State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1088

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

David Devon Bryant,
Appellant.

Filed April 27, 2026
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-CR-24-556

Keith M. Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Robert J. Jarrett, Steele County Attorney, Darrell J. Johnston, Aaron D. Pulanco, Assistant
County Attorneys, Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Segal ,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this direct appeal, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing under the fair-and-just
standard. Alternatively, he argues that his plea is not constitutionally valid. Because we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his request to
withdraw his plea prior to sentencing and he has not demonstrated his plea is in valid, we
affirm.
FACTS
On April 7, 2024, police received a call reporting that an intoxicated man was at the
Executive Inn in Owatonna waving a BB gun and threatening people. After arriving on
the scene, police interviewed witnesses and the alleged victim , M.F. The witnesses told
police that appellant David Devon Bryant was waving a gun, was visibly angry, and was
threatening to shoot M.F., an individual who lived in the building. The witnesses further
stated that, after Bryant threatened to shoot M.F., M.F. sprayed Bryant with mace. Bryant
then fired the BB gun at M.F. M.F. reported a similar series of events to police. Officers
found Bryant at the scene. Bryant told officers that he had been “maced.” When officers
found him, he also had a BB gun in his waistband. The BB gun was shaped like a pistol.
Officers observed that the tip and inside of the muzzle were spray-painted gold.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Bryant with several crimes, including
threats of violence —cause or attempt to cause terror in violation of Minnesota Statutes
section 609.713, subdivision 3(a)(1) (2022) (count I); threats of violence in violation of
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Minnesota Statutes section 609.713, subdivision 1 (2022) (count II); fifth-degree assault in
violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.224, subdivision 1(2) (2022) (count III); and
second-degree attempted assault with a dangerous weapon in violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 609.222, subdivision 1 (2022) (count IV).
On January 9, 2025, Bryant and the state entered into a plea agreement. Under the
terms of the agreement, Bryant would plead guilty to the charge of threats of violence—
cause or attempt to cause terror (count I) and the state would dismiss the remaining charges.
The state also agreed to not make a recommendation as to sentencing.
Bryant signed a plea petition that day. In the plea petition, Bryant stated that he had
sufficient time to discuss the case with his attorney, that he had discussed all possible
defenses that he might have, and that he was advised by his attorney about the rights he
was giving up. Bryant did indicate on the plea petition that he had a claim of self-defense
on count I. But Bryant also stated that he was making “no claim that [he is] innocent” and
he understood that, if he pleads guilty, he would “not have a trial by either a jury or by a
judge.” Bryant further stated that he was making the plea voluntarily.
Later that same day, the district court held a plea hearing. After counsel explained
the terms of the plea agreement, Bryant confirmed that he wished to proceed with the plea
agreement. The district court then placed Bryant under oath and the following exchange
took place:
THE COURT: As you are participating in the hearing this
afternoon, I know it’s nerve-racking but do you feel like you
are thinking clearly?
THE DEFENDANT: I am just having super bad anxiety.

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THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything we can do to lessen
your anxiety in the moment here?
THE DEFENDANT: No, no.

THE COURT: Okay. And I know that you’ve had the last two
hours or so today to speak with [your attorney]. Are you
satisfied with the legal work that he’s done for you so far?
THE DEFENDANT: As far as what he’s done for me, correct.

The court then confirmed that Bryant had a chance to review the plea petition with his
attorney before he signed it. The court next explained to Bryant the significance of entering
into a guilty plea:
You understand, then, from the conversations with [your
attorney] and from reviewing the document yourself that if you
move forward with this plea agreement then you’re not going
to have a trial next week. That means you’re giving up your
presumption of innocence on Count I. You’re giving up your
right to require the State to prove all four charges in the
complaint to a jury of 12 people. If there’s no trial, there’s no
witnesses, so you’re giving up your right to question witnesses
against you, and you’re giving up your right to have the 12
people come to a unanimous decision on these charges. You
understand that?

Bryant confirmed he understood. Bryant also confirmed that he was not pressured by
anyone to plead guilty.
The court turned to the factual basis for the guilty plea. Bryant explained the events
at the Executive Inn. He stated that he was “in a rage,” he had a handgun-style BB gun
with the orange tip that was painted gold, and he “was threatening” M.F. with the BB gun.
He also agreed that the BB gun could easily have been mistaken for a real handgun and
that he displayed the BB gun in a manner that could have caused terror for M.F. After
testifying to these facts, Bryant explained that prior to going to the Executive Inn, he had
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been arguing with his girlfriend, he went over to the Executive Inn to do some work
painting with M.F., and the two got into an argument over the painting. Bryant then told
the court that he has post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD ) and he “ was not there
completely” at the time of the incident. But, upon further questioning by the court, Bryant
recalled threatening M.F. with a handgun -style BB gun and confirmed that he was
displaying the gun in a manner that M.F. could see. He also agreed that his threats and
display of the gun appeared to cause M.F. terror.
The district court accepted Bryant’s guilty plea and expressly found that the plea
was “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily” entered. The district court convicted
Bryant of threats of violence (count I) and scheduled the case for sentencing on March 5.
A presentence investigation report was completed on February 27. On March 4,
Bryant’s counsel filed a letter stating that Bryant may wish to address the court at the
beginning of the sentencing hearing and move to withdraw his plea. On March 5, Bryant
appeared before the district court and confirmed that he wished to withdraw his plea. The
district court requested that Bryant file a formal motion and continued the hearing until
April 17.
On April 10, Bryant filed a plea-withdrawal motion. His motion stated he would
move for withdrawal on the grounds that:
• “[Bryant] committed the offense due to his PTSD;”
• “[Bryant’s] guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent due to the medication he was taking at the time
of his guilty plea”; and
• “[Bryant] pleaded guilty under duress due to anxiety he was
experiencing at the time of his guilty plea.”

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Bryant brought his motion pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.05,
subdivision 2, on the basis that it would be “fair and just” to allow him to withdraw his
plea. His motion did not make any reference to subdivision 1 of rule 15.05, which provides
for plea withdrawal to correct a manifest injustice.
On April 17, the district court held a hearing to address Bryant’s motion and
sentencing. At the hearing, Bryant addressed the court personally and explained that he
wished to withdraw his plea because he was “under duress” when he entered his plea. He
told the court that at the time he pleaded guilty, he was taking newly prescribed
medication—Adderall and medical marijuana. He further stated that the medication
contributed to his anxiety on the day of the plea. Bryant went on to say, “I feel the reason
to withdraw this plea [is] not just based on that [reason]. It’s based on the fact [that] what
happened was wrong.” He stated that he was the victim in the incident at the Executive
Inn because he was “assaulted” and “maced” by M.F. At that point, the state objected. The
district court told the parties that Bryant’s testimony about the incident “essentially”
constituted a collateral attack on the facts that Bryant testified to at the plea hearing, which
potentially could subject Bryant to perjury. Bryant’s attorney responded that he and Bryant
discussed the possibility of perjury. The court then overruled the objection and allowed
Bryant to continue with his testimony.
Bryant told the district court that “[d]uring that time, [he] was experiencing a lot of
anxiety, confusion, worry, and stress.” He explained that he “felt when [he] took that plea,”
he did so “out of . . . fear and confusion at that time, and . . . after it was done, [he] went
home and immediately realized that was . . . a bad decision[.]” He further testified that, at
7
the time of the plea hearing, he was taking medical marijuana for his PTSD and Adderall
twice daily. In support of withdrawal of his guilty plea, he also expressed concern about
losing his employment once sentenced. During cross-examination, Bryant confirmed that
he has continued to take Adderall and medical marijuana since the plea hearing and he uses
the medication daily as prescribed. Bryant’s attorney did not provide any argument after
Bryant finished his testimony but relied on the testimony alone to support the
plea-withdrawal motion.
The state argued that Bryant had not demonstrated a basis for plea withdrawal. The
state asserted that “given the frequency that [Bryant] takes his medication,” the medication
did not affect Bryant’s ability to understand the plea proceeding or his plea. The state
further argued that Bryant was simply experiencing “buyer’s remorse.”
After hearing from the parties, the district court denied Bryant’s motion to withdraw
his plea. The district court judge noted that she was the judge who took Bryant’s plea. The
district court did not find Bryant’s testimony in support of his plea- withdrawal motion to
be credible. The district court stated that it did not have any concerns about Bryant’s state
of mind at the time of the plea hearing. The district court acknowledged that Bryant was
anxious at the time of the guilty plea, but not any more than anyone would “be given the
circumstances and the uncertainty as to the outcome of the case given the nature of the plea
agreement[.]” The district court explained to Bryant that it did not “find that either [his]
past diagnoses for which there’s been no medical documentation or the medications [he]
take[s] for which again there’s no corroborating evidence interfered with [his] ability to
knowingly and intelligently waive [his] rights to trial and enter a plea.” And the district
8
court also explained that Bryant’s claim that he was impaired at the time of the plea hearing
was undercut by his testimony that, as soon as he got home from the plea hearing, he
realized he made a mistake by pleading guilty. The district court stated that there was “no
reason to believe” that Bryant could be impaired at the hearing and then have “clarity of
thought” “mere minutes” after entering into the plea. For these reasons, the district court
found that “this is a situation where you simply changed your mind and you want to avoid
circumstances that might come along with the sentencing.”
The district court then went to the sentencing phase of the hearing. Before imposing
a sentence, the district court asked Bryant if there was anything else that he would like the
court to consider before deciding his sentence. Bryant returned to his claim that his
medication affected him on the day of the plea hearing, asserting that he had given counsel
documentation of his prescriptions in late December and again in January when his
prescriptions changed. Bryant again stressed that he was attacked by M.F., whom he
threatened with the BB gun. The district court imposed a 12-month sentence, stayed for
one year and placed Bryant on probation.
Bryant appeals.
DECISION
Bryant makes two arguments. First, Bryant argues that the district court abused its
discretion by concluding that he failed to show that it would be fair and just to allow him
to withdraw his guilty plea. In the alternative, Bryant argues that he must be allowed to
withdraw his guilty plea because his plea is constitutionally invalid. We conclude that
neither argument is persuasive.
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I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Brant’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea under the fair-and-just standard.

A criminal “defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.”
State v. Townsend, 872 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2015). But a district court may
permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing “if it is fair and just to do
so.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. “The ‘fair and just’ standard requires district courts
to give ‘due consideration’ to two factors: (1) the reasons a defendant advances to support
withdrawal and (2) prejudice granting the motion would cause the [s]tate given reliance on
the plea.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn. 2010). The defendant bears the
burden of proving a fair-and-just reason for withdrawal. State v. Lopez, 794 N.W.2d 379,
382 (Minn. App. 2011). The state bears the burden to show prejudice. Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d at 97.
We review a district court’s application of the fair-and-just standard for abuse of
discretion. Id. “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an
erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Allwine,
963 N.W.2d 178, 188 (Minn. 2021). When reviewing a district court’s decision denying a
motion to withdraw a plea, we consider “the entire context in which [a defendant’s] plea
of guilty occurred, as demonstrated by the record.” State v. Abdisalan, 661 N.W.2d 691,
695 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 19, 2003). Appellate courts rarely reverse
a district court’s decision to deny a plea-withdrawal motion. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97.
Bryant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
because “[t]here is evidence in the record from Bryant’s plea hearing to support Bryant’s
10
claim that plea withdrawal would have been fair and just under the circumstances.” In
particular, Bryant contends that his plea was made under duress. He claims the record
shows that he pleaded guilty out of fear and confusion, emphasizing he entered the plea
while on new medications and while experiencing anxiety.1
We discern no abuse in the district court’s decision. The record reflects that the
district court gave due consideration to Bryant’s stated reasons for withdrawing his plea.
The district court rejected Bryant’s claim that he was under duress due to anxiety and fear
because the district court did not find Bryant’s testimony to be credible. We defer to that
credibility determination. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988).
Regarding his anxiety, the district court also found that Bryant was not any more anxious
than anyone would “be given the circumstances and the uncertainty as to the outcome of
the case given the nature of the plea agreement,” which did not address sentencing. Nor
was the court persuaded by Bryant’s claim that his medication interfered with his ability to
enter a guilty plea, noting that there was no evidence in the record regarding the
prescriptions or his medical diagnoses. The district court also emphasized Bryant’s
acknowledgment that he regretted pleading guilty immediately after the plea hearing. On
this basis, the district court concluded that Bryant failed to show he was under duress when

1 For the first time on appeal, Bryant also argues that he should be permitted to withdraw
his plea because he acted in self-defense, and did not realize that he waived his right to
claim self-defense by pleading guilty. But generally, we will not consider arguments raised
for the first time on appeal. Ferguson v. State, 645 N.W.2d 437, 448 (Minn. 2002).
Therefore, we confine our analysis to the argument that Bryant’s plea was not voluntary
because he was under the influence of new medication and suffering from anxiety when he
entered into his plea.
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he pleaded guilty. Considering the record as a whole, including that the district court judge
who denied this motion was the same district court judge who presided over the plea
hearing and was able to observe Bryant’s demeanor and behavior, we discern no abuse of
discretion by the district court in this determination.
Bryant also argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
to withdraw his plea because he testified at the plea-withdrawal hearing that he acted in
self-defense when he made the threats of violence and it would be fair and just to allow
him to withdraw his plea on this basis. He argues that, although the district court
discounted his statements, the district court should have credited the statements because
“they are statements against his own interest” and “Bryant could be perjuring himself” by
making them. But again, the district court did not find Bryant’s testimony at the plea-
withdrawal hearing to be credible. We defer to that determination. Id. Appellate courts
do not “reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses.” Tamarack Vill.
Shopping Ctr., LP v. County of Washington, 9 N.W.3d 820, 831 (Minn. 2024). The district
court found that Bryant was seeking to withdraw his plea because he simply changed his
mind. “[M]ore than a change of heart is needed to withdraw a guilty plea.” Lopez ,
794 N.W.2d at 382. Considering the record before us, we conclude the district court did
not abuse its discretion by denying Bryant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea under the
fair-and-just standard.
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II. Bryant’s guilty plea is not constitutionally invalid.
Bryant next argues that his guilty plea is constitutionally invalid. Bryant did not
raise this argument before the district court when he made his motion to withdraw his plea.
We generally decline to consider issues not raised and decided by the district court.
State v. Anderson, 871 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 2015). But “[a] defendant may challenge
the constitutional validity of a guilty plea for the first time on direct appeal.”
State v. Crawford, 13 N.W.3d 693, 696 (Minn. App. 2024) (citing Brown v. State,
449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989)). Therefore, we consider the validity of Bryant’s guilty
plea.
“To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and
intelligent.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. The validity of a guilty plea presents a legal
question that we review de novo. Id. A defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that
his guilty plea was invalid. Id. Bryant argues that his plea was not accurate, voluntary, or
intelligent when entered. We consider each requirement in turn.
Accuracy
“Accuracy requires that the plea be supported by a proper factual basis . . . .”
State v. Jones, 7 N.W.3d 391, 395 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted ). The “factual-basis
requirement is satisfied if the record contains sufficient evidence to support a conclusion
that the defendant is guilty of at least as great a crime as that to which he pled guilty.” Id.
at 396. “A factual basis is inadequate, though, when the defendant makes statements that
negate an essential element of the charged crime, unless the defendant subsequently
13
withdraws or corrects the statement, or the guilty plea is otherwise rehabilitated. ” Id.
(quotations and citations omitted).
Bryant pleaded guilty to the offense of threats of violence— cause or attempt to
cause fear of another —in violation of section 609.713, subdivision 3(a)(1). To support a
conviction under this provision, Bryant needed to admit to facts establishing that he
“display[ed], exhibit[ed], brandishe[d], or otherwise employ[ed] a replica firearm or a BB
gun in a threatening manner” that “cause[d] or attempt[ed] to cause terror in another
person.” Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 3(a)(1). Bryant argues that he negated the mens rea
for the charge when he testified that he “was not there completely” at the time he made the
threat of violence. We are not persuaded.
As an initial matter, Bryant’s argument is inadequately briefed because Bryant does
not identify the mens rea required for the offense at issue. Nor does he explain how his
testimony—that he “was not there completely”—negated the mens rea for this offense.
“An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or
authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless
prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” Anderson, 871 N.W.2d at 915. Because
the argument is inadequately briefed and we discern no prejudicial error, we could decline
to address the argument.
Regardless, the record reflects that the plea was accurate. After Bryant stated that
he “was not there completely,” the district court clarified: “But you do recall that you
threatened [M.F.] and that you had that handgun style BB gun?” Bryant responded: “Yes.”
Bryant then also agreed that he was displaying the gun so that M.F. could see it and that it
14
appeared to cause M.F. terror. Assuming without deciding that Bryant negated the mens
rea for the offense when he stated that he “was not there completely,” Bryant’s responses
to the district court’s questions after that statement were sufficient to rehabilitate the mens
rea. See Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 860 (Minn. 2016) (explaining that “ [i]ntent is
generally proved by inferences drawn from a person’s words or actions in light of all the
surrounding circumstances” when rejecting appellant’s assertion that “he made statements
during the plea colloquy that negated the elements of intent and premeditation”). We are
satisfied, based on the colloquy, that Bryant’s guilty plea is accurate.
To persuade us otherwise, Bryant relies on Jones, 7 N.W.3d at 391. In Jones, the
supreme court concluded that the accuracy requirement was not met because the defendant
testified that he did not commit the act that he was pleading guilty to, thereby negating an
element of the offense. Id. at 397-98. Bryant made no such claim of innocence here. As
discussed above, he testified on the record that he threatened M.F. with a BB gun and that
the act appeared to cause M.F. terror. Considering the entirety of Bryant’s testimony, we
have no problem concluding that the plea colloquy contains sufficient evidence to support
the conclusion that Bryant is guilty of the crime of threats of violence under section
609.713, subdivision 3(a)(1).
Voluntariness
Voluntariness refers to “what the parties reasonably understood to be the terms of
the plea agreement” and whether the defendant pleaded guilty due to “improper pressure
or coercion.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. The state “may not produce a plea by actual or
threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant.”
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Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970); see State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 719
(Minn. 1994). But “a defendant’s motivation to avoid a more serious penalty or set of
charges will not invalidate a guilty plea.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 719. “Whether a plea is
voluntary is determined by considering all relevant circumstances.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d
at 96.
Similar to his argument regarding his plea-withdrawal motion, Bryant argues that
his remarks at the plea hearing about his anxiety “call into question the voluntariness of his
plea.” We are not persuaded. Viewed as a whole, the record does not demonstrate that
Bryant did not understand the plea or that he pleaded guilty due to improper pressure or
coercion. While Bryant did tell the district court that he was experiencing strong anxiety
at the plea hearing, that statement alone does not establish that his plea was not voluntary.
As the district court noted at the plea-withdrawal hearing, Bryant was not any more anxious
than anyone would “be given the circumstances and the uncertainty as to the outcome of
the case given the nature of the plea agreement.” And, at the plea hearing, Bryant
acknowledged that no one was pressuring or forcing him to plead guilty. At that hearing,
the district court asked, “[p]utting the anxiety of being under criminal charges aside, do
you feel in any way that you’re being forced or pressured into this agreement?” Bryant
stated: “Under the circumstances outside of my hands, yes, nothing here that anybody did.”
This statement reflects that the pressure Bryant felt to plead guilty was pressure to avoid a
potentially more serious sentence after trial due to his own conduct—not that he faced
improper pressure or coercion by the state or anyone else to plead guilty.
16
Bryant also argues that his plea was not voluntary because he was taking certain
medication—Adderall and medical marijuana —that he claimed made him more anxious.
The supreme court rejected a similar argument in Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 691
(Minn. 1997). In Perkins, the supreme court held that a defendant’s “medical condition in
no way precluded an accurate, voluntary, and intelligent plea” where the defendant made
no showing that his medical condition or prescriptions prevented him from understanding
the proceedings. Id. The record here requires a similar conclusion. At the plea hearing,
Bryant stated clearly that he understood the proceedings, and, at the plea-withdrawal
hearing, he conceded that he “understood the [plea] petition.” Additionally, Bryant’s only
support for his claim that his prescriptions made him anxious was his testimony, which the
district court did not find to be credible. In short, the record does not support Bryant’s
claim that his plea was not voluntary.
Intelligence
“The intelligence requirement ensures that a defendant understands the charges
against him, the rights he is waiving, and the consequences of his plea.” Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d at 96 (citing State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983)).
“Consequences refers to a plea’s direct consequences, namely the maximum sentence and
fine.” Id. (quotation omitted). A defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that his
guilty plea was not intelligent. Id. at 94.
Bryant argues that his plea was not intelligent because he did not understand that,
by pleading guilty, he was waiving his right to argue that he acted in self- defense. In
support of his argument, Bryant emphasizes that when he signed the plea petition, he
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checked a box to indicate that he acted in “self-defense.” But the signed plea petition also
includes a statement that Bryant makes “no claim that [he] is innocent” and includes a list
of rights that Bryant is waiving, such as the right to a trial to decide his guilt. In addition,
at the plea hearing, the district court explained the significance of the guilty plea to Bryant:
[This plea] means you’re giving up your presumption of
innocence on Count 1. You’re giving up your right to require
the State to prove all four charges in the complaint to a jury of
12 people. If there’s no trial, there’s no witnesses, so you’re
giving up your right to question witnesses against you, and
you’re giving up your right to have the 12 people come to a
unanimous decision on these charges.

Bryant agreed that he understood he was giving up these rights. And, at the subsequent
plea-withdrawal hearing, Bryant never claimed that he was confused about the fact that he
was waiving a self-defense claim; he simply claimed that he “made a bad decision” and
“it’s not right” that he waived a self-defense claim given that he was “assaulted.” Bryant
has not established that he did not understand the nature of the charges against him or the
rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. We therefore reject his argument that his plea
was not intelligent.
In sum , the record establishes that Bryant’s plea was knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent.
Affirmed.