County of Hennepin, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1085

County of Hennepin,
Respondent,

vs.

Jill Kline Rochford,
Respondent,

Ross Edgar Trooien,
Appellant.

Filed April 13, 2026
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-PA-FA-21-727

Jill Kline Rochford, Hopkins, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Kyle T. Wermerskirchen, Wermerskirchen & Blomquist, LLC, Wayzata, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant-father challenges the parenting schedule for the parties’ child, arguing
that the district court abused its discretion by awarding him less than the statutory
presumptive minimum 25% of parenting time and by imposing a parenting -time schedule
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that differed from the schedules he and respondent -mother each proposed; respondent -
mother, pro se, argues that the district court abused its discretion in not awarding her
retroactive child support, reimbursement for her expenses, and attorney fees. Because we
see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision, we affirm.
FACTS
The parties are the unmarried parents of a child, S., born in November 2020. S. has
always lived with respondent in the Twin Cities area . Appellant lives over three hours
away in Grand Rapids, where S. has spent some time with him.
Both parties were represented by legal counsel at the four-day trial in January and
February 2025 on legal and physical custody, parenting time, and child support, after which
they submitted proposed findings of fact. Appellant’s proposal gave respondent 100
overnights per year until September 2026 , when S. will begin kindergarten; respondent’s
proposal gave appellant 130 overnights per year until September 2026 and 89 overnights
per year thereafter. Respondent’s counsel withdrew in April 2025.
In May 2025, the district court filed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law , and an
Order, awarding both parents joint legal custody and respondent sole physical custody.
Neither parent challenges these awards. Appellant was awarded parenting time from the
third week in June until the second week in August and one weekend per month until
September 2026, as well as “agreed-upon increased parenting time prior to [S.’s] entry into
kindergarten in September 2026.” The district court did not attempt to alloca te parenting
time after S. starts kindergarten but instead left it up to the parties, asking them to “work
to reach agreement on parenting time once S. reaches kindergarten, or demonstrate that
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they have cooperated in good faith mediation prior to bringing a motion seeking to modify
the schedule based on a change of circumstances.” Each parent may take two non -
consecutive weeks of vacation with S.
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding him less
than the statutorily presumed 25% of parenting time and by imposing a parenting-time plan
if its own devising; respondent argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying
her retroactive child support, reimbursement for some expenses, and attorney fees.
DECISION
1. Minimum Parenting-Time Presumption
On appeal, this court considers “whether [a] district court abused its discretion by
not following the statutory 25% parenting -time presumption.” Hagen v. Schirmers , 783
N.W.2d 212, 217 (Minn. App. 2010). “[T]here is a rebuttable presumption that a child
must receive a minimum of at least 25 percent of the parenting time with each parent.
Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(g) (2024). In its order, the district court referred to the 25%
rebuttable presumption but awarded appellant 22.7%.
Appellant relies on Hagen to argue that this was an abuse of discretion, but his
reliance is misplaced: Hagen is distinguishable on three grounds. First, t he district court
in that case did not acknowledge the statutory 25% minimum-parenting-time presumption
when it allocated one parent less than 10% of parenting time. Hagen, 783 N.W.2d at 218.
This court remanded for the district court to “determine parenting time with due regard for
the rebuttable presumption” and “state the basis for departing from th e statutory
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presumption.” Id. at 219. Here, the district court acknowledged the presumption and
explained the basis for its decision to depart 2.3% below the statutory 25%.
Second, Hagen “reiterate[d] that the statute gives district courts flexibility in
weighing the evidence and the presumption.” Id. There appears to be no case law finding
that an allocation of 22.7% is beyond the bounds of flexibility or an abuse of discretion.
Third, Hagen holds that “parenting time allocations that merely fall below the 25%
presumption can be justified by reasons related to the child’s best interests and
considerations of what is feasible given the circumstances of the parties.” Id. at 218. While
the 22.7% allocation fell below the 25% presumption, the district court provided numerous
reasons related to S.’s best interests and the circumstances of his parents for its parenting -
time schedule.
2. Parenting-Time Schedule
The district court has broad discretion in deciding parenting-time questions and will
not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Shearer v. Shearer , 891 N.W.2d 72, 75
(Minn. App. 2017). Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion when it
devised a parenting -time plan that differed from the plans suggested by himself and
respondent. But the plans they submitted were very dissimilar, and neither of them
indicated an ability to agree with the other’s plan. The district court devised a plan that
considered S.’s best interests and his parents’ circumstances —chiefly the fact that they
lived more than three hours apart.
The district court’s findings show that it thoroughly considered what was in S.’s
best interests and “feasible given the circumstances of the parties.” Hagen, 783 N.W.2d
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at 218. The district court noted that appellant had “expressed that he intends to relocate [to
Grand Rapids] regardless of the outcome of this case ” and that balancing S .’s time with
each parent “will understandably require some compromising of priorities to give [S.] the
best possible schedule under the circumstances.”
In explaining its parenting -time arrangement, the district court demonstrated its
consideration of both the child’s best interests and the parties’ circumstances. “The [c]ourt
must balance the circumstances, including the impact of travel on the child, and the
economic and logistical hurdles that would fall upon [respondent] if she were required to
travel to Grand Rapids or part [of the] way[] due to [appellant]’s choice to relocate away
from the metro area.” Ultimately, the district court determined:
Given that [respondent] has physical custody and [appellant]
resides approximately three hours away, the [c]ourt determines
that a proper schedule to balance the circumstances would be
for [appellant] to exercise parenting time from the third week
of June through the second week of August. This would allow
for the child to complete the school year and be ready for the
upcoming academic year. This arrangement would also
provide [appellant] with additional time to bond with the child
and facilitates meaningf ul experiences, without unduly
disrupting the child’s established routines with [respondent].

The district court, having considered two parents living over three hours apart and
a child who will necessarily live with one of them during the school year , devised a plan
to give the other parent a significant majority of the time when the child is not in school
and at least monthly contact during the school year. The fact that neither parent devised
this plan does not make it an abuse of discretion, and there is no basis for reversal.

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3. Retroactive Child Support
An appellate court will not reverse a district court’s decision denying additional
child support absent an abuse of discretion. Ver Kuilen v. Ver Kuilen , 578 N.W.2d 790,
792 (Minn. App. 1998). The district court’s May 2025 decision from which this appeal is
taken does not address retroactive child support. Respondent’s argument pertains to the
district court’s order filed on November 20, 2024, which is no longer appealable, and in
which the district court gave three reasons for why “attempting to reach b ack and modify
or set support [was] neither practicable nor warranted”: namely, temporary support may
have been based on respondent’s income that was actually higher; childcare expenses were
complicated because the parties refused to agree on a provider; and appellant incurred and
covered several expenses before and after S.’s birth until respondent prevented him from
regularly seeing S. Therefore, there is nothing for this court to review.
4. Reimbursement of Respondent’s Expenses
Respondent sought reimbursement for various expenses. The district court found
that she:
submitted an extensive list of expenses she deemed necessary
for the child’s well -being, growth, and development.
However, the Court found items listed such as cat food, lip
balm and other non-child related items which did not meet the
criteria for necess ary expenditures for the child’s care and
upbringing. Also, items such as the placenta encapsulation and
the keepsake ultrasound appear to be [respondent’s] preference
rather than for the need of the child. Given the inclusion of such
unrelated items, the Court finds that the list lacks credibility
and does not provide a clear and substantiated justification for
reimbursement from [appellant]. Neither party is currently
employed full -time, and [respondent] is being awarded the
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dependency exemption going forward. [Respondent’s] request
for reimbursement of these expenses is not warranted.

Respondent argues that:

[Appellant] did not pay pregnancy expenses. [Respondent]
provided receipts and unpaid medical bills in her name. In the
District Court’s November 20th 2024 order, one of their reasons
for denying retroactive support is that [appellant] paid for
pregnancy expenses. The only medical expense [appellant]
showed the court, was not even itemized, nor was it under the
child’s medical record. Exhibit #167 was thrown out by the
court.

Respondent provides no references to the record to support this argument, and the
transcript of the district court’s analysis of each exhibit on the first day of trial says
“[Exhibits] 166 and 167 will be received at this time without objection.” Respondent does
not address any of the district court’s rejections of her list of necessary expenses or provide
any support for her statement that the court “threw out” exhibit 167. There is no basis to
reverse the district court’s decision on reimbursement.
5. Attorney Fees
A district court’s decision on attorney fees under Minn. Stat. § 518.14 is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. Geske v. Marcolina , 624 N.W.2d 813, 816 -19 (Minn. App.
2001).
As to respondent’s request for need-based attorney fees, the district court found:
The testimony provided suggested that [respondent] was
unable to pay for attorney’s fees [and] as such should receive
need-based fees. [Respondent] supported this by providing
testimony that she received a loan from her parents of $42,000
to help contribute to the cost of attorney’s fees. The Court did
not find the testimony fully credible that this was a loan in that
repayment was more than aspirati onal, especially considering
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other testimony that was murky regarding the nature of family
support. [Respondent] also indicated that the total of attorney
fees incurred throughout this matter is approximately $67,000.
[Respondent] has indicated that she has not been able to work
full time due to taking care of the child, however, [respondent]
also indicated that she was able to get side -gigs after her
employment closed its business, notwithstanding not to a
considerable amount to cover the high costs. [Respondent’s]
testimony that these proceeding [s], in and of themselves,
precluded her ability to maintain employment was not
persuasive. It does not appear that either party is currently able
to contribute to need-based attorney fees. Both parties appear
to have incurred litigation costs likely beyond their ability to
cover without outside support or otherwise due to the length of
these proceedings

Respondent argues that the district court “ignored [appellant’s] ability to contribute”
to her need -based attorney fees. But the district court found that appellant is now
unemployed: he chose not to go back to his position in the Twin Cities and hopes to find
contract employment soon in the Grand Rapids area. Appellant did not oppose the
imputation of the income he made in his previous position for child -support purposes.
Mother also is presently unemployed; the district court’s finding that neither par ty is able
to contribute to need-based attorney fees is supported by the evidence.
As to conduct-based attorney fees, the district court stated that

although the Court understands that parties have the right to
zealously litigate their respective cause[s], the Court is not
persuaded that the facts support an award of attorney fees.
Both parties collectively contributed to the length and expense
of these proceedings. . . . Both parties asked the Court to let
them walk away from their original negotiated agreement.
Considering all the litigation conduct in total, the Court
determines an award of conduct -based fee[s] is not an
appropriate exercise of discretion.

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Respondent also argues that she is entitled to conduct -based attorney fees because
of appellant’s conduct, but she does not refute the district court’s finding that both parties
contributed to the length and extent of the proceedings. The district court’s decision on
attorney fees is supported by the record.
Affirmed.