Paul Scott Seeman, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1069

Paul Scott Seeman, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed April 27, 2026
Affirmed
Ede, Judge

Rice County District Court
File No. 66-CR-14-1473

Paul Scott Seeman, Faribault, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian M. Mortenson, Rice County Attorney, Sean R. McCarthy, Assistant County
Attorney, Faribault, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Bentley, Judge; and Smith, John
P., Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
This is an appeal from a district court’s order summarily denying appellant’s
petition for postconviction relief. Appellant argues that the district court abused its
discretion by: (A) improperly determining that his claim that a witness testified falsely
failed under the applicable standard; (B) improperly determining that his claims that the
state elicited false testimony and failed to disclose exculpatory evidence are procedurally
barred; and (C) relying on the challenged testimony, which unlawfully resulted in prejudice
as to the sentence appellant received. We affirm.
FACTS
In June 2014, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Paul Scott Seeman
with 26 counts, which included racketeering, perjury, receiving stolen property, providing
false information in a motor-vehicle-title application, and theft. According to the
complaint, Seeman had been switching out vehicle-identification- number plates from
legitimately scrapped vehicles, putting the plates on stolen vehicles, and reselling the
vehicles. The state later amended the complaint, bringing the number of counts to 36, which
included multiple counts of receiving stolen property and theft. Seeman moved—and the
parties ultimately agreed—to sever the 36 counts into three matters. Two counts were
severed into “Matter 1,” which involved perjury and receiving stolen property relating to a
motorcycle; one count was severed into “Matter 2,” which involved receiving stolen
property relating to a trailer; and the other counts remained as “Matter 3.”
3
The three matters proceeded to separate jury trials, after which Seeman was
convicted of: 1 count of racketeering, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.903,
subdivision 1(1) (2012); 1 count of perjury, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
609.48, subdivision 1(1) (2012); 19 counts of receiving stolen property, in violation of
Minnesota Statutes section 609.53, subdivision 1 (2012); and 3 counts of providing false
information in a motor-vehicle-title application, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
168A.30, subdivision 1 (2012).
In Matter 1, which concerned charges of perjury and receiving stolen property, the
district court imposed concurrent sentences of 15 months’ imprisonment on both counts
but stayed execution of the sentences and set probationary conditions. As to Matter 2,
which concerned one count of receiving stolen property, the district court sentenced
Seeman to 19 months in prison. And on Matter 3, the district court convicted Seeman of
racketeering (Count 1) and imposed a 117-month sentence concurrent to the sentence in
Matter 2. Under Minnesota Statutes section 609.035, subdivision 1 (2012), the district court
did not impose sentences on the remaining convictions in Matter 3. This appeal focuses on
three of Seeman’s convictions in Matter 3: Count 1 (racketeering); Count 27 (receiving
stolen property, a military truck); and Count 28 (theft, altering identification symbols on a
military truck).
Alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Seeman filed a self-represented
petition for postconviction relief on the same day that he was sentenced in Matter 2 and
Matter 3. He later retained counsel, who filed an amended postconviction petition in
4
January 2023. The district court summarily denied Seeman’s ineffective-assistance-of-
trial-counsel claim because the record established that he was not entitled to relief.
Seeman also filed two direct appeals, both of which resulted in this court affirming
his convictions and sentences. See State v. Seeman, No. A19-2084, 2021 WL 79524, at *1,
*3–7 (Minn. App. Jan. 11, 2021) (affirming the denial of Seeman’s motion to suppress
evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant because the affidavit
established probable cause to search Seeman’s property for a motorcycle and the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request to reopen the omnibus hearing)
(Seeman I), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 30, 2021); see also State v. Seeman, No. A22-1117,
2023 WL 8178144, at *1–10 (Minn. App. Nov. 27, 2023) (affirming the convictions and
sentences in Matter 2 and Matter 3 and rejecting ten claims that Seeman raised in a self-
represented brief) (Seeman II), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 20, 2024).
At issue here is Seeman’s second petition for postconviction relief, filed in February
2025. In that petition, Seeman asserted that there was new evidence that a key witness,
D.O., falsely testified at trial, that the state elicited this false testimony (i.e., a “Napue
claim”),
1 and that the state failed to disclose favorable evidence (i.e., a “Brady claim”).2

1 See State v. Hill, 871 N.W.2d 900, 907 (Minn. 2015) (“‘[I]mplicit in any concept of
ordered liberty’ is the principle that ‘a State may not knowingly use false evidence’ to
obtain a conviction.” (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959))).

2 See Ezeka v. State, 16 N.W.3d 768, 779 (Minn. 2025) (“Brady addresses the prosecution’s
failure to turn over exculpatory evidence, holding that suppressing evidence that is
‘favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.’” (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963))).
5
Seeman also submitted an affidavit from S.S., who, after a conversation with D.O., alleged
that D.O.: (1) “lied when he testified that he had stolen a 6x6 military truck
for . . . Seeman”; (2) “[p]urposely misidentified [a vehicle] as a truck that he had stolen”
when shown a picture of it; and (3) “fabricated a claim of ste aling 200 vehicles
for . . . Seeman.” The district court summarily denied Seeman’s second postconviction
petition, determining that Seeman was not entitled to relief on his false-testimony claim
and that Seeman’s remaining claims were procedurally barred by Knaffla.3
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Seeman challenges the district court’s summary denial of his second petition for
postconviction relief. He contends that the district court abused its discretion
by: (A) improperly determining that his false -testimony claim failed under the Larrison
standard;4 (B) improperly determining that Seeman’s Napue and Brady claims are Knaffla-
barred; and (C) relying on the challenged testimony, which unlawfully resulted in prejudice
as to the sentence Seeman received in Matter 3. As explained below, we discern no abuse

3 See State v. Knaffla , 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976) (precluding review of
postconviction claims that were known but not raised on direct appeal).

4 The Larrison standard applies to claims of recanted or false testimony. See Larrison v.
United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87–88 (7th Cir. 1928), overruled by United States v. Mitrione,
357 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2004). “Although Larrison was overruled in Mitrione,
Minnesota courts continue to apply the Larrison test in cases involving witness-recantation
and false-testimony claims.” State v. Duol, 25 N.W.3d 135, 139 n.4 (Minn. 2025)
(quotation omitted).
6
of discretion in the district court’s order summarily denying Seeman’s second
postconviction petition.
“[Appellate courts] review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief,
including the petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing, for an abuse of discretion.”
Tichich v. State, 4 N.W.3d 114, 119 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). “An abuse of
discretion occurs if a district court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious
manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual
findings.” Gilbert v. State, 2 N.W.3d 483, 487 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). Appellate
courts “review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for
clear error.” Tichich, 4 N.W.3d at 119 (quotation omitted).
A person convicted of a crime may seek postconviction relief by filing a petition
alleging that the conviction “violated the person’s rights under the Constitution or laws of
the United States or of the state.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2024). After a petition
is filed, the district court must schedule a hearing, “[u]nless the petition and the files and
records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.”
Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2024). “In deciding whether to summarily deny a petition,
the district court presumes the facts alleged in the petition to be true.” Reese v. State, 992
N.W.2d 373, 378 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). “[A] district court need not hold an
evidentiary hearing when the petitioner alleges facts that, if true, are legally insufficient to
entitle him to the requested relief.” Tichich, 4 N.W.3d at 119 (quotation omitted).
With these principles in mind, we address Seeman’s arguments in turn.
7
A. The district court acted within its discretion in determining that
Seeman’s false-testimony claim did not satisfy the Larrison standard.

Seeman asserts that the district court abused its discretion by determining that his
false-testimony claim failed under the Larrison standard.5
Under the Larrison standard: “(1) the court must be reasonably well- satisfied that
the testimony in question was false; (2) without that testimony the jury might have reached
a different conclusion; and (3) the petitioner was taken by surprise at trial or did not know
of the falsity until after trial.” Kaiser v. State, 4 N.W.3d 95, 101 ( Minn. 2024) (quotation
omitted). Under the second prong of this standard, “might” means something more than
“an outside chance” but much less than “ would probably.” Ortega v. State, 856 N.W.2d
98, 104 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). “The first two prongs are compulsory, but the

5 Seeman also contends that the district court erroneously applied the Rainer standard—
which applies to claims of newly discovered evidence, see Rainer v. State, 566 N.W.2d
692, 695 (Minn. 1997) —to his false-testimony claim. The district court did consider this
claim under both the Rainer and Larrison standards, and we agree with Seeman that his
claim is properly analyzed under Larrison and not Rainer. The Minnesota Supreme Court
has “consistently considered witness recantation to be newly discovered evidence of false
testimony and [has] therefore applied the Larrison test in such cases.” Tichich, 4 N.W.3d
at 120; see also Opsahl v. State, 677 N.W.2d 414, 422– 23 (Minn. 2004) (applying the
Larrison standard to the appellant’s claim that several witnesses gave false testimony,
which the appellant supported with affidavits in which three of the state’s witnesses
recanted their testimony, as well as affidavits of individuals who claimed to have heard
certain state witnesses recant trial testimony). That said, we conclude that any error by the
district court in analyzing Seeman’s claim under the Rainer standard, in addition to the
Larrison standard, is harmless. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01 (requiring that harmless error
be disregarded). Indeed, the district court determined that Seeman “failed to allege facts
regarding [D.O.’s] alleged false testimony that, if proven by a fair preponderance of the
evidence, would entitle [Seeman] to a new trial” under both the Rainer and Larrison
standards. Cf. Greer v. State, 973 N.W.2d 918, 924 (Minn. 2022) (concluding that the
Minnesota Supreme Court “need not resolve [a] . . . procedural dispute because . . . the
alleged error was harmless”).
8
third prong is not required in order to grant a new trial.” Kaiser, 4 N.W.3d at 101 (quotation
omitted). Appellate courts review a district court’s application of the Larrison test for an
abuse of discretion. Id. at 103.
1. False Testimony

Under the first Larrison prong, the district court concluded that it was “not
reasonably well-satisfied” that the entirety of D.O.’s testimony was false. The district court
acknowledged that S.S. “alleges in his affidavit that [D.O.] admitted to lying about stealing
the military truck for [Seeman] and about the number of vehicles [D.O.] stole for
[Seeman].” But the district court also observed that “there is no claim that [D.O.] perjured
himself regarding any of the other vehicles and equipment that [D.O.] specifically testified
about at trial.” And the district court ruled that, “if proven, [Seeman’s claims] would only
satisfy the court that [D.O.’s] testimony [was] false only in relation to the military truck
stolen by [D.O.] (as opposed to the military truck found on [Seeman’s] property) and the
estimated number of vehicles [D.O.] stole for [Seeman].”
Seeman maintains that D.O. falsely testified in three instances. According to S.S.’s
affidavit, D.O.: (1) “lied when he testified that he had stolen a 6x6 military truck
for . . . Seeman”; (2) “[p]urposely misidentified [a vehicle] as a truck that he had stolen”
when shown a picture of it; and (3) “fabricated a claim of ste aling 200 vehicles
for . . . Seeman.” And Seeman argues that the district court’s decision disregards S.S.’s
affidavit.
6 This argument is unavailing.

6 The state responds that Seeman failed to satisfy the first Larrison prong because S.S.’s
affidavit did not meet the requirement that the recantation “bear sufficient indicia of
9
In its analysis of the first Larrison prong, the district court properly considered
S.S.’s affidavit as true and correctly considered some of D.O.’s statements to be false. On
that basis, the district court decided that Seeman had satisfied the first Larrison prong with
respect to the statements about the military truck and the number of stolen vehicles but not
with respect to many other statements that supported Seeman’s guilt. We discern no abuse
of discretion in this aspect of the district court’s analysis.
2. Effect on the Jury
On the second Larrison prong, the district court determined that other evidence
besides D.O.’s testimony supported Seeman’s convictions of Counts 27 and 28. The district
court reasoned that “the jury could have still reached the same conclusions on Count[s] 27
and 28 regarding the military vehicle without [D.O.’s] testimony” and “could have still
reached the same conclusion on Count 1 regarding racketeering without the alleged
perjured testimony of [D.O.].”
Seeman argues that “[t]he [district] court conceded that the jury still ‘could have’
convicted without [D.O.’s] testimony” and that “Larrison requires only that the jury might
have reached a different result.” We take Seeman’s point that whether the jury could have
reached the same conclusion is a distinct inquiry from whether the jury might have reached
a different conclusion without the false testimony. The language of the district court’s

trustworthiness.” As Seeman points out, however, a district court should not determine that
a witness is unreliable without first evaluating the witness’s credibility at an evidentiary
hearing. See Opsahl, 677 N.W.2d at 423–24; see also Ferguson v. State, 779 N.W.2d 555,
561 (Minn. 2010) (stating that any “doubts about whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing
should be resolved in favor of granting the hearing” (quotation omitted)). We therefore
reject the state’s argument in that regard.
10
order—that D.O.’s testimony was “not necessary” and the other evidence “was sufficient
for a conviction”—appears to focus on the former inquiry rather than the latter. But
considering the district court’s decision as a whole, the court’s phrasing does not amount
to a determination in Seeman’s favor on the second Larrison prong. For the following
reasons, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in determining that
Seeman’s claim fails on the second Larrison prong.
Notwithstanding the phrasing of the order, the district court ruled that Seeman did
not show that the jury might have reached a different result without the recanted testimony.
The district court properly relied on the “significant additional [trial] evidence” of
Seeman’s guilt on Counts 1, 27, and 28. See Ortega, 856 N.W.2d at 104. As the district
court observed, testimony from witnesses other than D.O. established that the military truck
had been stolen, found on Seeman’s property, and altered by Seeman, such that the jury
would still have convicted Seeman of Count s 27 and 28. As to D.O.’s testimony about
stealing 200 vehicles, the district court reasoned that “the jury was instructed that the
criminal act was conduct constituting receiving stolen property and that the pattern of
criminal activity was three or more criminal acts.” Because the jury “received evidence
supporting several counts against [Seeman] of receiving stolen property, including Count
27 regarding the military truck, Count 6 regarding . . . four green truck doors, and Count 7
regarding [an] International Tractor,” the district court ruled that the jury would not have
reached a different result without the allegedly false testimony.
Seeman does not dispute the district court’s characterization of the record and
therefore has not shown that the court abused its discretion in determining that his
11
postconviction claim failed on the second Larrison prong. See Hooper v. State, 680 N.W.2d
89, 96 (Minn. 2004) (concluding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the appellant an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction claim because, while recanted
testimony was relevant to the appellant’s guilt, “[t]here was ample evidence independent
of . . . [the recanted] testimony implicating [appellant]”); see also Morgan v. State , 384
N.W.2d 458, 460 (Minn. 1986) (deciding that the appellant was not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on a postconviction claim because there was other convincing evidence
of guilt and, even without certain recanted testimony, the jury would not have reached a
different conclusion because the recanted testimony went to credibility rather than guilt).
In short, the district court properly determined that the allegations in Seeman’s
petition, when viewed as true, meet the first Larrison prong. And on the second Larrison
prong, the district court acted within its discretion by determining that Seeman did not
demonstrate that, without the allegedly false testimony, the jury might have reached a
different conclusion. Because the facts alleged in Seeman’s postconviction petition are thus
legally insufficient to warrant relief, the district court acted within its discretion by denying
Seeman’s false-testimony claim without an evidentiary hearing.
7 See Tichich, 4 N.W.3d at
119.

7 Given our conclusion that Seeman has not established that the district court abused its
discretion in its determinations about the first two Larrison prongs— which are
“compulsory”—we need not and do not review the district court’s consideration of the third
prong, which “is not required in order to grant a new trial.” Kaiser, 4 N.W.3d at 101
(quotation omitted).
12
B. The district court acted within its discretion in determining that
Seeman’s remaining postconviction claims are procedurally barred by
Knaffla.

Seeman argues that the district court erred in applying the Knaffla procedural bar to
his Napue and Brady claims.
The Knaffla procedural bar precludes review of “all claims raised in the direct
appeal and all claims that were known or should have been known but were not raised in
the direct appeal.” Ezeka, 16 N.W.3d at 776 (quotation omitted); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 1(2) (2024) (“A petition for postconviction relief after a direct appeal has
been completed may not be based on grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal
of the conviction or sentence.”). “[T]here are two exceptions to the Knaffla procedural bar:
(1) if a novel legal issue is presented; or (2) if the interests of justice require review.”
Gilbert, 2 N.W.3d at 487. Appellate courts review a district court’s decision that a claim is
procedurally barred by Knaffla for an abuse of discretion. Reed v. State, 793 N.W.2d 725,
730 (Minn. 2010). As mentioned above, an abuse of discretion occurs when a district court
exercises its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, bases its ruling on an erroneous
view of the law, or makes clearly erroneous factual findings. Gilbert, 2 N.W.3d at 487.
1. Napue Claim
Seeman contends that the district court abused its discretion in applying the Knaffla
procedural bar to his Napue claim. As noted above, this claim is based on “the principle
that ‘a State may not knowingly use false evidence’ to obtain a conviction.” Hill, 871
N.W.2d at 907 (quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 269).
13
In his memorandum supporting his postconviction petition, Seeman asserted that
“the state elicited [D.O.’s] knowingly false testimony in violation of [his] due process
rights under the fourteenth amendment.” And Seeman maintained that “[t]he state had
reason to know that [D.O.] would make misrepresentations in his testimony, given his
history of false statements to law enforcement,” certain cellphone data, D.O.’s propensity
for dishonesty, and the inconsistent questions that the state asked D.O.
The district court considered Seeman’s contentions that the state intentionally
elicited D.O.’s false testimony but determined that his claim was procedurally barred by
Knaffla. In making that determination, the district court stated that Seeman “d[id] not
provide any explanation regarding why [he] failed to raise this issue during trial or at the
time of appeal.” And the district court reasoned that, because Seeman had retained a
cellphone expert, he “certainly knew or, at the very least, should have known about any
allegedly exculpatory or impeaching information contained in reports created prior to
trial.”
On appeal, Seeman contends that “[d]ue process prohibits convictions obtained
through false testimony” and “[t]he reliability of [D.O.], the key witness, was central.”
Nevertheless, Seeman neither challenges the district court’s reasoning in applying the
Knaffla procedural bar nor explains why his Napue claim was not known or could not have
been known at the time of his direct appeal. Consequently, Seeman has not established that
the district court abused its discretion in determining that Seeman’s Napue claim is
procedurally barred by Knaffla.

14
2. Brady Claim
Seeman also asserts that the district court abused its discretion in determining that
the Knaffla procedural bar applies to his Brady claim. As discussed earlier, “Brady
addresses the prosecution’s failure to turn over exculpatory evidence, holding that
suppressing evidence that is ‘favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.’” Ezeka, 16 N.W.3d at 779 (quoting Brady, 373 U.S.
at 87). Brady also applies to “material evidence that could be used to impeach a witness’s
credibility.” Id. To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show: “(1) the evidence
is favorable to the defendant because it would have been either exculpatory or impeaching;
(2) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution, intentionally or otherwise; and (3) the
evidence is material — in other words, the absence of the evidence must have caused
prejudice to the defendant.” Id. (quotations omitted). “The facts . . . must meet all three
requirements to establish a Brady violation.” Zornes v. State, 903 N.W.2d 411, 417 (Minn.
2017).
In his memorandum supporting his postconviction petition, Seeman contended that
the state did not comply with its Brady obligations because it suppressed evidence of
D.O.’s potential accomplices who acted as drivers. Seeman maintained that “[D.O.]
testified that he ‘had a friend drop him off’ to the theft location of the military truck, where
he crashed through the gates of the business.” And Seeman asserted that “[D.O.’s] claim
of stealing 200 vehicles requires 200 individual rides to those thefts.”
15
The district court determined that Seeman’s Brady claim was procedurally barred
by Knaffla because Seeman “was aware at [the] time [of trial] of at least one unidentified
driver and of the state’s alleged failure to corroborate the existence of the driver ( or
drivers), but [Seeman] failed to raise the issue at trial or on [direct] appeal.” Moreover, the
district court reasoned that Seeman did not argue that any of the exceptions to the Knaffla
procedural bar apply.
As with his Napue claim, Seeman does not challenge the district court’s reasoning
related to its application of Knaffla. Instead, Seeman contends that “[t]he record shows
[that he] attempted to identify [D.O.’s] driver-accomplice during trial, but the state
objected, and the objection was sustained.” This argument acknowledges that Seeman was
aware of the state’s alleged failure to corroborate the driver’s identity or that he should
have known of this claim at the time of trial, such that he could have raised the claim on
direct appeal or in his first postconviction petition—confirming the applicability of the
Knaffla procedural bar. And Seeman does not argue that any exception to Knaffla obtains.
Accordingly, Seeman has not established that the district court abused its discretion in
determining that Seeman’s Brady claim is procedurally barred by Knaffla.8

8 We also note that the district court determined that Seeman’s Brady claim fails on the
merits because, “[w]hile [Seeman’s] claim could potentially meet the first prong of the
Brady test as [evidence that is favorable to Seeman because it would have been]
impeaching,” the court ruled that the second and third Brady prongs were not satisfied
because “the state cannot suppress information it does not have” and Seeman did not
specify “how the evidence would have made a material difference in [the] outcome of the
trial.” Although he argues that “[t]he suppressed evidence was material” and “could have
led to exculpatory testimony undermining [D.O.’s] credibility and supporting Seeman’s
innocence,” Seeman has not shown on appeal that the purported evidence was in the state’s
16
C. Seeman has forfeited his sentencing argument.
Finally, we conclude that Seeman has forfeited his argument that the district court’s
reliance on the challenged testimony unlawfully resulted in prejudice as to the sentence he
received in Matter 3.
While Seeman lists this argument in the “Statement of Legal Issues” portion of his
brief, he neither elaborates upon it nor supports it with any analysis or citations to legal
authority. Thus, Seeman has forfeited his sentencing argument. See State v. Vasko, 889
N.W.2d 551, 555–56 (Minn. 2017) (“Generally, we consider an argument not raised in the
parties’ briefs to be forfeited.”).
Affirmed.

possession, that the state suppressed such evidence, and that—absent speculation —he was
prejudiced because of the alleged suppression. See Ezeka, 16 N.W.3d at 780.