Alexis Lashun Suggs, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1073

Alexis Lashun Suggs, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed April 13, 2026
Affirmed
Bentley, Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File Nos. 71-CR-24-270, 71-CR-24-1078

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chelsie M. Willett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Dawn R. Nyhus, Sherburne County Attorney, George R. Kennedy, Assistant County
Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Bentley, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BENTLEY, Judge
In this appeal from the denial of a postconviction petition, appellant argues that he
should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea to misdemeanor domestic assault —
committing an act with intent to cause fear of immediate bodily harm or death. Specifically,
he maintains that his plea was inaccurate because he did not admit that he had the intent to
commit that offense. Because we conclude appellant admitted facts sufficient to permit a
reasonable inference that he had the requisite intent, we affirm.
FACTS
In March 2024, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Alexis Suggs with
three counts of threats of violence—reckless disregard of risk, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.713, subd. 1 (2022); three counts of misdemeanor domestic assault—committing an
act with intent to cause fear of immediate bodily harm or death, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.2242, subd. 1(1) (2022); and one count of obstructing legal process—interfering with
peace officer, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2) (Supp . 2023). After the
charges were filed, the district court entered a domestic abuse no contact order (DANCO)
that prohibited Suggs from having contact with the three alleged victims of the offenses for
the duration of proceedings. Suggs was later charged with violating the DANCO. At the
time, Suggs was on probation for an unrelated offense so the state also filed a probation-
violation report alleging that he failed to remain law-abiding.
The parties reached a plea agreement in which Suggs would plead guilty to the
DANCO violation, and one count of misdemeanor domestic assault against one of the
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victims, his girlfriend, as well as admit to the probation violation in exchange for the
dismissal of the remaining charges. During the plea hearing, after explaining to Suggs his
constitutional rights, the district court found that he had knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently waived those rights.
When establishing the factual basis for his guilty plea to domestic assault, Suggs
admitted that he and his girlfriend were living together and got into an argument. The
prosecutor asked Suggs if it was fair to say that, during the argument, he was asking his
girlfriend “for a photograph and [she] was trying to tell [him] she didn’t have it anymore.”
Suggs answered, “Yes.” He also acknowledged that he had been drinking and was very
upset with his girlfriend. The prosecutor the n asked, “[S]o did you then threaten that you
were going to break [her] neck?” This exchange followed:
SUGGS: I don’t think I said that. . . . [W]hat I would say is
like I’m going to beat the sh-t out of you, like you better give
it to me or probably something like that, but not break a neck.
Break a neck is kind of harsh. I don’t think I’ve ever said break
your neck, but I know I said man you better give me the picture
or I’ll beat the sh-t out of you, something like that in those
terms, something like that.

STATE: Maybe if she didn’t give it to you , you would beat
her a-s?

SUGGS: Yes.
When the prosecutor asked if Suggs believed “that [his girlfriend] had a fear that [he] would
cause her immediate bodily harm,” based on his threats and him being upset, Suggs initially
answered, “Probably not—yes.” The following exchange occurred:
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STATE: So you said probably not and then yes. You know,
[Suggs], . . . we don’t take pleas of guilty from people that
don’t believe they’re guilty.

SUGGS: Okay.

STATE: And so . . . like I said given your state of mind, how
upset you were, and that sort of thing, what you stated you were
going to beat her a-s, and I’m sure it wasn’t just that one, you
know, statement, perhaps you said it multiple times, is that
possible?

SUGGS: Yes ma’am.

STATE: Okay. And so given all of that, do you think that she
had a reasonable fear of immediate bodily harm from you?

SUGGS: Yes ma’am.
Suggs also admitted to the factual basis underlying the DANCO violation and to the
probation violation. The district court accepted Suggs’s guilty pleas and admission to the
probation violation.
Before announcing its sentencing determinations, the court questioned Suggs’s
girlfriend who had been in contact with the state and attended the hearing. She mentioned
that she was not afraid that Suggs would break her neck and explained, “[T]hat’s what
[Suggs’s] mouth would run off with and . . . it would raise our eyebrows or whatever.” She
elaborated: “[T]o be fair he probably shouldn’t talk like that, and he shouldn’t scare people
like whatever. I mean, I know he wouldn’t do it but, you know, I guess I really can’t say
for the other[] [victims], but I’m sure they would agree too.”
In accordance with the plea agreement and at Suggs’s request, the district court
executed Suggs’s sentences and ordered him to serve 90 days in jail for the domestic-
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assault charge, 90 days in jail for the DANCO violation, to run consecutively to the
domestic-assault sentence, and 90 days in jail for the probation violation to be served
concurrently with the domestic-assault sentence. All other pending charges were dismissed
in accordance with the plea agreement.
Suggs later filed a petition for postconviction relief seeking to withdraw his guilty
plea. The district court held a hearing on the petition, and Suggs testified. By that time, he
had served his sentences.
Following the hearing, the district court denied Suggs’s petition. In its order, the
district court noted that intent to cause immediate fear of bodily harm or death may be
inferred and concluded: “Suggs’s intent can be drawn from the surrounding circumstances.
Because [Suggs] wanted [his girlfriend] to return a picture, he made a statement with the
intention and belief that statement would cause fear of immediate bodily harm in [her] and
that fear would result in [her] returning the picture.”
Suggs appeals.
DECISION
Appellate courts review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Erickson v. State, 842 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Minn. 2014). “In
doing so, we review findings of fact for clear error and questions of law de novo.” Id. The
validity of a guilty plea is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo. State v.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010).
The district court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea “upon a timely
motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a
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manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1; see State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712,
715-16 (Minn. 1994) (applying Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1, to a postconviction
challenge). “A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid. To be constitutionally
valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. A defendant bears the
burden of showing his plea was invalid.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94 (citations omitted).
Suggs argues that his guilty plea to domestic assault was inaccurate and, therefore,
invalid.1 For a plea to be accurate, it must be supported by a proper factual basis, with
“sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within
the charge to which he desires to plead guilty.” State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 349
(Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted). “It is the responsibility of the trial judge . . . to ensure
that an adequate factual basis has been established in the record.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at
716. This duty “protect[s] a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than
he could be convicted of were he to insist on his right to trial.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d
248, 251 (Minn. 1983).
Suggs argues that his plea was inaccurate because he did not admit that he had the
necessary intent under the domestic-assault statute. Minnesota Statutes section 609.2242,
subdivision 1(1), provides that , whoever “commits an act with intent to cause fear in
another of immediate bodily harm or death” against a household member, “commits an
assault and is guilty of a misdemeanor.” Suggs did not expressly admit that he intended to

1 Suggs also argues that, if he is permitted to withdraw his plea to the domestic-assault
charge, he should also be allowed to withdraw his plea to the DANCO violation because it
was part of the same global plea agreement. Because we determine that Suggs is not entitled
to withdraw his plea to domestic assault, we decline to reach this argument.
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cause his girlfriend to fear “immediate bodily harm or death.” Minn. Stat. § 609.2242,
subd. 1(1). But caselaw does not require a defendant to admit every element of the charged
crime so long as “facts exist from which the defendant’s guilt of the crime charged can be
reasonably inferred.” Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 861 (Minn. 2016) (quotation
omitted); see also Rosendahl v. State, 955 N.W.2d 294, 299 (Minn. App. 2021) (“Even if
an element to an offense is not verbalized by the defendant, a district court may
nevertheless draw inferences from the facts admitted to by the defendant.” (emphasis
omitted)).
Considering the facts that Suggs admitted, we conclude that they are sufficient to
create a reasonable inference that he intended to cause his girlfriend fear of immediate
bodily harm. “Intent can be inferred . . . from the idea that a person intends the natural
consequences of his or her actions.” Nelson, 880 N.W.2d at 860 (quotation omitted). The
natural consequence of Suggs’s threat was that his girlfriend would fear immediate bodily
harm and give in to his demand. Suggs admitted at the plea hearing that he believed his
girlfriend had a reasonable fear of bodily harm from him as a result of his threat. Therefore,
it may reasonably be inferred that Suggs intended that consequence. Id. We agree with the
district court that the facts established at the plea hearing support a reasonable inference
that Suggs acted with the intent to cause his girlfriend to fear immediate bodily harm so
that she would give him the photo.
To convince us otherwise, Suggs points to his girlfriend’s statements that she was
not actually afraid and did not think Suggs was going to beat her. But whether his girlfriend
was, in fact, afraid is not the issue. For domestic assault–fear, “the intent of the defendant,
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as contrasted with the effect upon the victim, becomes the focal point for inquiry.” State v.
Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). Thus, even if his girlfriend
did not actually fear immediate bodily harm or death from Suggs, that fact does not negate
that Suggs admitted to facts sufficient “to support a conclusion that defendant’ s conduct
falls within” the crime of domestic assault. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d at 349 (quotation omitted).
In denying Suggs’s postconviction petition, the district court analogized this case to
Ibrahim v. State, 14 N.W.3d 294 (Minn. App. 2024). In Ibrahim, this court concluded that
the defendant’s guilty plea to second- degree assault–fear was accurate because it was
reasonable to infer from the facts admitted by the defendant—including that the defendant
brandished a weapon with intent to cause fear—that the defendant intended to cause fear
of immediate bodily harm or death. 14 N.W.3d at 303-05. Suggs seeks to distinguish his
case from Ibrahim because, unlike the defendant in Ibrahim, he did not have a weapon. Id.
at 304. We are not persuaded that this factual difference is material. In Ibrahim, the
brandishing of a weapon was only one factor that the court considered in determining
whether the defendant had admitted sufficient facts to infer that the defendant intended to
cause fear of immediate bodily harm or death . Id. at 303-05. The court also considered
admissions that the defendant disagreed with a decision to remove him from a bar and was
tackled after the assault and held down until police arrived. Id. Similarly here, for the
reasons articulated, the facts admitted in their totality are sufficient to infer that Suggs had
the requisite intent for a domestic assault–fear conviction.
Because Suggs admitted facts permitting a reasonable inference that he intended to
cause his girlfriend to fear immediate bodily harm or death and also admitted facts
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establishing all other elements of domestic assault, his plea was accurate and valid. See
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94 (stating that to be valid, a plea must be, among other things,
accurate). As such, withdrawal is not necessary to correct a manifest injustice under
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.05, subdivision 1. The district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the postconviction petition.
Affirmed.