State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1106

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Thomas Wayne Ward,
Appellant.

Filed May 18, 2026
Affirmed
Smith, John, Judge*

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-23-3434

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M. , Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge;
and Smith, John, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, JOHN, Judge
We affirm appellant’s convictions for third-degree assault and felony domestic
assault, concluding that any prosecutorial misconduct was harmless and did not affect the
jury verdict.
FACTS
In October 2022, the Saint Paul Fire Department was called to a motel after
employees found a woman passed out in her room. When paramedics arrived, they noted
that the woman appeared to be intoxicated. Paramedics also observed small amounts of
blood on some papers and on the bed. The woman was later identified as P.P. P.P. told
paramedics that her wrist was injured but could not recall what happened. P.P. was
transported to the hospital and was diagnosed with a wrist fracture.
Police officers arrived at the hospital later that evening to interview P.P. P.P. told
the officers that appellant Thomas Wayne Ward had repeatedly assaulted her while they
were staying at the motel. She stated that Ward punched her , “threw her to the ground,
causing her to bump her head,” and “grabbed, twisted, and pulled on her arm.” In a follow-
up interview, she explained that she and Ward had a week -long “fling” at the motel and
that they had been drinking heavily throughout the week. P.P. stated that, on their last day
together, Ward pushed her so hard that her head hit the floor, resulting in a concussion.
She also told police that Ward broke her wrist by “grabbing [her] hand and yanking it, so
hard he cracked it.”
3
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Ward with one count of third-degree assault
under Minnesota Statutes section 609.223, subdivision 1 (2022) and one count of felony
domestic assault under Minnesota Statutes section 609.2242, subdivision 4 (2022).
At trial, the jury heard testimony from P.P., a police officer, a sergeant, a paramedic,
and a physician who treated P.P.’s broken wrist. P.P. testified that she and Ward met five
months prior to the incident. The pair would occasionally meet for lunch or drinks, and
eventually their relationship became intimate. A week before the incident, Ward and P.P.
decided to get a motel room. P.P. stated that they spent the week “[d]rinking [and] walking
to get our meals at the . . . gas station.” P.P. also test ified that she and Ward drank “big
gallon jugs” of alcohol every day. On their last day, they were walking back from the gas
station when P.P. said “hi” to someone on the street. P.P. testified that this made Ward
“really angry.” When they got back to their motel room, Ward “threw [her] across the
room,” causing her to hit her head. When she stood up, Ward took her hand and “yanked
on it so hard.” When P.P. cried out, Ward told her to “shut up” and to “quit being a baby.”
Ward then smashed P.P.’s cellphone and left the motel room.
A police officer who interviewed P.P. at the hospital observed various bruises on
her body and recalled P.P. having a cast on her arm. During the interview, P.P. told the
officer that Ward caused her injuries. The officer stated that he did not consider any other
suspects based on her statements, which conveyed that Ward was the only other person in
the motel room.
P.P.’s treating physician testified that P.P. suffered a distal radial fracture to her left
wrist. P.P. reported to the physician that she had been assaulted. The physician also
4
testified that P.P. had been in an altercation with a man who “shoved her,” causing her to
hit her head.
The jury also heard testimony from a police sergeant who interviewed P.P. one
month after the assault. The sergeant stated she reviewed the initial police report and
learned that P.P. was “a victim of domestic violence” and that Ward had assaulted her.
During the interview, P.P. told the sergeant that she “met this guy and that they were at the
motel for seven days straight, drinking. The last day, the seventh day, it got violent[,] and
he put his hands on her.” When asked about P.P.’s concussion, the sergeant testified that
P.P. was “pushed hard in the chest to where she was knocked back approximately five
feet[,] where she ended up landing on the ground hitting her head.” And when asked about
P.P.’s broken wrist, the sergeant recalled P.P. telling her that Ward “pulled so hard on her
hand that it made [P.P.]’s wrist crack.”
At closing argument, the prosecutor stated, in relevant part, “P.P. was consistent
about what happened to her. She told you the truth even when it was embarrassing. She
told you the truth even when nothing about this situation made her look good . . . . None of
it makes her look good, and she was honest about all of it.” The jury found Ward guilty of
third-degree assault and felony domestic assault.
Ward appeals.
DECISION
Ward argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by vouching for the victim’s
credibility, eliciting improper vouching testimony, and misstating the evidence. Ward did
not object to the alleged errors at trial.
5
We review a claim of unobjected-to trial error under a modified plain-error standard.
State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). Under this standard, the appellant
must first show that an error occurred and that it was plain. Id. An error is plain if it
“contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” Id. When the appellant establishes
plain error, the burden shifts to the state to show that the misconduct did not affect the
appellant’s substantial rights. Id. The state must show tha t “there is no reasonable
likelihood” that the misconduct would have a significant effect on the jury verdict. Id.
(quotation omitted). When deciding whether an alleged plain error affected a defendant’s
substantial rights, “we consider the strength of the evidence against the defendant, the
pervasiveness of the improper suggestions, and whether the defendant had an opportunity
to (or made efforts to) rebut the improper suggestions.” State v. Davis, 735 N.W.2d 674,
682 (Minn. 2007).
Ward first argues that the prosecutor improperly expressed his opinion on P.P.’s
credibility in his closing argument. Ward challenges the following statements:
[P.P.] told you the truth even when it was embarrassing.
. . . .
She told you the truth even when nothing about the situation
made her look good.
. . . .
None of it makes her look good, and s he was honest about all
of it.
. . . .
She was honest about the fact that even after this defendant had
pushed her, had fractured her wrist, she watched him walk out
the door.
. . . .
She told you exactly what happened.

6
A prosecutor “may not express a personal opinion regarding witness credibility.”
State v. Smith , 825 N.W.2d 131, 139 (Minn. App. 2012). “A prosecutor’s statements in
closing argument becomes improper vouching when the prosecutor implies a guarantee of
a witness’s truthfulness, refers to facts outside the record, or expresses a personal opinion
as to a witness’s credibility.” Id. (quoting State v. Patterson, 577 N.W.2d 494, 497 (Minn.
1998). But this rule “is not designed to prevent the prosecutor from arguing that particular
witnesses were or were not credible.” State v. Leutschaft, 759 N.W.2d 414, 425 (Minn.
App. 2009) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Jackson, 773 N.W.2d 111 , 123 (Minn.
2009) (“While a prosecutor must not personally endorse a witness’s credibility, the State
may, in closing argument, argue that a witness was or was not credible.”). We analyze a
prosecutor’s statements in the context of the closing argument as a whole. State v. Powers,
654 N.W.2d 667, 679 (Minn.2003).
Here, the prosecutor’s statements about P.P.’s honesty did not constitute plain error.
She did not express her personal opinion or suggest any particular knowledge of P.P.’s
truthfulness. The prosecutor merely argued that P.P. was credible despite private aspects
of her personal life being publicized at trial. See Leutschaft, 759 N.W.2d at 425 (holding
that prosecutor’s statement about a witness being “very honest on the stand” did not
constitute improper vouching for the witness’s credibility).
By contrast, the prosecutor’s statement, “She told you the truth,” did constitute
impermissible vouching. State v. Hobbs, 713 N.W.2d 884, 889 (Minn. App. 2006),
remanded mem. (Minn. Aug. 15, 2006) (concerning other grounds), aff’d (Minn. App. May
1, 2007) (holding that the statement “she told you the truth” was improper and constituted
7
prosecutorial misconduct). But given the strength of the state’s evidence against Ward, the
limited nature of the misconduct, and Ward’s opportunity to rebut the improper
suggestions, there is no reasonable likelihood that the remark significantly affected the
verdict. Thus, any error was harmless.
Ward next argues that the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony from the
sergeant who interviewed P.P. and purportedly vouched for her credibility. Ward
challenges the following exchange:
PROSECUTOR: So, before you spoke with [P.P.], what sort
of information did you have about the incident that you were
going to be talking to her about?

WITNESS: That she was a victim of domestic violence, that it
happened at a Motel 6 off Old Hudson Road, and it was with
Mr. Ward.

PROSECUTOR: And where did you get this information
from?

WITNESS: I obtained it from the original police officer’s
reports.

Ward contends that the sergeant improperly vouched for P.P.’s testimony by
referring to her as a “victim of domestic violence.” Ward argues that the testimony
“implies” that the sergeant believed P.P. was telling the truth about the assault.
Improper vouching occurs when a witness testifies that another witness is telling the
truth or is more believable than another witness. See State v. Ferguson, 581 N.W.2d 824,
835 (Minn. 1998). Vouching is improper because “the credibility of a witness is for the
jury to decide, not [another] witness.” State v. Koskela, 536 N.W.2d 625, 630 (Minn.
1995). But vouching typically occurs when a witness makes an explicit statement about
8
the credibility of another witness. Id.; see also Van Buren v. State, 556 N.W.2d 548, 550-
52 (Minn. 1996) (holding that eliciting testimony of witnesses saying they believed the
victim constituted improper vouching).
Here, the challenged testimony does not reference the sergeant’s personal opinions
about the veracity of P.P.’s testimony. Nor did the sergeant make an explicit statement
about P.P.’s credibility. The sergeant’s testimony was based on information she obtained
from the police report, which indicated that a domestic assault occurred at the motel.
Therefore, the prosecutor did not clearly elicit vouching testimony from the sergeant.
Finally, Ward argues that the prosecutor misstated the evidence during closing
argument. “The state may present all legitimate arguments on the evidence and all proper
inferences that can be drawn from that evidence in closing argument.” State v. Peltier, 874
N.W.2d 792, 804 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). “However, a lawyer may not speculate
without a factual basis.” Id. It is misconduct for the prosecutor to “intentionally misstate
the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.” State v. Smith, 876
N.W.2d 310, 335 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). “When assessing alleged prosecutorial
misconduct during a closing argument, we look to the closing argument as a whole, rather
than to selected phrases and remarks.” State v. Graham, 764 N.W.2d 340, 356 (Minn.
2009) (quotation omitted).
Ward argues that the prosecutor misstated the evidence during her closing argument
by stating that P.P.’s testimony was “consistent.” After a review of the trial transcript, we
observe that the prosecutor’s unobjected-to statement was part of her overall argument that
the jury should find P.P.’s testimony credible. Furthermore, evidence in the record
9
demonstrates that P.P. reported the same version of events to multiple witnesses, including
the police officer, sergeant, and physician treating her wrist fracture. The prosecutor
merely expressed a proper inference from that evidence that P.P.’s testimony was
consistent. Thus, the prosecutor did not commit misconduct.
Affirmed.