Bradley Neyens, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1123

Bradley Neyens,
Relator,

vs.

ISD #712,
Mountain Iron-Buhl Public Schools,
Respondent.

Filed April 13, 2026
Affirmed; Motion granted
Connolly, Judge

ISD #712,
Mountain Iron-Buhl Public Schools

Jeffrey D. Schiek, Villaume & Schiek, P.A., Bloomington, Minnesota (for relator)

Michael J. Ervin, Shelby M. Borthwick, Squires, Waldspurger & Mace P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Relator, in this certiorari appeal, challenges respondent school district’s decision not
to renew relator’s teaching contract. He argues that the decision should be reversed
because (1) he was tenured at the time of the attempted nonrenewal , and (2) the school
board violated the open meeting law (OML) by failing to give him adequate notice.
2
Respondent has moved this court to exclude relator’s OML argument. Because the record
indicates that relator was a probationary teacher at the time of his nonrenewal we affirm;
because this court lacks subject -matter jurisdiction over relator’s OML claim, we grant
respondent’s motion.
FACTS
In November 2021, a teacher in respondent Independent School District 712 went
on medical leave for 18 weeks. Relator Bradley Neyens was hired as a substitute teacher
to replace him. When the teacher did not return in March 2022, relator was hired as a
substitute for the remainder of the 2021-2022 school year. The School Board continued to
hire relator as a probationary teacher for the 2022-2023, 2023-2024, and 2024-2025 school
years. His performance reviews indicated that he was an effective teacher.
In May 2025, the superintendent of respondent Independent School District 712
(ISD 712) informed relator that the school board might vote not to renew his contract at its
June meeting. Notice of the June 16, 2025, school board meeting was sent to all district
staff, but relator did not receive it. At that meeting, a motion was made to adopt a resolution
not to renew relator’s contract, the school board chair seconded the motion, and the school
board voted unanimously for nonrenewal.
A letter from the superintendent dated June 18, 2025, informed relator of the
nonrenewal and told him that: (1) he had a statutory right to request the reasons for the
nonrenewal; and (2) the reason for the nonrenewal was that ISD 712 “had concerns
regarding [relator’s] ability to maintain professional boundaries with respect to what [he
said] to students.” Relator received the letter on June 24, 2025. On July 2, 2025, relator’s
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attorney sent a letter requesting the reasons for the nonrenewal to the superintendent,
school board chair, and the human -resources manager of ISD 712; on July 3, 2025, the
superintendent replied to the letter, repeating the reason for nonrenewal given in the June
18, 2025, letter. At the school board’s next meeting on July 28, 2025, the school board
chair resigned from the board, and the school board voted to hire him to fill the teaching
position that had been relator’s.
Realtor argues that he is entitled to reinstatement and back pay from ISD 712
because he was a tenured teacher when ISD 712 did not renew him and that ISD 712
violated the OML; ISD 712 has moved this court to exclude relator’s OML argument.
DECISION
1. Relator’s Status on June 16, 2025
This court will reverse a school board’s decision to terminate a teacher only if that
decision was fraudulent, arbitrary, unreasonable, not supported by substantial evidence in
the record, not within the school board’s jurisdiction, or based on an erroneous theory of
law. Ganyo v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 832, 311 N.W.2d 497, 500 (Minn. 1981). However,
if the school board’s decision is based on interpretation of a statute, this court applies a de
novo standard of review. Long v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 332, Mora , 907 N.W.2d 228, 231
(Minn. App. 2018).
Relator’s argument that he was tenured when he was no t renewed depends on
whether his time as a substitute teacher, from November 2021 to the end of the 2021-2022
school year, was a year of probation. Three statutes are relevant here. The first defines
probationary teachers. “The first three consecutive years of a teacher’s first teaching
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experience in Minnesota in a single district are deemed to be a probationary period of
employment[.]” Minn. Stat. § 122A.40, subd. 5(a) (2024). The second statute divides
substitute teachers into two groups: those hired “(1) [f]or a duration of time of less than
one school year . . . ” (group 1) and those hired “(2) [f]or a duration of time equal to or
greater than one school year . . . ” (group 2). Minn. Stat. § 122A.44 , subd. 2(a) (2024).
The third statute explains the relationship between probation a nd those in group (2):
“[E]ach full school year during which the [group (2)] teacher is employed by a district
pursuant to that clause shall be deemed one year of the teacher’s probationary period of
employment pursuant to . . . section 122A.40, subdivision 5.” Minn. Stat. § 122A.44, subd.
2(b) (2024). No statute establishes a relationship between substitute teachers in group (1),
i.e., those hired for less than one school year, and probation.
Relator was hired as a substitute teacher for 18 weeks in November 2021 and for
the remainder of the 2021-2022 school year in March 2022. He was not hired and did not
work as a substitute for the “duration of time equal to or greater than one school year”
specified in Minn. Stat. § 122A.44, subdivision 2(a)(2), or the “full school year” specified
in Minn. Stat. § 122A.44, subdivision 2 (b); he was a group 1 substitute teacher without
probationary status from November 2021 to June 2022 . See Haddad v. ISD 27 2, Eden
Prairie, No. C3-98-1128, 1999 WL 107738, at *2 (Minn. App. Mar. 2, 1999) (“Because
relator concedes she was a substitute teacher for less than a full school year, she is not
entitled to credit for a year of probationary employment”).1

1 While nonprecedential opinions are not binding, they “may be cited as persuasive
authority.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
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Because Minn. Stat. § 122A.44 , subd. 2(b) provides that only substitutes hired for
at least a full school year may count that year as a probationary year and relator was not
hired as a substitute until November 2021, that provision did not apply to him in 2021 -
2022. At the time of his nonrene wal on June 16, 2025, his third probationary year, 2024 -
2025, had not been completed, and another statute applied: Minn. Stat. § 122A.40, subd.
5(a) (providing that “[d]uring the probationary period any annual contract with any teacher
may or may not be re newed as the school board shall see fit” ). The school board timely
“saw fit” not to renew relator’s contract under that statute.
Minn. Stat. § 122A.40, subd. 5(a), also provides that “the board must give any such
[probationary] teacher whose contract it declines to renew for the following school year
written notice to that effect before July 1.” Relator argues that the school board did not
comply with this provision because, by the time relator’s attorney requested the reasons for
his nonrenewal on July 2, the time for ISD 712 to comply with the July 1, 2025, notice
requirement had lapsed. There are two flaws in relator’s argument. First, the notice of
nonrenewal sent to relator on June 18 had already provided the reason for the nonrenewal.
Second, relator waited eight days after receiving notice of his nonrenewal on June 24 before
requesting the reasons on July 2.
Relator also argues that he “was denied his due process rights because he was denied
any meaningful opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why the
proposed termination action should be taken , which is a fundamental due process right
created under Minn. Stat. § 122A.40 et [seq].” But under Minn. Stat. § 122A.40, subd.
7(a) (2024), the right to “a hearing before the board or an arbitrator” before nonrenewal
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accrues only after the probationary period has been completed, and relator’s probationary
period had not been completed when he was not renewed. ISD 712 did not deprive relator
of the due process provided by the statutes.
2. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over Relator’s OML Claim
ISD 712 argues that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over relator’s OML
claim. Appellate courts review subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Zweber v. Credit River
Twp., 882 N.W.2d 605, 608 (Minn. 2016). “Subject matter jurisdiction is the authority of
the court to hear the type of dispute at issue . . . .” Cnty. of Washington v. City of Oak Park
Heights, 818 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Minn. 2012). “The writ of certiorari is an extraordinary
remedy that is not granted where there is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the
law.” Nelson v. Schlener, 859 N.W.2d 288, 292 (Minn. 2015) (discharging a writ granted
to a university employee who had failed to exhaust the university’s grievance process)
(quotation omitted); see also Stephens v. Bd. of Regents , 614 N.W.2d 764, 777 (Minn.
2016) (discharging a writ granted to a university employee who had failed to exhaust the
university’s grievance process); Willis v. Cnty. of Sherburne, 555 N.W.2d 277, 283 (Minn.
1996) (holding that a Minnesota Human Rights Act claim is not required to be pursued by
certiorari).
This court lacks subject -matter jurisdiction over relator’s OML claim because the
OML provides a remedy in Minn. Stat. § 13D.06, subd. 2 (2024) (“An action to enforce
the penalty in subdivision 1 may be brought by any person in any court of competent
jurisdiction where the administrative office of the governing bo dy is located.”) Thus,
relator’s remedy for ISD 712’s alleged violation of the OML was bringing an action in a
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court of competent jurisdiction. Instead, he brought his OML claim in a petition for
certiorari to this court.
Relator argues that he does not have “an adequate remedy in the course of law”
under the OML because he seeks reinstatement in his position and reimbursement of his
lost wages and the OML authorizes relief limited to $300 for each violation and a maximum
of $13,000 in attorney fees. But allowing an OML claim on certiorari review would not
enlarge the remedies available under the statute. Thus, the limitations on remedies under
the OML does not confer jurisdiction on this court to hear such claims. Relator concedes
in his brief that (1) “a violation of the OML does not justify invalidation of certain actions
of a government body,” (2) “courts have held that actions taken in violation of . . . the OML
do not justify invalidation of the agency’s actions either partially or in its entirety,” (3)
“damages under the facts of this case under the OML would be de minimis in comparison
to a full reinstatement and lost wages, which is what [relator] is seeking in this case,” and
(4) “[t]he OML does not allow . . . relator to seek reinstatement and full back pay due to
the violations of the OML.”
Thus, because the OML provides a remedy for OML violations outside this court,
this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over relator’s OML claim.
Affirmed; motion granted.