Jackson Benson, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1011

Jackson Benson,
Relator,

vs.

Housing & Redevelopment Authority of Winona,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed May 11, 2026
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge*

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 51360496

Jackson Benson, Winona, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Housing & Redevelopment Authority of Winona, Winona, Minnesota (respondent
employer)

Rebecca Wittmer, Melannie M. Markham, Keri A. Phillips, Minnesota Department of
Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent
department)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Halbrooks,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HALBROOKS, Judge
Relator challenges the decision of an unemployment-law judge (ULJ) that he is
ineligible for unemployment benefits because he was discharged for misconduct. Relator
argues that his failure to report for work did not constitute employment misconduct under
Minnesota Statutes section 268.095, subdivision 6 (2024), because his conduct was
excused under the single-incident and good- faith exceptions. He also contends that the
ULJ’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
Relator Jackson Benson began working as a maintenance specialist for respondent
Housing & Redevelopment Authority of Winona (HRAW) in April 2000. On December 5,
2024, Benson asked his supervisor whether he could take off work the next day. Although
his supervisor responded that he would “investigate and get back to” him, the supervisor
did not get back to Benson.
Benson did not report to work on December 6, 2024. The executive director for the
HRAW tried calling Benson on his personal phone and his work phone, but Benson did
not answer his phones or call the executive director back.
The following Monday, Benson met with the executive director, who suspended
Benson for three days without pay. After the three-day suspension, Benson was discharged
on the grounds that he was absent without notice on December 6 and “failed to respond to
calls despite knowing he needed to remain available for calls in the case of emergency.”
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Benson applied to receive unemployment benefits from respondent Minnesota
Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED). DEED issued an initial
determination that Benson was not eligible for unemployment benefits because he was
terminated for employment misconduct. Following Benson’s appeal of that determination,
a hearing before a ULJ occurred.
This dispute is not about what Benson did, but whether his conduct constituted
misconduct under Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6. Throughout the proceedings, the parties
agreed to the following facts: (1) Benson asked his supervisor if he could take time off the
next day; (2) Benson did not receive a response; (3) he did not report for work the next day
and did not respond to the executive director’s attempts to contact him; and (4) his
employment was terminated as a result. The parties also agreed that Benson’s belief that
he was entitled to take off December 6 was based on an old policy, which was no longer in
effect.
The old policy stated that if an employee worked on-call over a weekend, they could
take the following Friday off. The current policy stated that an employee who worked
on-call over a weekend earned two hours off per day, and the employee could take four
hours of paid time off on the following Friday afternoon. But if the employee wished to
take the full Fri day off, they would have to use their vacation hours for the morning and
submit a request by the Wednesday before.
Both the executive director and the finance director of the HRAW testified at the
hearing. The executive director testified that the old policy had not been in effect since
“before 2011.” She stated that in her meeting with Benson on the Monday after he missed
4
work, he explained his absence by “talk[ing] about the old process from back in 2010 or
2009.” She also testified that she had talked to Benson about the importance of answering
his phone and responding to phone calls prior to December 6. The executive director
testified that the new policy was in writing and was most recently provided to all staff at a
staff meeting in October 2024. The employer introduced into evidence minutes from the
staff meeting and a copy of the policy, as well as the timesheet that showed that Benson
was present for the meeting.
Benson testified that he believed that he was entitled to take a full day off on Friday
without putting in a request or using vacation hours because he had “earned eight hours”
by working on-call during the previous four-day weekend. He believed that the old policy
was in effect until two and a half years ago. This was the first time that he had been on-call
over a four-day weekend since the new policy went into effect and, because he believed he
had “earned eight hours,” Benson thought that he “should not have had to use vacation” to
take the full day off.
Benson testified that he spoke to his supervisor on December 5 about taking the
following day off. The supervisor said that he would “get back to [him] and never did. So
[Benson] just stayed home” on Friday. On December 6, Benson’s work phone was at work,
and his personal phone had fallen out of his pocket while he was in his wife’s car. As a
result, he did not have access to his phone until his wife came home from work around
3:00 p.m. When she got home, Benson saw that the executive director had left messages
for him on his personal phone. Even though Benson knew that the executive director
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usually worked until 4:00 p.m., he did not respond to her messages because “the day was
pretty much done.” Later that evening, he submitted a written request for time off.
The ULJ determined that Benson was discharged for employment misconduct and
thus ineligible for unemployment benefits. As to the parties’ credibility, the ULJ found that
“the parties provided largely consistent testimony about the relevant facts.” The ULJ stated
that “it is reasonable for an employer to expect that its employees will not only report to
work as scheduled but also respond to calls when they know that they may be called in for
an emergency.” The ULJ found that “Benson was unsure” whether he was allowed to take
that Friday off when he spoke with his supervisor on Thursday. And the ULJ found that
when his supervisor “never responded,” Benson “made no other effort to confirm his
assumptions” about taking the day off. The ULJ concluded that “Benson’s absence without
notice coupled with his failure to respond to [the executive director] when she asked him
to call about his absence without notice was a serious violation of the standards of behavior
an employer may reasonably expect” from an employee.
Benson filed a request for reconsideration on the ground that the misconduct at issue
was simply “a matter of miscommunication” because he contacted his supervisor the day
before his absence and the supervisor knew that Benson would not be coming to work. He
also emphasized his consistent work record, stating that he had been employed with
HRAW for more than 25 years “without incident until new management came in.”
The ULJ affirmed the previous decision, concluding that while Benson disagreed
with it, he “fail[ed] to offer any specific factual or legal dispute with the decision.”
This appeal by writ of certiorari follows.
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DECISION
When reviewing a ULJ’s determination, appellate courts may affirm, remand for
further proceedings, or reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the relator
have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusion, or decision are, as
relevant here, affected by an error of law or are unsupported by substantial evidence. Minn.
Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2024). We review the ULJ’s factual findings in the light most
favorable to the decision and defer to the ULJ’s credibility determinations. Peterson v. Nw.
Airlines Inc., 753 N.W.2d 771, 774 (Minn. App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 1, 2008).
We “will not disturb the ULJ’s factual findings when the evidence substantially sustains
them.” Id. “Whether a particular act constitutes disqualifying conduct is a question of law
we review de novo.” Wilson v. Mortg. Res. Ctr., Inc., 888 N.W.2d 452, 460 (Minn. 2016).
I.
Benson contends that the ULJ erred when it determined that he was discharged for
employment misconduct. An individual is ineligible for unemployment benefits if “the
applicant was discharged because of unemployment misconduct.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095,
subd. 4(1) (2024). “Employment misconduct means any intentional, negligent, or
indifferent conduct, on the job or off the job, that is a serious violation of the standards of
behavior the employer has the right to reasonably expect of the employee.” Id., subd. 6(a).
“As a general rule, refusing to abide by an employer’s reasonable policies and requests
amounts to disqualifying misconduct.” Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., 644 N.W.2d 801, 804
(Minn. 2002). And an employer generally “has a right to expect an employee to work when
7
scheduled.” Del Dee Foods, Inc. v. Miller, 390 N.W.2d 415, 417 (Minn. App. 1986)
(quotation omitted).
Benson argues that his conduct falls under both the single-incident and good-faith
exceptions to misconduct in section 268.095, subdivision 6. We address each exception in
turn.
A. Single-Incident Exception
The fact that an appellant was discharged for conduct involving “only a single
incident” is “important” and “must be considered in deciding whether the conduct rises to
the level of employment misconduct.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(d). But a ULJ is not
required to document this consideration in their orders. Id. And a single incident can
“constitute misconduct” if the “employee deliberately chooses a course of action adverse
to the employer.” Ress v. Abbott Nw. Hosp., Inc., 448 N.W.2d 519, 524 (Minn. 1989).
Quoting Del Dee Foods, DEED argues that “a single absence from work may constitute
misconduct when an employee has not actually received permission to be absent.” 390
N.W.2d at 417.
Relying on language from the 2006 statute, Benson counterargues that he cannot be
denied unemployment benefits because his conduct constituted a “single incident that does
not have a significant adverse impact on the employer.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(b)
(2006).
Benson’s argument is flawed for two reasons. First, the legislature amended the
statute in 2009 to remove the language stating that a “single incident that does not have a
significant adverse impact on the employer” is “not employment misconduct.” 2009 Minn.
8
Laws ch. 1, § 9, at 47 -48. Therefore, while a ULJ is still required to consider whether
conduct was a single incident in determining whether employment misconduct occurred,
proof that conduct was “a single incident that does not have a significant adverse impact
on the employer” no longer precludes a ULJ from determining that employment
misconduct occurred.
Second, Benson did not prove that his conduct was a single incident that did not
have a significant adverse impact on HRAW. In fact, the ULJ’s findings suggest otherwise.
The ULJ found that Benson failed to respond to calls even though “he knew he needed to
remain available for calls in the case of emergency,” and that this absence, “coupled with
his failure to respond to the executive director when she asked him to call about his absence
without notice was a serious violation of the standards of behavior an employer may
reasonably expect.” (Emphasis added.)
Thus, we conclude that the single-incident exception does not apply.
B. Good-Faith Exception
Under section 268.095, subdivision 6(b)(6) (2024), “good faith errors in judgment
if judgment was required” are “not employment misconduct.” But the good-faith exception
does not apply when “no judgment was required of” the employee and when the
employee’s duty “was simply to follow the policy without having any discretion to choose
otherwise.” Potter v. N. Empire Pizza, Inc., 805 N.W.2d 872, 877 (Minn. App. 2011), rev.
denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 2011).
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Benson argues that “[m]isconduct requires conduct showing a serious violation of
standards, not a good faith mistake,” and that because he asked his supervisor for
permission before he missed work, any error was made in good faith.
DEED argues that the good-faith exception does not apply for two reasons. First,
Benson “was not required to use judgment in determining whether he should stay home”
because he “did not have express approval from his supervisor.” Second, Benson “did not
follow the procedure for requesting the day off.”
We agree with DEED . The ULJ found that HRAW’s updated policy required
employees who wanted to take a full Friday off to submit a request at least two days before
the time off. Benson did not submit a request before taking time off and asked his
supervisor about taking time off only one day in advance. Then, without hearing back from
his supervisor or speaking to anyone else in management, Benson “neither reported to work
on December 6, 2024 nor called in to report that he was not working that day.” The ULJ
concluded that Benson was “unsure” whether he was permitted to take that day off and that
he “made no other effort to confirm his assumptions.” Benson does not argue that the
updated policy was unreasonable and offers no excuse for failing to follow it, other than
his assumption that the old policy still applied in his situation. In sum, we conclude that
Benson was not required to exercise his judgment in deciding whether to stay home. Thus,
the good-faith exception does not apply.
II.
Benson also argues that the ULJ’s determination must be reversed because its
findings are not supported by sufficient evidence. Specifically, he contends that the ULJ
10
“disregarded” testimony that he contacted his supervisor “ prior to the absence.” But he
does not specifically challenge any of the ULJ’s findings.
Because the ULJ made a finding that Benson spoke to his supervisor about taking
time off, we interpret Benson’s argument to be that in reaching its decision, the ULJ gave
inadequate weight to that factual finding. But it is not our role to reweigh evidence. Staeheli
v. City of St. Paul, 732 N.W.2d 298, 312 (Minn. App. 2007) (stating, in the context of an
appeal under the Minnesota Administrative Procedures Act, that “[w]e do not reweigh
conflicting evidence or re-judge the credibility of testimonial evidence”) . An appellate
court may reverse or modify a ULJ’s decision only if, among other things, it is
“unsupported by substantial evidence.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)(5). And as stated
above, “this court will not disturb the ULJ’s factual findings when the evidence
substantially sustains them.” Peterson, 753 N.W.2d at 774.
Here, the ULJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. The ULJ found that
Benson did not report to work, did not follow the updated policy for taking that Friday off,
and did not remain in contact with his supervisor by phone. These findings are supported
by Benson’s testimony that he did not go to work on that day, he did not ask his supervisor
to take time off two days in advance, and he did not submit his time- off request until after
he had missed work. Benson’s testimony that his phone was in his wife’s car on December
6 and that he did not return the executive director’s calls even after his wife returned with
his phone also supports the ULJ’s findings. Benson stated that he assumed that he could
take the day off because of previous practices, but he presented no evidence or testimony
11
to refute HRAW’s evidence that the updated policy was discussed at a meeting that Benson
attended.
Because we conclude that Benson’s conduct constituted employment misconduct as
defined under section 268.095, subdivision 6, and the record supports the ULJ’s findings,
the ULJ did not err in determining that Benson is ineligible for unemployment benefits.
Affirmed.