In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: D.L.P. and J.A.P.,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1105

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: D.L.P. and J.A.P.,

Commissioner of Human Services,
Legal Custodian

Filed January 26, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Kirk, Judge∗

Chippewa County District Court
File No. 12-JV-22-341

Rachel Osband, Mark D. Fiddler, Fiddler Osband Flynn LLC, Minnetonka, Minnesota (for
appellants)

Rhia Bornmann Spears, Spears Family Law, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent
T.R.)

Matthew Haugen, Chippewa County Attorney, Montevideo, Minnesota (for respondent
county)

David A. Yates, Juvenile Justice Center, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem)

Randall Tietjen, Jacqueline R.D. Fielding, Robins Kaplan LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for amici curiae Dr. Jacquetta Blacker and ATTACh)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KIRK, Judge
Appellant-foster parents challenge the district court’s determinations that (1) the
county was reasonable in failing to make an adoptive placement of a child with them and
(2) that the best interests of the child favor placement with a maternal uncle. We reverse
and remand for the district court to reassess whether the county acted reasonably when it
denied appellants’ request for an adoptive placement. Because the district court’s
reassessment of the reasonableness of the child’s placement could impact its analysis of
the child’s best interests, we decline to address the parties’ disputes about the district
court’s analysis of the child’s best interests.
FACTS
B.P. (child) was born in June 2022. D.L.P. (mother) and J.A.P. (father) are the
biological parents of child. Chippewa County Family Services (the county) learned mother
had not been willing to engage in services and had prior involuntary and voluntary
terminations of her parental rights to three other children. Shortly after child’s birth, the
county petitioned the district court for emergency protective care of child, which the district
court granted. The county was informed both that no biological relatives had come forward
for the prior terminations and that the family that had adopted child’s siblings was unable
to accept placement of child.1 Appellants (the foster parents) were identified as a potential

1 If the family that had adopted child’s siblings had been able to accept child, child likely
would have been placed with the adoptive family. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(d)
(2024) (stating “[s]iblings should be placed together for foster care and adoption at the
earliest possible time unless it is documented that a joint placement would be contrary to
3
foster-care placement for child, and following child’s birth, child was placed with the m.2
Child remained in the foster parents’ custody for approximately the first three years of his
life.
In approximately July 2022, T.R., child’s maternal uncle, received a relative search
letter from the county . T.R. then came forward as an interested relative, moved for
adoptive placement of child, and requested visitation. However, in September 2022,
mother sent a letter to the district court alleging that T.R. was not fit to have custody of
child because T.R. had sexually abused her. The county was not aware of mother’s letter
when it sent T.R. the relative-search letter.
In March 2023, the county sent a letter to the district court stating that the county
and the guardian ad litem (GAL) supported permanent placement of child with the foster
parents. The letter first assessed how placement with T.R. would meet child’s best interests
and then assessed how placement with the foster parents would meet child’s best interests
under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.212, subd. 2 (2024). After considering child’s best
interests, the county noted mother’s letter requesting that child not be placed with T.R.

the safety or well-being of any of the siblings or unless it is not possible after reasonable
efforts by the responsible social services agency”).
2 The county filed a petition to terminate the parental rights (TPR) of mother and father
immediately after child was born. The district court granted the county’s TPR petition,
and child was placed under guardianship of the Commissioner of Human Services for
adoptive placement by the county. See In re Welfare of Child of D.L.P., No. A22-1594,
2023 WL 2847355 (Minn. App. Apr. 10, 2023) (D.L.P. I) (remanding the TPR); In re
Welfare of Child of D.L.P., No. A23- 1347, 2024 WL 688447 (Minn. App. Feb. 14, 2024)
(D.L.P. II), rev. denied (Mar. 22, 2024) (affirming the TPR after remand).
4
In February 2024, the GAL asked the district court to rule out T.R. as a placement
option for child. The GAL reported that, after visits with T.R., child “shows increased
agitation, tearfulness, and that he will cling to the foster mother’s leg, body, and pull her
hair in order to stay close to her.” The district court ordered an attachment study for child,
a parental-capacity assessment for T.R., and observed visitation for T.R.
In May 2024, the district court denied T.R.’s motion for adoptive placement,
determining that he failed to make a prima facie showing that the county acted
unreasonably in not placing child with him. The district court also denied T.R.’s request
for an evidentiary hearing on that point and ruled that visitation with T.R. should cease.
In June 2024, the county entered into an adoptive placement agreement (APA) with
the foster parents.
3 In July 2024, the APA with the foster parents was submitted to the
Department of Children, Youth, and Families (the department).
In August 2024, the department denied approval of the APA with the foster parents
stating that its decision was due to “non-compliance information regarding consideration
of relatives.” The department noted that (1) the county indicated an analysis of the best
interests of the child indicated placement of child with T.R. or with the foster parents was
equally appropriate; but (2) the county’s consideration of placement with the relatives did
not occur in the order specified under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.212, subd. 2. The
department further noted that, after an investigation into maltreatment by T.R. based on

3 The district court noted that the delay between the determination to move forward with
the foster parents and the signed APA was due to pending appeals of the underlying
termination matter that had been filed with this court, and petitions for review of our
decisions that had been filed in the supreme court.
5
mother’s allegations of sexual abuse, there was no determination of maltreatment; that T.R.
was licensed as a child foster-care provider; and that the district court had not made a
determination that mother’s request that child not be placed with T.R. was in child’s best
interests.
In September 2024, mother informed T.R.’s attorney that she was no longer
objecting to child’s placement with T.R. In October 2024, the county sent a letter to the
district court that explained mother’s change of position, and stated that in its March 2023
letter it indicated child’s best interests would be served “virtually equal[ly]” by placement
with T.R. or the foster parents, and that the only factor that led to the foster parents being
the identified placement option was mother’s objection. The county now determined that,
in accordance with Minnesota Statutes section 260C.221, child should be placed with T.R.
instead of the foster parents because T.R. is a tier 1 relative under that statute.
T.R. then asserted to the district court that the county acted unreasonably when it
refused to place child with him. The district court—without holding an evidentiary
hearing—rejected T.R.’s assertion, and T.R. appealed. In December 2024 , this court
reversed the district court’s decision denying adoptive placement to T.R. because the
district court did so without holding an evidentiary hearing on T.R.’s motion. In re Welfare
of Child of D.L.P., No. A24-0918, 2024 WL 4927651, at *1, 6 (Minn. App. Dec. 2, 2024)
(D.L.P. III). This court concluded that, because T.R. had made a prima facie showing but
the district court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion, the county’s placement
decision was unreasonable, and we remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to
“compare the competing placement options and determine” the child’s best interests. Id.
6
at *5-6 (emphasis added). In issuing the remand, this court did not express any opinion on
how the district court should weigh the best -interest factors, and any interpretation to that
effect is incorrect.
In December 2024, after we filed D.L.P. III, the county moved the district court for
permission to transition adoptive placement from the foster parents to T.R. The foster
parents then filed a notice of motion and motion for adoptive placement. In February 2025,
the district court granted an evidentiary hearing on the foster parents’ motion for adoptive
placement.
Also in February 2025, the county submitted an updated best-interests assessment.
After weighing the ten relevant best-interests factors under Minnesota Statutes
section 260C.212, subd. 2, the county determined that “both families can equally meet
[child’s] needs.” The county then recommended “placement with [T.R.’s] family, who [is]
a Tier 1 relative, as described in [Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2 (a)(1)].”
The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing over six days. At the conclusion
of the hearing, the district court determined that the foster parents did not prove by a
preponderance of evidence that the county was unreasonable in failing to approve the
adoptive placement with them. The district court further found that “the [foster parents]
are not the most suitable adoptive home to meet the child’s needs and the adoption with
[T.R.’s family] is in the child’s best interest.”
The foster parents appeal.

7
DECISION
The foster parents argue first that the record does not support the district court’s
determination that it was reasonable for the county to deny the foster parent’s request for
adoptive placement ; and second that the record does not support the district court’s
determination that child’s best interests favor placement with T.R.
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.607, subd. 6 (2024), governs motions for adoptive
placement. The party who unsuccessfully sought adoptive placement bears the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency was unreasonable in failing to
make the requested placement. Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(d). This court reviews a
district court’s decision of whether a county agency unreasonably failed to make an
adoptive placement for an abuse of discretion. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(f)
(stating that the district court “may” order adoptive placement with the moving party if the
agency unreasonably fails to make requested placement); see also In re Welfare of Child.
of L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d 563, 570 (Minn. App. 2013) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion a
district court’s decision that movants had not met their burden to obtain an evidentiary
hearing on their motion for adoptive placement). “A district court abuses its discretion by
making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or
delivering a decision that is ‘against logic and the facts on record.’” Bender v. Bernhard,
971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022) (quotin g Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202
(Minn. 1997)).
The district court’s determination that the county acted reasonably appears to be
based in part on its reliance on RDNT, LLC. v . City of Bloomington, 861 N.W.2d 71, 75-
8
76 (Minn. 2015). RDNT involved a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel a city to
grant an application for a conditional-use-permit (CUP). See 861 N.W.2d at 73-75. The
part of RDNT on which the district court relied involved the district court’s assessment of
whether the city’s denial of the CUP was “unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.” Id. at
75. Thus, the RDNT analysis arose in a much different context to address considerations
quite different from those at issue in the current case (land-use concerns vs. a child’s best
interests).4 Id. at 72. Prior decisions by this court have alluded to the significant
differences between the contexts for RDNT and adoption-placement proceedings.
See In re Welfare of Child. of C.F., No. A19 -2099, 2020 WL 4433117, at *7 (Minn. App.
Aug. 3, 2020) (stating “we are mindful that the context of adoptive-placement proceedings
obviously differs from the denial of a conditional use permit at issue in RDNT”). If the
district court’s use of RDNT was a misapplication of the law, the district court’s decision
resulting from that misapplication of the law was an abuse of its discretion. Bender, 971
N.W.2d at 262 (quoting Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d at 202).
Alternatively, if the RDNT analysis is proper ly applied in the adoption-placement
context, we have two concerns about how the district court applied that analysis in this

4 While we have previously cited the RDNT analysis in adoption-placement proceedings,
we note that the parties in those cases did not raise any challenge to the standard’s
applicability. Cf. In re Rollins, 738 N.W.2d 798, 802 (Minn. App. 2007) (stating that
“[o]pinions must be read in light of the issue presented for decision. And assumptions
underlying an opinion that are not the subject of a court’s analysis are not precedential on
the point that is assumed.” (citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Comm’r of Taxation, 131 N.W.2d 632,
645 (Minn. 1964); Chapman v. Dorsey, 41 N.W.2d 438, 443 (Minn. 1950))).
9
case.5 First, we are not convinced that the district court adequately tailored its use of the
RDNT analysis to account for the differences between the land-use questions at the crux of
the RDNT dispute and the best interests of this child that are at the crux of this dispute.
Stated another way, the district court’s reliance on the RDNT analysis was defective
because the district court failed to adequately tailor its application of the use of RDNT’s
conditional-use permit analysis to the best-interests-of-the-child context.
Second, and more importantly, our review of this record suggests that D.L.P. III’s
remand to the district court was misread to suggest child should actually be placed with
T.R. Any such reading of D.L.P. III is incorrect. If a party who unsuccessfully seeks a
placement of a child challenges the county’s actual placement of that child, the challenging
party is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on their challenge if the party makes a prima
facie showing that the county’s failure to make the requested placement was unreasonable.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(b), (c). Whether a prima facie showing has been made is
a separate determination from the determinations of the best interests of the child and the
permanent placement of the child. Compare Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, with
Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2. The district court is required to dismiss the challenge if
the challenger fails to make the required prima facie showing, but the district court must
grant an evidentiary hearing if the challenger successfully makes the required prima facie
showing. See D.L.P. III, 2024 WL 4927651, at *4-5 (explaining the process required when

5 Because the parties did not raise the question and did not provide argument about whether
the RDNT analysis is appropriate in the adoptive-placement context, we do not address the
unbriefed question of whether the RDNT analysis is, in fact, proper in the adoptive-
placement context.
10
challenger makes a prima facie showing). In D.L.P. III, this court addressed only the
question of whether T.R. made a prima facie showing such that T.R. was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on his motion; this court did not reach the merits of any separate
determinations of the best interests of child or the decision on permanent placement of
child.
Because it appears that the district court also made a legal error in explaining how
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.212, subd. 2, is applied, we offer clarification on the
statute. The district court misread the statute when it stated that it “creates a preference for
relative placement.” The error appears to be triggered by situations in which the county is
considering multiple potential permanency placements, which is the case here. We
therefore seek to clarify how the district court, on remand, should evaluate the county’s
reasonableness in light of the multiple placement options for permanency that are available
under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.212, subd. 2. The statute provides:
(a) The policy of the state of Minnesota is to ensure that
the child’s best interests are met by requiring an individualized
determination of the needs of the child in consideration of
paragraphs (a) to (f), and of how the selected placement will
serve the current and future needs of the child being placed.
The authorized child- placing agency shall place a child,
released by court order or by voluntary release by the parent or
parents, in a family foster home selected by considering
placement with relatives in the following order:

(1) with an individual who is related to the child
by blood, marriage, or adoption, including the legal
parent, guardian, or custodian of the child’s sibling; or

(2) with an individual who is an important friend
of the child or of the child’s parent or custodian,
including an individual with whom the child has resided
11
or had significant contact or who has a significant
relationship to the child or the child’s parent or
custodian.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(a). The Minnesota S upreme Court has provided express
guidance on how to interpret language that is nearly identical to the following language of
this statute: the “authorized child-placing agency shall place a child . . . in a family foster
home selected by considering placement with relatives in the following order.” (Emphasis
added.)
In re S.G. involved a contested adoption of two children with competing petitions
filed by their foster parents and their paternal grandmother and step-grandfather. 828
N.W.2d 118, 119-20, 121 n.2 (Minn. 2013). The district court granted the adoption petition
of the foster parents, and the grandparents appealed, arguing that the district court erred by
not giving them statutory preference as relatives. Id. at 120. The relevant statute in that
case, Minn. Stat. § 259.57, subd. 2(c) (2012 ), required the district court to “consider
placement, consistent with the child’s best interests and in the following order, with (1) a
relative or relatives of the child, or (2) an important friend with whom the child has resided
or had significant contact.” Id. at 123 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). The supreme
court concluded that the statute’s language “[did] not require that the district court prefer a
relative over a nonrelative in determining the best interests of the child, nor does it establish
a preference for relatives in the same way that earlier versions of the statute did.” Id. at
124. The supreme court explained:
The current version of [the statute] requires that the district
court first consider adoption by relatives before considering
adoption by nonrelatives. The consideration requirement is not
12
meaningless, as the grandparents suggest. This is so because
if both the relative and nonrelative petitioners are equally
qualified to adopt and the best interests analysis renders an
equivalent result as to each party, the relative would benefit
from bei ng considered first and could proceed with the
adoption.

Id. at 125. Subsequently, this court applied the supreme court’s guidance from S.G. to the
same statute at issue in this case.
In In re Welfare of the Child. of M.L.S., this court interpreted the language in
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.212, subd. 2, as it relates to relative placements. 964
N.W.2d 441, 449-50 (Minn. App. 2021) (citing S.G., 828 N.W.2d at 125). We observed
that the relative-placement option receives preference over the important-friend option
when both placements are equally qualified to adopt the child based on the best-interests
analysis. Id. Thus, we do not read this language to create a preference for tier 1 relative-
placement options over tier 2 important-friend placement options unless both placements
are equally qualified to adopt the child based on the best-interests analysis. This court
explained that:
When making permanency placement decisions for a
child who is the subject of a juvenile -protection proceeding,
Minnesota law provides that the county “is to ensure that the
child’s best interests are met by requiring an individualized
determination of the needs of the child and of how the selected
placement will serve the needs of the child being placed.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(a) (2020). Minnesota law also
directs that placement efforts shall prioritize consideration of
relatives as placement options by stating that the county shall[:]

Consider[ ] placement with relatives and important
friends in the following order:
(1) with an individual who is related to the child by
blood, marriage, or adoption; or
13
(2) with an individual who is an important friend with
whom the child has resided or had significant contact.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(a) (regarding selection
of family foster home). See [In re] S.G., 828 N.W.2d at 125
(“[I]f both the relative and nonrelative petitioners are equally
qualified to adopt and the best interests analysis renders an
equivalent result as to each party, the relative would benefit
from being considered first.”).

Id. at 449-50 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
6
Pursuant to this court’s analysis in M.L.S., Minnesota Statute section 260C.212,
subd. 2(a), recognizes the reality that a child-placing agency may consider more than one
placement option at a time, and thus it allows for more than one placement to be considered
and provides a mechanism for deciding between those multiple placement options. If
multiple placements are equally in the child’s best interests, then placements should be
made in the order of priority set forth in the statute: first considering placement with
relatives and then considering placement with foster parents. See id. at 458. We therefore
conclude that, to the extent the district court expressed its interpretation of this statute, it
misapplied the law and therefore abused its discretion. Bender, 971 N.W.2d at 262.
Because the district court misapplied the law either in using the RDNT analysis or
in the way it applied that analysis, the district court abused its discretion. Id. Therefore,
we remand for the district court to reassess whether the county acted reasonably when it

6 While M.L.S. cites to the 2020 version of Minnesota Statutes section 260C.212, subd. 2,
these versions are functionally equivalent in that both versions use the relevant language
requiring the child-placement agency to “consider[] placement with relatives” by first
considering a blood relative and then foster parents. Compare Minn. Stat. § 260C.212,
subd. 2 (2020), with Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2 (2024).
14
denied appellants’ request for an adoptive placement. 7 Because t he district court’s
reassessment of the reasonableness of child’s placement could impact its analysis of child’s
best interests, we decline, at this time, to address the parties’ disputes about the district
court’s analysis of child’s best interests. Instead, on remand, the district court shall also
consider to what extent, if any, it is proper to alter its analysis of child’s bes t interests.8
And because the relevant facts and the best interests of the child may have evolved since
the district court made the decisions at issue in this appeal, on remand, the district court
shall have the discretion to reopen the record to engage in a fulsome analysis of the best
interests of child and the permanency placement decision. We express no opinion on how
the district court should resolve any question it addresses on remand.
Reversed and remanded.

7 In remanding, we are keenly aware of the length of time of these proceedings and the
need for child to achieve permanency, which is in the best interests of child, and thus, is a
paramount consideration in child-protection cases. We acknowledge the difficult decision
the district court must make, the desire of both placements to be a good home to child, and
the balance that must occur to ensure the best decision possible consistent with the law.
8 Consideration of the Foster Care Sibling Bill of Rights could help inform this analysis as
the statute gives children in foster care rights to maintain relationships with their biological
siblings. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.008.