Solution Blue Inc., a Minnesota Corporation, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1067

Solution Blue Inc., a Minnesota Corporation,
Respondent,

vs.

Hmong American Veterans Park Inc.,
Appellant,

Northwest Asphalt Inc.,
Respondent,

Rapp Land Surveying Inc.,
Respondent.

Filed March 30, 2026
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Goodhue County District Court
File No. 25-CV-24-760

Chad D. Lemmons, Kelly & Lemmons, PA, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents Solution
Blue Inc. and Northwest Asphalt Inc.)

Sia Lo, Lo Law Firm, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
In this appeal from the denial of its motion to vacate a default judgment under
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(a), appellant argues the district court abused its
discretion by determining that appellant failed to meet the required Finden factors.1 We
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Hmong American Veterans Park Inc. (HAVP) purchased 89 acres of
vacant real property in Goodhue County and planned to use the property to develop a
veterans’ memorial park. HAVP then contracted with each of the respondents —Solution
Blue Inc., Northwest Asphalt Inc., and Braun Intertec Corporation—to provide
construction services on the property. 2 It is undisputed that no respondent was ever paid
for its services.3

1 A party seeking relief under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(a) must satisfy the four Finden factors.
Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 619-20 (Minn. 2016); see Finden by Finden v. Klaas,
128 N.W.2d 748, 750 (Minn. 1964) (listing factors for relief under Minn. R. Civ.
P. 60.02(a)).

2 Respondent Rapp Land Surveying Inc. has not participated in this litigation and is not
included in any discussion of the parties in this opinion. Northwest informed this court
that it has been assigned Braun’s interest in the judgment and mechanic’s lien. For clarity,
this opinion refers to each respondent separately.

3 HAVP alleged to the district court and on appeal that the respondents did not complete
the project in time to accommodate an inaugural event. HAVP had projected that the
inaugural event would generate $1.4 million. HAVP asserts that, because the inaugural
event did not occur, it had no money to pay the respondents.
3
Each respondent perfected a mechanic’s lien against the property. Solution Blue
then initiated an action to foreclose on its lien in district court, the other respondents
answered and asserted cross-claims against HAVP, and HAVP was served with the
summons and complaint on May 3, 2024. At the end of October 2024, respondents moved
for a default judgment because HAVP had not responded to the complaint. HAVP filed its
answer on December 3, 2024—about 200 days after an answer was required—asserting a
number of defenses related to breach of contract.4
The district court held a hearing on December 16, and on January 23, 2025, it
entered a default judgment against HAVP pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 55.01. The district
court awarded damages to respondents in the following amounts: $33,783.56 to Solution
Blue; $1,666,504.39 to Northwest; and $29,442.46 to Braun; plus continuing interest on
each award.
On March 10, 2025, HAVP moved to vacate the default judgment pursuant to Minn.
R. Civ. P. 60.02, and on May 19, 2025, the district court held a hearing on the motion and
subsequently denied the motion in a written order.
HAVP appeals.

4 Minnesota Statutes section 514.11 (2024) states that the defendant in an action to
foreclose a lien shall file an answer with the court administrator within 20 days after service
of the complaint.
4
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that HAVP failed
to satisfy the required Finden factors.

A district court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order for “[m]istake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. ” Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(a). “The decision
whether to grant Rule 60.02 relief is based on all the surrounding facts of each specific case
and is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” Gams, 884 N.W.2d at 620.
Accordingly, “a district court will not be reversed on appeal except for a clear abuse of
discretion.” Id. (quotation omitted). “A district court abuses its discretion when it acts
under a misapprehension of the law or when its factual findings are clearly erroneous.” Id.
(quotations omitted).
To qualify for rule 60.02(a) relief, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating
four factors: (1) a reasonable defense on the merits; (2) a reasonable excuse for its failure
or neglect to act; (3) the movant “acted with due diligence” after learning of the error or
omission; and (4) “no substantial prejudice will result to the other party” (the Finden
factors). Charson v. Temple Israel, 419 N.W.2d 488, 491-92 (Minn. 1988); see also
Finden, 128 N.W.2d at 750. A district court must consider and expressly find that a party
has satisfied all four of the Finden factors to grant relief. Gams, 884 N.W.2d at 619. In
Gams, the supreme court rejected a court of appeals holding that a party “need not
categorically establish all four of the . . . factors.” Id. at 619-20 (quotation omitted). While
all four Finden factors must be proved, “a weak showing on one factor may be offset by a
5
strong showing on the others.” Reid v. Strodtman, 631 N.W.2d 414, 419 (Minn. App.
2001).
“[T]he district court is in the best position to evaluate the reasonableness of the
excuse, the prejudice to the other party, and whether the party has a reasonable claim or
defense.” Gams, 884 N.W.2d at 620 (quotation omitted). Accordingly, the “district court’s
discretion is ‘particularly broad’ when its decision is based upon an evaluation of
conflicting affidavits or other evidence.” Id. (quoting Roehrdanz v. Brill, 682 N.W.2d 626,
631-32 (Minn. 2004)).
In its principal brief, HAVP argued that the district court misapplied the law when
it determined that HAVP had not met the reasonable-defense-on- the-merits factor. We
observe, however, that the district court determined that HAVP failed to meet two of the
Finden factors— the reasonable-excuse factor and the reasonable- defense-on-the-merits
factor—and that HAVP did not address the reasonable-excuse factor until its reply brief.
All four factors must be satisfied. Gams, 884 N.W.2d at 619. HAVP’s failure to
address the second factor in its principal brief forfeits its argument as to that factor here
and is a sufficient basis to affirm. See Hunter v. Anchor Bank, N.A., 842 N.W.2d 10, 17
(Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 18, 2014) (“[A]n argument for reversal that is
not raised in an appellant’s principal brief is forfeited.”); Zimmerman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
Am., 593 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. App. 1999), aff’d , 605 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 2000)
(stating that forfeited arguments “cannot be revived” via a reply brief).
However, even if we were to consider the merits of HAVP’s arguments regarding
the second factor, we are not persuaded the district court abused its discretion because
6
HAVP failed to establish both the first and second Finden factors. We briefly address each
of these two factors in turn.
A. Reasonable-Defense Factor

On the first Finden factor, the district court stated it could not find that HAVP ha d
a reasonable defense on the merits of the breach-of-contract claims because HAVP did not
file any supporting affidavits or any evidence of the terms of its contracts with the
respondents. The district court stated it had before it only “the claims, conclusory
statements, and speculation HAVP’s counsel included in the Motion.”
“A reasonable defense on the merits is one that, if established, provides a defense
to the plaintiff’s claim.” Northland Temps., Inc. v. Turpin, 744 N.W.2d 398, 403 (Minn.
App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 29, 2008). “Specific information that clearly
demonstrates the existence of a debatably meritorious defense satisfies this factor.”
Palladium Holdings, LLC v. Zuni Mortg. Loan Tr. 2006-OA1, 775 N.W.2d 168, 174 (Minn.
App. 2009) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 27, 2010).
“If no affidavit . . . or other proof of a valid defense is provided, the motion to
vacate will be denied.” Hengel v. Hyatt, 252 N.W.2d 105, 106 ( Minn. 1977); see also
Valley View, Inc. v. Schutte, 399 N.W.2d 182, 184 (Minn. App. 1987) (stating a valid
defense may be presented in an affidavit, answer, or in the record), rev. denied (Minn.
Mar. 18, 1987). Ordinarily, the existence of a reasonable defense must be “demonstrated
by more than conclusory allegations in moving papers.” Charson, 419 N.W.2d at 491.
HAVP argues the district court erred because it demanded a level of proof
appropriate for summary judgment or trial, not for a rule 60.02(a) motion, and dismissed
7
its defenses “solely for lack of a sworn affidavit.” While it is true that an affidavit is not a
strict requirement, see Hyatt, 252 N.W.2d at 106, and that the moving party must only
“clearly” demonstrate “a debatably meritorious defense,” Palladium Holdings,
775 N.W.2d at 174, we do not read the district court’s findings to state that it dismissed
HAVP’s defenses solely for a lack of a sworn affidavit. Rather, the district court
determined that HAVP failed to meet this factor because HAVP failed to provide any
evidence that demonstrated that it had a meritorious defense.
HAVP argues that respondents materially breached the contract first by failing to
complete phase one of construction by May 1, 2023, thereby causing HAVP to cancel a
large inaugural event. HAVP also argues that it provided sufficient evidence that
respondents breached the contract because the work was noncompliant.
To establish a reasonable defense , HAVP was required to submit evidence that,
among other things, clearly demonstrated there was a contract that required respondents to
complete phase one by May 1, 2023. Our review of the record reveals that, notwithstanding
HAVP’s counsel’s assertion at oral argument, HAVP provided no such information to the
district court.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that HAVP failed to
demonstrate a meritorious defense because the record contains no information establishing
any deadlines or work specifications. HAVP submitted an exhibit to the district court that,
it asserts, shows that Solution Blue and Northwest failed to meet timelines. The exhibit
reflects part of an accepted proposal from Solution Blue, but the proposal contains no dates
for the completion of any phase of construction. Moreover, the exhibit includes the cover
8
page of the proposal and then skips to the page that discusses phase three; thus, the pages
that presumably address phase one are missing. The exhibit also includes an accepted work
proposal from Northwest with a “TENTATIVE Job Schedule,” but again, there are no
deadlines in the documents.
To support its assertion that respondents’ work was noncompliant, HAVP submitted
emails from Goodhue County indicating that “turf establishment,” which was part of the
memorial construction for which it alleges Northwest was responsible, was not completed
correctly or may not have been completed in a timely manner. However, nothing in the
record establishes the specifics of Northwest’s contractual obligations or associated
deadlines.
HAVP did not file a sworn affidavit or complete copies of any of the contracts at
issue, which the district court found problematic when it analyzed HAVP’s purported
defenses. The district court is in the best position to evaluate whether a party has a
reasonable claim or defense. Gams, 884 N.W.2d at 620. HAVP provided no more than
“conclusory allegations in moving papers.” Charson, 419 N.W.2d at 491. As such, we
discern no clear abuse of discretion by the district court that warrants reversal. See Gams,
884 N.W.2d at 620 (stating that “a district court will not be reversed on appeal except for
a clear abuse of discretion” (quotation omitted)).
B. Reasonable-Excuse Factor

To establish the second Finden factor, HAVP stated in its reply brief that severe
financial hardship and reliance on ongoing communications that the alleged issues with the
project were being resolved prevented it from timely answering the complaint. HAVP’s
9
failure to include any argument on this factor in its principal brief on appeal provides this
court independent and sufficient grounds to affirm, see Hunter, 842 N.W.2d at 17;
however, our review of the record also confirms that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in determining HAVP failed to establish this Finden factor.
To satisfy the reasonable-excuse-factor, a movant must establish “a reasonable
excuse for the movant’s failure or neglect to act.” Gams, 884 N.W.2d at 620 (quotations
omitted). The district court bears the responsibility for determining “whether the excuse
offered by the movant is true and reasonable under the circumstances.” Cole v. Wutzke,
884 N.W.2d 634, 639 (Minn. 2016); see also Gams, 884 N.W.2d at 620 (stating “the
district court is in the best position to evaluate the reasonableness of the excuse” (quotation
omitted)). “[T]here are no per se rules of law requiring either the grant or denial of a
Rule 60.02(a) motion under the ‘reasonable excuse’ requirement. Instead, the decision is
fact-intensive.” Cole, 884 N.W.2d at 639.
HAVP argued to the district court that it could not afford an attorney to respond to
the complaint because respondents failed to meet the alleged deadline to complete phase
one of the construction. It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to determine
that HAVP’s excuse for its failure to respond to the complaint in a timely manner was not
reasonable. T he record contains no evidence and no information outside of counsel’s
assertions that HAVP expected any revenue that was contingent on the alleged deadline
for phase one of the construction or that payment to respondents for their work was
contingent on such revenue. HAVP also did not submit any evidence of efforts it made to
find an attorney to answer the complaint.
10
Absent this information, the only record evidence supporting HAVP’s assertion that
it failed to respond because it could not afford an attorney was its attorney’s statement at
the motion hearing. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in determining that HAVP’s excuse was not sufficiently supported and was not reasonable.
HAVP also argued to the district court that it had a reasonable excuse for not
answering the complaint because, based on communications from Northwest from
May 2023 to August 2024, it “inadvertently believed that the issues concerning the project
performance” would be resolved and that the lien foreclosure would not proceed.
We discern no error in the district court’s conclusion that this argument was also
unsupported because, again, HAVP did not provide any evidence to support its position.
The record contains no evidence of communication between HAVP and any respondent.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining HAVP failed to establish the
reasonable-excuse factor based on HAVP’s mere allegation that it thought that respondents
would not enforce their perfected mechanic’s liens in a pending foreclosure action. See
Gams, 884 N.W.2d at 620 (stating that “the district court is in the best position to evaluate
the reasonableness of the excuse” (quotation omitted)).
In conclusion, while we recognize the difficult financial situation HAVP is facing
following the foreclosure of the property, the district court did not abuse its discretion when
it determined that HAVP failed to establish the first and second Finden factors and denied
HAVP’s motion to vacate the judgment.
Affirmed.