Lauren Ann Hoffman, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1100

Lauren Ann Hoffman, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Appellant.

Filed February 23, 2026
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge*

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-24-8101

Lauren Ann Hoffman, Roberts, Wisconsin (respondent pro se)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Zoe Graham, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KIRK, Judge
Appellant Commissioner of Public Safety appeals the district court’s order
rescinding the suspension of respondent Lauren Ann Hoffman’s driver’s license. The

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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commissioner argues that the district court erred by concluding that Hoffman’s conviction
for refusing to submit to a chemical blood test in Wisconsin did not support the suspension
of her driving privileges in Minnesota. Because the district court correctly concluded that
the elements of the Wisconsin offense for which Hoffman was convicted would not
necessarily result in a conviction under Minnesota law, we affirm.
FACTS
In February 2023, Hoffman was arrested in Wisconsin for operating a vehicle while
impaired. In September 2024, Hoffman was convicted in Wisconsin for refusing to take a
test for intoxication after arrest pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes section 343.305(9)(a)
(2023-24). In November 2024, the Wisconsin Division of Motor Vehicles reported
Hoffman’s conviction to the Minnesota Department of Public Safety and Driver Vehicle
Services and the Minnesota Department of Public Safety (the department), and the
department suspended Hoffman’s Minnesota driving privileges pursuant to Minnesota
Statutes section 171.18 (2024).
In December 2024, Hoffman petitioned the district court for judicial review of her
license revocation and generally requested that the district court rescind the suspension. At
the hearing, Hoffman called the arresting officer as a witness. The officer testified that she
performed a drunk-driving investigation of Hoffman, after which she placed Hoffman
under arrest. The officer also testified that she asked Hoffman to take a chemical blood
test, that Hoffman refused the blood test, and that the refusal was the basis for Hoffman’s
driver’s license revocation in Wisconsin.
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At the hearing, Hoffman argued that although “the Commissioner is absolutely
entitled to [revoke an individual’s driver’s license] if a person sustains a revocation in
another state based on laws in that state that are sufficiently similar to those laws in the
State of [Minnesota],” the Wisconsin law under which her license was revoked was not
sufficiently similar to its Minnesota counterpart. Specifically, Hoffman argued that the
laws do not conform because the Wisconsin statute authorizes revocation for the refusal to
submit to a warrantless blood test, whereas the Minnesota statutes authorize revocation for
refusal to submit to a blood test that is supported by a search warrant. The commissioner
argued that the relevant Minnesota and Wisconsin statutes conform because the statutes
prohibit the same conduct—“o perating or driving under the influence and . . . refusing
tests.”
In May 2025, the district court ordered that the commissioner’s suspension of
Hoffman’s license be rescinded. The district court concluded that the relevant laws were
not sufficiently similar to justify suspension because “[t]he two states laws do not prohibit
the same conduct.”
The commissioner appeals.
DECISION
On appeal, the commissioner challenges the district court’s order rescinding the
suspension of Hoffman’s driver’s license. Hoffman did not file a responsive brief.
However, we have an independent obligation to decide cases according to the law.
State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn. 1990); see also Minn. R. Civ. App.
4
P. 142.03 (“If the respondent fails or neglects to serve and file its brief, the case shall be
determined on the merits.”).
A person whose driver’s license has been suspended pursuant to Minnesota Statutes
section 171.18 may challenge the suspension by petitioning the district court.
Minn. Stat. § 171.19 (2024). The district court must independently determine whether the
licensure determination is justified. Underhill v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 989 N.W.2d 909,
914 (Minn. App. 2023). In performing de novo review, the district court is permitted to
examine new evidence. See Madison v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 585 N.W.2d 77, 82 (Minn.
App. 1998) (clarifying “a district court taking new evidence under Minnesota Statutes
section 171.19 conducts a trial de novo”), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 1998). But it is the
petitioner’s burden to prove that the commissioner erred. Underhill, 989 N.W.2d at 914.
The district court, as with this court, “may reverse the commissioner’s licensure
determination if it was fraudulent, arbitrary, unreasonable, or not within its jurisdiction and
powers.” Pallas v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 781 N.W.2d 163, 167 (Minn. App. 2010). The
commissioner’s determination is arbitrary if the commissioner:
(1) relied on factors that the legislature had not intended it to
consider, (2) failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, (3) offered an explanation for the decision that runs
counter to the evidence, (4) rendered a decision that is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view
or the product of agency expertise, or (5) if the agency’s
decision reflects the agency’s will and not its judgment.

Id. This court has also held that a licensure determination made by the commissioner was
arbitrary when the commissioner acted inconsistent with its statutory authority. See Id. at
168-69 (holding that the commissioner acted arbitrarily when it imposed a condition on an
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applicant seeking to reinstate his license that went beyond the investigative process
authorized by statute).
“[T]his court applies a de novo standard of review to the district court’s
determination of legal issues and a clear -error standard of review to the district court’ s
findings of fact.” Underhill, 989 N.W.2d at 914.
The commissioner contends that the district court erred by concluding that it “could
not suspend Hoffman’s driving privileges.” The commissioner generally argues that,
contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the commissioner was authorized to suspend
Hoffman’s license and did so properly.
Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 171.18, subdivision 1(a), the commissioner
is permitted to suspend a person’s driver’s license for any of the 13 statutorily enumerated
reasons. Relevant here, the commissioner is authorized to suspend a person’s driver’s
license if that person “has committed an offense in another state that, if committed in this
state, would be grounds for suspension.” Minn. Stat. § 171.18, subd. 1(a)(7).
In determining whether the requirements of section 171.18, subdivision 1(a)(7), are
satisfied, the question for the court is whether the elements of the out-of-state offense, if
proved in Minnesota, would justify a conviction for the same offense. Underhill, 989
N.W.2d at 914-15; Anderson v. State, Dept. of Pub. Safety, 305 N.W.2d 786, 787 (Minn.
1981). However, “if the elements of the out -of-state offense could be proven without
proving a violation of Minnesota law, then the out-of -state conviction would not be a
violation of a Minnesota offense.” State v. Martin, 941 N.W.2d 119, 124 (Minn. 2020)
(applying the analysis from Anderson to determine whether an out-of-state conviction
6
qualified as a violation of Minnesota law under Minnesota Statutes section 243.166,
subdivision 1b(b)(1) (2012)).
In relevant part, the commissioner argues that the district court erred because
Wisconsin Statutes sections 343.305, subdivision 3(a) (2023- 24), and 344.305,
subdivision 9(a)— under which Hoffman was convicted—and Minnesota Statutes
sections 169A.51, subdivision 3(a) (2024), and 171.177, subdivision 4(a) (2024), prohibit
the same conduct. The commissioner argues that the conduct prohibited by both statutes
is “refusing to submit to a lawfully requested test.” We disagree.
Wisconsin Statutes section 343.305, subdivision 3(a), provides that, after arrest for
a violation of Wisconsin’s operating-while-under-the-influence laws, “a law enforcement
officer may request the person to provide one or more samples of his or her breath, blood
or urine.” And Wisconsin Statutes section 343.305, subdivision 9(a), authorizes the
revocation of a person’s driver’s license who refuses a test under subdivision 3(a). The
Wisconsin statutes, however, do not require that an officer obtain a warrant to request any
sample.
On the other hand, Minnesota Statutes section 169A.51, subdivision 3(a), provides
that “a blood or urine test may be conducted only pursuant to a search warrant or a
judicially recognized exception to the search warrant requirement.” And Minnesota
Statutes section 171.177, subdivision 4(a), provides that upon certification of “probable
cause to believe the person had been driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor
vehicle . . . and that the person refused to comply with the execution of the search warrant,
the commissioner shall revoke the person’s license or permit to drive.”
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In comparing the statutes here, the elements necessary to prove the offense of
refusing to submit to a test in Wisconsin, if proved in Minnesota, would not necessarily
justify a conviction under Minnesota law. As the district court aptly explained, “if a driver
refuses a warrantless blood test as provided for in Wisconsin, it would not justify a
conviction for test refusal in Minnesota, because warrantless blood tests in Minnesota are
unlawful.” Stated differently, to be convicted of the offense of refusing to test for
intoxication in Wisconsin, a person would only have to refuse any test for intoxication
regardless of whether a search warrant was obtained to support that request.
Wis. Stat. § 343.305, subds. 3(a), 9(a). That same conduct in Minnesota would not justify
a conviction because, if a person refused to submit to a warrantless blood or urine test for
intoxication, that conduct would not result in a conviction.
Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 3(a); Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 4(a).
Accordingly, because “the elements of the out-of-state offense could be proven
without proving a violation of Minnesota law,” the out-of-state conviction is not a violation
of the Minnesota offense. See Martin, 941 N.W.2d at 124. As such, the prohibited conduct
under the Wisconsin statute does not conform with the prohibited conduct of its Minnesota
counterparts sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Minnesota Statutes section 171.18,
subdivision 1(a)(7). Because the requirements of section 171.18, subdivision 1(a)(7), were
not satisfied, the commissioner was not authorized to suspend Hoffman’s license and the
commissioner’s initial determination suspending Hoffman’s license was therefore
arbitrary. Accordingly, the district court did not err by rescinding the commissioner’s
suspension of Hoffman’s license.
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To persuade us otherwise, the commissioner raises several related arguments
challenging the district court’s order. The commissioner argues that: the warrant
requirement for a blood test is merely a procedural distinction between the Minnesota and
Wisconsin statutes; Hoffman failed to carry her burden to prove that the commissioner
acted arbitrarily; the commissioner did not act arbitrarily by relying on the report from
Wisconsin; Hoffman cannot collaterally attack the Wisconsin judgment; and allowing
Hoffman to maintain her driving privileges is contrary to public safety. None of these
arguments persuade us.
Procedural or Evidentiary Difference
The commissioner argues that the warrant requirement for a blood test under
Minnesota Statutes sections 169A.51, subdivision 3(a), and 171.177, subdivision 4(a), is a
procedural or evidentiary difference from the Wisconsin statutes and is thus immaterial to
the analysis of the elements of the offense. The commissioner asserts that the warrant
requirement under Minnesota law only requires “the officer to take additional procedural
steps prior to obtaining a blood or urine sample,” but does not “change the conduct that is
prohibited which is refusing to submit to a lawfully requested chemical test.” The
commissioner points to Anderson, 305 N.W.2d at 786, and
Hendrickson v. Commissioner of Pub lic Safety, No. A08- 0460, 2009 WL 67417, at *3
(Minn. App. Jan. 13, 2009), in support of its argument.
1

1 “Nonprecedential opinions and order opinions are not binding authority” but “may be
cited as persuasive authority.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
9
Indeed, the supreme court in Anderson observed that “[w]hen taking into
consideration the differing evidentiary standards relating to the admissibility of blood
alcohol test results,” the out-of-state offense “undoubtedly requires less proof for a
prosecutor in Colorado to prove that a person ’s capacity to drive is impaired than it does
for a prosecutor in Minnesota to make the same showing.” 305 N.W.2d at 787. But the
supreme court concluded that the “elements of the Colorado offense . . . are the same
elements which, if proven in Minnesota, would justify a conviction for the offense of
driving while under the influence.” Id. (emphasis added). And we similarly concluded in
Henrickson that it was “irrelevant that North Dakota and Minnesota use slightly different
methods of measuring alcohol concentration,” when “[e]ach statute sets forth the same
basic requirements of a DWI offense: (1) physical control of a vehicle, and (2) alcohol
concentration of .08 within two hours of that physical control.” 2009 WL 67417, at *3
(quotation omitted).
For the reasons discussed above, the warrant requirement in Minnesota Statutes
sections 169A.51, subdivision 3(a) and 171.177, subdivision 4(a), operates as an element
of the offense. That is, to be convicted for refusing a blood or urine test in Minnesota, the
state is required to prove that a warrant for the blood or urine test existed.
See Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 3(a) (requiring the police to obtain a search warrant to
conduct a blood or urine test); Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 4(a) (providing that the
commissioner shall revoke a person’s driver’s license if the person “refused to comply with
the execution of the search warrant”). As such, unlike the different evidentiary burdens in
Anderson or different blood-alcohol measurement methods in Henrickson— neither of
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which affected the underlying elements necessary for conviction in each of those cases—
the warrant requirement under Minnesota law is an element of the offense which that be
proved. The commissioner’s argument that the warrant requirement is only a procedural
or evidentiary difference in the statutes is therefore unpersuasive.
Burden to Prove that the Commissioner Acted Arbitrarily
The commissioner also argues that the district court erred because Hoffman failed
to carry her burden to prove that the commissioner’s determination was arbitrary. The
commissioner argues that Hoffman only “submitted two documents and called one
witness” in support of her challenge. The commissioner contends that Hoffman’s evidence
fails to show “what procedures were or were not followed,” or “whether the officer had a
warrant or could have obtained one.”
However, the central inquiry for a district court reviewing the commissioner’s
determination under Minnesota Statutes section 171.18, subdivision 1(a)(7), is whether the
elements of the out-of-state offense justify a conviction under Minnesota law. Anderson,
305 N.W.2d at 787; Underhill, 989 N.W.2d at 914-15. The court is not directed to consider
the underlying facts of the out-of-state offense. See State v. Dumont, No. A20-0094, 2021
WL 317973, at *2 (Minn. App. Feb. 1, 2021) (applying the Anderson analysis in the context
of Minnesota Statutes section 243.166, subdivision 1b(b)(1) (2016), and observing that it
does not “involve the facts related to the underlying out- of-state offense —only the
elements are considered”), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 28, 2021).
Accordingly, questions about “what procedures were or were not followed,” or
“whether the officer had a warrant or could have obtained one” when Hoffman was arrested
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are irrelevant to the issue of whether the commissioner’s initial revocation determination
was arbitrary. Moreover, for the reasons discussed above, Hoffman carried her burden to
show that the commissioner acted arbitrarily because the elements of Wisconsin Statutes
sections 343.305, subdivision 3(a), and 343.305, subdivision 9(a), do not sufficiently
conform with the elements of Minnesota Statutes sections 169A.51, subdivision 3(a) and
171.177, subdivision 4(a) for the purposes of satisfying section 171.18, subdivision 1(a)(7).
The commissioner’s argument that Hoffman failed to carry her burden of proof is therefore
unpersuasive.
Remaining Arguments
The record reveals that the commissioner’s remaining arguments—that the
commissioner did not act arbitrarily by relying on the report from Wisconsin, that Hoffman
cannot collaterally attack the Wisconsin judgment, and that allowing Hoffman to maintain
her driving privileges is contrary to public policy—were not raised in or decided by the
district court. The commissioner therefore forfeited these arguments on appeal, and we
decline to address the merits of those claims. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580 , 582
(Minn. 1988) (stating that appellate courts generally address only those questions
previously presented to and considered by the district court).
Affirmed.