State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1059

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Nicholas Richard Speten,
Appellant.

Filed April 27, 2026
Affirmed
Frisch, Chief Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-24-7120

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brad Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant County Attorney,
Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Charles F. Clippert, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Frisch , Chief Judge; and
Johnson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Chief Judge
Appellant Nicholas Richard Speten appeals his convictions following a jury trial for
seven counts of violating a domestic-abuse no-contact order (DANCO). He argues that he
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is entitled to a new trial because the district court abused its discretion in admitting a
register of actions (ROA) as evidence that he was served with the DANCO because the
ROA is hearsay, not reliable, and violates his constitutional right to confront witnesses.
Because on this record we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the ROA, and the admission of the ROA did not violate appellant’s constitutional
right to confrontation, we affirm.
FACTS
On October 28, 2024, respondent State of Minnesota charged Speten with seven
counts of violating a DANCO. See Minn. Stat. § 629.75, subd. 2(d)(1) (2024) (providing
that person is guilty of felony for violating DANCO “within ten years of the first of two or
more previous qualified domestic violence-related offense convictions”). The complaint
alleged that in September 2024, Speten violated a DANCO issued in August 2024 seven
times.
Before trial began, the state disclosed that it intended to offer a certified copy of an
ROA1 to prove that Speten was served with the DANCO on August 1, 2024, during a court
proceeding in a different matter. Defense counsel objected on the grounds that the ROA
is inadmissible hearsay, lacks foundation, and is unreliable. The state responded that a
certified copy of the ROA falls within the public-records exception to the hearsay rule and

1 A register of actions, which is prepared and maintained by the district court administrator,
is a list of the events occurring and documents filed in a pending court case. See Minn.
Stat. § 485.07(1) (2024).
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is a self-authenticating document. See Minn. R. Evid. 902(4). The district court reserved
a ruling on the objection at that time.
Later that day, the district court revisited the admissibility of the ROA. The district
court ruled that the ROA is admissible pursuant to the public-records exception to the
hearsay rule, reasoning that “the [ROA] is an official record of the clerk of court,” which
the clerk is “required to keep.” The district court also rejected defense counsel’s argument
that the ROA lacked reliability, reasoning that “[t]here’s been nothing in this case to
indicate there’s any errors in [the ROA].”
Trial commenced. Both the investigating detective and the individual protected by
the DANCO (individual) testified. The individual, with whom Speten shares a child,
testified that in September 2024, Speten called her from the Anoka County jail. The
detective testified that, after receiving a tip regarding a possible violation of the DANCO,
the detective reviewed the DANCO and discovered that it was issued on August 1, 2024.
The ROA denotes “deft served in court” at the August 1, 2024 hearing. The state offered
a certified copy of the ROA as an exhibit, and defense counsel renewed the previously
asserted objections. The district court overruled the objections and received the ROA into
evidence. The detective testified that she reviewed the phone calls from the Anoka County
jail to the protected individual. The jury heard recordings from seven separate phone calls.
During its closing argument, the state urged the jury to rely on the ROA and the
detective’s testimony to prove that Speten knew of the DANCO when he called the
individual seven times in September 2024.
The jury found Speten guilty on all seven counts. Speten appeals.
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DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the ROA under the
public-records exception to the hearsay rule.

Speten argues that the district court erred in admitting the ROA over his objection
because the ROA is not a public record within the meaning of the public-records exception
to the hearsay rule. See Minn. R. Evid. 803(8) (providing that “public records and reports,”
as defined in the rule, are not excluded by the rule against hearsay). Speten further argues
that, even if the ROA meets the public -records exception, it contains hearsay within the
document that is also inadmissible pursuant to the rule against double hearsay. See Minn.
R. Evid. 805 (stating that hearsay within hearsay is not admissible unless “each part of the
combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule”). The state maintains
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the ROA because the ROA
is a public record within the meaning of Minn. R. Evid. 803(8).
We generally review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019). “A district court abuses
its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic
and the facts in the record.” State v. Guzman , 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017). If a
district court admits evidence over an objection in error, we determine whether the error
requires reversal under the harmless-error standard. State v. Smith, 940 N.W.2d 497, 505
(Minn. 2020). To obtain reversal of a conviction based on such errors, the appellant must
show that there is “a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence
significantly affected the verdict.” Id. (quotation omitted).
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Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn. R.
Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is not admissible unless it falls into an exception set forth in the
Minnesota Rules of Evidence. Minn. R. Evid. 802. One such exception is for public
records. Minn. R. Evid. 803(8). When multiple layers of hearsay are at issue, each level
of hearsay must conform with an exception to the hearsay rule. Minn. R. Evid. 805.
The district court concluded that the ROA meets the public-records exception to the
rule against hearsay because the ROA “is an official record of the clerk of court,” and
nothing in the record indicates that the ROA lacks trustworthiness. The parties do not
dispute that the ROA is hearsay. See Minn. R. Evid. 801(c) (defining hearsay). Thus, the
question before us is whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting the ROA
as a public record excepted from the rule against hearsay. To answer this question, we
look to the plain language of Minn. R. Evid. 803(8).2
The public-records exception provides that “records, reports, statements, or data
compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of
the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which
matters there was a duty to report” are not excluded by the hearsay rule “[u]nless the

2 On appeal, Speten argues that the ROA is not a public record within the meaning of the
hearsay exception because the user acknowledgment on the Minnesota Court Records
Online website states that “[t]he information available on Minnesota Court Records Online
(MCRO) is provided as a service and is not the official court case record.” But the user
acknowledgment is not relevant to our analysis of whether the ROA received into evidence
in this case fits the criteria for the public-record exception to the hearsay rule as set forth
in Minn. R. Evid. 803(8).
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sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.” Minn. R.
Evid. 803(8). Because the ROA admitted into evidence in this case satisfies the criteria set
forth in both 803(8)(A) and 803(8)(B), the ROA meets the public-records exception to the
rule against hearsay.
First, the ROA is a “record[] . . . setting forth . . . the activities” of the state court
within the meaning of Minn. R. Evid. 803(8)(A) because, under Minnesota law, the ROA
is a record of the proceedings that occur in a district court action. See Minn. Stat.
§ 485.07(1) (stating that every court administrator shall keep an ROA in which the
administrator shall enter “all proceedings” in the action). Indeed, the ROA admitted into
evidence bears the seal of the court administrator and expressly provides that the court
administrator “certif[ies] that this is a true and correct copy of a computerized record of the
Minnesota State Court Information System.”
Second, the ROA appears to qualify as a public record within the meaning of Minn.
R. Evid. 803(8)(B), because Minnesota law imposes a duty on the court administrator to
keep an ROA, “in which the court administrator shall enter the title of each action . . . a
minute of each paper filed in the cause, and all proceedings in them.” Minn. Stat.
§ 485.07(1). Thus, the ROA appears to be a record setting forth “matters observed pursuant
to duty imposed by law.” Minn. R. Evid. 803(8)(B).
Because the ROA admitted into evidence in this case fits the criteria for a public
record within the public-records exception to the rule against hearsay, the district court’s
decision to admit the ROA was not based on an erroneous view of the law. Thus, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the ROA.
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On appeal, Speten further argues that the August 1, 2024 entry on the ROA —
denoting “deft served in court”—is hearsay within hearsay and that the district court
therefore abused its discretion in admitting the entirety of the ROA. See Minn. R.
Evid. 805. Speten did not make this objection to the district court. “The complexity and
subtlety of the operation of the hearsay rule and its exceptions make it particularly
important that a full discussion of admissibility be conducted at trial.” State v. Manthey,
711 N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn. 2006); see also State v. Vasquez, 912 N.W.2d 642 , 6 49
(Minn. 2018) (“A defendant’s objection to the admission of evidence preserves review only
for the stated basis for the objection or a basis apparent from the context of the objection.”).
In the absence of a hearsay within hearsay objection before the district court, the state did
not have the opportunity to establish that the ROA entry was not hearsay within hearsay.
See Manthey, 711 N.W.2d at 504. Because Speten did not assert this objection at trial, on
this record, we are unable to conclude that the district court plainly erred. See id. (denying
relief related to hearsay argument raised for the first time on appeal); see also Roby v. State,
547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996) (“This court generally will not decide issues which
were not raised before the district court . . . .”).
II. Admission of the ROA did not violate Speten’s constitutional right to
confrontation.

Speten also argues for the first time on appeal that admission of the ROA violated
his constitutional right to confrontation. We review de novo the allegation of a violation
of the constitutional right to confront witnesses. State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 308
(Minn. 2006).
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We disagree with Speten’s characterization that he objected to the admission of the
ROA at trial as violative of his confrontation rights. As relevant here, an objection at trial
to evidence on a ground other than a violation of the constitutional right to confront
witnesses does not preserve the constitutional error unless it is “apparent from the context”
that the constitutional error was the “specific ground” for the objection. State v. Rossberg,
851 N.W.2d 609, 617-18 (Minn. 2024) (quoting Minn. R. Evid. 103(a)(1)). Our review of
the trial record shows that Speten’s trial counsel objected to the admission of the ROA on
the grounds of inadequate foundation, hearsay, and lack of reliability. The record does not
reflect any mention of Speten’s confrontation rights, and no constitutional challenge is
apparent from the context of the objection. See id. at 618 (reasoning that a defendant’s
“exclusive focus” at trial on the residual hearsay exception indicated that “a Confrontation
Clause challenge was not apparent from the context of the objection”). We therefore apply
the plain-error standard of review. See id.; see also Vasquez, 912 N.W.2d at 650 (applying
plain-error standard of review to forfeited evidentiary objection). “Under the plain-error
standard, relief is available only if there is (1) error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affected
the defendant’s substantial rights.” Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d at 618 (quotation omitted).
Speten asserts that the district court plainly erred in admitting the ROA because
admission of the ROA implicated his confrontation rights. We disagree. Under the
Confrontation Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions, a defendant has
the right to confront witnesses against them. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I,
§ 6. The Confrontation Clause requires that “testimonial” out-of -court statements be
excluded at trial unless the speaker is unavailable for the trial and the defendant has had an
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opportunity to cross-examine the speaker. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68
(2004); see also State v. Swaney, 787 N.W.2d 541, 552 (Minn. 2010) (describing
requirements of right to confrontation as set forth in Crawford). “To determine whether a
statement is testimonial, Minnesota courts consider whether the statement was prepared for
trial, the nature and substance of the statements, and whether the statements are in the ‘core
class’ of testimonial statements described in Crawford.” State v. Butze, 9 N.W.3d 582, 587
(Minn. 2024). In determining whether the evidence was testimonial, the “critical
determinative factor . . . is whether it was prepared for litigation.” Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d
at 309; see also State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 252 (Minn. 2006) (“[T]he key to
determining whether a statement is testimonial is whether either a declarant or government
questioner is acting, to a substantial degree, in order to produce a statement for trial.”). The
state has the burden to prove the evidence was nontestimonial. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at
308.
The ROA is not a testimonial statement. It was not created in preparation for trial
or during the investigation into Speten’s alleged violations of the DANCO. The ROA entry
at issue—stating that “deft served in court”— was created on August 1, 2024, almost three
months before the instant matter was initiated and one month before the events giving rise
to the convictions. There is no basis in the record to conclude that the ROA was prepared,
as Speten asserts, “to prove an element of the offense.” See id. at 309 (holding that lab
report identifying substance found on defendant as cocaine was testimonial because it was
created after police had seized substance and began investigation); State v. Weaver, 733
N.W.2d 793, 800 (Minn. App. 2007) (holding that lab results , created in the course of
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homicide investigation and after appellant had been arrested as a suspect, were
testimonial), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 2007); State v. Johnson, 756 N.W.2d 883, 890
(Minn. App. 2008) (holding that autopsy report created in course of homicide investigation
was testimonial).3
Because the ROA is not testimonial, its admission at trial did not implicate Speten’s
confrontation rights, and no plain error occurred. See State v. Noor, 907 N.W.2d 646, 656
(Minn. App. 2018) (ending plain-error analysis at determination that Confrontation Clause
was not violated because evidence was not testimonial).
Affirmed.

3 Speten’s reliance on Butze is misplaced. In Butze, we concluded that a certificate of order
sent, created for the purposes of litigation and introduced at appellant’s trial for driving
after suspension of driving privileges, violated appellant’s right to confrontation. 9 N.W.3d
at 589. Unlike the circumstances here, the certificate of order in Butze “was created for
litigation for the purpose of proving an element of a crime at trial.” Id. Namely, the
document in Butze was created after the defendant was issued a citation for driving after
suspension. The ROA at issue here existed before Speten was charged with the instant
offenses, so the document is not testimonial in nature.