State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1029

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Christian Dior Byrd,
Appellant.

Filed June 29, 2026
Affirmed
Cleary, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-15622

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CLEARY, Judge
In this direct appeal from the final judgment of conviction for felony domestic
assault, appellant Christian Dior Byrd argues, in part, that he is entitled to a new trial
because the district court violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense.
The court ruled that he could not roll up his sleeves to show his tattooed arms at the counsel
table during closing arguments Defense counsel wanted the jury to compare appellant’s
tattoos at trial with video and photo evidence of the arms and hands of the person
committing the assault and the suspect who was arrested Appellant also contends that the
trial should have proceeded only on one count of domestic assault-harm, rather than one
count of domestic assault-harm and one count of domestic assault-fear, and that the district
court erred by allowing the state to amend the complaint to add the count of domestic
assault-fear after the first trial ended in a mistrial, in violation of the statute prohibiting
serialized prosecutions. In the alternative, appellant challenges his sentence, asserting that
the district court abused its discretion by basing its decision to impose an upward departure
on the victim’s particular vulnerability.
We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant by amended complaint with
second-degree assault, involving an assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of
Minnesota Statutes section 609.222, subdivision 1 (2022), and felony domestic assault, in
violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.2242, subdivision 4 (2022). The charge
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description for felony domestic assault stated that “[appellant] did intentionally cause fear,
or inflict or attempt to inflict bodily harm, upon [the victim].” (Emphasis added.)
The matter proceeded to a jury trial. When discussing proposed jury instructions
with the district court, the prosecutor requested that the jury not be instructed on domestic
assault-fear to avoid a potential unanimity problem. The prosecutor stated, “So I’m asking
that that portion, I guess, of the complaint be stricken and that the jury only hears this
version based on that comment.” The jury acquitted appellant of second-degree assault but
could not reach a verdict on domestic assault- harm, so the court declared a mistrial as to
that count.
Before retrying appellant for felony domestic assault, the state requested to amend
the complaint to separate assault-harm and assault-fear into two distinct counts.
Appellant’s attorney argued that the amendment should be barred as a serialized
prosecution under Minnesota Statutes section 609.035, subdivision 2, (2022), because the
state did not charge assault-harm and assault-fear separately in the first trial and ultimately
proceeded just under the harm theory. After some discussion with the parties, the district
court granted the state’s request. The court explained that the state’s amendment would
not be serialized prosecution because “it’s the same crime, different ways of committing
the same crime, either by fear or by harm.” “[T]he fact that it was originally charged as
one crime with different ways of committing it, they’re not different elements, they’re
different, you know, sort of means of committing the crime.”
The matter proceeded to a jury trial on one count of domestic assault-harm and one
count of domestic assault-fear. Before the state rested, the prosecution requested that the
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district court prevent appellant from rolling up his sleeves to expose his tattoos to the jury
during closing argument. The request stemmed from the first trial, where appellant
exposed his tattoos during closing argument and defense counsel argued that the man in
the surveillance-video footage of the assault did not have tattoos, while appellant had
tattoos on his arms and hands. According to the prosecutor, appellant had his tattoos hidden
under long sleeves during the first trial until the closing argu ment when he rolled up his
sleeves. Defense counsel argued: “Tattoos on hands and forearms. Do you see any tattoos
on there? Do you see any tattoos on him? No tattoos on this video. Is that the same person
with tattoos on their forearms and their hands? Take a look. Is that in the video?”
The state was concerned that appellant would be “testifying to the jury from his seat
at counsel table while [defense counsel] makes that argument, and then the jury looks over
at him.” Ultimately, the state was concerned that defense counsel would “comment on
evidence that is not part of the testimonial record,” and then the state would not be able to
offer any evidence in response, for example, that appellant could have gotten the tattoos
when he was out of custody.
The district court ruled that “obviously if the identity of someone and possible body
markings are an issue with the case, that Mr. Byrd will not, you know, be allowed to be
showing the jury or people in the courtroom his arms,” and “you can’t show everybody
your tattoos, right, unless you’re going to get up and testify.” And the district court
explained that defense counsel could not “make an argument that is . . . based on evidence
that didn’t come in or that isn’t properly before the jury.” After the state rested, appellant
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waived his right to testify and did not put on any evidence. Appellant did not further
challenge the district court’s earlier ruling preventing him from showing his tattoos.
The jury found appellant guilty of both counts of felony domestic assault. The state
had previously noticed its intent to seek an aggravated sentence based on the victim being
particularly vulnerable and being treated with cruelty.1 Because appellant waived his right
to a jury trial on aggravated sentencing facts, the issue was submitted to the district court
to decide. The court found that “Byrd assaulted the victim in front of a residential, multi-
unit property on Broadway Avenue, a heavily traveled thoroughfare in Minneapolis, in
broad daylight.” And that appellant “ripped off the victim’s shirt, leaving her naked from
the waist up. Although the victim attempted to put her shirt back on immediately, Mr.
Byrd prevented her from doing so, leaving her exposed while he continued to assault her.”
Based on these facts, the district court found that the victim was particularly
vulnerable, as appellant “knew or should have known that the victim was less able to flee,
seek help, or fight back while she was naked in a public area in broad daylight.” The court
also determined that “[a]lthough pulling off the victim’s clothing appears intentionally
designed to humiliate her and maximize her vulnerability,” this conduct did not meet the
definition of particular cruelty outlined in the Minnesota sentencing guidelines and
Minnesota Statutes section 244.10 (2022).
At sentencing, the state requested that the district court impose a 60-month sentence,
which was 24 more months than the top of the presumptive guidelines range of 26 to 36

1 The state also initially included a third factor in arguing for an aggravated sentence—that
the defendant violated the victim’s zone of privacy—but did not pursue it.
6
months, and the statutory maximum sentence. Appellant’s counsel requested a 30-month
sentence, which was the middle of the presumptive guidelines range. The district court
ultimately departed upward by four months from the top of the range, sentencing appellant
to 40 months’ imprisonment for felony domestic assault-harm. The court explained that
the sentence “is a slight upward, aggravated upward departure,” based on the court’s
finding that the victim “was particularly vulnerable in this situation because [appellant]
removed her clothing during the assault.” But the court also determined that the
aggravating factor was not sufficient “to basically double the presumptive sentence in this
case.” The district court did not adjudicate the felony domestic assault-fear count.
Byrd appeals.
DECISION
I. Any error in the district court’s ruling preventing appellant from rolling up
his sleeves to show the jury his tattooed arms was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Appellant challenges the district court’s ruling preventing him from displaying his
tattooed arms during closing argument unless he testified and further ruling that defense
counsel could not reference evidence that was not admitted during trial during closing
arguments. He maintains that the court’s ruling denied his right to present a complete
defense because the ruling effectively prohibited defense counsel from referring to
appellant’s body, which appellant argues is nontestimonial evidence, and in restricting
defense counsel’s closing argument “to asking the jury to compare a single photo showing
only a light tattoo on the back of one forearm—not the hands, and not both arms— with the
video [of the assault].”
7
The Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution and the Minnesota
Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant’s right to present a complete defense. U.S.
Const. amend. XI, and Minn. Const. art. I, § 6; see also State v. Atkinson, 774 N.W.2d 584,
589 (Minn. 2009) (“A defendant has the constitutional right to present a complete
defense.”). But the right to present a complete defense “is not absolute.” State v. Wilson,
900 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn. 2017). “Criminal defendants are bound by the rules of
evidence, which are designed to assure fairness and reliability in ascertaining guilt or
innocence.” Id. (quotation omitted). Accordingly, “courts may limit the scope of a
defendant’s arguments to ensure that the defendant does not confuse the jury with
misleading inferences.” Id. (quoting Atkinson, 774 N.W.2d at 589).
“[Appellate courts] review the evidentiary rulings of the district court for an abuse
of discretion, even when it is claimed that the exclusion of evidence deprived the defendant
of his constitutional right to present a complete defense.” State v. Carbo, 6 N.W.3d 114,
123 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Romine, 757 N.W.2d 884, 892
(Minn. App. 2008) (“We review a district court’s rulings regarding the scope of arguments
for abuse of discretion.”), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 17, 2009). “ A district court abuses its
discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic
and the facts in the record.” State v. Lyons, 997 N.W.2d 771, 774 (Minn. App. 2023)
(quoting State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017)), rev. denied (Minn. Feb.
28, 2024).
Appellant argues that the district court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion because
it prevented him from presenting a complete defense. He asserts that he was not required
8
to testify for the jury to observe his body and the court’s ruling prevented him from arguing
to the jury that the lack of tattoos on the individual in the video of the assault as compared
to appellant in the courtroom suggests that he did not commit the offense.
The court did not prohibit defense counsel from arguing that appellant did not look
like the assailant in the video evidence that was submitted. What the court was apparently
trying to avoid was a repeat from the first trial of appellant’s long sleeves hiding tattoos
during trial followed by the big reveal of the tattoos during closing argument when the
sleeves were rolled up, to-wit: the display of testimonial evidence without oral testimony
or cross examination.
We need not decide whether the district court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion
because we conclude that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and does not
warrant reversal. When a district court’s evidentiary error amounts to a constitutional error,
such as denying a defendant the right to present a complete defense, appellate courts
consider whether excluding the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Carbo,
6 N.W.3d at 123. An error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when the reviewing
court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that, “[i]f the evidence had been admitted and
the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, . . . a reasonable jury[] would have
reached the same verdict.” State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. 1994) (footnote
omitted).
If the district court had permitted appellant to roll up his sleeves to display his tattoos
and allowed appellant’s defense counsel to make a slightly more detailed closing argument
that the person in the video was not appellant, we are confident that a reasonable jury would
9
have reached the same verdict. Put differently, appellant displaying tattoos on the day of
trial, when there were no discernable tattoos on the man in surveillance video of the assault,
does not reasonably undermine all the other evidence identifying appellant as the individual
on the surveillance video assaulting the victim.
The 911 caller, who was a staff member at the apartment building, observed the
assault on the apartment building’s surveillance camera and identified “a man with a knife
in front of [the] building,” and saw that the man had a woman cornered, was stabbing her,
and tried to get her to go with him. The caller described the individual as a skinny Black
male, approximately 5’5”, wearing a white tank top and blue jeans, and holding a knife.
The surveillance-video footage matches this description. It shows a Black male dressed in
a white tank top, light- colored pants, and sneakers, holding a long knife-like object. For
about four minutes, the video shows the man hitting the victim with the object, yelling at
her, pulling her shirt off, and pulling her from the building’s alcove towards the sidewalk.
It is undisputed that there are no discernable tattoos on the man in the surveillance footage.
When police arrived, the officer observed a person matching the description given
by the 911 caller actively assaulting the victim. The officer described the suspect as a
Black male with an afro, who was wearing a white t-shirt. The man saw police and ran
away. After the suspect ran away, the responding officer approached the victim, who told
the officer that the person who assaulted her was her boyfriend, Christian Byrd.
Other officers set up a perimeter around the address and searched the area for the
suspect. The officers apprehended a man matching the description of the suspect. Once in
the squad car, the suspect identified himself as Christian Byrd. And while testifying during
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trial, the officers identified the person they apprehended as the defendant who was sitting
at the defense counsel table. In a Mirandized interview, appellant admitted that he was in
a relationship with the victim, agreed that he chased the victim to where she “ended up in
front of that building at the front door,” and admitted to hitting the victim with a plastic
piece from a tent. Collectively, this evidence overwhelmingly identifies appellant as the
individual in the surveillance-video footage assaulting the victim, such that the jury would
have reached the same verdict if appellant was permitted to show the jury his tattoos.
On appeal, appellant argues that the verdict could not be surely unattributable to the
error because the jury in the first trial compared appellant’s tattooed arms with the person
in the video and acquitted him of second-degree assault but could not reach a verdict on
the domestic-assault charge. This argument is unavailing. Any explanation for the first
jury ending deadlocked is speculative.
2 The retrial had a new judge and a new jury. And
the court’s ruling did not prevent the appellant from making an identity argument to the
new jury during the second trial. In arguing against the identification of appellant, defense
counsel argued that an officer testified that the person arrested had tattoos on his forearms,
but the tattoos were not visible in the surveillance video; that the person arrested was
wearing grey sweatpants, was not wearing blue jeans like the 911 caller said and argued
that witness identification is not always accurate.

2 The state maintains that if the jury at the first trial concluded that the state failed to prove
identity it would have acquitted appellant of domestic assault in addition to second-degree
assault.
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Accordingly, any error in the district court’s ruling preventing appellant from
showing his tattoos to the jury unless he testified was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
II. The additional count in the amended complaint did not violate appellant’s
statutory protection against serialized prosecution under Minnesota Statutes
section 609.035.

Appellant also asserts that the district court erred when it granted the state’s request
to add an additional count of domestic assault to the complaint after the first trial. He
contends that because the state’s amendment added new charges, it violated his statutory
protection against serialized prosecution under Minnesota Statutes section 609.035.
Typically, we review a district court’s decision to amend the complaint for an abuse
of discretion, State v. Baxter, 686 N.W.2d 846, 850 (Minn. App. 2004), while we review a
district court’s sentencing decision under section 609.035 de novo. State v. Williams , 3
N.W.3d 68, 79 (Minn. App. 2024). Relying on State v. Schmidt, 612 N.W.2d 871, 876
(Minn. 2000), appellant contends that this court should review his serialized-prosecution
argument de novo; the state appears to agree with appellant’s suggested standard of review.
The relevant portion of section 609.035 states:
If a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense under
the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one
of the offenses and a conviction or acquittal of any one of them
is a bar to prosecution for any other of them. All the offenses,
if prosecuted, shall be included in one prosecution which shall
be stated in separate counts.

Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (2022). Section 609.035 “limit[s] punishment to a single
sentence where a single behavioral incident results in the violation of more than one
criminal statute[,]” and “protect[s] against exaggerating the criminality of a person’ s
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conduct and to make both punishment and prosecution commensurate with culpability.”
State v. Bilbro, 24 N.W.3d 827, 83 8-39 (Minn. 2025) (quotations and citation omitted).
“The statute does not protect a constitutional right; instead, it is a legislatively created rule
for sentencing that generally limits the punishment an offender can receive.” Id. And
“while a prosecutor cannot file a new indictment or complaint to begin prosecution of any
new charge following a trial that resolved a charge arising from that same behavioral
incident, charges tried but unresolved are subject to retrial.” State v. Sater, 588 N.W.2d
512, 514 (Minn. App. 1998), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 1999).
Appellant argues that the amended complaint charged an additional offense in
violation of section 609.035 because the prosecutor voluntarily dismissed assault-fear from
the first complaint before the jury reached a verdict, which resolved that charge. Because,
according to appellant, the assault-fear charge was resolved, it was impermissible for the
state to add assault-fear to the amended complaint before the retrial. Appellant asserts that,
unlike in Schmidt where the number of counts remained the same, here “the math didn’t
add up,” because the number of counts went from one to two.
We disagree with appellant that the amended complaint charged an additional new
offense. The state amended the complaint to add an additional count to charge domestic
assault-fear and domestic assault-harm separately. Under the facts here, the second count
was not an “additional offense” but an alternative way to commit domestic assault.
See State v. Patzold, 917 N.W.2d 798, 811–12 (Minn. App. 2018) (concluding that
appellant could not be convicted and sentenced for both assault -fear and assault- harm
because both counts were based on the same conduct), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 27, 2018);
13
State v. Nowels , 941 N.W.2d 430, 442 (Minn. App. 2020) (stating that in Patzold “the
defendants were charged with two counts of the same crime, but each count was a different
means of committing the same crime”), rev. denied (Minn. June 16, 2020). The
amendment did not charge appellant under a provision with greater penalties, appellant was
not adjudicated guilty or sentenced on domestic assault-fear, and appellant does not allege
that the amendment was retaliatory. Schmidt, 612 N.W.2d at 878. For these reasons, we
conclude that the district court did not err by granting the state’s request to amend the
complaint between the two trials.
III. The district court acted within its discretion in imposing an upward sentencing
departure based on the victim’s particular vulnerability.

Alternatively, appellant challenges the district court’s decision to impose an upward
sentencing departure based on the victim’s particular vulnerability. Appellate courts
review a district court’s decision to depart from the presumptive sentencing range for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Vanengen, 3 N.W.3d 579, 582 (Minn. 2024). “A district court
abuses its discretion when its reasons for departure are not legally permissible or when the
evidentiary record is insufficient to justify the departure.” Id. Conversely, “[i]f the reasons
given for an upward departure are legally permissible and factually supported in the record,
the departure will be affirmed.” State v. Edwards, 774 N.W.2d 596, 601 (Minn. 2009).
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines exist to “maintain uniformity,
proportionality, rationality, and predictability in sentencing.” Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd.
5 (2022). Accordingly, the sentencing guidelines establish presumptive sentences for
felony offenses that are “presumed to be appropriate for all typical cases sharing criminal
14
history and offense severity characteristics.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.13 (2022). A
district court can depart from this presumptive sentence when there are “identifiable,
substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.D.1 (2022). “Substantial and compelling circumstances are those
circumstances that make the facts of a particular case different from a typical case.”
State v. Peake, 366 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Minn. 1985).
An upward durational departure is a sentence longer than the presumptive range
established by the sentencing guidelines. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.5.b (2022). The
sentencing guidelines provide a nonexclusive list of aggravating factors that district courts
may use to justify such a departure. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.b & cmt. 2.D.301
(2022). One aggravating factor is that “[t]he victim was particularly vulnerable due
to . . . reduced physical or mental capacity and the offender knew or should have known of
this vulnerability.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.b(1).
When a district court imposes an upward sentencing departure, it must provide
“(1) a factual finding that there exists one or more circumstances not reflected in the guilty
verdict or guilty plea, and (2) an explanation by the district court as to why those
circumstances create a substantial and compelling reason to impose a sentence outside the
range on the grid.” State v. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d 913, 919 (Minn. 2009). And the court
must disclose in writing or on the record the reasons for the departure and file a departure
report with the Sentencing Guidelines Commission. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1.c.
(2022).
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Here, appellant waived his right to a jury trial on the aggravated sentencing facts
and consented to judicial fact -finding.3 The district court found that “Byrd assaulted the
victim in front of a residential, multi-unit property on Broadway Avenue, a heavily traveled
thoroughfare in Minneapolis, in broad daylight.” And that appellant “ripped off the
victim’s shirt, leaving her naked from the waist up. Although the victim attempted to put
her shirt back on immediately, Mr. Byrd prevented her from doing so, leaving her exposed
while he continued to assault her.” Based on these facts, the district court found that the
victim was particularly vulnerable, as appellant “knew or should have known that the
victim was less able to flee, seek help, or fight back while she was naked in a public area
in broad daylight.”
Appellant argues that the departure must be reversed, and the matter remanded for
imposition of a presumptive sentence because “[the victim] was not ‘particularly
vulnerable’ to support a departure because her nudity was an effect of the offense and not
something that Byrd exploited to commit.” He maintains that “a departure based on the
victim being particularly vulnerable is about the victim’s pre-established vulnerability as
well as the defendant’s exploitation of it; it is not about the victim being rendered
particularly vulnerable as a result of the offense.” Therefore, “the particularly vulnerable

3 Unless waived, “a district court must submit to a jury the question of whether the State
has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of additional facts, which were neither
admitted by the defendant, nor necessary to prove the elements of the offense, but which
support reasons for departure.” Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 920-21, explaining that the
additional facts (i.e., the defendant sprayed the handcuffed victims with chemicals), are
found by the jury, but whether the facts provide a reason to depart is a question for the
district court.

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victim departure factor does not apply because [the victim] was not suffering a particular
vulnerability that [he] exploited to commit the offense.” Under the facts here, we disagree
with appellant’s assertion that the district court erred by determining that the victim was
particularly vulnerable.
A victim’s particular vulnerability “impairs the victim’s ability to seek help, fight
back, or escape harm.” State v. Mohamed, 779 N.W.2d 93, 98 (Minn. App. 2010),
rev. denied (Minn. May 18, 2010). And we have explained that the district court is not
precluded from considering nudity as a basis for an upward departure because the victim
was particularly vulnerable. See State v. Rabold, 935 N.W.2d 902, 906 (Minn. App. 2019).
In Rabold, the perpetrators forced the victims to undress at gunpoint during a robbery after
breaking into their home in the middle of the night. Id. at 908. We concluded: “Rabold
and his accomplice not only created the vulnerability but used it to further manipulate the
situation to rob the victims in the privacy of their home, causing a psychological
disadvantage in the victims and limiting their ability to seek help or fight back.” Id.
Appellant contends that Rabold is distinguishable based on the timing and purpose
of the nudity. He maintains that in Rabold the defendant forced the victims to remove their
clothes before and for the purpose of committing the robbery. But we do not find any
meaningful distinction between the facts of Rabold and of this case as it relates to the
vulnerability of the victim.
The record supports the district court’s determination that appellant created the
vulnerability by removing the victim’s clothes and then used the victim’s nudity to keep
manipulating the situation and assaulting the victim, as the nudity in the public setting
17
impaired the victim’s ability to fight back, seek help, or escape harm. And appellant’s
argument that he “pulled [the victim’s] shirt off during the assault, he did not do it so that
he could commit the assault,” is unsupported by the record. The surveillance video shows
appellant dragging the victim from the building alcove towards the sidewalk, by her shirt,
and pulling her shirt off completely exposing her naked body and then continuing to beat
her. Under these circumstances, appellant did not just remove the victim’s shirt during the
assault but exploited the victim’s nudity to keep assaulting her. See Mohamed, 779 N.W.2d
at 98. The district court properly focused on the mental and physical capacity of the victim,
rather than the nudity itself, and acted within its discretion by imposing a four-month
upward departure, as the victim’s particular vulnerability was a legally permissible reason
to depart.
Affirmed.