State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1087

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Aaron Michael Edberg,
Appellant.

Filed May 26, 2026
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Ede, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-24-1910

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Timothy C. Rank, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Janelle Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Jesson, Judge.
∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
This direct appeal challenges a final judgment of conviction and the sentence
imposed for first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Appellant contends that the district court

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
article VI, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution.
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abused its discretion (1) by denying his motion to present alternative-perpetrator evidence
based on its determination that the proffered testimony did not inherently tend to connect
the alleged alternative perpetrator with the charged offenses and (2) by considering factors
that were unrelated to the charged offenses in denying his motion for a downward
durational departure at sentencing. Because the district court acted within its discretion in
excluding the alternative-perpetrator evidence, we affirm appellant’s conviction. But
because the district court abused its discretion by using an inapposite legal standard in
denying appellant’s de parture motion, we reverse appellant’s sentence and remand for
resentencing not inconsistent with this opinion so that the court may exercise its discretion
under the appropriate standard.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Aaron Michael Edberg with first-
degree criminal sexual conduct—engaging in multiple acts of sexual penetration over an
extended period with a child under 16 years of age while having a significant relationship
with the child—in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1(h)(iii)
(2020) (Count I), and first-degree criminal sexual conduct—engaging in sexual penetration
with a child under 16 years of age while having a significant relationship with the child—
in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1(g) (2020) (Count II).
According to the complaint, Edberg sexually penetrated a minor child, M.L., multiple times
while he lived in the child’s home and when the child was between the ages of four and
five years old. The matter proceeded to a jury trial. The following factual recitation stems
from the record of the pretrial and trial proceedings.
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Investigation

In December 2023, while she was living and attending school in California, M.L.
disclosed to a school counselor that Edberg had sexually abused her when she lived in
Minnesota. After M.L.’s disclosure, law enforcement in Minnesota contacted M.L.’s
grandmother (grandmother) regarding the allegations. Grandmother gave police a
recording of a conversation between grandmother and M.L. During that recorded
conversation, M.L. reported that Edberg had sexually abused her. M.L. said that Edberg
“wanted [her] to do . . . private stuff” and “told [her] to suck his . . . thingy.” She identified
the perpetrator of this abuse as her “stepdad” and, when grandmother asked if it was
“Aaron” who had done these things, M.L. responded: “Aaron Michael.” In addition, M.L.
stated that the sexual abuse had occurred “when [she] was with [her] mom and [Edberg]
was with [her] mom.”
California and Minnesota law enforcement agencies made arrangements for a
forensic interview of M.L. in California, which occurred in January 2024. During that
interview, M.L. said that her stepdad “told [her] to come in the room and . . . told [her] to
suck this part . . . right here,” pointing to the area between her legs. When asked where this
occurred, M.L stated that it happened in her mother and her stepdad’s bedroom. She
reported that her stepdad asked her to do this “five times” or maybe “seven times.” And
M.L. recalled that she was “four or five” years old when the sexual abuse last occurred. At
the time of the forensic interview, M.L. could not remember her stepdad’s name and said
that she had referred to him as “father.” Although she described the perpetrator’s
appearance by stating that he had a “mustache,” M.L. pointed at her chin and then above
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her lip when she said so. Moreover, while pointing above her lip, M.L. reported the
perpetrator had “skin right here.” And M.L. also stated that the perpetrator “always [wore]
his hat in front” and “always told [her] to help [him] with the groceries.”
In September 2024, prosecutors and a victim -witness coordinator spoke with M.L.
During the meeting, M.L. was shown a photograph of herself, her mother, and Edberg. She
identified Edberg as “the guy that did this to her.”
Pretrial Proceedings
In May 2024, Edberg provided notice of his intent to assert an alternative-
perpetrator defense. After the district court considered Edberg’s motion to introduce
alternative-perpetrator evidence at a contested omnibus hearing in August 2024, the court
filed an order denying the motion. In the order, the district court explained its determination
that Edberg had “failed to meet his burden with admissible evidence connecting [the
alleged alternative perpetrator, W.M.], or any other third party, and which supports an
inherent tendency to connect such other person(s) with the actual commission of the
crime.” The district court also “reserve[d] the right to revisit said motion should additional
admissible evidence be presented.”
Edberg later moved for reconsideration of his alternative- perpetrator motion. He
maintained that M.L. “was sexually abused by someone else and ha[d] been led through a
series of leading questions and suggestive photographic identification procedures to form
an honest but mistaken belief that [Edberg was] the abuser.” During a hearing and in a
written order, the district court reserved for trial its ruling on Edberg’s motion for
reconsideration of his alternative-perpetrator defense. In its written order, the district court
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acknowledged that E dberg “ha[d] provided some information that may connect the
alternative perpetrator to the crime with which defendant [was] . . . charged.” More
specifically, the district court observed that Edberg had provided the name of W.M. as an
alleged alternative perpetrator and had “presented photos of [W.M.] with facial hair that
could fit the description given by [M.L.]” At the same time, the district court noted that
other descriptions provided by M.L. could negate Edberg’s alternative-perpetrator theory.
Jury Trial
In February 2025, the matter proceeded to a three-day jury trial. At the time of trial,
M.L. was nine years old. She testified that, when she had lived in Minnesota, she resided
with her mother and “him,” pointing out Edberg in the courtroom. When asked about the
underlying incidents, M.L. responded that she “forgot” several times but clarified that when
she said she “forgot,” she meant that she did not want to talk about it. And when M.L. was
questioned further about the underlying incidents, she again responded, “I don’t like to talk
about that,” explaining that she did not want to discuss Edberg. M.L. eventually described
a time when Edberg had sexually abused her while her mother was crying in the kitchen of
their apartment after an argument. She testified that she and Edberg were on a bed in a
bedroom shared by Edberg and her mother. M.L. said that Edberg put his “body part” inside
her mouth. She reported that this sexual abuse had occurred “more than one time” and that
each time “he put that body part” into her mouth.
The state also presented the testimony of M.L.’s mother (mother), who stated that
the only people M.L. had ever called “dad” or “father” were her biological father and
Edberg. Mother also said that Edberg had encouraged M.L. to call him “dad.” And mother
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reported that the only adult males who had stayed at her apartment in Minnesota were
Edberg and M.L.’s biological father.
After the state rested its case and on the last day of the trial, Edberg made an offer
of proof about his alternative-perpetrator defense. Outside the jury’s presence , Edberg
introduced the testimony of a witness, J.V., who said that she and mother were “best friends
at the time” and that she would visit mother “a couple times a week.” J.V. stated that “a lot
of people” visited mother’s Minnesota apartment and that mother sold cannabis out of her
bedroom, “[s]o everyone went in [mother’s bedroom].”
When asked about W.M., J.V. recalled him “being around” and that he normally
had a hat on that he may have worn backwards. In response to a question about whether
she remembered anything about W.M.’s facial hair, J.V. said, “It was there and kind of --
I mean, it’s more of his eyes, his nose, not the hair.” J.V. also testified that W.M. “could
have” babysat M.L. because Edberg “would run up to the store sometimes, and [Edberg]
would never leave the kids alone,” so she assumed that W.M. “would watch [the children
living in the home, including M.L.,] because [Edberg] didn’t bring a lot of people over.”
And J.V. remembered an occasion in which , when J.V. delivered groceries to mother,
W.M. was in mother’s bedroom “[s]itting on the bed in a relaxed state, . . . which [was] not
the usual . . . [and] was weird.”
The district court asked J.V. if she could recall when mother had given birth to A.J.,
who is M.L.’s sibling. Edberg also asked J.V. if she could remember when mother had
been hospitalized after a certain incident. Other than general descriptions of seasons,
however, J.V. could not recollect specific dates or years when those events had happened.
7
And while J.V. stated that A.J. had been born “towards the fall . . . at least . . . five years”
before her testimony in February 2025, mother reported that A.J. had actually been born in
January 2021.
The district court determined that Edberg had “not met [his] burden of proof” and
rejected his alternative -perpetrator defense, reasoning that J.V. could not recall whether
W.M. had facial hair and that it was “questionable whether there was . . . corroboration that
that’s what [W.M.] looked like in the photos back at the time that this all happened.”
Moreover, the district court explained that there appeared to be no corroboration as to what
W.M. looked like at the time of the underlying events, observing that J.V. had testified that
W.M. wore his hat backwards. And the district court ruled that no testimony by J.V.
established that M.L. had been left alone with W.M. Thus, the district court decided that
Edberg had failed to present a “sufficient factual basis that connect[ed] [W.M.] to the crime
with which . . . Edberg [was] presently charged,” and the court did not “allow in [the]
alternative-perpetrator defense without further admissible evidence being provided.” In a
supplemental order and supporting memorandum, the district court reiterated its reasoning
that Edberg had “failed to proffer evidence having an inherent tendency to connect [W.M.]
with the actual commission of the crime.”
The jury found Edberg guilty of both counts.
Sentencing
Before the sentencing hearing, Edberg moved for a downward durational departure,
asking the district court to determine “that the conduct at issue was less severe than the
8
typical first-degree criminal sexual conduct case, and that the presumptive sentence is
excessive in light of the overall goals of Minnesota’s criminal laws.”
The parties presented arguments about Edberg’s durational-departure motion during
a sentencing hearing in April 2025. The district court denied the motion, stating that it was
“used to hearing these buzz words called the Trog factors[1] . . . : [a]ge, remorse, support in
the community, all these other things” and that “the person seeking the departure has the
burden of proving by substantial and compelling evidence that he or she is particularly
amenable to probation.” And the district court determined “[u]nder that burden of proof”
that it did “not find[] that . . . [Edberg] ha[d] met his burden.” The district court therefore
convicted Edberg of and sentenced him on Count II, imposing an executed term of 360
months’ imprisonment.
2
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Edberg maintains that the district court abused its discretion (1) by denying his
motion to present alternative-perpetrator evidence based on its determination that the
proffered testimony did not inherently tend to connect W.M. with the charged offenses and
(2) by considering factors that were unrelated to the charged offenses in denying his motion

1 See State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) (explaining that “[n]umerous factors,
including the defendant’s age, his prior record, his remorse, his cooperation, his attitude
while in court, and the support of friends and/or family, are relevant to a determination
whether a defendant is particularly suitable to individualized treatment in a probationary
setting”).

2 The district court neither convicted nor sentenced Edberg on Count I.
9
for a downward durational departure at sentencing. As explained below, we affirm the
conviction because we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in
excluding the alternative-perpetrator evidence. But we reverse the sentence and remand for
resentencing because we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by
erroneously using the legal standard that applies to dispositional departures in denying
Edberg’s motion for a downward durational departure.
I. The district court acted within its discretion in determining that Edberg’s
proffered alternative-perpetrator evidence did not inherently tend to connect
W.M. with the charged offenses.

Edberg asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it did not allow him
to present alternative- perpetrator evidence, thereby violating his constitutional right to
present a defense and committing reversible error. This argument is unavailing.
Appellate courts “review a district court’s ruling on alternative-perpetrator evidence
for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Rooney, 23 N.W.3d 75, 81 (Minn. 2025). “A district
court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is
against logic and the facts in the record.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Even if [appellate courts]
determine that the district court abused its discretion, [appellate courts] must further find
that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt to reverse the district court’s
decision.” Id.; see also State v. Atkinson, 774 N.W.2d 584, 589, 592 (Minn. 2009)
(explaining that, “[i]f [an appellate court] conclude[s] that the [district] court erred, [it]
must then determine whether the error was harmless”).
“The Due Process Clauses of the Minnesota and United States Constitutions
guarantee a criminal defendant’s right to present a complete defense.” Id.; Minn. Const.
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art. I, § 7; U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The right to present a complete defense includes “the
right to introduce evidence that an alternative perpetrator committed the crime.” Rooney,
23 N.W.3d at 81. But a defendant’s right to present a complete defense is not absolute. Id.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has explained that a “motion to present alternative-
perpetrator evidence is subject to the foundation and admissibility requirements [that the
supreme court] outlined in State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150, 158–59 (Minn. 1977).” Id.
“First, a defendant must make a foundational proffer of evidence having an inherent
tendency to connect the third person with the actual commission of the crime.” Id. at 82
(quotation omitted ). Courts must “determine whether the evidence, not the assertions,
contained in the proffer provides the required foundation.” Id. (quotation omitted). “This
foundational requirement avoids the consideration of matters collateral to the crime and
the use of bare suspicion and safeguards the third person from indiscriminate use of past
differences with the victim.” Id. at 82 (quotation omitted). Courts review an alternative-
perpetrator proffer as a whole. State v. Carbo, 6 N.W.3d 114, 124 (Minn. 2024).
Edberg’s proffer included the following: J.V. was “best friends” with mother at the
time of the underlying incidents, visited mother “a couple times a week,” and recalled
W.M. “being around” ; J.V. could not remember anything specific about W.M.’s facial hair
and instead referenced “more of his eyes” and “his nose”; J.V. stated that W.M. normally
had a hat on that he may have worn backwards; although “a lot of people” visited mother
to buy cannabis that mother sold out of her bedroom, J.V. recalled an occasion that she
thought was unusual and “weird” when she delivered groceries to mother and W.M. was
in mother’s bedroom, “[s]itting on the bed in a relaxed state” ; J.V. testified that W.M.
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“could have” babysat M.L. because Edberg “would run up to the store sometimes, and
[Edberg] would never leave the kids alone,” so she assumed that W.M. “would watch [the
children living in the home, including M.L.,] because [Edberg] didn’t bring a lot of people
over”; and J.V. could only provide general descriptions of seasons—some of which
differed from mother’s testimony—without a particular recollection of dates or years when
certain events happened.
In rejecting the alternative-perpetrator defense, the district court reasoned that
Edberg had “failed to proffer evidence having an inherent tendency to connect [W.M.] with
the actual commission of the crime.” Among other things, the district court reasoned that
J.V. “made [an] assumption[] but . . . had no personal knowledge that [W.M.] ever
provided care to the children.” The district court also observed that, even assuming that
J.V.’s “assumption may support a finding that [W.M.] had an opportunity to be around the
alleged victim, the child testified that the last time the alleged conduct occurred, her mother
was present and crying in the kitchen,” and “[t]here was no evidence of [W.M.] being in
the home without the victim’s mother also present.” Moreover, the district court noted that
“[a]ll that was presented that could connect [W.M.] to the alleged conduct was that he may
have met some part of the physical description and was possibly in the home at the same
time as others were in the home.” And the district court determined that J.V. “did not have
personal knowledge of any opportunity [W.M.] would have had to be alone with the alleged
victim.”
We conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in determining that
there was no inherent tendency to connect W.M. to the charged offenses. While the
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proffered evidence established that W.M. was in the home during the general period in
which M.L. was sexually abused, mere presence does not provide an inherent connection
between the charged offenses and W.M. See Rooney, 23 N.W.3d at 83 (“An alternative
perpetrator’s presence at a crime scene is not enough, by itself, to establish an inherent
tendency to connect the alternative perpetrator with the offense, nor is it necessary to
establish an inherent tendency.”).
Edberg argues that the district court abused its discretion when it expressed concerns
about J.V.’s reliability and weighed the proffered evidence. It is true that district courts
cannot make credibility determinations when deciding whether a defendant has met the
foundational requirements for admitting alternative-perpetrator evidence. See State v.
Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578, 621 (Minn. 2004) (concluding “that the district court
inappropriately made a credibility assessment in rejecting . . . [certain alternative-
perpetrator] testimony when all that was required was a determination of whether the
inherent tendency connection, beyond a bare suspicion, had been made”). Here, however,
any concerns that the district court expressed regarding the reliability of J.V.’s testimony
based on her inability to specifically recall when certain events occurred did not serve as
the ultimate basis on which the court denied Edberg’s alternative- perpetrator motion. On
the contrary, the district court’s determination that the proffered evidence did not have an
inherent tendency to connect W.M. with the charged offenses turned on J.V.’s admission
that she had no personal knowledge that W.M. had ever been alone with M.L. We discern
no abuse of discretion in that determination.
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Edberg also maintains that the district court abused its discretion by considering the
state’s evidence rather than exclusively relying on his proffer. He cites the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Jenkins for the principle that the “admissibility [of
alternative-perpetrator evidence] depends exclusively on whether the evidence offered by
the defendant inherently connects an alternative perpetrator to the commission of the
charged crime regardless of the strength of the State’s case.” 782 N.W.2d 211, 226 (Minn.
2010). But the district court did not reject Edberg’s alternative-perpetrator defense based
on “the strength of the State’s case.” Id. Rather, the district court considered Edberg’s
proffered evidence— J.V.’s testimony—and decided that it did not have an inherent
tendency to connect W.M. with the actual commission of the charged crimes because J.V.
“did not have personal knowledge of any opportunity [W.M.] would have had to be alone
with the alleged victim.”
In short, the district court acted within its discretion in determining that Edberg’s
alternative-perpetrator proffer did not inherently tend to connect W.M. with the charged
offenses. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion, we need
not address whether the district court’s decision is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Cf. Atkinson, 774 N.W.2d at 592 (concluding that, because the appellant “did not lay
sufficient foundation for the introduction of his proffered alternative perpetrator evidence,
[the Minnesota Supreme Court was] not required to consider whether that evidence was
otherwise admissible”). For these reasons, we affirm the conviction.

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II. The district court abused its discretion by considering factors that were
unrelated to the charged offenses in denying Edberg’s motion for a downward
durational departure.

The parties agree that the district court abused its discretion by erroneously using
the legal standard that applies to dispositional departures in denying Edberg’s motion for a
downward durational departure. And the parties concur that remand for resentencing is the
appropriate remedy for this error. Because the district court relied on offender-related
factors that are not legally permissible grounds for denying a motion for a downward
durational departure, we agree with the parties and conclude that the district court abused
its discretion.
We review a district court’s denial of a sentencing departure motion for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Beganovic, 974 N.W.2d 278, 286 (Minn. App. 2022), aff’d, 991 N.W.2d
638 (Minn. 2023). As mentioned above, a district court “abuses its discretion when its
decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” State v. Glover, 4 N.W.3d 124, 134 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted).
“[A] durational departure is a sentence that departs in length from the presumptive
guidelines range.” State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016). “A durational
departure must be based on factors that reflect the seriousness of the offense, not the
characteristics of the offender.” Id.; see also State v. Rund, 896 N.W.2d 527, 533 (Minn.
2017) (“Durational departures may be justified by offense-related reasons only.”). In
particular, durational departures are “justified only if the defendant’s conduct was
significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.”
Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 624 (quotation omitted). “Offender-related reasons— such as
15
particular amenability to probation or treatment, remorse that does not reduce the
seriousness of the offense, or age—are not legally permissible reasons for a downward
durational departure.” Rund, 896 N.W.2d at 533.
Here, the district court expressly cited the Trog factors— which relate to the offender
rather than the offense—in denying Edberg’s motion for a downward durational departure.
Indeed, the district court specifically stated that “the person seeking the departure has the
burden of proving by substantial and compelling evidence that he or she is particularly
amenable to probation” and that, “[u]nder that burden of proof,” the court did “not find[]
that . . . [Edberg] ha[d] met his burden.” Because the offender-related factors that the
district court considered in denying Edberg’s motion are not legally permissible reasons
for a downward durational departure, the court’s decision was based on an erroneous view
of the law and therefore an abuse of discretion. See Glover, 4 N.W.3d at 134; see also
Rund, 896 N.W.2d at 533. We therefore reverse the sentence and remand for resentencing
not inconsistent with this opinion so that the district court may exercise its discretion under
the appropriate durational-departure standard.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.