State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1113

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Dione Jermaine Nelson,
Appellant.

Filed May 26, 2026
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-20413

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Connolly , Judge; and
Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal from the final judgment of conviction for third-degree criminal
sexual conduct, appellant Dione Jermaine Nelson argues that he is entitled to a new trial
because the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of the victim’s
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alleged prior false report of sexual assault. In a pro se supplemental brief, Nelson reiterates
the arguments raised in his counseled brief and, additionally, argues that the district court
abused its discretion by referencing behaviors of Nelson’s family members during trial,
taking a recess during cross-examination of the victim, and redacting text messages that
were admitted as relationship evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
The following factual summary is drawn from Nelson’s trial and pretrial
proceedings as well as from other relevant record information.
On September 19, 2023, Y.Y. went to a hospital and reported that she had been
sexually assaulted that day by Nelson. She was examined by a sexual-assault nurse
examiner and also made a report to law enforcement. In an interview with law enforcement,
Nelson admitted having sex with Y.Y. on September 19 but claimed that it was consensual.
By amended complaint, respondent State of Minnesota charged Nelson with third-
degree criminal sexual conduct —penetration —use of force, in violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 609.344, subdivision 1(c) (2022), third-degree criminal sexual conduct—
penetration—use of coercion, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.344,
subdivision 1(a) (2022), and fifth- degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of
Minnesota Statutes section 609.3451, subdivision 1 (2022). The matter proceeded to a jury
trial.
Y.Y.’s Account of Events
In her trial testimony, Y.Y. provided the following account of events. Nelson and
Y.Y. became friends when they worked together at a hospital. They began a sexual
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relationship, through which Y.Y. became pregnant three times. Y.Y. terminated the first
two pregnancies. In the summer of 2023, Y.Y. became pregnant for the third time and
decided to have the baby. Y.Y. bought supplies for the baby such as baby clothes and
bottles using Nelson’s Amazon account, to which she had access. Y.Y. did not inform
Nelson that she had purchased these items.
On September 19, Y.Y. went to Nelson’s apartment to retrieve the baby items.
Nelson informed Y.Y. that he had canceled the purchases , which upset Y.Y. Eventually,
Nelson and Y.Y. went to a mall to do some errands, picked up carry- out food for dinner,
and brought the food back to Nelson’s apartment.
While they were eating at the apartment, Nelson told Y.Y. that she was eating too
slowly, and he took her meal away and put it in the kitchen. Nelson told Y.Y. to sit on the
couch. He then “made some sexual advances towards [her], ” “grabbing” her by the arms.
Y.Y. said “‘no’ multiple times.” Nelson twisted Y.Y.’s arms behind her back, pinned her
to the couch face down, removed her pants and underwear, and penetrated her vagina with
his penis until he ejaculated. In the beginning, Y.Y. told Nelson to stop but then felt
“defeated.” Afterward, Nelson told Y.Y. to clean herself, and she took a shower. He told
her to lie on the couch, and she did. Y.Y. fell asleep. After she awoke, she and Nelson
discussed the baby. Nelson told Y.Y. that the baby was “none of his concerns.” Y.Y.
became upset by the conversation and, because she was angry, destroyed the Xbox and
television that she had bought Nelson. Y.Y. left Nelson’s apartment and went to the
hospital because she “wanted to protect [her]self and the baby.”
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Evidence of Y.Y.’s Previous Sexual Conduct
Before trial, Nelson moved to introduce evidence of Y.Y.’s past sexual conduct
pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 412. Nelson sought to introduce evidence of a
previous, allegedly false accusation of sexual assault via testimony from Y.Y.’s ex-
husband, as well as evidence of Y.Y.’s previous consensual sexual conduct with Nelson
via direct and cross-examination. At a hearing on the motion , Y.Y.’s ex-husband, K.T.,
testified. He said that, during an order for protection (OFP) hearing related to his and Y.Y.’s
divorce proceedings some five years earlier , Y.Y. had falsely accused K.T. of sexual
assault. K.T. testified that he had never sexually assaulted Y.Y., that the OFP hearing was
the first time that the allegation was raised, and that no police report or other court filings
had ever been made in connection with Y.Y.’s allegation. K.T. testified that Y.Y. “likes to
manipulate people. You know, have power over people,” would use sex for manipulation
in their relationship, and is generally “retaliatory.” A transcript of the OFP hearing was
also provided to the district court here, though it is not in the record on appeal. Nelson’s
counsel argued that K.T. should be allowed to testify at trial because his testimony
illustrates a common scheme or plan of similar sexual conduct.
The district court filed an order denying Nelson’s motion to admit K.T.’s testimony,
ruling that the offered testimony did not meet the standards for admissibility articulated in
Minnesota Rules of Evidence 412 and 404. But the district court allowed Nelson to
introduce evidence of the prior consensual relationship between Nelson and Y.Y.
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Trial Evidence
At trial, Y.Y. testified as described above, and she was cross-examined about
making unauthorized purchases on Nelson’s Amazon account, about details of the incident
that she did not report to police or the sexual-assault nurse examiner, and about an instance
in which she posted a photo of Nelson’s penis on Facebook. The nurse who conducted
Y.Y.’s sexual-assault examination testified , and photos from the examination were
introduced. The defense called a medical expert who testified that Y.Y.’s injuries were not
consistent with her sexual-assault allegations.
The jury found Nelson guilty on all three counts. The district court adjudicated
Nelson guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree and sentenced him to 41
months in prison.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of Y.Y.’s
prior sexual-assault allegation.

Nelson argues that the district court violated his constitutional right to present a
complete defense when the district court excluded K.T.’s testimony about Y.Y.’s prior
accusation of sexual assault.
Appellate courts “afford the district court broad discretion when ruling on
evidentiary matters, and . . . will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that
discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch, 872 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Minn. 2015). “But the erroneous
exclusion of evidence is grounds for a new trial unless the exclusion was harmless.” Id. “A
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district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the
law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291
(Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions confer upon criminal defendants the
right to present a complete defense. State v. Foster, 20 N.W.3d 6, 17 (Minn. 2025). This
right “is comprised, at a minimum, of the right to examine the witnesses against the
defendant, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel.” Id. at 18 (quotation
omitted). “To vindicate [this right], district courts must allow defendants to present
evidence that is material and favorable to their theory of the case.” State v. Crims, 540
N.W.2d 860, 866 (Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 1996). But “[t]he right to
present a complete defense is subject to rules of evidence designed to exclude unfairly
prejudicial, confusing, or misleading evidence.” Foster, 20 N.W.3d at 19 (quotation
omitted).
Relevant evidence—evidence that has a tendency to make a fact of consequence to
the determination more or less probable— is generally admissible. Minn. R. Evid. 401, 402.
But Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403 provides that relevant evidence “may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
Minnesota Statutes section 609.347 (2024) and Minnesota Rule of Evidence 412
govern the admissibility of evidence of a victim’s past conduct in criminal-sexual-conduct
7
cases.1 Rule 412, also known as the rape-shield rule, provides that evidence of the victim’s
previous sexual conduct is generally inadmissible. The rule allows evidence of a victim’s
previous sexual conduct to be admitted “only if the probative value of the evidence is not
substantially outweighed by its inflammatory or prejudicial nature” and only in the
circumstances enumerated in the rule. Minn. R. Evid. 412(1). One such circumstance is
“when consent of the victim is a defense.” Minn. R. Evid. 412(1)(A). In that circumstance,
the following evidence may be admissible:
(i) evidence of the victim’s previous sexual conduct
tending to establish a common scheme or plan of similar sexual
conduct under circumstances similar to the case at issue,
relevant and material to the issue of consent;
(ii) evidence of the victim’s previous sexual conduct
with the accused.

Id. Accordingly, for K.T.’s testimony to be admissible under rule 412, the probative value
of the testimony must not be substantially outweighed by its inflammatory or prejudicial
nature and the testimony must tend to establish a common scheme or plan of similar sexual
conduct under circumstances similar to this case.
Probative Value Versus Prejudice
Nelson argues that Y.Y.’s alleged previous false accusation of sexual assault is more
probative than prejudicial. Relatedly, Nelson argues that, because the other evidence
admitted at trial was highly inflammatory, K.T.’s testimony is not prejudicial relative to
that other evidence. The state counters that K.T.’s testimony is substantially more

1 Minnesota Statutes section 609.347, subdivision 3, and Minnesota Rule of Evidence 412
are nearly identical. The district court relied on rule 412, and, accordingly, this opinion
references the rule.
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prejudicial than probative, especially considering the inadmissible character evidence
about Y.Y. and K.T.’s contentious divorce that the state contends would accompany K.T.’s
testimony.
The district court determined that the evidence was inadmissible under rule 412.
The district court explained, “Both [K.T.’s] testimony and the [OFP hearing] transcript
couch the supposed false allegation in a host of inadmissible evidence and the evidentiary
thicket associated with a contested marriage dissolution. In this Court’s view, relevance
itself is doubtful.” The district court also relied on rule 403, citing concerns that K.T.’s
testimony would “bring confusion of the issues, waste of time, or other danger of
misleading of the jury.” It explained that the testimony would result in a “trial within a
trial” regarding the truth of the previous accusation and that, “[g]iven the drama associated
with the charged case,” it was “disinclined to try two such matters.”
The record supports the district court’s determination that the probative value of
K.T.’s testimony is substantially outweighed by its inflammatory or prejudicial nature. As
for probative value, K.T.’s testimony has some probative value because a history of making
false reports and using such reports to manipulate her partner would bolster Nelson’s
defense that Y.Y. fabricated a sexual-assault claim against him. But the probative value is
limited because the two situations are not analogous—the previous report consisted of one
comment during an OFP proceeding during dissolution proceedings, compared to reporting
an assault to the police in this case.
As for prejudice, K.T.’s testimony would likely have been unfairly prejudicial and
inflammatory. As the district court observed, K.T.’s testimony at the motion hearing
9
included what the district court observed to be “a host of inadmissible character evidence.”
For example, K.T. testified about Y.Y.’s contemplation of abortion in a previous
pregnancy, K.T.’s fears that Y.Y. would make it more difficult to him to see his children,
and his view that Y.Y. “likes to manipulate people.”
And we are not persuaded by Nelson’s argument that, because the evidence admitted
at the trial was already generally inflammatory and dramatic, K.T.’s testimony would not
be inflammatory or prejudicial in comparison. The standard articulated in rule 412 requires
comparison of the probative value with the prejudicial and inflammatory nature of that
piece of evidence, not in comparison to all the evidence in the case. And, although the
context of the trial and its subject matter may inform whether offered evidence is
potentially inflammatory, Nelson does not provide any authority that requires comparison
between the various pieces of evidence offered. Moreover, the district court also relied on
rule 403 , which provides an additional basis for excluding the evidence due to the
likelihood that a dispute about an alleged incident in a different relationship raised in a
different proceeding would confuse or mislead the jury in this proceeding.
In sum, we see no abuse of discretion in the determination that the prejudicial or
inflammatory nature of the evidence substantially outweighs its probative value.
Common Scheme or Plan
Although we could affirm the district court’s exclusion of the evidence based on our
conclusion that there was no abuse of discretion in determining that the prejudicial or
inflammatory nature of the evidence substantially outweighed its probative value, for
completeness, we also address Nelson’s argument that the district court abused its
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discretion by determining that K.T.’s testimony would not establish a common scheme or
plan.
Nelson argues that K.T.’s testimony mirrors his theory of the case and is thus
admissible under rule 412 as evidence of a common scheme or plan. The district court
found that the incident to which K.T. would testify did not establish a common scheme or
plan relevant to the issue of consent.2
“[E]vidence of sexual activity with third persons cannot withstand a rule 403
weighing unless special circumstances enhance its probative value.” Crims, 540 N.W.2d
at 868. “Such circumstances include situations in which the evidence explains a physical
fact in issue at trial, suggests bias or ulterior motive, or establishes a pattern of behavior
clearly similar to the conduct at issue.” Id. Rule 412 requires “a common scheme or plan
of similar sexual conduct under circumstances similar to the case at issue, relevant and
material to the issue of consent.”
We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling that a common
scheme or plan material to the issue of consent does not exist here. The incident about
which K.T. would testify occurred during an OFP proceeding related to a contentious
divorce and involved a stand-alone allegation that was never reported, charged, or tried. In
contrast, in this case, Y.Y. went to the hospital for a sexual-assault exam and reported her
assault to law enforcement. Even if, as Nelson alleges, Y.Y. was manipulative, it is unclear

2 The district court also found that the evidence could not be admitted under Minnesota
Rule of Evidence 404(b) as evidence of a similar plan because proof of the other alleged
bad act did not meet the clear-and-convincing standard of proof under that rule. See Minn.
R. Evid. 404(b)(2)(b).
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how these two instances constitute a common scheme or plan relevant to consent. Y.Y.’s
supposed motive for falsely accusing K.T. was different in the OFP proceeding (to obtain
an OFP) from her supposed motive in this case (to obtain money for an abortion or to act
out of anger toward Nelson). As the district court noted, “[i]t may be that [Y.Y.] leveraged
the prospect of an abortion for money. But that is substantively different than leveraging a
claim of criminal sexual conduct.” Nelson’s assertion of commonality appears to
essentially be an argument that Y.Y. is generally manipulative in relationships, particularly
concerning sex, but this is not sufficient to establish a common scheme or plan relevant to
consent under rule 412 and likely also verges on inadmissible character evidence. See
Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 868 (affirming no clearly similar behavior relevant to consent where
the victim had a history of exchanging sex for money or drugs). Accordingly, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by det ermining that K.T.’s testimony did not meet the
common-scheme-or-plan requirement under rule 412 or the “clearly similar” conduct
standard that applies under rule 403. Id.3

3 Nelson also argues that the district court erred because it excluded Y.Y.’s previous
accusation based on prejudice without first determining whether the accusation was false.
He argues that, under our decision in State v. Goldenstein, the district court was required
to first mak e a finding as to the reasonable probability and existence of the previous
accusation’s falsity. 505 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. App. 1993), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 19,
1993). The argument is unpersuasive. In Goldenstein, we reversed the defendants’
convictions of sexually assaulting their three foster children, ruling that the district court
violated the defendants’ constitutional right to present a defense when it excluded evidence
that the children had previously falsely accused a social worker of sexual abu se, even
though the district court had found that the accusation was probably not true. Id. at 338-40.
We concluded that, because the case “rested nearly exclusively on the children’s out-of-
court statements,” the children’s veracity was “critical to appellants’ defense.” Id. at 340.
Here, the district court determined that, even if K.T.’s claim of a false allegation were true,
the evidence would still be inadmissible under rule 412 because the probative value of the
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The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding K.T.’s testimony.
II. Nelson’s arguments in his pro se brief are unavailing.

Nelson raises several additional arguments in his pro se supplemental brief, none of
which are convincing.
First, Nelson argues that the district court inappropriately pointed out the reactions
and behaviors of family members—his mother outside of the courtroom and his brother in
the courtroom.
Evidently, during the trial, Nelson’s mother yelled at Y.Y. in the hallway. The
following day, when Y.Y. was on the witness stand, the prosecutor began questioning her
about the incident.
Q: Prior to court yesterday, you were sitting in the hallway; is
that right?
A: Correct.
Q: Did something happen while you were sitting in the
hallway?
[Nelson’s counsel]: Your Honor, may we approach?

Outside the presence of the jury, the parties discussed with the district court the relevance
of Y.Y.’s interaction with Nelson’s mother the previous day. The district court sustained
Nelson’s objection to the testimony and instructed the jury to ignore the question: “I will
note for the record that I am sustaining the objection. And I’m ordering you to disregard

evidence was outweighed by its inflammatory and prejudicial nature, and it determined
that, under rule 403, the evidence would pose a danger of confusing the issues, wasting
time, or misleading the jury. Goldenstein does not preclude a district court from assuming
for purposes of argument that a previous accusation was false but still excluding evidence
of that false accusation based on other applicable evidentiary principles.

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the last question that was asked.” The identity of the woman who had caused the
disturbance was never discussed in front of the jury. We see no error by the district court.
Also during Y.Y.’s testimony, the court cautioned the gallery:
THE COURT: Hang on. Hang on one second. Members of the
gallery, let me make it very clear, I will not tolerate any – your
obligation is to sit and to listen. And if I see any gestures, head
nods, agreeing or disagreeing with testimony, I will send you
from this courtroom. So fair warning: nothing from the gallery.

This instruction was directed only to the “members of the gallery” and did not identify
anyone by name or relation to Nelson. There is nothing in the record that supports a
conclusion that the district court judge pointed out Nelson’s family member’s actio ns to
“garner additional compassion for [Y.Y.]” as Nelson alleges. Again, we discern no error
by the district court.
Second, Nelson argues that a recess in the middle of Y.Y.’s cross-examination
interfered with the integrity of his trial because, he alleges, Y.Y. was “coached” by the
prosecutor during the recess. The recess occurred when the parties had a dispute about the
admissibility of certain text messages:
THE COURT: All right. The record should reflect that the jury
has left the courtroom. Counsel are present. Defendant is
present. An objection has been raised. I’ll start with the State.

[COUNSEL FOR STATE]: Your Honor, the counsel was
about to approach the witness to refresh her recollection with
text messages. I had inquired whether these had been uploaded
to MNDES. [4] I was informed they were uploaded this
morning. They were not shared with me. I was told at the bench
conference that it was things that I had given to him. But I had
never prior to this exact moment been told that they were going

4 MNDES refers to the Minnesota Digital Exhibit System.
14
to be offered or shown as an exhibit in this trial, despite the fact
we had spent days arguing over text messages. He sat on it until
right now to confront the witness with it.

The record does not reflect that this recess occurred for any reason other than a dispute
about admissibility of certain text messages, and Nelson offers no support for his assertion
that the recess occurred so that Y.Y. could be “coached.” Accordingly, Nelson’s argument
fails.
Lastly, Nelson argues that certain text messages admitted as evidence were
improperly “redacted.” The specific admitted exhibit that Nelson quotes is not redacted.
Nelson’s argument appears to be that relevant portions of the text conversation were
improperly excluded because they provided necessary context. But Nelson does not cite
the record to clearly identify what text messages he contends were improperly excluded,
nor does he cite any authority that shows that the district court abused its discretion by not
admitting them. In addition, while portions of two sets of text messages introduced by Y.Y.
were redacted, those messages were admitted without objection and Nelson does not cite
them here. For these reasons, we conclude that Nelson has not demonstrated that the district
court abused its discretion by redacting or otherwise not admitting additional text
messages.
Affirmed.