In the Matter of the Peace Officer License of Jason Michael Sievert, No. 21239.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1112

In the Matter of the Peace Officer License of
Jason Michael Sievert, No. 21239.

Filed April 6, 2026
Affirmed
Segal, Judge*

Peace Officer Standards and Training Board
File No. PB 24-073

Mark Schneider, Renee Zachman, Law Enforcement Labor Services, Inc., Brooklyn
Center, Minnesota (for relator Jason Michael Sievert)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Christopher M. Kaisershot, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Peace Officer Standards and Training Board)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Segal ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Judge
In this certiorari appeal from an order censuring relator’s peace- officer license,
relator argues that respondent’s decision is affected by an error of law, is unsupported by
substantial evidence, and is arbitrary and capricious. We affirm.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
FACTS
Relator Jason Michael Sievert is a licensed peace officer who works as a deputy in
the Isanti County Sherriff’s Office. 1 In September 2023, Sievert’s wife was conducting
field work in her capacity as an assessor in neighboring Pine County. Sievert’s wife called
911 after an armed individual confronted her about driving on his property and locked a
gate, which left her trapped in her car behind an electrified fence. Deputies from the Pine
County Sheriff’s Office responded to the incident.
After the incident, Sievert’s wife filled out a first-report- of-injury form for her
employer. She testified that the report needed to be filed within 24 hours of an injury. She
said she contacted the Pine County Sheriff’s Office to obtain a copy of a report about the
incident so that she could submit it with her form. She was told that no report had yet been
prepared. Sievert’s wife testified that, “at that point, [she] was concerned that [the matter]
wasn’t being taken very seriously, and [she] wasn’t getting the information that [she]
needed.” She felt that she was being given “the runaround” and asked her husband to
contact the Pine County Sheriff’s Office on her behalf.
Sievert called the Pine County Sheriff’s Office and was given the same
information—that no report had yet been prepared. After being initially transferred, he
requested to speak with a supervisor and was eventually transferred to Chief Deputy Scott
Grice. Sievert left Grice a voicemail in which he identified himself as a deputy with the
Isanti County Sheriff’s Office. The voicemail was transcribed as follows:

1 The facts are summarized from the testimony and record presented in the contested-case
hearing before the administrative law judge (ALJ).
3
Hey Chief Deputy, this is Deputy Sievert from the Isanti
County Sheriff’s Office. I have a question regarding my wife’s
incident yesterday under 230919567. She was a county
appraiser out doing her job yesterday and got, basically, held
against her will within an electrified fence at a property. Just
wanted to know if there was going to be a full-fledged report
on this. I’m guessing her boss is going to be wanting one and
also the County Administrator. If you can, give me a call at
[phone number]. Again, her name is [wife’s name]. Thanks.

Grice did not know Sievert but promptly returned his call, and the two spoke for about five
minutes.
Grice testified that, during the phone call, Sievert several times demanded to know
if a full report was being prepared or just notes from the deputies’ response to the call.
Grice said that he tried to explain that an investigation report was being prepared that would
be referred to the county attorney’s office, but that Sievert’s tone was “confrontational ”
and “demanding.” He believed that Sievert “was using his position to try to leverage any
kind of decision for the sheriff’s office.” Grice testified that, toward the end of the call,
Sievert repeated what he had stated in the voicemail message that he “was sure that [his
wife’s] boss[, the Pine County Assessor,] and [the Pine County Administrator] would want
the report.” Grice testified that it is not normal protocol to provide copies of reports to
such individuals. Grice also testified that Sievert’s phone call did not in fact influence the
office’s investigation and that the report was completed later that day and was forwarded
to the county attorney’s office.
Believing that Sievert acted inappropriately, Grice contacted the Isanti County
Sheriff’s Office and spoke with Chief Deputy John Gillquist about his concerns. Gillquist
relayed the conversation to Isanti County Sheriff Wayne Seiberlich. The two of them then
4
met with Sievert to obtain his summary of what had occurred. Seiberlich testified that
Sievert told them “that he felt his wife was getting the runaround, and that . . . they weren’t
getting the answers that they thought they deserved.” Sievert acknowledged making these
statements in the meeting. He also acknowledged telling Seiberlich and Gillquist that, if
their spouse was involved, “you can’t tell me that [you] wouldn’t do the same.”
Seiberlich determined that Sievert’s contacts with the Pine County Sheriff’s Office
violated several office policies, including conduct “that tends to reflect unfavorably upon
the office or its members”; “[u]sing or disclosing one’s status as an employee with the
office in any way that could reasonably be perceived as an attempt to gain influence or
authority for non-office business or activity”; and “[u]sing or disclosing one’s status as an
employee with the office in a way that could reasonably be perceived as an attempt to gain
influence or authority for non-office business or activity.” Seiberlich issued Sievert a
verbal warning. In the letter accompanying the warning, Seiberlich stated:
Though I understand the urge to protect your family,
this phone call was made at a time you were off duty, yet you
represented yourself as a member of this office. You used your
title in a manner to influence a response. Your conversation
with the Chief Deputy reflected negatively upon yourself and
this office. It was not your place to speak on behalf of the Pine
County Assessor’s Office or the Pine County Administrator.

In his testimony, Seiberlich further explained his decision to issue discipline:
One of the benefits that law enforcement has is we have the
ability to share information . . . with other agencies, and we can
do that without subpoenas or search warrants or documentation
when it is a legitimate reason for investigative purposes or law
5
enforcement purposes.[2] But it’s a completely different thing
if you identify yourself as a police officer and you try to get
information from another agency for your own personal
benefit, or for the benefit of a spouse.

Seiberlich additionally testified that he “chose to use the least amount of discipline I could
in this, but something needed to be done.” Seiberlich stated that Sievert’s reaction to the
discipline was that it was “harsh,” but Sievert did not grieve or otherwise contest the
disciplinary action. Seiberlich then reported the matter to respondent Peace Officer
Standards and Training Board (the board). Sievert did not self-report the matter to the
board.
The board is responsible for the licensing of all peace officers in the state and is
required to adopt rules establishing minimum standards of conduct for licensees. See Minn.
Stat. §§ 626.84, subd. 1, .843, subd. 1 (2024). The board is also authorized, as relevant
here, to suspend or revoke a peace officer’s license for violating those standards. See Minn.
Stat. § 626.8432, subd. 1(a)(4) (2024).
The board referred Seiberlich’s report to a Complaint Investigation Committee for
investigation. Based on its investigation, the committee recommended disciplinary action,
asserting two violations of the board’s rules of conduct: (1) “misuse of a peace officer’s
authority by: . . . the use or attempted use of one’s position or authority as a peace officer
to obtain a benefit, avoid a detriment, or harm another,” which is set out in Minnesota Rule

2 The Minnesota Government Data Practices Act provides that nothing in the act “prohibits
the exchange of information by law enforcement agencies provided the exchanged
information is pertinent and necessary to the requesting agency in initiating, furthering, or
completing an investigation,” with certain exceptions not relevant here. Minn. Stat.
§ 13.82, subd. 24 (2024).
6
6700.1600, subpart 1(G)(1) (2023); and (2) failing to comply with the reporting
requirement set out in Minnesota Rule 6700.1610, subparts 2 and 3 (2023), which requires
that a licensee report to the board “any action, inaction, or condition of that licensee which
the licensee reasonably believes would constitute grounds for disciplinary action under any
of the board’s regulatory provision s” within “ten days after learning of the reportable
event.”
The case proceeded to a contested-case hearing before an ALJ pursuant to section
214.10 of the Minnesota Statutes, which provides for an administrative hearing for board
disciplinary proceedings. See Minn. Stat. § 214.10, subd. 12 (2024). Grice, Seiberlich,
Sievert, and Sievert’s wife testified at the hearing, along with several other witnesses. The
ALJ recommended against a determination that Sievert violated the misuse rule. The ALJ
explained that “[a]lthough communicating his position and place of work was ill-advised
and caused a reasonable perception of misuse that justified workplace discipline, the
totality of the evidence does not show that [Sievert] had the requisite intent to violate the
Board’s prohibition” by using or attempting to use his position or authority as a peace
officer to obtain a benefit. The ALJ further reasoned that, if Sievert did not violate the
misuse rule, he could not have reasonably believed that his conduct “would constitute
grounds for disciplinary action under any of the board’s regulatory provisions.” The ALJ
thus also recommended that Sievert should not be found in violation of the reporting rule.
The matter proceeded to the board for a final decision. After considering the
evidence in the record and hearing arguments from Sievert and the Complaint Investigation
Committee, the board determined that Sievert had violated both the misuse and reporting
7
rules. In its decision, the board modified three of the ALJ’s findings by (1) adding a finding
that Sievert admitted telling Seiberlich and Gillquist that they would do the same if their
spouse was involved, and that “Seiberlich testified that he would not invoke his title for
personal benefit and reiterated that it was wrong for Sievert to do so”; (2) deleting the
ALJ’s finding that incorporated any material fact set out in her memorandum as a finding
of fact, replacing that with a statement that “[t]he Board declines to adopt and does not
incorporate any findings and conclusions set forth in the ALJ’s memorandum”; and
(3) adding a finding that Seiberlich and Grice testified credibly, “particularly concerning
their interactions with [Sievert]. ”3 The board censure d Sievert’s license but stayed
suspension.
Sievert now seeks certiorari review of the board ’s decision to censure his peace-
officer license.

3 The ALJ included a credibility finding concerning Grice’s testimony in her memorandum,
not in her findings of fact. She made no credibility finding concerning Seiberlich’s
testimony. As to Grice’s credibility, the ALJ stated the following in her memorandum:

Grice’s testimony that [Sievert] introduced himself as a Deputy
when they spoke to one another on the phone is unsupported
by the record. Grice conceded that [Sievert ’s] introduction
occurred only once; the voicemail recording establishes when
[Sievert] introduced himself. Grice’s recollection of the
telephone call is erroneous in at least that respect, diminishing
the reliability of his testimony about the call.

Grice’s testimony that [Sievert] was demanding and
argumentative is contradicted by the Sieverts’ testimony, and
no more compelling.
8
DECISION
The Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act governs appellate review of the
board’s decision. See Minn. Stat. §§ 14.02, subd. 2, .57(a), 214.10, subd. 12 (2024). Under
the act, an appellate court “may reverse or modify [a final] decision [in a contested case] if
the substantial rights of the petitioner[] may have been prejudiced because,” as relevant
here, the decision is affected by an error of law, unsupported by substantial evidence, or
arbitrary or capricious. Minn. Stat. § 14.69 (2024).
An administrative agency’s decision enjoys a presumption of correctness and
appellate courts defer to the agency’s expertise and special knowledge in its field. 4 In re
Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance, 731 N.W.2d 502, 513
(Minn. 2007). Appellate courts defer to such expertise or special knowledge when (1) “the
agency is interpreting a regulation that is unclear and susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation or the agency’s interpretation is reasonable”; or (2) “when the
application of the regulation is primarily factual and necessarily requires application of the
agency’s technical knowledge and expertise to the facts presented.” In re Rev. of 2005
Ann. Automatic Adjustment of Charges for all Elec. & Gas Utils., 768 N.W.2d 112, 119
(Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted).
In this appeal, Sievert’s challenge to the board’s decision is focused largely on the
board’s interpretation of the misuse rule. Sievert maintains that the rule requires evidence

4 In this regard, we note that ten of the 17 members that make up the board are required to
be current or former licensed peace officers, including two county sheriffs, two chiefs of
police, and the superintendent of the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension or
designee. See Minn. Stat. § 626.841 (2024).
9
of a specific intent to use one’s position or authority for attempt violations— violations
when no benefit is actually obtained. He contends that the board committed an error of
law by interpreting the rule as not requiring proof of specific intent. Sievert also argues
that the board’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence because the record does
not support that he either intended to misuse his position or authority or that he intended to
obtain a “benefit” within the meaning of the rule. He asserts that the facts establish that he
was only trying to assist his wife in obtaining information that any crime victim is entitled
to receive. Sievert further argues that the board’s decision is arbitrary and capricious
because it found, without adequate explanation, that Grice’s testimony was credible when
the ALJ found, in her memorandum of law, that Grice’s testimony about his call with
Sievert had “diminish[ed] . . . reliability.” Finally, Sievert challenges the board’s
determination that he violated the reporting rule, again asserting an error of law, lack of
substantial evidence, and that the decision is arbitrary and capricious.
We address each argument in turn.
I. The board’s decision that Sievert violated the misuse rule, Minn. R. 6700.1600,
subp. 1(G)(1), is not based on an error of law, is supported by substantial
evidence, and is not arbitrary or capricious.

A. The board’s determination that Sievert violated the rule is supported by
substantial evidence, even if the rule requires proof of specific intent.

Sievert’s first argument is that the board’s decision that he violated the misuse rule
should be reversed because the board committed an error of law in interpreting the rule.
He maintains that the rule requires proof of a specific intent to use his peace officer position
10
for the purpose of obtaining a benefit to constitute a violation of the attempt portion of the
rule. Sievert contends that the record does not support that he had this intent.
The board maintains that the rule does not require proof of a specific intent and that
a peace officer can be found in violation of the rule for even carelessly using one’s position
to attempt to obtain a benefit. The board notes that the rule lists three prohibited actions
that constitute misuse and, of the three, only one is prefaced by the requirement that the
action be malicious: “maliciously procuring a search warrant.” Minn. R. 6700.1600,
subp. 1(G)(3) (2023). The board reasons that the express inclusion of a scienter
requirement in 1(G)(3) and the absence of any such requirement in 1(G)(1), the provision
at issue here, establishes that scienter is not a required element of 1(G)(1). See, e.g., In re
Ins. Agents’ Licenses of Kane, 473 N.W.2d 869, 876-77 (Minn. App. 1991) (deeming the
absence of a scienter requirement in one provision of a statute to be intentional when
scienter is expressly required in other provisions), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 25, 1991).
We need not resolve this dispute, however, because there is no claim by the board
in this case that Sievert’s violation was the result of carelessness. We thus assume, without
deciding, that the rule requires proof of a specific intent to attempt to use “one’s position
or authority as a peace officer, to obtain a benefit, avoid a detriment, or harm another.”
Minn. R. 6700.1600, subd. 1(G)(1).
The next step in our analysis is to assess whether there is substantial evidence in the
record to support the board’s finding that Sievert had such intent. The “substantial
evidence” standard has been interpreted as requiring “(1) such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; (2) more than a scintilla
11
of evidence; (3) more than some evidence; (4) more than any evidence; or (5) the evidence
considered in its entirety.” In re Admin. Order Issued to Wazwaz, 943 N.W.2d 212, 216 -
17 (Minn. App. 2020) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. June 30, 2020). Under this
standard, we will not disturb an agency’s decision if “it has adequately explained how it
derived its conclusion and that conclusion is reasonable in the basis of the record.” In re
Enbridge Energy, Ltd. P’ship, 964 N.W.2d 173, 189 (Minn. App. 2021) (quotations
omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 2021). So long as an agency engages in reasoned
decision-making, an appellate court “will affirm, even though it may have reached a
different conclusion had it been the factfinder.” Cable Commc’ns Bd. v. Nor-West Cable
Commc’ns P’ship, 356 N.W.2d 658, 669 (Minn. 1984).
If specific intent is required, which we are assuming for purposes of this opinion,
then the record must contain substantial evidence that Sievert possessed a specific intent to
use his position and that the purpose of that use was to obtain a benefit. Intent can be
proved either through direct evidence or by inference. See In re Appeal by Kind Heart
Daycare, Inc. v. Comm’r of Hum. Servs., 905 N.W.2d 1, 13 (Minn. 2017) (relying on
circumstantial evidence in determining that substantial evidence supports the
commissioner’s determination that an individual acted with “intent to defeat the purposes
of . . . child care assistance programs” (quoting Minn. Stat. § 256.98, subd. 1 (2016)); c f.
State v. Cruz , 997 N.W.2d 537, 552 (Minn. 2023); Iowa Kemper Ins. Co. v. Stone, 269
N.W.2d 885, 887 (Minn. 1978); Potter v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 622 N.W.2d 141, 145
(Minn. App. 2001). Because of the absence of direct evidence of intent in this case, proof
of intent relies on inference.
12
Sievert argues that the following circumstances support that he lacked the requisite
intent: he was calling on behalf of his distressed wife, just like any spouse would do in a
similar situation; he used his peace officer title only in the voicemail that he left for Grice
and did not reference it any other time in his initial call or during the return call from Grice;
and the use of his title was inadvertent and out of habit based on the frequent work-related
calls he has with other law-enforcement agencies where he identifies himself using his job
title. We are not persuaded, however, that t his undermines the board’s findings to the
contrary.
Here, the record establishes that Sievert called the Pine County Sheriff’s Office
because his wife believed she was getting “the runaround.” It is reasonable to infer that
Sievert then made the call believing that he might be able to cut through the perceived
“runaround” because of his position as a fellow sheriff’s deputy. Indeed, if Sievert was not
a peace officer, there is no reason to believe that a law-enforcement agency would be any
more responsive to the spouse of a crime victim than to the actual victim and there would
be no reason for Sievert to make the call. And the fact is that Sievert did identify himself
as a sheriff’s deputy in the voicemail message that he left for Grice. In addition, Sievert
told his sheriff and chief deputy that they would have acted likewise if their spouses were
in a similar situation.
These uncontested facts support an inference that he used his position when making
the call to the Pine County Sheriff’s Office. As such, the record contains “substantial
evidence” supporting the board’s determination that Sievert “used his position” when
13
making the call to the Pine County Sheriff’s Office, even though a different inference might
also be supported by the facts. See Cable Commc’ns Bd., 356 N.W.2d at 669.
The next question is whether Sievert used his position to obtain a benefit. Sievert
argues that there was no benefit to be gained because his wife, as the victim of the incident,
was entitled to receive a copy of the report. 5 The board came to a contrary conclusion.
The board based its finding, in part, on the fact that Sievert communicated to the Pine
County Sheriff’s Office that he wanted to make sure that there was going to be a “full-
fledged report” and not just notes of the incident, with Grice assuring Sievert that there
would be such a report with a referral to the county attorney’s office for review for potential
charging. Sievert’s statements in both the voicemail and the call with Grice that the Pine
County Administrator and Assessor would want copies of the report lends support to the
board’s determination that Sievert sought heightened attention to his wife’s case, arguably
implying that the top-level administrators in the county had an interest in the outcome.
The word “benefit” is not defined in the rule, but we can look to dictionary
definitions to determine its plain meaning. See Larson v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 855
N.W.2d 293, 301 (Minn. 2014) (“[Appellate courts] often look to dictionary definitions to

5 The board argues that Sievert’s contention is inaccurate. It notes that “[a]ctive criminal
investigative data are classified [under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act] as
confidential or protected nonpublic, meaning they are not public and inaccessible even to
the subject of the data,” citing Minn. Stat. § 13.82, subd. 7 (2024). But “[a] crime victim
may nevertheless access certain active investigative data upon a written request to the
prosecuting authority, based on that prosecutor’s discretion.” The board thus contends that,
because Sievert is not the crime victim, he was not entitled to receive any protected data.
The board also notes that his wife never made a written request. We express no opinion
on this issue.
14
determine the plain meanings of words.”). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “benefit” as
“[t]he advantage or privilege something gives; the helpful or useful effect something has.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 193 (12th ed. 2024) (defining benefit). And the American Heritage
Dictionary similarly defines “benefit” as “[s]omething that promotes or enhances well-
being; an advantage.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 168
(5th ed. 2018). Consistent with these definitions, we conclude that “benefit,” when used
in this context, refers to the receipt of some advantage or helpful or useful result. Using
these definitions, we conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the board’s
determination that Sievert attempted to seek a benefit from his calls with the Pine County
Sheriff’s Office—that he was seeking the “helpful or useful” result or “advantage” of
cutting through “the runaround” and ensuring that a “full-fledged report” would be
prepared that would be sent to the county attorney’s office for review.
We therefore conclude that the board’s determination that Sievert violated the
misuse rule is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
B. The board’s decision that Sievert violated rule 6700.1600, subpart
1(G)(1), is not arbitrary or capricious.

Sievert next argues that the board’s decision that he violated rule 6700.1600, subpart
1(G)(1), is arbitrary and capricious because the board modified the ALJ’s findings,
including a change in the ALJ’s finding regarding Grice’s credibility. An agency’s
decision is arbitrary and capricious when “it is an exercise of the agency’s will, rather than
its judgment, or if the decision is based on whim or is devoid of articulated reasons.” CUP
Foods, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 633 N.W.2d 557, 565 (Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied
15
(Minn. Nov. 13, 2001). But we must also bear in mind that we “afford deference to the
agency’s decision” and, consequently, “our review of the [agency’s] decision is guided by
the principle that the agency’s conclusions are not arbitrary and capricious so long as a
rational connection between the facts found and the choice made has been articulated.”
Rev. of 2005 Ann. Automatic Adjustment, 768 N.W.2d at 120 (quotations omitted). As
such, “[i]f there is room for two opinions on a matter, [an agency’s] decision is not arbitrary
and capricious, even though the court may believe that an erroneous conclusion was
reached.” Id.
In evaluating whether an agency’s decision is arbitrary or capricious, we consider
whether the decision
(a) relied on factors not intended by the legislature; (b) entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem;
(c) offered an explanation that runs counter to the evidence; or
(d) the decision is so implausible that it could not be explained
as a difference in view or the result of the agency’s expertise.

In re Waters, 977 N.W.2d 874, 885 (Minn. App. 2022) (quotation omitted).
Sievert argues that the decision was arbitrary and capricious because the board made
findings contrary to the ALJ’s findings without adequately explaining the basis for the
deviation. He points, in particular, to the differing interpretations of the reliance to be
placed on Grice’s testimony. The ALJ found Grice’s testimony less reliable because he
mistakenly testified that Sievert stated his job title in the phone call with him instead of in
the voicemail message. The ALJ also questioned “Grice’s testimony that [Sievert] was
16
demanding and argumentative” because it contradicted testimony by Sievert and his wife
that he was “cordial and respectful and not demanding.”6
In its decision, the board came to a different conclusion and found that “Grice
testified credibly at the hearing, particularly concerning [his] interactions with” Sievert,
stating that it accorded “significant weight” to the testimony of Grice and Seiberlich.
Although the board, as the final decision-maker, has a duty to independently weigh all the
evidence in the record, the board must explain its reasons for deviating from an ALJ’s
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations. Minn. Stat. § 14.62, subd. 1
(Supp. 2025) (“A decision or order that rejects or modifies a finding of fact, conclusion, or
recommendation contained in the report of the administrative law judge required under
sections 14.48 to 14.56 . . . must include the reasons for each rejection, modification, or
request for remand.”); see also CUP Foods, 633 N.W.2d at 565. For its explanation of the
reason for reaching a different assessment of Grice’s credibility, the board noted in the
decision that “[t]he Board, like [the] testifying officers, used its experience, technical
competence, and specialized knowledge of policing in the evaluation of the conduct at issue
and the evidence in the record.” We agree with Sievert that this is less than a complete
explanation. We are not persuaded, however, that this renders the decision arbitrary or
capricious.
The tone used by Sievert in his phone conversation with Grice, whether it was
confrontational or respectful, is irrelevant to the issue of whether he used his position to

6 We note that the ALJ offered no further explanation of why she favored the Sieverts’
testimony concerning his demeanor in the call over Grice’s testimony.
17
attempt to obtain a benefit. It is the use of his position that is the crux of the rule violation,
not the tone that Sievert may have used in his conversation with Grice. Moreover, Sievert’s
voicemail was recorded and was admitted into evidence without any dispute by Sievert
concerning its accuracy. The contents of that voicemail establish the elements of the rule
violation, almost independent of the subsequent phone conversation between Grice and
Sievert. And Sievert acknowledged in his testimony that he told Grice during the phone
call that he wanted a detailed report to be prepared with copies sent to the Pine County
Administrator and Assessor. Finally, it seems reasonable that the board could have viewed
the fact that Grice initially testified that Sievert identified himself as a sheriff’s deputy in
the phone call, instead of in the voicemail, as a minor discrepancy and not evidence that
Grice’s testimony was unreliable. For these reasons, we conclude that the board’s
determination that Sievert violated the misuse rule is not arbitrary or capricious.
II. The board’s decision that Sievert violated Minn. R. 6700.1610, subps. 2 and 3,
is not affected by an error of law, unsupported by substantial evidence, or
arbitrary or capricious.

Sievert next argues that the board’s decision that he violated Minn. R. 6700.1610,
subps. 2, 3, by failing to report his purported misconduct is affected by an error of law,
unsupported by substantial evidence, and arbitrary and capricious. Sievert’s error of law
argument is based on his contention that he did not violate the misuse rule. Because we
are affirming the board’s determination to the contrary, that argument is not sustainable.
Sievert next argues that, even if he violated the misuse rule, the board failed to prove
that he reasonably believed that he was required to report this conduct. We disagree.
18
As noted above, “[a] licensee must report to the board . . . any action, inaction, or
condition of that licensee which the licensee reasonably believes would constitute grounds
for disciplinary action under any of the board’s regulatory provisions.” Minn.
R. 6700.1610, subp. 2. Here, Sievert acknowledged that he failed to report his conduct to
the board and wrote in his response to the board committee conducting the investigation
that he “take[s] full responsibility for not contacting the [board] as highlighted and outlined
to do so.” In addition, Sievert was issued discipline by his employer for violating policies
of the sheriff’s office, including “[u]sing or disclosing one’s status as an employee with
the office in any way that could reasonably be perceived as an attempt to gain influence or
authority for non-office business or activity,” and “[u]sing or disclosing one’s status as an
employee with the office in a way that could reasonably be perceived as an attempt to gain
influence or authority for non-office business or activity.” Sievert accepted the discipline
and did not pursue a grievance or otherwise contest the disciplinary action. Although the
sheriff’s office policies he was found to have violated are not identical to the misuse rule—
the sheriff’s office policy focuses on “reasonable perception” —they are similar enough
that Sievert should reasonably have known that he had a duty to report the matter to the
board. These facts satisfy the “substantial evidence” standard.
For his final argument, Sievert asserts that the determination is arbitrary and
capricious because the board failed to consider the whole record and, instead, focused on
the discipline given Sievert by the Isanti County Sheriff’s Office. We reject this argument
as well. The board’s decision reflects that it considered the entire record before the ALJ.
And, as previously noted, just because there may be “room for two opinions on a matter,”
19
that does not mean that a decision is arbitrary or capricious so long as the agency articulates
a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. Rev. of 2005 Ann.
Automatic Adjustment, 768 N.W.2d at 120. The board’s decision meets that standard.
Affirmed.