In the Matter of the Appeal by Kelvin Caga of the Order of the License Revocation of his Adult Foster Care and Home and Community-Based Services Licenses.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1054

In the Matter of the Appeal
by Kelvin Caga of the Order of the License Revocation
of his Adult Foster Care and Home and Community-Based Services Licenses.

Filed April 20, 2026
Affirmed
Segal, Judge*

Department of Human Services
File No. 39815

Jason Steck, Brooklyn Center, Minnesota (for relator Kelvin Caga)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, João C.J.G. de Medeiros, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Kathleen M. Stock, Chief Assistant County
Attorney, Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent Minnesota Department of Human
Services)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Segal ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Judge
In this certiorari appeal from an order revoking an adult foster care license and a
home and community-based services license, relator argues that respondent agency erred

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
because it applied an incorrect definition of “primary caregiver,” and that the decision to
impose revocation as the sanction for relator’s alleged licensing violation is arbitrary and
capricious, among other arguments. We affirm.
FACTS
In June 2019, relator Kelvin Caga obtained an Adult Foster Care License (AFC
license).1 Caga’s AFC license allows him to operate a “[f]amily adult foster care home.”
Minn. Stat. § 245A.02, subd. 6f (2024). Adult foster care provides “functionally impaired
adults with food, lodging, protection, supervision, and household services in a residence.”
Id., subd. 6c (2024). Adults eligible for adult foster care can choose to live in a family
adult foster care home or a corporate foster care home.2 See id., subd. 6f; Minn. Stat.
§ 245D.02, subd. 4d (2024). Caga’s AFC license was for a family adult foster care home,
which requires (1) appropriate licensure by respondent Minnesota Department of Human
Services (DHS), (2) that the home must be the license holder’s primary residence, and
(3) that the license holder be the “primary caregiver” for the client-residents. Minn. Stat.
§ 245A.02, subd. 6f.

1 The facts are summarized from the testimony and record presented in the contested-case
hearing before the administrative-law judge (ALJ).

2 A corporate foster care home is a facility that is typically staffed by shift-based employees
and where the license holder does not live on the premises. In 2009, the legislature imposed
a moratorium on granting new licenses for corporate adult-foster-care settings. See 2009
Minn. Laws ch. 79, art. 8, § 8, at 848 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 245A.03, subd. 7 (2024)).
The law emphasizes that an AFC license holder must reside at the licensed home as their
primary residence and mandates that a failure to comply with this requirement requires
license revocation.
3
Caga also held a Home and Community-Based Services License (HCBS license).
An HCBS license is a separate license from the AFC license; it allows the holder to provide
certain additional support services. See Minn. Stat. § 245D.03 (2024).
In 2021, Caga began operating a five-bedroom family adult foster care home located
in Moorhead. His license initially allowed him to house four residents, with three residents
housed in above-ground bedrooms and one resident in a basement bedroom. Caga was
paid an average of over $77,000 per month for the four residents. Caga’s licensed capacity
was reduced to three residents in 2022 because a September 2021 inspection by the fire
marshal found that the basement bedroom lacked a proper means of egress.
3
Clay County, which serves as DHS’s designated licensing agent for the home,
received a report in 2023 that Caga was not the primary caregiver for the residents in his
home and launched an investigation. 4 The investigation revealed that Caga operated the
home through a paid manager, R.S., and that, although Caga slept at the home, he was only
on the work schedule for eight hours per day during daytime hours, and that up to ten
additional employees worked at the home. 5 Caga also informed the county licensors that

3 Specifically, the inspection required Caga to obtain a new egress ladder for the room
before it could be used as a bedroom.

4 DHS designates county agencies to “perform licensing functions” for family adult foster
care providers, including conducting investigations to ensure compliance with applicable
licensing rules and statutes. Minn. Stat. § 245A.16, subds. 1(a) (Supp. 2025), 2(a) (2024).
But the ultimate authority regarding licensing decisions and the imposition of license
sanctions lies with DHS. Minn. Stat. §§ 245A.07 (2024 & Supp. 2025), .16, subds. 2-4
(2024).

5 In contrast, the employee roster for Caga’s AFC license listed Caga as the only employee,
along with three “volunteers,” including R.S., the person identified by Caga as the home’s
4
the employees were instructed to go to R.S. with issues. One of the residents indicated that
he rarely saw Caga, heated up his own microwave meals, ate by himself in his room, and
did not get to do things he enjoys outside the home.
During a site visit, the county discovered that Caga still had four residents in the
home, including one who was living in the basement bedroom that had an inadequate
means of egress. The county licensors observed numerous signs posted on walls with
instructions to staff, suggesting to the licensors that the home was being operated more as
a corporate site than a family home. They also observed that the dining room table did not
have enough chairs for the residents to eat meals together, and they learned that Caga did
not typically eat meals with the residents, administer their medications, provide personal
care, or take residents to appointments or other activities outside the home.
The county licensors recommended, and DHS issued in June 2023, two correction
orders identifying the following issues: (1) operating above licensed capacity; (2) allowing
a resident to sleep in a room that was not approved by the fire marshal; (3) the lack of an
adequate number of chairs at the dining room table; and (4) a failure to affiliate the HCBS
staff who provided adult foster care services with Caga’s AFC license under Minn. Stat.
§ 245C.07 (Supp. 2025). The county also concluded that Caga was not the “primary
caregiver” for the home and recommended revocation of his license.

manager. The roster for Caga’s HCBS license identified two (and later three) employees,
including Caga, and seven “volunteers.” The staffing of the home in operation was thus
quite different from the rosters submitted for Caga’s licenses.
5
A license, such as Caga’s AFC license, may be revoked or suspended for, among
other reasons, a failure “to comply fully with applicable laws or rules.” Minn. Stat.
§ 245A.07, subd. 3. Before deciding to revoke a license, the DHS commissioner, “shall
consider the nature, chronicity, or severity of the violation of law or rule and the effect of
the violation on the health, safety, or rights of persons served by the program,” absent
certain exceptions not relevant here. Id., subd. 1.
Based on the results of the county’s investigation, DHS issued an order in January
2024 revoking Caga’s AFC license. The revocation order is based on Caga’s failure to
serve as the “primary caregiver” at the home in violation of Minn. Stat. § 245A.02,
subd. 6f(3). The order also cites the June 2023 correction orders as part of the record
considered by DHS in determining whether revocation was appropriate, including the fact
that Caga was operating over capacity and allowed a person to sleep in a room not approved
by the fire marshal.
Caga’s HCBS license was revoked in the same order. The revocation of Caga’s
AFC license triggered an automatic revocation of his HCBS license. See Minn. Stat.
§ 245A.04, subd. 7(d) (Supp. 2025) (providing for automatic revocation of affiliated
licenses upon revocation of a license issued under chapter 245A).
The matter progressed to a contested-case hearing before an ALJ. At the hearing,
the ALJ received testimony from the manager of foster-care licensing at DHS, two county
licensors, the brother of a resident, and Caga. In her findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and recommendation, the ALJ found that Caga was not the primary caregiver and thus was
in violation of the statutory requirements for an AFC license. The ALJ also found that
6
Caga was in violation of the four matters covered in the corrective orders issued by DHS.
The ALJ thus concluded that DHS “had reasonable cause to sanction [Caga’s] family AFC
license,” but found that the rationale in the revocation order “fail[ed] to demonstrate that
[DHS] considered the nature, chronicity, or severity of the violations or the effect of the
violation on the health, safety, or rights of persons served by the program.” The ALJ thus
recommended that “the Commissioner modify the . . . Revocation Order to provide a
detailed rationale for the sanction imposed and impose a sanction consistent with the
detailed rationale.” (Emphasis omitted.)
The interim DHS commissioner issued a final decision affirming the revocation of
Caga’s licenses. In the final decision, the commissioner adopted all of the ALJ’s findings
of fact and made one additional finding to the effect that any conclusion of law that “is
more properly considered to be a Finding of Fact” is to be adopted as such and incorporated
by reference. The commissioner rejected one of the ALJ’s conclusions of law, determining
instead that the revocation order’s rationale demonstrated that DHS had considered the
nature, chronicity, or severity of the violations and the effect of the violations on the health,
safety, or rights of persons served by the program.
The commissioner also added seven conclusions of law related primarily to
interpreting the statutory requirement that the license holder be the “primary caregiver.”
The most significant of the added conclusions stated that the phrase “primary caregiver”
as set out in the AFC statute, Minn. Stat. § 245A.02, subd. 6f(3), “is clear, unambiguous,
and not subject to more than one reasonable interpretation—that ‘primary caregiver’ in
subd. 6f(3) can only be reasonably interpreted to mean the ‘majority’ of the actual care
7
being provided to the adult clients residing in the license holder’s family adult foster care
home.”
In the memorandum accompanying the decision, the commissioner cited the
testimony of the DHS licensing manager discussing the significance of the “family” and
“home” aspects of the AFC program as allowing for more familiarity with “each resident’s
evolving need s[,] . . . help[ing] identify developments as they occur in the home,
provid[ing] flexibility in addressing individual residents’ care needs, and giv[ing] the
comfort of a household setting.” The commissioner noted that, “[i]n choosing an AFC
home,” it is the residents’ “right and they deserve the family setting they elected to
receive.”
DECISION
In his appeal, Caga argues that the commissioner’s decision is affected by an error
of law because it applied an improper definition of “primary caregiver.” He additionally
argues that the decision is arbitrary and capricious because the commissioner treated
license revocation as mandatory rather than discretionary and because of deficiencies and
errors in the commissioner’s analysis of the appropriateness of revocation as a sanction.
6

6 DHS argues that this court lacks jurisdiction because Caga’s petition for a writ of
certiorari was not timely filed. To obtain review of a final decision in a contested-case
proceeding, an aggrieved person must file with this court and serve on all parties a petition
for a writ of certiorari within “not more than 30 days after the party receives the final
decision and order of the agency.” Minn. Stat. § 14.63 (2024).

DHS argues that Caga received DHS’s final decision by email on May 23, 2025,
making his June 26, 2025, filing of a petition for writ of certiorari untimely. We accepted
jurisdiction of Caga’s appeal based on his representation that he received DHS’s final
decision May 27, and DHS did not assert the jurisdictional issue until it was granted
8
The Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act governs appellate review of the
commissioner’s final decision. See Minn. Stat. § 14.63. Under the act, an appellate court
“may reverse or modify [a final] decision [in a contested case] if the substantial rights of
the petitioner[] may have been prejudiced because,” as relevant here, the decision is
affected by an error of law, “unsupported by substantial evidence,” or “arbitrary or
capricious.” Minn. Stat. § 14.69 (2024).
I. The final decision was not affected by an error of law.
Caga first argues that the commissioner applied an incorrect definition of “primary
caregiver” under Minn. Stat. § 245A.02, subd. 6f(3). In early 2021, DHS issued a “policy
clarification” document to county adult foster care licensing staff that defined the statutory
requirement of being a “primary caregiver” as meaning that the license holder must
personally provide a “majority of the care to residents receiving services in the home.” See
In re Petition of Minn. Ass’n of Residential Servs. Homes (MARSH), No. A24-1562, 2025
WL 1922283, at *1, *7 (Minn. App. July 14, 2025). 7 In MARSH, we agreed with DHS’s
interpretation based on the plain and unambiguous meaning of the phrase “primary
caregiver.” We concluded that, “[b]ecause the term ‘primary’ means the majority, and

permission to submit a second brief. Although we acknowledge that the record includes a
certificate of service indicating that DHS served the final decision on counsel for Caga via
electronic mail on May 23, DHS fails to provide information indicating that counsel for
Caga or Caga himself actually received service of the final decision— either electronically
or through physical mail—before May 27. Therefore, we decline to dismiss this matter as
untimely filed.

7 Nonprecedential decisions may be cited for their persuasive value. Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01.
9
‘caregiver’ is defined in the adult-foster-care context as one who ‘gives care,’ there is no
reasonable interpretation of the ‘primary caregiver’ requirement where the license holder
does not provide the majority of the care.” Id. at *7.
Caga contends that the phrase “primary caregiver” does not require that an
individual directly provide the majority of the care. He asserts that a “primary caregiver”
can be the person who has the “greatest responsibility” for the operation of the home. Caga
argues that he fulfilled this requirement because “he was the ultimate decision- maker,
responsible for all coordination of care and the management of staff.” But for the reasons
set out in our MARSH opinion, we reject Caga’s argument and conclude, as we did in
MARSH, that the phrase “primary caregiver,” as set out in Minn. Stat. § 245A.02,
subd. 6f(3), unambiguously means that the license holder must personally provide a
majority of the care.
Caga also argues that, even if MARSH is correct in its interpretation of the phrase
“primary caregiver” under Minn. Stat. § 245A.02, subd. 6f(3), that interpretation is not
controlling here, because Caga held not just an AFC license but also an HCBS license. He
contends that we should look to the definition of “primary caregiver” in DHS’s rules for
HCBS license holders. See Minn. R. 9525.1800, subp. 20 (2023). The definition in the
HCBS rules provides that a “primary caregiver” for the purposes of HCBS licensing is “a
person other than a member of the person’s family who has primary responsibility for the
assistance, supervision, or training of the person in the person’s residence.” Id.
We reject this argument because the two licensing programs are very different. The
HCBS program provides funding for services to disabled individuals, regardless of whether
10
they live in their own home or elsewhere. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 256B.092 (Supp. 2025).
The definition of “primary caregiver” in the rules under the HCBS program mainly serves
to distinguish a caregiver paid under the HCBS program from a member of the recipient’s
own family. See Minn. R. 9525.1800, subp. 20. By contrast, the phrase “primary
caregiver” under the AFC statute is to distinguish the nature of the residential setting—a
family-home setting— from corporate residential providers. See Minn. Stat. § 245A.02,
subd. 6f. In addition, the violations forming the basis for the revocation decision were all
under the AFC licensing statute, not because of any independent violations of the HCBS
statute or rules. See Minn. Stat. § 245A.04, subd. 7 (Supp. 2025) (requiring revocation of
any other licenses of the holder issued under chapter 245A, which includes HCBS
licenses).
Caga additionally notes that “caregiver,” as defined in Minnesota Rule 9555.5105,
subpart 8 (2023), is inapplicable because a rule that it references—Minnesota Rule
9555.6125, subpart 4 (2023)—contemplates multiple caregivers. Assuming that rule
9555.6125, subpart 4, is relevant to interpreting the statutory meaning of “primary
caregiver,” Caga’s argument relies on the false assumption that there cannot be a “primary
caregiver”—a person who performs a majority of the care—when there are multiple
caregivers. We thus affirm the commissioner’s interpretation of the “primary caregiver”
requirement as unambiguously requiring that the license holder must personally provide a
majority of the care.
We also affirm the commissioner’s determination that Caga was not the “primary
caregiver.” Caga does not dispute the relevant findings of fact on this issue. He himself
11
acknowledged that he could not personally provide the requisite level of care for four
residents but housed and received reimbursement for four residents (even though he was
only licensed for three residents). 8 Caga further admitted that he does not typically
distribute medications, cook or eat meals with the residents, provide personal care for the
residents, clean the house, or take residents to appointments, but generally relies on staff
to perform these activities. Based on these undisputed facts, the commissioner’s decision
that Caga was not the “primary caregiver” within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 245A.02,
subd. 6f(3), was not in error.
II. The imposition of revocation as a sanction is not arbitrary and capricious and
there is substantial evidence to support that the commissioner considered the
rights of residents in deciding to revoke Caga’s license.

Caga next argues that the decision to impose revocation as a sanction is arbitrary
and capricious and that the record is lacking substantial evidence to support that the
commissioner considered the rights of the residents in deciding that revocation was
appropriate, among several other arguments.
An agency’s decision is arbitrary and capricious when “it is an exercise of the
agency’s will, rather than its judgment, or if the decision is based on whim or is devoid of
articulated reasons.” CUP Foods, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 633 N.W.2d 557, 565 (Minn.
App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 2001). An “agency’s conclusions are not arbitrary
and capricious so long as a rational connection between the facts found and the choice

8 Testimony in the record indicated that there are also significant tax advantages to
operating a family adult foster care home under an AFC license as opposed to a corporate
foster care license.
12
made has been articulated.” In re Rev. of 2005 Ann. Automatic Adjustment of Charges for
All Elec. & Gas Utils. , 768 N.W.2d 112, 120 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). In this
vein, “[i]f there is room for two opinions on a matter, [an agency’s] decision is not arbitrary
and capricious, even though the court may believe that an erroneous conclusion was
reached.” Id.
Caga argues that the decision to impose revocation as the sanction is arbitrary and
capricious because the commissioner essentially treated a violation of the “primary
caregiver” requirement as requiring a mandatory license revocation. Caga notes, correctly,
that the only mandatory basis for revocation of an AFC license is a violation of the
“primary residence” requirement. See Minn. Stat. § 245A.03, subd. 7. We are not
persuaded, however, that DHS made this error.
Both the revocation order and the commissioner’s decision cite the correct provision
relating to sanctions— Minn. Stat. § 245A.07, subd. 1—and discuss both factors that must
be considered when determining the appropriate sanction—the “nature, chronicity, and
severity” of the violations and “the effect of the violation on the health, safety, or rights”
of the residents. The revocation order and the commissioner’s decision reference not just
the current violation, but the two prior correction orders, including Caga’s operation of the
facility above licensed capacity.
Similarly, the commissioner’s decision discusses the effect of the violation on the
rights of the residents, citing the testimony of the DHS licensing manager about the
importance of there being a family atmosphere in an AFC home and the testimony of the
brother of one of the residents who indicated that he chose an AFC home for his brother
13
because he wanted a smaller, family-style home instead of a larger corporate setting.9 The
commissioner’s decision also contains findings related to one of the residents who rarely
saw Caga, prepared his own meals by heating them up in the microwave, and ate by himself
in his room. We are thus satisfied that the commissioner applied the correct standard and
did not treat the revocation decision as if it was mandatory.
Caga argues next that the record lacks substantial evidence demonstrating that DHS
considered the effect of the violation on the “rights of persons served by the program”
before imposing the sanction of revocation, as required by Minn. Stat. 245A.07, subd. 1.
A finding is supported by “substantial evidence,” when there is “(1) such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; (2) more than a
scintilla of evidence; (3) more than some evidence; (4) more than any evidence; or (5) the
evidence considered in its entirety.” In re Admin. Ord. Issued to Wazwaz, 943 N.W.2d
212, 216-17 (Minn. App. 2020) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. June 30, 2020).
Under this standard, we will not disturb an agency’s decision if “it has adequately explained
how it derived its conclusion and that conclusion is reasonable in the basis of the record.”

9 Caga criticizes the reliance on the testimony of the brother because the core of the
brother’s testimony was that the brother was generally pleased with the home and that it
was much better than the facilities where his brother had previously resided because staff
got his brother to appointments without issue and showed flexibility in being able to
accommodate getting him to appointments if an earlier time became available, and he was
able to speak to Caga directly to help resolve matters instead of going through a nurse or
other staff. The brother did, however, express in his testimony that he did not always talk
to Caga, but also spoke with R.S. and other staff who actually provided care for his brother.
This does not undermine the fact that the brother desired a smaller, family-style home for
his sibling and that, while Caga’s home was an improvement over the sibling’s prior
residence, the sibling was entitled to all the benefits of a true adult foster care home.
14
In re Application of Enbridge Energy, Ltd. P’ship for Certificate of Need, 964 N.W.2d 173,
189 (Minn. App. 2021) (quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 2021).
Here, the commissioner’s decision describes consideration of the effect of the
violation on the rights of the residents. As noted above, the commissioner cited the
testimony of DHS’s manager of foster-care licensing about the benefits of the “‘family’
and ‘home’ aspects of an AFC program” in helping “residents to build relationships with
the AFC license holder, enabl[ing] more familiarity with each resident’s evolving needs
and help[ing] identify developments as they occur in the home, provid[ing] flexibility in
addressing individual residents’ care needs, and giv[ing] the comfort of a household
setting.”
10 And in addition to the information from one of the resident s and the brother’s
testimony noted above, the commissioner also cited Caga’s description of the residents as
“homebodies” and that one resident was a “loner.”
The commissioner emphasized in her decision that it is the right of residents who
choose to live in an AFC home to have a family, homelike setting where the license holder
not only lives in the home but serves as the primary caregiver, instead of a “corporate-style

10 Caga asserts that the manager provided opinions that should have been noticed as expert
opinions, but that DHS provided no such notice. Caga objected to this testimony before
the ALJ as being outside the manager’s personal knowledge. But as the manager of foster-
care licensing for DHS, an understanding of the benefits for the residents of a family adult
foster care home versus a corporate foster care home is well within her personal knowledge
and the ALJ correctly overruled his objection. In addition, the manager’s testimony was
consistent with the legislature’s moratorium on the issuance of new corporate foster care
licenses. Finally, evidentiary rules are significantly more relaxed in administrative
proceedings. See Minn. Stat. § 14.60, subd. 1 (2024) (“In contested cases agencies may
admit and give probative effect to evidence which possesses probative value commonly
accepted by reasonable prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs.”).
15
or community residential setting” with a “more shift-based staff.” Moreover, the statute
requires only that DHS must consider the effect on the rights of residents, not that it is a
controlling factor. See, e.g., The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language
392 (5th ed. 2018) (defining consider as “[t]o think carefully about (something), especially
before making a decision”); see also Larson v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 855 N.W.2d 293,
301 (Minn. 2014) (“[Appellate courts] often look to dictionary definitions to determine the
plain meanings of words.”). Based on the evidence presented, we are satisfied that there
is substantial evidence in the record to support that DHS considered the effect on the rights
of residents.
Caga further argues that the decision is arbitrary and capricious because the
commissioner overturned one of the ALJ’s credibility determinations without explanation.
The commissioner, as the final decision- maker, has a duty to independently weigh all the
evidence in the record, but must nevertheless explain significant deviations from an ALJ’s
recommendations. See Minn. Stat. § 14.62, subd. 1 (2024); see also CUP Foods, 633
N.W.2d at 565. Caga points to the fact that the ALJ found that the evidence in the record
that the residents were harmed by the number of staff working on site was “speculative.”
Yet, in the memorandum explaining her decision, the commissioner placed reliance on the
testimony of DHS’s manager that having shift-based staff —instead of the primary care
being provided by the license holder —was less beneficial to residents who choose to live
in an AFC. Even assuming that this involves an alteration of a credibility finding, the
commissioner explained her reason for the change—namely, that a recipient of services
who chooses to live in an AFC as opposed to a corporate foster care facility, has a right to
16
live in the setting chosen by the resident, i.e., a home where the license holder is the primary
caregiver.
The commissioner further explained that “[t]he ‘primary caregiver’ violation is not
just a ‘technical’ violation or mere paperwork oversight, but a serious violation that directly
affects the health, safety, and rights of program recipients and violates the whole purpose
of the legislature imposing a moratorium on corporate-style facilities.” Indeed, the
“primary residence” and “primary caregiver” requirements are the only requisites set out
in the statutory definition of a family adult foster care home, aside from the requirement of
“appropriate licensure.” See Minn. Stat. § 245A.02, subd. 6f. The commissioner thus
explained her reasons for agreement with the manager’s testimony.
Finally, Caga argues that his rights to due process were violated because DHS’s
allegations about the effect of the violation on the rights of the residents were not included
in the revocation order. “[P]rocedural due process guarantees reasonable notice and a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.” In re Rental Dwelling Lic. held by Khan, 804 N.W.2d
132, 137 (Minn. App. 2011). Assuming without deciding that Caga preserved this
argument for our review, we discern no such procedural due-process violation here. The
revocation order clearly set out the violation relied upon as the basis for the revocation and
the prior violations that were considered in determining the appropriate sanction. The
revocation order also advised that DHS had considered the nature, chronicity, and severity
of violations and the impact on the residents. We thus reject this argument.
Affirmed.