State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1110

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Bradley Loren Owens,
Appellant.

Filed July 27, 2026
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Larson, Judge

Carlton County District Court
File No. 09-CR-23-762

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jacob Campion, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Jeffrey Boucher, Carlton County Attorney, Carlton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Patrick Monnens, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Following a jury trial, appellant Bradley Loren Owens challenges his conviction for
first-degree criminal sexual conduct and four convictions for second-degree criminal
sexual conduct. Owens argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court
2
abused its discretion when it allowed an expert to testify, and that respondent State of
Minnesota committed plain-error prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. In
the alternative, Owens argues the district court erred when it entered certain convictions
and imposed a lifetime conditional-release term. Because the district court did not abuse
its discretion when it allowed the expert to testify, and the state did not commit plain-error
prosecutorial misconduct, we affirm in part. But because the district court erred when it
entered certain convictions and imposed a lifetime conditional-release term, we reverse in
part and remand.
FACTS
In an amended complaint, the state charged Owens with seven counts of criminal-
sexual conduct. Prior to trial, Owens filed a motion to prohibit the state from calling an
expert witness on the basis that the state failed to comply with the notice requirements set
forth in Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1(4)(c). After a hearing, the district court reserved
ruling on the motion until trial.
Twelve days before trial, the state filed a notice of a new expert witness to testify in
the original expert’s place. Owens filed a motion to exclude the new expert from testifying
on the same grounds as the original motion. The district court denied Owens’ motion to
exclude, reserved ruling on the state’s request to present the new expert until trial, and—
should the expert testify—explicitly limited the scope of the expert’s testimony. At trial,
the district court permitted the new expert to testify but reaffirmed the limitation on the
scope of the testimony.
3
The following evidence was elicited at trial. A.R. (victim) was born in July 2010.
From ages nine to 12 victim lived with her mother, Owens (her stepfather), and her four
siblings. During this time, Owens sexually assaulted victim multiple times until she was
12 years old. The incidents often occurred in the morning after victim’s mother went to
work or while victim played video games in her bedroom. At first, Owens told victim to
remove her clothes and would then look at her. The abuse escalated, including incidents
where Owens: rubbed his penis on victim’s pants; licked her vagina; penetrated her vagina
with his finger; exposed his penis and told victim to touch his penis with her hands; grabbed
her breasts with his hands; “spank[ed]” her buttocks with his hands; and kissed her on her
mouth. Owens also showed pornographic videos to victim on multiple occasions. On one
occasion, while victim watched the videos, Owens exposed his penis and almost touched
victim’s mouth with it . Owens suggested that victim and Owens perform the acts that
appeared in the pornographic videos.
The last incident occurred in May 2023. During that incident, Owens came into
victim’s bedroom after she showered. Owens told victim to drop her towel and lean against
her bed. At that point, Owens approached victim from behind and rubbed his exposed
penis against her buttocks. After victim went to school, Owens messaged her saying that
he wanted to “do that to [her] a-- later.” Following this incident, victim sent a text message
to her mother asking what to do if “someone says they want to f-ck my a--.” Eventually,
victim reported this incident to her teacher, her school counselor, law enforcement, and a
forensic interviewer.
4
Based upon these facts, the district court submitted five counts to the jury: 1
• Count I: first- degree criminal sexual conduct under
Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1a(g) (penetration – under
age 16 – significant relationship);

• Count III: second-degree criminal sexual conduct under
Minn. Stat. § 609.343. subd. 1a(g) (Supp. 2021) (sexual
contact – under age 16 – significant relationship);

• Count IV: second- degree criminal sexual conduct
under Minn. Stat. § 609.343. subd. 1a(g) (sexual contact
– under age 16 – significant relationship);

• Count V: second-degree criminal sexual conduct under
Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1a(h)(iii) (Supp. 2021)
(multiple instances of sexual contact – under age 16 –
significant relationship);

• Count VI: second- degree criminal sexual conduct
under Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1a(h)(iii) (multiple
instances of sexual contact – under age 16 – significant
relationship).

After final jury instructions, each party presented their closing argument. During
the state’s closing argument and rebuttal, as relevant here, the prosecutor used the word s
“we” and “you” multiple times. The jury returned guilty verdicts, and the district court
entered convictions, on all five counts. The district court sentenced Owens to a 144-month
prison term on count I and a 150-month prison term on count V, to be served concurrently.
The district court did not impose sentences on counts III, IV, and VI.
Owens appeals.

1 The state filed three amended complaints; each included seven counts. The district court
granted Owens’ motion to dismiss count VII for a lack of probable cause. The remaining
six counts proceeded to trial. Before the final jury instructions, the state moved to dismiss
count II. The district court granted the motion.
5
DECISION
Owens raises four arguments on appeal. First, he argues the district court abused
its discretion when it allowed the state’s new expert to testify. Second, he asserts the state
committed plain-error prosecutorial misconduct when the prosecutor used the words “we”
and “you” during closing arguments. Third, he contends, and the state agrees, that the
district court erred when it entered convictions for counts III, IV, and VI because they were
part of the same behavioral incident as count V. Fourth, he argues, and the state agrees,
that the district court erred when it sentenced him to a lifetime conditional-release term.
We address his arguments in turn.
I.
Owens first argues the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the state’s
new expert to testify. Specifically, Owens challenges the district court’s decision that no
discovery violation occurred when, less than two weeks before trial, the state filed a notice
of a new expert witness with an allegedly inadequate written summary of the subject matter
of the expert’s testimony. Owens also argues that, if a violation did occur, the district court
abused its discretion in its selection of the appropriate remedy—limiting the scope of the
expert’s testimony.
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.01 sets out the state’s discovery
obligations. The rule provides that the state must disclose “[t]he names and addresses of
witnesses who may be called at trial . . . within the prosecutor’s actual knowledge.” Minn.
R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1(1)(a). Additionally, subdivision 1(4)(c) provides:
6
A person who will testify as an expert but who created
no results or reports in connection with the case must provide
to the prosecutor for disclosure to the defense a written
summary of the subject matter of the expert’s testimony, along
with any findings, opinions, or conclusions the expert will
give, the basis for them, and the expert’s qualifications.

Id., subd. 1(4)(c). This summary must be disclosed “at the defense’s request and before
the Rule 11 Omnibus Hearing,” Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1, but “in time to afford
counsel the opportunity to make beneficial use of it,” Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.03, subd. 2(a).
When a prosecutor fails to comply with this rule, it is a discovery violation, and the
district court must determine the appropriate remedy. State v. Freeman, 531 N.W.2d 190,
197-98 (Minn. 1995). Appropriate remedies include allowing additional discovery,
granting a continuance, or entering “any order it deems just in the circumstances.” Minn.
R. Crim. P. 9.03, subd. 8. When deciding the appropriate remedy, the district court must
assess whether the discovery violation harmed the defendant and “the extent to which th[e]
harm can be eliminated or otherwise alleviated.” State v. Lindsey, 284 N.W.2d 368, 373
(Minn. 1979). To do so, the district court should consider “(1) the reason why disclosure
was not made; (2) the extent of prejudice to the opposing party; (3) the feasibility of
rectifying that prejudice by a continuance; and (4) any other relevant factors.” Id.
Here, we assume without deciding that a discovery violation occurred because the
district court did not abuse its discretion in its selection of the appropriate remedy. The
district court found that (1) the state disclosed the new expert so close to trial “due to the
unavailability of the [s]tate’s previously- disclosed expert witness”; (2) Owens was
prejudiced because of the short timeline for defense counsel to prepare for cross-
7
examination; and (3) continuing the trial was “not feasible” and “not practical” because a
jury had been sworn in and had answered questionnaires, and the interest of “fairness to
the parties, the witnesses, and the alleged victim.” As to other relevant factors, the district
court found it “relevant that the proposed expert witness [was] similar to the previously-
disclosed expert witness” and that “the expert testimony, if needed at all, [would] be limited
in scope.” Based upon this record, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it determined that the appropriate remedy for any discovery violation was limiting
the scope of the expert witness’s testimony.
For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in its
selection of the appropriate remedy for any discovery violation that occurred.
II.
Owens argues second that the state committed plain-error prosecutorial misconduct
during closing argument. Because Owens did not object during closing argument, we apply
the modified plain-error test. State v. Portillo, 998 N.W.2d 242, 248 (Minn. 2023). Under
this test, the defendant must show that the prosecutor’s conduct constituted (1) an error
(2) that was plain. Id. An error is plain if it “contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of
conduct.” State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294 , 302 (Minn. 2006). “If the defendant is
successful, the burden then shifts to the [s]tate to demonstrate that the error did not affect
the defendant’s substantial rights.” Portillo, 998 N.W.2d at 248 (quotation omitted).
Misconduct does not affect substantial rights if “there is no reasonable likelihood that the
absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the verdict of
the jury.” Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302 (quotation omitted). To determine whether a
8
reasonable likelihood exists, “we consider the strength of the evidence against the
defendant, the pervasiveness of the improper suggestions, and whether the defendant had
an opportunity to (or made efforts to) rebut the improper suggestions.” Portillo, 998
N.W.2d at 251 (quotation omitted). If the state fails to meet its burden, we “will not grant
relief to correct the error unless our failure to do so will cause the public to seriously
question the fairness and integrity of our judicial system.” Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d
347, 359 (Minn. 2022).
Owens asserts that during closing argument and rebuttal, the prosecutor improperly
invited the jurors to put themselves in victim’s shoes because they repeatedly used the
words “we” and “you.” Owens highlights six instances, five during closing argument and
one during rebuttal:
We’ve all experienced things in our lives that we’ll never
forget. We may not remember every detail, but we will never
forget that we’ve experienced them, events such as a wedding,
a car accident, our favorite concert, or the birth of a child.

(Emphasis added.)

If she were going to lie, don’t you think she’d keep it simple,
easier to remember, maybe one event? But she talked about so
many different ways that he had touched her and penetrated her
over a period of years.

If you’re going to tell a story, you’re not going to tell a
story that last two years, over a period of two years that you
have to try to remember. If she was lying, she wouldn’t
minimize what Mr. Owens did to her.

(Emphasis added.)

Think how hard it was for her to come into this
courtroom and testify about things that Mr. Owens did to her
9
two to four years ago, how nervous she must have been. And
I don’t know if you were watching her, but you certainly can
consider just her body language as she was testify [sic].

How nervous some of you were even during voir dire
asking questions in front of a room full of people. It’s not easy
to come in here. It’s not easy for us as attorneys even to stand
here and talk in a room full of people.

(Emphasis added.)

They’re [sic] minor variations because people don’t remember
the exact details again. But if something happens to you, you
know that it happened to you.

(Emphasis added.)

There’s some things in life that you just don’t forget, and you
don’t forget your stepdad sticking his fingers inside of you ,
kissing you, grabbing your breasts, grabbing your butt, rubbing
his penis on you , and making you masturbate him. You don’t
forget your stepdad showing you pornography and telling you
he wants to do those things with you. And while you may
forget some of the details, you just don’t forget that it
happened.

(Emphasis added.)

[Defense counsel] talks about . . . how [victim] said it
seemed like[] every night that he was in there. Maybe it felt
like every night. When you’re 11 and 12 years old and your
stepdad comes into your room and wants to see you naked and
touches you, it probably feels like every night.

(Emphasis added.)
“It is improper to request that the jurors put themselves in the shoes of the victim.”
State v. Jones, 753 N.W.2d 677, 692 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). This rule
specifically prohibits urging jurors to sympathize with the victim ’s experience of the
offense. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 578 N.W.2d 734, 742 (Minn. 1998) (holding that
10
prosecutor’s statement that victim was “awakened to probably one of the most terrible
sights that any mother can see . . . your own daughter being killed right before your eyes,”
was an improper invitation to stand in witness ’s shoes). But it is not improper to ask the
jury to consider whether a witness’s testimony made sense in light of the jury’s experience
and common sense. Jones, 753 N.W.2d at 692. Nor does the rule preclude the prosecutor
from “fairly meet[ing]” defense arguments about a victim ’s credibility. State v. Martin ,
773 N.W.2d 89, 106 (Minn. 2009). To determine whether a prosecutor struck the
appropriate balance, we consider the closing argument as a whole. State v. Swanson, 707
N.W.2d 645, 656 (Minn. 2006). Three of our nonprecedential opinions are instructive to
resolving this case.2
First, in State v. Santos, a prosecutor responded to a challenge to the victim’s
credibility. No. A24- 1310, 2025 WL 1794044, at *3-4 (Minn. App. June 30, 2025), rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 24, 2025). The prosecutor used the words “we” and “you” to ask the
jurors whether an alleged “vacillation” in a witness’s testimony was understandable under
the circumstances. Id. at *4. After noting that the remark was made in response to the
defendant’s closing argument, we determined no error occurred. Id. Likewise, here, the
prosecutor’s statement during rebuttal was aimed at countering Owens’ attack on victim’s
recollection of the incidents.
Second, in State v. James, a prosecutor used the word “you” to invite the jurors to
consider whether the victim would fabricate the specific allegations, given the jurors’

2 We cite nonprecedential opinions as persuasive authority only. See Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
11
common sense and life experiences. No. A20-0207, 2021 WL 669018, at *8 (Minn. App.
Feb. 22, 2021), rev. denied (Minn. May 26, 2021). We distinguished Thompson on the
basis that “the prosecutor did not invite the jurors to imagine the sensory experience of
appellant’s son,” but asked the jury to consider whether it made sense for a witness to
fabricate his testimony “given the facts in evidence and the jurors’ common sense and life
experiences.” Id. We determined that this was not an impermissible invitation to stand in
the victim’s shoes. Id. Here, like in James, the prosecutor did not ask the jury to imagine
the victim’s sensory experience. Rather, the remarks asked the jury to consider their
common sense and life experiences in evaluating whether victim’s testimony was
reasonable.
Finally, in State v. Lan , a prosecutor asked the jurors to consider the effect of the
crime on the victim. No. A20-0897, 2021 WL 1847175, at *3 (Minn. App. May 10, 2021),
rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2021). We concluded the prosecutor did not engage in
prosecutorial misconduct because the remarks did not direct the jurors, as individuals, to
imagine themselves as victims of a crime but asked them to consider what it was like for
the victim to experience the crime. Id. Here, like in Lan , the prosecutor’s remarks do not
ask the jurors to imagine themselves individually as a victim of the crime.
We conclude that the prosecutor’s use of the words “we” and “you” in this case is
akin to Santos, James, and Lan. Given these prior decisions, the state did not plainly err
because the closing argument did not obviously contravene “case law, a rule, or a standard
of conduct.” Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302.
12
But even if the use of the words “we” and “you” was plain error, we would reach
the same result because there is no reasonable likelihood that the alleged misconduct had
a significant effect on the jury’s verdict. See id. First, the state’s case against Owens was
strong: victim testified about the abuse, and her testimony was corroborated by the forensic
interviews, her mother, her teacher, her counselor, and law enforcement. Second, the
alleged misconduct was not pervasive; the prosecutor’s statements consist of a few, isolated
statements in a trial transcript of over 1,100 pages and a 45- page closing argument and
rebuttal. Third, Owens had an opportunity to respond to the alleged improper statements
in his own closing argument. Based on this record, there is no reasonable likelihood that
the absence of the alleged prosecutorial misconduct would have had a significant effect on
the jury’s verdict. See Jones, 753 N.W.2d at 692-93.
Accordingly, Owens is not entitled to relief based upon his prosecutorial misconduct
argument. See State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 620 (Minn. 2012) (providing that, if any
requirement in plain-error test is not satisfied, we need not consider other requirements).
III.
Third, Owens contends, and the state agrees, that the district court erred when it
entered convictions for counts III, IV, and VI because they were part of the same behavioral
incident as count V. Applying our de novo review, we agree with the parties. See State v.
Bonkowske, 957 N.W.2d 437, 443 (Minn. App. 2021) (reviewing this issue de novo).
Under Minnesota law, a defendant “may be convicted of either the crime charged
or an included offense, but not both.” Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (2020). The supreme
court has interpreted section 609.04 to “bar[] multiple convictions under different sections
13
of a criminal statute for acts committed during a single behavioral incident.” State v.
Jackson, 363 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1985). “If the lesser offense is a lesser degree of
the same crime or a lesser degree of a multi-tier statutory scheme dealing with a particular
subject, then it is an ‘included offense’ under [Minn. Stat. §] 609.04.” State v. Hackler,
532 N.W.2d 559, 559 (Minn. 1995).
The proper procedure for district courts “when the defendant is convicted on more
than one charge for the same act is for the [district] court to adjudicate formally and impose
sentence on one count only,” retaining the guilty verdicts on remaining charges, but not
formally adjudicating them. State v. LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 1984).
“When [the] official judgment order states that a party has been convicted of or sentenced
for more than one included offense,” we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the
erroneous conviction. State v. Pflepsen, 590 N.W.2d 759, 767 (Minn. 1999); see also State
v. Crockson, 854 N.W.2d 244, 248 (Minn. App. 2014), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 16, 2014).
Here, the state brought charges under count s V and VI for second-degree criminal
sexual conduct pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1a(h)(iii) (multiple instances of
sexual contact – under age 16 – significant relationship). For both counts, the jury
instructions provided one set of elements and articulated the same timeframe. And during
closing argument, the prosecutor described the conduct involved in counts V and VI by
relying on the same evidence and the same acts described by victim during the same
timeframe for each count. See State v. Folley, 438 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Minn. 1989) (holding
defendant was improperly convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct
14
“based on the same evidence and the same acts, all of which occurred before complainant
turned 13”).
Regarding counts III and IV, the state brought charges for two individual instances
of second-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1a(g) (sexual
contact – under age 16 – significant relationship). The complaint alleged that each incident
occurred during the same timeframe as the multiple instances charged in count V. Because
count V related to multiple instances of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (sexual
contact – under age 16 – significant relationship), the single instances were necessarily
proved as part of that conduct. See, e.g., State v. Goggleye, No. A15-0125, 2016 WL
102493, at *8 (Minn. App. Jan. 11, 2016) (“[P]roof of multiple acts . . . necessarily includes
proof of a single act under [the same statute] , if the single act occurred during the same
time period as the multiple acts”), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 2016).
For these reasons, we reverse and remand to vacate the convictions for counts III,
IV, and VI and to issue a new warrant of commitment consistent with this opinion.
Pflepsen, 590 N.W.2d at 767. We instruct the district court to preserve the underlying
guilty verdicts for counts III, IV, and VI. See LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d at 284.
IV.
Finally, Owens argues, and the state agrees, that the district court erred when it
imposed lifetime conditional release. Again, applying our de novo review, we agree with
the parties. See State v. Williams, 771 N.W.2d 514, 520 (Minn. 2009) (reviewing de novo
whether a sentence conforms to the requirements of a statute).
15
A person convicted of first-degree or second-degree criminal sexual conduct is
subject to a ten-year conditional- release term. Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6 (Supp.
2021). But if “the offender has a previous or prior sex offense conviction,” the offender is
subject to a lifetime conditional-release term. Id., subd. 7(b) (Supp. 2021).
Owens argues that he did not have a prior sex-offense conviction at sentencing that
allowed the district court to impose lifetime conditional release because the district court
adjudicated him guilty of all five counts simultaneously. See State v. Brown, 937 N.W.2d
146, 156 (Minn. App. 2019) (“[C]onvictions adjudicated simultaneously cannot constitute
both a prior conviction and a present offense. ”), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 2020). We
agree.
The jury returned guilty verdicts for all five counts. At sentencing, the district court
stated, “[s]o, if it has not already been accepted, the [c]ourt will accept the verdict of the
jury and ask that it be recorded.” In doing so, the district court accepted and recorded all
five guilty verdicts simultaneously. Accordingly, Owens did not have a prior sex-offense
conviction because there was no temporal gap between the district court’s adjudication of
the offenses. See Brown, 937 N.W.2d at 157; see also State v. Nodes, 863 N.W.2d 77, 81-
82 (Minn. 2015).
Therefore, we reverse and remand for the district court to impose a ten-year
conditional-release term.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.