment are related and share a standard of review, we analyze the parties’ arguments
according to those categories.
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I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the parties’ property.

In a dissolution proceeding, the district court “shall make a just and equitable
division of the marital property of the parties without regard to marital misconduct, after
making findings regarding the division of the property.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1
(2024). A district court has broad discretion in dividing marital property, and we will not
disturb the property division absent an abuse of discretion. Schmidt v. Schmidt, 964 N.W.2d
221, 231 (Minn. App. 2021). A district court abuses its discretion if it makes factual
findings that lack support in the evidence, misapplies the law, or renders a decision that is
“against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn.
2022) (quotation omitted).
Husband challenges several aspects of the district court’s property division:
(1) valuation of one of the parties’ real properties, (2) denial of his nonmarital claims, and
(3) denial of his request for expense reimbursement. Wife challenges two additional
decisions related to the property division: (4) denial of her request for half of husband’s
2022 bonus, and (5) denial of her request for a marital lien. We address each issue in turn.
A. The record supports the district court’s valuation of the parties’ real
property.

Husband challenges the district court’s valuation of one of the parties’ real
properties, which is located on Clubhouse Lake Road in Marcell (the Clubhouse property).
The value of an asset is a factual finding that we will not set aside unless it is clearly
erroneous. Maurer v. Maurer, 623 N.W.2d 604, 606 (Minn. 2001). A finding is clearly
erroneous if it is “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably
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supported by the evidence as a whole.” Kiya v. Jackson, 23 N.W.3d 857, 863 (Minn. App.
2025) (quoting In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021)),
rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 12, 2025). “A [district] court’s valuation should be upheld if it
falls within the range of credible estimates even though it does not coincide exactly with
any one estimate.” Maher v. Maher, 393 N.W.2d 190, 193 (Minn. App. 1986).
The parties purchased the Clubhouse property in February 2021 for $550,000. They
spent much of 2021 converting the existing garage into a three- bedroom, two-bathroom
guest home; those improvements cost a total of $75,320. The parties presented to the
district court competing appraisals as of the November 10, 2022 valuation date. Wife’s
appraisers valued the Clubhouse property at $935,000, whereas husband’s appraiser
estimated the value to be only $685,000.
The district court found the analysis by husband’s appraiser “generally more
credible” than that of wife’s appraisers. But the district court rejected the portion of
husband’s proposed valuation that described the guest home as an “over improvement” that
added only $135,000 in value to the initial purchase price. Instead, the district court
identified three factors that persuaded it to “add $100,000 in value” to husband’s proposed
valuation: (1) wife’s appraisers’ higher valuation included consideration of properties with
“in-law suites,” which husband’s did not; (2) wife’s appraisers estimated the cost of a new
guest home would be between $193,000 and $264,000; and (3) a contractor estimated the
value of the guest home would be a minimum of $200,000. Based on these factors, the
district court assigned the Clubhouse property a value of $785,000.
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Husband contends the district court’s valuation is clearly erroneous because the
value it assigned to the guest home lacks support in the record. He is correct that neither
party’s appraiser specifically endorsed the valuation that the district court adopted. But the
district court was not required to simply adopt one valuation or the other. See Maher, 393
N.W.2d at 193. The district court articulated reasons, based on the record, for finding that
the addition of the guest home increased the value of the Clubhouse property by about
$235,000. Husband also contends the district court’s reasoning for that valuation is flawed.
We are not persuaded. He emphasizes the evidence that supports his preferred valuation
and contends the district court should have given that evidence greater weight.1 But we do
not reweigh evidence, and the existence of evidence in the record that could support an
alternative finding does not render a finding clearly erroneous. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at
221-22. In sum, husband has not demonstrated that the district court clearly erred by
finding that adding the three-bedroom, two-bathroom guest home to the Clubhouse
property increased its value by around $235,000 and assigning that property a total value
of $785,000.
B. The district court did not err in determining that h usband failed to
prove his nonmarital claims.

Marital property is any real or personal property “acquired by the parties, or either
of them, . . . at any time during the existence of the marriage relation between them.” Minn.

1 Husband also asserts that the contractor estimate of at least $200,000 value for the guest
home was hearsay but does not present any argument or authority addressing the district
court’s evidentiary ruling. “Summary arguments made without citation to legal support are
waived.” Fannie Mae v. Heather Apartments Ltd. P’ship, 811 N.W.2d 596, 600 n.2 (Minn.
2012). Husband’s hearsay argument is therefore waived.
8
Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b (2024). Minnesota law presumes that all property acquired by
either party during the marriage, before the valuation date, is marital property “regardless
of whether title is held individually or by the spouses in a form of co-ownership.” Id. To
overcome the presumption of marital property, a spouse must prove, by the preponderance
of the evidence, that the property is “nonmarital property.” Baker v. Baker, 753 N.W.2d
644, 649-50 (Minn. 2008). Nonmarital property is real or personal property that either
spouse acquired that
(a) is acquired as a gift, bequest, devise or inheritance
made by a third party to one but not to the other spouse;
(b) is acquired before the marriage;
(c) is acquired in exchange for or is the increase in value
of property which is described in clauses (a), (b), (d), and (e);
(d) is acquired by a spouse after the valuation date; or
(e) is excluded by a valid antenuptial contract.

Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b.
Whether property is marital or nonmarital is a question of law that we review
de novo. Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Minn. 2018). But we defer to the district court’s
underlying factual findings and set them aside only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. We
also defer to the district court’s credibility determinations. Kerr v. Kerr, 770 N.W.2d 567,
570 (Minn. App. 2009). For a claimed nonmarital gift, a court considers “whether a gift
was intended at all and to whom it was intended to be made,” both of which are “fact
questions that depend on the surrounding circumstances.” Id. at 571.
Husband claimed to have acquired $882,094 of nonmarital property in the form of
gifts from his father and the increase in value of those gifts. He asserted that his father
made numerous gifts of money and labor to buy and improve the parties’ real properties,
9
which increased in value during the marriage. Husband also claimed that although the gifts
were made during the marriage, they were intended only for husband’s benefit. Wife did
not dispute, and the district court implicitly found, that husband’s father made significant
gifts of money and labor during the marriage. But the district court found that those gifts
were not intended solely for husband. Instead, the district court determined, based on
findings about the family’s history and the credibility of the parties and husband’s father,
that the gifts were intended for the benefit of the whole family. Consequently, the district
court concluded that the gifts and any increase in their value were marital property and that
husband failed to prove his nonmarital claims.
Husband asserts various errors in the district court’s decision. He first contends the
district court erred by not addressing each of his nonmarital claims individually despite his
efforts to trace each gift across various real-property transactions. This contention is
unavailing. A party claiming nonmarital property must demonstrate that the property
maintained its nonmarital status even when comingled with marital property. Risk ex rel.
Miller v. Stark, 787 N.W.2d 690, 696 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 16,
2010). But tracing whether nonmarital property retained its nonmarital character is
necessary only if the property was nonmarital in the first place. The district court ’s
conclusion that all the gifts from husband’s father were marital property—which is amply
supported by its detailed factual findings and credibility determinations—eliminated any
need to trace those gifts and any increases in their value.
Husband also contends the district court (1) placed too much weight on wife’s
testimony about one gift; (2) improperly discredited the testimony of husband’s father;
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(3) improperly treated the contributions of the parties’ parents as equivalent; (4) misused
an email from husband’s mother and improperly weighed against him her nonappearance
at trial; and (5) “punishe[d]” him for making a nonmarital claim, as reflected in the court’s
finding that the claims “appear to be manufactured” in response to wife obtaining an OFP
and pursuing dissolution. All these arguments challenge how the district court weighed
evidence and assessed credibility in finding that husband’s father did not intend for his
gifts to be solely for husband’s benefit. But weighing evidence and assessing credibility
are the exclusive province of the district court. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222.
Our role is simply to determine whether the district court clearly erred in finding
that husband’s father did not intend the gifts solely for husband. Id. Husband’s arguments
that the record could have supported a different finding are insufficient to convince us that
it did. See id. To the contrary, the district court carefully identified the evidence it
considered in determining intent and explained how it weighed and drew inferences from
that evidence. For example, the district court noted evidence that money transfers from
husband’s father were all in husband’s name but reasoned that this labeling did not indicate
intent to benefit only husband because it was consistent with evidence that husband was
the sole manager of the family’s finances. The district court also specifically explained its
credibility findings, stating that husband’s father was not credible because he exhibited
patent animus toward wife and his testimony was so focused on the exclusive nature of his
gifts that it appeared “coached.” The district court noted that husband likewise exhibited
animus toward wife and had a strong financial incentive to minimize any property award
to wife. In short, the record supports the district court ’s finding that the gifts from
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husband’s father were not intended solely for husband. We therefore discern no error in the
district court’s conclusion that the gifts, including any increase in their value , are marital
property.
C. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying husband’s
request for expense reimbursement.

Husband asked the district court to order wife to reimburse him for certain expenses
he paid during the pendency of the dissolution proceeding: (1) the mortgage and various
other expenses related to the marital home, where wife resided; and (2) the cost of keeping
wife on his health and dental insurance. The district court denied both requests. As to the
expenses related to the marital home, the court explained that “both parties have had to pay
ongoing expenses for living expenses and to preserve marital assets during the pendency
of this proceeding,” much of the information about the expenses “is not currently in the
record,” and husband’s request “is an incomplete accounting of the expenses both parties
have paid and therefore an insufficient basis for the Court to order that he be reimbursed.”
As to insurance costs, the court reasoned that the parties had initially chosen to include
wife on husband’s insurance, even though she had access to insurance through her own
employer, and husband “provide[d] no accounting of the amount to which he believes he
should be reimbursed.”
Husband contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
reimbursement requests. With respect to expenses related to the marital home, he asserts
that the record contains “clear evidence of what [he] paid for.” But husband does not
address the district court’s concern that wife also incurred expenses during the pendency
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of the proceeding, and husband failed to provide a full accounting of both parties’ expenses.
Because the district court was charged with equitably dividing the parties’ property, Minn.
Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1, declining to award reimbursement based on information that
accounted for only one party’s expenses was not an abuse of discretion.
With respect to insurance, husband assigns error to the district court’s refusal to
award reimbursement because he claims “the record reflects what [he] paid to cover [wife]
under his insurance,” pointing to two pages of benefit rates that were admitted as evidence.
This again fails to address one of the district court’s stated concerns—that husband
requested reimbursement but did not specify the amount to be reimbursed or identify
evidence that supported his claim. “On appeal, a party cannot complain of a district court’s
failure to rule in [their] favor when one of the reasons it did not do so is because that party
failed to provide the district court with the evidence that would allow the district court to
fully address the question.” Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk, 668 N.W.2d 235, 243 (Minn. App.
2003), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2003). Because husband sought insurance
reimbursement but failed to specify the amount of the request or direct the court to specific
documents supporting the request in the record—which comprises more than 6,000 pages
of exhibits—the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the request.
D. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying wife’s request
for half of husband’s 2022 bonus.

Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her request for
half of husband’s 2022 bonus because an exhibit shows that husband received an annual
bonus on January 31, 2023. This argument is unavailing for two reasons.
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First, although wife’s appellate brief identifies a single page showing the bonus she
describes, she never brought th at exhibit or any other supporting evidence to the district
court’s attention. Even after the district court noted this omission, wife’s motion to amend
the district court’s finding on this issue merely referenced unspecified “undisputed
evidence.” As noted above, a party cannot complain that the district court did not rule in
their favor when they did not give the court the information necessary to support their
request. See Eisenschenk, 668 N.W.2d at 243. Because wife failed to identify for the district
court the single relevant page within the thousands of pages of exhibits submitted, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying her request for half of the bonus.
Second, the exhibit wife identifies on appeal does not independently support her
position that the bonus should have been allocated as marital property. The exhibit shows
that the bonus was paid in 2023— after the November 10, 2022 valuation date— making it
nonmarital property. See Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b(d). Wife suggests that husband
earned the bonus for work performed in 2022, most of which occurred before the valuation
date, and thus the bonus is marital property. But she did not present this argument to the
district court. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that appellate
review is limited to issues presented to and considered by the district court). More
troublesome still, wife does not point to any evidence that husband had a legally cognizable
right to the bonus, rather than merely an expectation of receiving it, before the valuation
date. See Stageberg v. Stageberg, 695 N.W.2d 609, 613-15 (Minn. App. 2005) (discussing
factors for determining whether nonvested economic interests, such as an attorney’s
contingent fee, are marital property or merely expectation), rev. denied (Minn. July 19,
14
2005). On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying wife’s
request for half of husband’s 2022 bonus.
E. The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to award wife
a marital lien.

Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding her a property-
equalizer payment but declining to award her a marital lien in property allocated to husband
as security for the payment. She does not identify any authority beyond Minn. Stat.
§ 518.58, subd. 1, which merely requires a district court to equitably divide the parties’
property and says nothing about marital liens. A marital lien is a mechanism for distributing
marital property in a dissolution proceeding. Bakken v. Helgeson, 785 N.W.2d 791, 794
(Minn. App. 2010). W ife acknowledges that, as with other property-division decisions,
whether to award a marital lien is a matter of the district court’s discretion. See Rohling v.
Rohling, 379 N.W.2d 519, 522-23 (Minn. 1986). Yet she has not identified an abuse of that
discretion here. The district court’s order explained that, if husband fails to pay within the
specified time, wife “may seek a judgment against [him]” and pursue “any other
remedies.”2 Wife asserts that pursuing collection of a marital lien would be simpler and
less expensive for her than pursuing traditional collection methods. Even if that is so,

2 We observe that wife availed herself of this option after entry of the original dissolution
judgment, and a money judgment was entered and docketed against husband in October
2024.

15
merely declining to afford wife that advantage does not amount to an inequitable property
division or other abuse of discretion.3
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying wife’s request for
spousal maintenance.

We review a district court’s decision whether to award spousal maintenance for an
abuse of discretion. Curtis v. Curtis, 887 N.W.2d 249, 252 (Minn. 2016). When reviewing
a spousal-maintenance decision, we review findings as to a party’s income or expenses for
clear error. Sinda v. Sinda, 949 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Minn. App. 2020).
If a party requests spousal maintenance, the threshold determination is whether, in
light of the marital standard of living, the requesting party has shown that they need
maintenance because they: (1) “lack[] sufficient property” to provide for their “reasonable
needs,” (2) are “unable to provide adequate self-support,” or (3) are “the custodian of a
child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be
required to seek employment outside the home.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1 (2024); see
also Lyon v. Lyon, 439 N.W.2d 18, 22 (Minn. 1989) (stating that an award of spousal
maintenance requires a showing of need).

3 Husband moves this court to strike wife’s reply argument on this issue because it recounts
events in the district court after the filing of this appeal, which, he contends, are outside
the record on appeal. We may strike references to extra-record matters from the parties’
briefs. Brodsky v. Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Minn. App. 2007). But we will deny a
motion to strike as moot if we do not consider or rely on the material that is the subject of
the motion. Drewitz v. Motorwerks, Inc., 728 N.W.2d 231, 233 n.2 (Minn. 2007). Because
we have not considered the extra-record matters that wife addresses in her reply brief, we
deny husband’s motion as moot.
16
The district court determined that wife can support herself because her net monthly
income of $7,990 exceeds her reasonable monthly expenses of $6,992. Because wife had
not made the required threshold showing of need, the district court denied her request for
spousal maintenance. Wife disputes the district court’s findings on both her net income and
her expenses.4
As to wife’s income, the district court found, and wife does not dispute, that she is
able to work full-time and earn a total (base and bonus) gross annual income of $122,666
and that she has pre-tax deductions for life-insurance premiums totaling $33.12 annually.
Wife disputes only (1) the amount she is expected to pay in taxes annually, asserting it is
$25,563 instead of the $24,647 that the district court found; and (2) the annual cost of her
pre-tax deductions for health insurance, asserting it is $2,460 instead of the $2,102 that the
district court found. As a result, she contends she has net monthly income of $7,884 instead
of the $7,990 that the district court found. But the tax and insurance figures that wife
challenges have a basis in the evidentiary record. The district court explained, and wife
does not dispute, that its tax figure is based on the same 21% tax rate that her expert used.
And the insurance figure corresponds to the year-to-date amount listed for insurance on her
last paystub of 2023. Thus, the district court did not clearly err by incorporating those
figures into its finding on wife’s net income.

4 Wife also claims the district court erred by not imputing income to husband for purposes
of spousal maintenance. But because wife did not make the threshold showing of need,
husband’s income played no role in the court’s denial of spousal maintenance.
17
As to wife’s expenses, she argues that the district court erred by finding that her
reasonable monthly expenses are $6,992, rather than $12,986, as she claimed. She contends
the district court arbitrarily determined her budget based on a percentage calculation and
the figure is not supported by findings or the record. This argument is unavailing. The
district court observed that wife has “taken many positions” regarding her budget, ranging
from $6,000 during the 2022 OFP proceeding to $18,691 in a November 2023 financial
disclosure. It reasoned that, considering those wide-ranging positions and evidence of the
family’s monthly net income in recent years, wife’s claimed budget of $12,986 (plus
$3,487 for the children) was not credible. Instead, the district court cited evidence that the
family’s average monthly spending was about $9,200; used that figure as a budget for wife
and the children; and determined, based on the percentages wife used in calculating her
own budget, that 76% of that figure —$6,992 —is for her personal expenses. In short, the
district court identified the record evidence on which it relied and the logical inferences it
made in determining wife’s expenses. Wife’s suggestion that the court could have weighed
the evidence differently and made a different finding is insufficient to demonstrate clear
error in its determination of wife’s monthly expenses. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222.
In sum, the record supports the district court’s findings as to wife’s income and
expenses, and because those figures show that her income is sufficient to meet her needs,
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the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying her request for spousal
maintenance.5
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in addressing child support.
A district court has broad discretion to provide for the support of the parties’
children. Putz v. Putz, 645 N.W.2d 343, 347 (Minn. 2002). An abuse of discretion occurs
when a district court sets support in a manner that is “against logic and the facts on record.”
Id. A district court’s determination of income for child-support purposes is a factual finding
that we will not disturb unless it is clearly erroneous. Newstrand v. Arend, 869 N.W.2d
681, 685 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 2015).
Wife makes three arguments regarding child support. First, wife challenges the
district court’s determination of husband’s income for purposes of determining child
support. She contends the district court should have imputed income to him because he
“could have found a higher paying job in his field.” A district court must calculate child
support based on “potential income” if a parent is voluntarily underemployed. Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.32, subd. 1 (2024). But the district court expressly determined that husband is not
voluntarily underemployed because he “credibly testified” that the types of higher paying
jobs wife references are no longer available. It also found that his “history of developing
his career, consistent high-level earnings, and efforts to earn more income for the family
through the rental business would be inconsistent with him voluntarily reducing his

5 Wife also contends the district court abused its discretion by denying spousal maintenance
without reserving the issue. She has waived this issue because she presents no supporting
argument or legal authority. See Fannie Mae, 811 N.W.2d at 600 n.2.
19
income.” Wife’s recitation of evidence that would have supported a different finding is
insufficient to show that the district court clearly erred in finding that husband is not
voluntarily underemployed. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222.
Second, wife argues that, even if the district court accurately determined the amount
of child support that husband must pay going forward, it abused its discretion by making
that determination retroactive to February 1, 2023, when husband began his current
employment. The retroactive modification applied to husband’s temporary child-support
obligation under the OFP. Under Minnesota law, a “temporary order or restraining order”
does not “prejudice the rights of the parties or the child which are to be adjudicated at
subsequent hearings in the proceeding” and “[m]ay be revoked or modified by the court
before the final disposition of the proceeding.” Minn. Stat. § 518.131, subd. 9 (2024).
Because that statute authorizes the modification that the district court ordered here and wife
identifies no error in the district court’s application of that statute, we discern no abuse of
discretion in the retroactive modification of husband’s temporary child-support obligation.
Third, wife claims error in the district court’s denial of her request to require
husband to secure the child-support obligation with life insurance. When ordering child
support, a district court “may require sufficient security to be given ” for payment of the
obligation. Minn. Stat. § 518A.71 (2024). This statute affords the district court discretion
to require a person obligated to pay child support to obtain life insurance, but it is “not
mandatory.” Hunley v. Hunley, 757 N.W.2d 898, 90 0-01 (Minn. App. 2008) (addressing
precursor to Minn. Stat. § 518A.71). We reverse a district court’s discretionary decision
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only if the court made unsupported factual findings, misapplied the law, or rendered an
illogical decision. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506.
Wife contends the district court abused its discretion by denying her life-insurance
request because the court’s own findings show that her monthly income of $7,990 is
insufficient to cover the $9,200 monthly budget for her and the children. The district court
did not expressly articulate a reason for denying wife’s request, b ut its findings and the
record support its implicit determination that a life-insurance requirement is not warranted
here. As the district court highlighted in denying wife need-based attorney fees, wife earns
more than enough to support herself and is also entitled to a “substantial” property-division
equalizer payment of more than $400,000. Additionally, as husband notes, the child-
support obligation will only be in effect for a few more years because the parties’ youngest
child was 13 years old at the time of trial and is now 15, and that obligation will expire
once that child finishes high school. Because wife has not demonstrated any factual, legal,
or logical error in the denial of a life-insurance requirement, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in this aspect of its child-support decision.
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying attorney fees.

A district court analyzes a request for need- or conduct-based attorney fees in a
family-law matter under Minnesota Statutes section 518.14 (2024).6 We review a district

6 The legislature amended this statute during the pendency of this action, effective for
proceedings “commenced on or after” August 1, 2024. 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 101, art 1,
§ 5, at 862, 868. We cite the current version of the statute because it does not appear that
the recent amendments affect the parties’ rights or arguments. See Interstate Power Co. v.
Nobles Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 617 N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000).
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court’s decision regarding both types of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Backman
v. Backman, 990 N.W.2d 478, 489 (Minn. App. 2023) (need); Madden v. Madden, 923
N.W.2d 688, 702-03 (Minn. App. 2019) (conduct).
A. Need-Based Fees
A district court “shall” award attorney fees “in an amount necessary to enable a
party to carry on or contest the proceeding” if it finds, in relevant part, that the party
requesting the fees “does not have the means to pay them.” Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1.
A district court may consider a party’s property award in assessing the need for fees. See
Schallinger v. Schallinger, 699 N.W.2d 15, 24 (Minn. App. 2005) (affirming denial of
need-based fees when party paid fees in part with “advance marital fund distribution”), rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2005); cf. Beck v. Kaplan, 566 N.W.2d 723, 727 (Minn. 1997)
(affirming award of need-based fee based on finding that requesting party would have to
“deplete ‘the limited capital assets available to her for her retirement’” to pay fees). A
district court’s determination regarding a party’s ability to pay fees is a factual finding that
we review for clear error. Muschik v. Conner-Muschik, 920 N.W.2d 215, 225 (Minn. App.
2018).
Wife sought need-based attorney fees for the dissolution proceeding and
postdecision motions. The district court denied her requests, finding that she “has the
means” to pay her fees based on her income and the “substantial” property-division
equalizer owed to her. In challenging that decision, wife first argues that a fee award is
appropriate because husband has a greater ability to pay fees. This argument relies on
outdated caselaw interpreting an earlier version of Minn. Stat. § 518.14. Geske v.
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Marcolina, 624 N.W.2d 813, 818 n.2 (Minn. App. 2001) (explaining that “disparity in
income” is no longer “an adequate basis for a fee award”). Wife also lists evidence that she
presented to show need, but the mere existence of evidence that could support an alternative
finding does not render the district court’s finding clearly erroneous. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d
at 222. Finally, wife insists that she “should not be obligated to use her property settlement
to pay for fees,” but she cites no supporting authority and, in fact, acknowledges that a
court may consider a party’s property award when assessing need. On this record, the
district court did not clearly err in determining that wife has the means to pay her attorney
fees or otherwise abuse its discretion in denying her request for need-based fees.
B. Conduct-Based Fees
A district court may award conduct-based fees “against a party who unreasonably
contributes to the length or expense of the proceeding.” Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1a.
Conduct-based fees may be based on a party’s pursuit of “frivolous or bad-faith claims.”
Baertsch v. Baertsch, 886 N.W.2d 235, 239 (Minn. App. 2016). A district court may deny
conduct-based fees if both parties “contributed to the unnecessary length of the[]
proceedings.” See Kahn v. Tronnier, 547 N.W.2d 425, 431 n.5 (Minn. App. 1996), rev.
denied (Minn. July 10, 1996); see also Kitchar v. Kitchar, 553 N.W.2d 97, 104 (Minn.
App. 1996) (noting that “the actions of both parties contributed to the expense involved in
this case” in affirming denial of conduct-based fees), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 1996).
Both parties challenge the district court’s denial of their requests for conduct-based
fees. We t urn first to wife, who argues that the district court abused its discretion by
denying her conduct-based attorney fees for the dissolution proceeding and postdecision
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motions. She contends she has incurred attorney fees in responding to husband’s
“unnecessary litigation” and “baseless arguments,” reciting various instances. But she does
not address the district court’s reasoning in denying fees—that this is a “high conflict case”
in which “both parties inappropriately contribute[d] to the litigation” and are “equally
responsible for the costs incurred.” Because that explanation is supported by both caselaw
and logic and wife does not dispute its factual accuracy, wife has not demonstrated that the
district court abused its discretion by denying her request for conduct-based fees.
Husband, in turn, argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
request for conduct-based attorney fees related to wife’s postdecision motion. He focuses
on the district court’s critical description of the motion, particularly that the motion
essentially restated the arguments in wife’s proposed order. In doing so, he also largely
fails to address the district court’s reasoning that neither party is entitled to conduct-based
fees because they both “inappropriately contribute[d] to the litigation.” The court
specifically explained that this pattern continued in postdecision motions, with both parties
filing “numerous, lengthy” motions that “equally contributed to the cost of this litigation.”
Because the district court’s reasoning is supported by the record, caselaw, and logic,
husband has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
request for conduct-based fees.
Affirmed; motion denied.