Renee Hogendorf, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1103

Renee Hogendorf,
Respondent,

vs.

James J. Green, Jr., et al.,
Appellants.

Filed March 9, 2026
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-22-678

William A. Cumming, Laura H. Lindsay, William M. Florek, Hessian & McKasy, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cara C. Passaro, Stephen P. Couillard, Stich Angell, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellants)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Ross , Judge; and
Florey, Judge.
∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
On appeal from a judgment against them for attorney fees and costs under the
Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act (MERLA), Minn. Stat. §§ 115B.01-

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
115B.20 (2024), appellants James Green Jr. and Well Groomed Lawns, Inc. (WGL) argue
that the district court erred by (1) awarding respondent Renee Hogendorf attorney fees in
an amount that is disproportionate to the award of compensatory damages, (2) awarding
attorney fees and expert costs incurred after state agencies become involved in the matter,
and (3) failing to reduce the attorney-fee award to account for work performed on
Hogendorf’s non-MERLA claims. We affirm.
FACTS
This dispute began in 2021 when Hogendorf, who owns property that abuts property
owned by WGL, discovered a drainage pipe on her property and noticed a foul smell and
dead plants around the pipe’s discharge area. Hogendorf contacted an environmental
consulting firm, which found evidence of contaminating substances in the soil and notified
environmental authorities. An Anoka County environmental health inspector inspected
both properties. Investigation determined that the drainage pipe on Hogendorf’s property
was connected to a drain in the garage of WGL. WGL, which is owned by Green, provides
lawn and garden services for residential and commercial properties. WGL maintained and
washed its trucks, commercial lawn mowers, and pesticide and herbicide sprayers in the
garage, generating “rinsate.” See Minn. Stat. § 18C.005, subd. 28 (2024) (defining
“rinsate” as “a dilute mixture of a fertilizer or fertilizer with water, solvents, oils,
commercial rinsing agents, or other substances”). WGL had placed the drainage pipe onto
Hogendorf’s property after the pipe that WGL had been using to carry the rinsate to the
drain field on its own property had become clogged. The Minnesota Department of
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Agriculture (MDA) and the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) each issued a
notice of violation to WGL, and WGL was eventually assessed two civil penalties.
In August 2021, Hogendorf retained the law firm of Hessian & McKasy, P.A., to
represent her in claims against appellants and paid a $1,000 retainer fee. Hogendorf and
the firm’s engagement agreement provided for four compensation scenarios, accurately
summarized by the district court as follows:
Scenario A: In the event of a pre-litigation settlement, Plaintiff
pays a hybridized “fixed” and “contingent” fee as follows:
$50,000.00 fixed, plus a contingency fee of thirty percent
(30%) of any damages, exclusive of costs.

Scenario B: In the event of a favorable judgment inclusive of
MERLA-based damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs which are
voluntarily paid by Defendants, attorneys collect the attorneys’
fees awarded under the judgment.

Scenario C: In the event of a favorable judgment inclusive of
MERLA-based damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs which are
not voluntarily paid by Defendants, money collected on the
judgment shall be split on a pro-rata basis. Plaintiff is awarded
costs and damages (but is also responsible for costs, so there’s
no windfall), and if the costs awarded were less than the costs
incurred, Plaintiff would be responsible for the difference, and
the attorneys awarded their fees.

Scenario D: Renegotiate if there is no settlement and also no
judgment due to bankruptcy, insolvency, or lack of assets.

The engagement agreement estimated that the time required to litigate the case would be
between 1,500 and 2,500 hours. Ultimately, 1,657.30 hours were billed for the case.
In February 2022, following unsuccessful efforts at settlement, Hogendorf brought
claims against appellants, including a claim for violation of MERLA and common-law
claims for negligence, negligence per se, nuisance, and trespass. Appellants asserted a
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counterclaim for adverse possession. Appellants moved for summary judgment on the
MERLA claim, and the motion was denied after a hearing. After a nine-day bench trial, the
district court found in Hogendorf’s favor on her MERLA claim, awarding Hogendorf
$331,295.84 in damages to compensate for the diminution in value of her property
($235,750), expenses she paid to an environmental consultant ($93,895.84), and expenses
she paid for a land survey ($1,650). The district court declined to reach Hogendorf’s
common-law claims, reasoning that doing so would amount to double recovery for the
same damages, which was prohibited under MERLA. See Minn. Stat. § 115B.13. The
district court rejected appellants’ adverse-possession counterclaim and determined that
Hogendorf was entitled to reasonable attorney fees under MERLA.
Hogendorf moved for costs and attorney fees, submitting an affidavit from her
attorney along with documentation of the hours billed on the case and the costs incurred.
Appellants opposed the motion. The district court then filed an order awarding Hogendorf
$574,803.00 in attorney fees and $194,562.10 in costs.
Appellants brought separate appeals from the merits judgment and the costs-and-
fees judgment. In the merits appeal, they challenged the district court’s interpretation of
various terms in MERLA, the admission of expert testimony, and the award of diminution-
of-value damages under MERLA. We affirmed in a precedential opinion. Hogendorf v.
Green, 26 N.W.3d 895 (Minn. App. 2025), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 26, 2025).
In this appeal, we address appellants’ challenges to the costs-and-fees judgment.
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DECISION
Appellants challenge the district court’s award of costs and attorney fees on three
bases. First, they argue that the attorney-fee award is unreasonable because it is
disproportionate to the damages award. Second, they argue that fees and expert costs
should have been cut off after state agencies became involved in the matter. And third, they
argue that the attorney-fee award is unreasonable because it includes compensation for time
spent on non-MERLA claims.
“The proper method to calculate an award of attorney fees is a question of law” that
appellate courts review de novo. State by Comm’r. of Transp. v. Krause, 925 N.W.2d 30,
32 (Minn. 2019). But the “reasonableness of a particular award” is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. Id. at 33.
The general rule is that attorney fees are not recoverable, but a statute can shift the
burden of attorney fees to the losing party. Dunn v. Nat’l Bev. Corp., 745 N.W.2d 549, 554
(Minn. 2008). MERLA contains such a fee- shifting provision. Minn. Stat. § 115B.14. It
provides that a court “may award costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney fees and
witness fees” to the prevailing party. Id.
We must apply the “lodestar method” for determining the reasonable amount of
attorney fees under MERLA. Musicland Grp., Inc. v. Ceridian Corp., 508 N.W.2d 524,
535 (Minn. App. 1993), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 27, 1994). Under that method, once the
party claiming attorney fees has been determined to be the prevailing party, “the starting
point in determining a reasonable fee is ascertainment of the number of adequately
documented hours expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”
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Specialized Tours, Inc. v. Hagen, 392 N.W.2d 520, 542 (Minn. 1986) (citing Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). From that assessment, the “hours not reasonably
expended should be deducted.” Id. In addition, courts evaluate the reasonableness of the
award by considering “all relevant circumstances, including the time and labor required;
the nature and difficulty of the responsibility assumed; the amount involved and the results
obtained; the fees customarily charged for similar legal services; the experience, reputation,
and ability of counsel; and the fee arrangement existing between counsel and the client.”
State v. Paulson, 188 N.W.2d 424, 426 (Minn. 1971); see also State by Comm’r of Transp.
v. Schaffer, 8 N.W.3d 220, 223 (Minn. 2024) (applying Paulson).
With that background, we turn to appellants’ arguments.
I. The district court’s award of fees does not constitute an abuse of discretion
based on disproportionality.

Appellants argue that the district court erred by awarding fees that are
disproportionate to the damages awarded to Hogendorf. In making the argument that the
fees are unreasonable because they are disproportionately high, appellants also contend
that the fees should be capped based on Hogendorf’s fee arrangement with her counsel.
In its order evaluating the attorney-fees request, the district court considered the
amount involved and the results obtained.1 Appellants argue that the total award of attorney

1 While also citing Minnesota caselaw, the district court evaluated relevant factors for
determining the reasonableness of attorney fees according to the twelve-factor test laid out
in the federal case of Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19
(5th Cir. 1974). See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.4 (adopting the Johnson factors). Like the
supreme court’s decision in Paulson, 188 N.W.2d at 426, the twelve-factor test in Johnson
includes the “amount involved and the results obtained,” Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718.
7
fees and costs ($574,803 plus $194,652) is more than three times the compensatory
damages awarded and is thus disproportionate and unreasonable. In making that
calculation, appellants consider the compensatory damages to be only the approximately
$235,000 in damages for diminution in value of the property and exclude the sums paid to
an environmental consultant and for a land survey. But the district court rejected
appellants’ argument that the compensatory damages for this purpose should be limited to
$235,000. Rather, the district court determined that the full damages award of $331,295.84
should be considered. Appellants do not specifically argue why that determination is
erroneous, and we do not see error in it. From there, the district court determined that the
attorney-fee award ($574,803) is only 1.73 times the damages award, diminishing
appellants’ argument of disproportionality. Again, appellants do not explain why the
district court’s determination is erroneous.
And importantly, as the district court observed, the supreme court has explicitly
rejected the idea that the factor of “the amount involved and the results obtained” translates
to a “dollar value proportionality rule.” Green v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 826 N.W.2d 530 ,
538 (Minn. 2013). Rather, this factor “is merely one factor, among a host of others, that
the district court is to consider.” Id. The district court here considered this factor, observing
that Hogendorf obtained compensatory damages of $331,295.84, which was “nearly all
[the] relief [that Hogendorf] sought.” It also explained that “[t]he amount involved and the
results obtained in this case was substantially colored by the novelty of the questions
involved in this case” under MERLA. And the district court observed that the fees covered
three years of litigation, including multiple motions and hearings, and culminated in a nine-
8
day trial. The district court also noted that the actual hours billed (1,657.30) were at the
low end of the 1,500 to 2,500 estimated by Hogendorf’s counsel at the start of the case. In
sum, the district court properly considered the amount involved and the results obtained
and did not err by awarding fees that exceed the damages awarded.
We are not persuaded otherwise by the mechanic’s lien cases cited by appellants in
which courts have compared the amount of the lien recovered to the attorney fees sought.
See, e.g., Asp v. O’Brien, 277 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Minn. 1979); Nw. Wholesale Lumber, Inc.
v. Citadel Co., 457 N. W.2d 244, 251 (Minn. App. 1990). Appellants urge that we should
apply the reasonableness test identified in the mechanic’s lien case of Jadwin v. Kasal, 318
N.W.2d 844, 848 (Minn. 1982), which, they assert, reflects “the concept o f
proportionality.” But t his is a MERLA case, not a mechanic’s lien case, and we have
applied the lodestar method and its associated factors for evaluating the reasonableness of
attorney fees in the MERLA context. Musicland, 508 N.W.2d at 535. Accordingly, the
Paulson factors are the appropriate factors to be applied here, and the district court properly
considered the “amount involved and the results obtained” factor.
Appellants further argue that the attorney- fee award “should be capped at what
[Hogendorf] agreed to in her agreement with Counsel because she has not actually incurred
any fees beyond the $1,000 she paid counsel to prepare a demand letter.” Specifically,
appellants argue that the amount should be based on the provision of the engagement letter
that assumed a judgment in Hogendorf’s favor without any attorney fees awarded under
MERLA—in other words, according to “Scenario A” of the engagement agreement, which
addressed prelitigation settlement in Hogendorf’s favor. Under this provision, appellants
9
calculate a fee award of $76,020.12, consisting of a $50,000 fixed fee plus a $26,020.12
contingent fee representing thirty percent of the damages award less Hogendorf’s costs. In
the alternative, appellants suggest that the award should be the amount of attorney fees that
would be paid under a “traditional plaintiff’s contingency agreement”—typically, 40% of
the recovery— which here would be either $94,300 (using appellants’ alleged
compensatory damages) or $132,518.34 (using Hogendorf’s and the district court’s
calculation of compensatory damages). Appellants reason that these numbers represent an
amount that Hogendorf “could have actually owed to her attorneys had a typical plaintiff’s
retainer agreement been used, rather than one specifically designed to take advantage of a
fee shifting statute.”
We are not persuaded by the argument. The district court took into account
Hogendorf’s fee arrangement with counsel. Applying the lodestar method, the district court
used the hours expended, supported by time entries and affidavits, multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate to calculate the attorney fees award. Appellants have not challenged
the number of hours billed or any entries for work performed (aside from those for the non-
MERLA claims discussed below in Section III). They do assert that they should not be
responsible for paying a higher hourly rate than Hogendorf was asked to pay for partner-
level work. But, as the district court noted, the engagement agreement provided that, if
litigation commenced, the higher hourly rate would apply. The district court found that the
hourly billing rates for an attorney with Hogendorf’s lead attorney’s experience were
“reasonable and appropriate for the Minneapolis/St. Paul metropolitan-area legal market
10
for civil litigation of this type, based upon an appropriate comparison to the exact same
type of litigation which occurred twenty years ago, as adjusted for inflation.”
The district court was not required to cap the award at the amount of a contingency
fee. The supreme court recently addressed the issue of reasonable attorney fees when a
contingent-fee agreement is in place in the context of Minnesota’s eminent-domain
statutes. See Schaffer, 8 N.W.2d at 224. There, the supreme court rejected an argument
similar to appellants’ reasoning:
The lodestar method does not prioritize one factor over any of
the others, particularly not contingent fee agreements. The
lodestar method already requires the district court to weigh fee
agreements among other factors. To use a fee agreement as a
cap on fees awarded would contravene the lodestar method by
giving double weight to the fee agreement factor.

Id. The Schaffer court also noted that other provisions in the eminent -domain statute “are
explicitly limited to ‘reimbursement,’” while the attorney- fee provision is not. Id. The
supreme court ultimately concluded that the fee agreement between a litigant and their
attorney does not cap an attorney-fee award because “‘reasonable attorney fees’ . . . means
attorney fees calculated using the lodestar method.” Id. Similarly, here, MERLA does not
limit recovery of attorney fees to “reimbursement” or otherwise contain qualifications other
than “reasonable.”
In sum, even if there is arguably some “disproportion” between the damages award
and the attorney- fee award, the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding
attorney fees that exceeded the amount of compensatory damages.
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II. The district court did not err by awarding attorney fees and expert costs
incurred after the state became involved in the litigation.

Appellants next argue that the district court erred by awarding attorney fees and
expert costs after November 23, 2021—the date that the MPCA issued a notice of violation.
Appellants reason that, at that point, the purposes of MERLA were “being accomplished”
and Hogendorf’s MERLA claim was “superfluous.” 2 Thus, they assert, she should not be
able to recover her fees and costs. Relatedly, appellants compare MERLA to Minnesota’s
“private attorney general” statute, Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a (2024), and argue for an
interpretation of MERLA that would impose a “public benefit” requirement before an
award of attorney fees may be made. Appellants’ arguments implicate statutory
interpretation, and appellate courts review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.
Pepper v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 813 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Minn. 2012).
Purposes of MERLA
MERLA provides a cause of action for private individuals for the release of
hazardous materials . Minn. Stat. §§ 115B.04, subd. 1, .05, subd. 1. Appellants do not
dispute that Hogendorf had a right to bring a claim against them under MERLA to recover
damages; rather, they argue that she cannot recover attorney fees and costs incurred after
state environmental authorities beca me involved because the purposes of MERLA were
already being served. We are not persuaded. MERLA’s primary purposes are “(1) to

2 We note that we rejected a similar argument in our decision in appellants’ merits appeal,
holding that “the state’s involvement in the investigation or cleanup of a hazardous
substance after a release under MERLA does not preclude a private cause of action under
MERLA or make one superfluous.” Hogendorf, 26 N.W.3d at 905.
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impose strict liability on those responsible for harm caused by the release of hazardous
substances; (2) to allow the state to clean up contamination and collect costs later; and
(3) to fund state cleanup activity.” Musicland, 508 N.W.2d at 529. Hogendorf’s MERLA
claim fits within the first purpose of MERLA.
Moreover, MERLA contains no language that limits the award of attorney fees
based on agency involvement. MERLA’s fee -shifting provision provides: “Upon motion
of a party prevailing in an action under sections 115B.01 to 115B.15 the court may award
costs, disbursements, and reasonable attorney fees and witness fees to that party.” Minn.
Stat. § 115B.14. Appellants provide no authority to support their offered interpretation and,
notably, our only precedential case interpreting the attorney- fee provision of MERLA,
Musicland, awarded attorney fees incurred after agency involvement. 508 N.W.2d at 535 .
Therefore, we conclude that the involvement of the MDA and MPCA does not limit
Hogendorf’s recovery of attorney fees under MERLA.
3
Public Benefit
Appellant’s argument that proof of a public benefit is required for an attorney-fee
award under MERLA relies on caselaw requiring a plaintiff seeking attorney fees under
Minnesota’s private attorney general statute to establish that their private civil action
benefited the public. See Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2000) (holding that the
prevailing party in consumer-fraud action could not be awarded attorney fees under section

3 Hogendorf argues that an interpretation limiting the recovery of attorney fees after agency
involvement “would effectively eviscerate MERLA’s fee provision, as state agencies
frequently become involved in contamination cases.” The concern is well-founded.
13
8.31, subdivision 3a, without establishing public benefit of their action); see also Liess v.
Lindemyer, 354 N.W.2d 556, 558 (Minn. App. 1984) (holding that an award under the
private attorney general statute “must take into account the degree to which the public
interest is advanced by the suit,” in addition to the Paulson factors). Appellants recognize
that the private attorney general statute, section 8.31 subdivision 3a, does not apply to
MERLA. But they urge us to interpret the MERLA attorney-fee provision to include the
same public-benefit limitation, arguing that the word “reasonable” provides a vehicle for
that limitation.
We are not convinced. MERLA provides for a private right of action of property
owners to recover damages from those responsible for releasing hazardous substances and
itself affords property owners the right to recover attorney fees and costs when they prevail.
As the district court reasoned, MERLA thus provides benefits to an injured party that are
personal. In that context, appellants’ argument that a public-interest benefit must also be
established is unpersuasive. Moreover, neither Musicland nor the federal cases interpreting
MERLA have applied a public-benefit analysis to the award of attorney fees. See Gopher
Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 955 F.2d 519 (8th Cir. 1992); Kennedy Bldg. Assocs., 375
F.3d at 750. We therefore reject appellants’ argument that the district court abused its
discretion by awarding Hogendorf fees incurred after the state became involved because
her MERLA claim did not provide a public benefit.
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III. The district court acted within its discretion by declining to apportion attorney
fees to exclude fees for non-MERLA claims.

Appellants argue that the district court erred because it did not apportion the attorney
fees between Hogendorf’s successful and unsuccessful claims. “Appellate courts review
the reasonableness of a particular attorney-fee award for an abuse of discretion.” State by
Comm’r of Transp. v. Williams, 26 N.W.3d 159, 169 (Minn. App. 2025) (quotation
omitted). “A district court abuses its discretion when it errs as a matter of law in applying
improper standards in an award of fees or makes clearly erroneous findings of fact in
determining the reasonable value of counsel’s work.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Generally, attorney fees are not awarded for time spent on unrelated, unsuccessful
claims. Id. (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-35). But when claims are related, attorney fees
may be awarded. Musicland, 508 N.W.2d at 535. In Musicland, we addressed the
apportionment of attorney fees in the context of a MERLA claim:
Where a plaintiff succeeds on only some claims and fails on
others, two questions must be addressed: whether the
unsuccessful claims were related to the successful claims, and
whether the plaintiff’ s level of success makes the hours
expended a satisfactory basis for making the fee award. . . .
Where the claims are unrelated, fees should not be awarded for
time expended on the unsuccessful claims. In other cases,
however, the claims will involve a common core of facts or
will be based on related legal theories. Much of counsel’s time
will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making
it difficult to divide hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis.
Such a lawsuit cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims.

15
Id. Additionally, we stated in Musicland that “the fee award should not be reduced simply
because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit. The most
critical factor is the degree of success obtained.” Id.
Appellants make two distinct arguments. First, they argue that any work on the tort
claims for which Hogendorf did not recover should reduce the attorney-fee award. Second,
appellants contend that there should be at least some reduction in the fees to account for
work on the claims that did not relate to rinsate discharge.
As to the first argument, Hogendorf’s tort claims for negligence, negligence per se,
nuisance, and trespass primarily involved the same core facts as her MERLA claim—
namely, WGL’s discharge of rinsate onto her property. Because the tort claims share a
common core of facts with the MERLA claim, they are “related” to the MERLA claim. Id.
Additionally, the tort claims were not “unsuccessful.” Appellants assert that Hogendorf’s
non-MERLA claims “failed,” but actually the district court declined to address
Hogendorf’s other claims simply because it determined that success on those claims would
amount to double recovery prohibited by MERLA. See Minn. Stat. § 115B.13. The district
court expressly concluded that the “facts underlying the disparate claims were the same, so
[Hogendorf’s] counsels’ efforts were not substantially distinct because it merely required
arguing different (but related) legal theories for the tort-based claims.”
As to the second argument, although Hogendorf’s common-law claims mostly
focused on the rinsate released onto Hogendorf’s property, she also alleged that WGL
stored lumber and parked vehicles on her property, constituting nuisance and trespass.
Additionally, the facts related to the lumber and parked vehicles on Hogendorf’s property
16
were also relevant to defend against the counterclaim for adverse possession brought by
appellants. Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion by not reducing its
award by some amount to account for the legal work related to this subset of facts regarding
those common-law claims. Hogendorf counters that the lumber and parking issues were
“ancillary” to the central focus of her common-law claims, which were grounded primarily
on environmental contamination and could not be disentangled from the MERLA claim.
We do not find an abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision. The primary
focus of Hogendorf’s common-law claims— like her MERLA claim—was the rinsate
discharge. Hogendorf’s concerns about lumber and parking were reflected in some of those
claims but were at most part of the common -law claims that primarily focused on the
rinsate. And a plaintiff need not “prevail on every contention.” Musicland, 508 N.W.2d at
535. In addition, in objecting to the fees, appellants do not identify specific billing entries
that they take issue with. Rather, they assert that they found $13,527.50 for “entries
dedicated at least partially” to the common-law claims and counterclaim. Because those
claims were based primarily on the rinsate discharge, only a small subpart of that amount
could arguably relate to the storage of lumber and trucks on Hogendorf’s property. On this
record, and considering the district court’s greater familiarity with the case, we cannot
conclude that the district court abused its discretion by not deducting some amount for
attorney fees that might have related to facts that played at most a minor role in a case in
which the plaintiff prevailed on her MERLA claim.
Affirmed.