State of Minnesota v. Jaylen Lavontai Jones

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1142

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jaylen Lavontai Jones,
Appellant.

Filed November 9, 2026
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CR-22-1061

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Dawn R. Nyhus, Sherburne County Attorney, George R. Kennedy, Assistant County
Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Frisch , Chief Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
Appellant Jaylen Lavontai Jones appeals from his convictions of unlawful
possession of ammunition and felony theft. He also appeals from the district court’s order
denying his petition for postconviction relief following a stay of this appeal. Jones argues

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that (1) the postconviction court erred by summarily denying his claim that his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to challenge the inventory search of the car Jones was driving,
and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his felony theft conviction. We affirm.
FACTS
Police received a report that a man suspected of theft was driving away from Home
Depot. Police stopped the car, identified the driver as Jones, and arrested him. When they
searched the car before impounding it, police found ammunition. Respondent State of
Minnesota charged Jones with felony theft and unlawful possession of ammunition. 1
The evidence presented at the jury trial, the convictions, sentence, and appeal
An asset-protection specialist at the Elk River Home Depot testified that she saw
Jones get a shopping cart and then go “straight to” an aisle that stocked “portable power”
merchandise. Jones rapidly placed items into the cart—three of one tool and two of
another—which the specialist understood as an indication that Jones was not intending to
purchase the items. The asset-protection specialist called law enforcement as a “heads up”
about a possible theft in progress while she continued watching Jones. She next saw Jones
standing by the doors leading to the outside garden area and then “looking around” in a
way that showed him observing his surroundings beyond what the specialist believed to be
“normal” for customers. Jones then pushed the cart through the doors to the outside garden
area and proceeded “directly” to the exit, passing the registers that were not staffed. Jones
had been in the store for about four or five minutes.

1 Jones was prohibited from possessing ammunition due to a prior conviction.

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The asset-protection specialist identified herself and confronted Jones while he was
“right at”— but not through—the exit doors. Jones abandoned the cart, “ran” into the
parking lot, “ran” to a car, and drove away. The specialist updated law enforcement with
what happened and a description of Jones’s clothing and car. The specialist then worked
with a cashier to determine the value of the items in Jones’s cart—three chainsaws, two
leaf blowers, and a container of fuel—which totaled $2,102.98.
Three officers from the Elk River Police Department testified about responding to
the asset-protection specialist’s call. The first officer arrived at the store in time to see the
reported car driving away. The officer followed the car, executed a traffic stop, and
identified the driver as Jones. The officer noted that Jones’s clothing matched the
asset-protection specialist’s description.2 Jones initially denied being at Home Depot, but
later claimed he had been shopping there and was “harassed by an employee.”
As the first police officer detained Jones, the second officer went to the store. The
second officer spoke with the asset-protection specialist, who showed the officer the
merchandise in question and the receipt showing its value; he photographed both. The
second officer then drove to Jones’s location, where the third officer had also responded.
Jones told the officers he was in pain, and they called for an ambulance. As they
waited for the ambulance, the second officer started an inventory search of the car because
it was going to be impounded. On the driver’s seat, the second officer found a black fanny
pack that matched the one Jones wore while in Home Depot. Inside the fanny pack was a

2 There were two other occupants in the car, but they declined to identify themselves, were
not suspected in the Home Depot incident, and were later permitted to leave the scene.

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firearm magazine containing hollow-point bullets. Jones said it was “his girlfriend’s clip.”
The second officer seized the fanny pack and the ammunition.
In addition to testimony, the district court received 15 exhibits into evidence. The
Home Depot surveillance videos showed Jones walking briskly with a full cart past
unattended cash registers. The two videos from each officer’s body-worn camera showed
their interactions with Jones.
At the close of trial, the jury found Jones guilty on both counts. The district court
convicted Jones and sentenced him to 60 months in prison for the ammunition- possession
conviction, with a shorter concurrent sentence for the theft conviction. Jones filed a direct
appeal, which we stayed to allow Jones to file a postconviction petition in the district court.
The postconviction proceedings
Jones filed a postconviction petition contending that his trial counsel was ineffective
for not challenging the warrantless search of the car. The petition alleged that the evidence
“strongly suggested” that police conducted an “invalid inventory search.” Jones attached
several exhibits to his petition, which added the following facts to the trial record.
The second officer’s body-worn-camera video shows the asset-protection specialist
identifying Jones by name and noting that Jones had been involved in numerous thefts at
other Home Depot locations. After learning that Jones was not the car’s owner and that
the owner was not present, police decided to impound the car. The body-worn-cam era
video showed the second and third officers talking. The second officer asked if there was
any “more stolen stuff” in the car and mentioned that the asset- protection specialist had
said that Jones was a “prolific” thief. The second officer called for an impound and told

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the third officer that he was “starting the impound sheet right now.” The video shows the
second officer walking towards the car, putting gloves on as he approached, and the police
report noted that he “was about to begin a vehicle inventory search.”
The second officer started the search at the driver’s side of the car where he
encountered the fanny pack and a wallet on the driver’s seat. The officer looked through
the wallet and the fanny pack, found the ammunition, and showed it to the other officers.
The second officer did not take notes while searching the car.
When the ambulance arrived, the paramedics asked the second officer what to do
about Jones’s handcuffs. The second officer responded that he would remove the
handcuffs, added that he would need to go with the ambulance, but needed to “finish the
impound.” The second officer then turned to the third officer and said, “I’ll probably have
to have you finish the impound for me.” The third officer agreed. The second officer said
he would take the fanny pack and the ammunition “just in case it’s involved in something”
and then followed the ambulance to the hospital.
The third officer finished searching the car while listing its contents in a notebook.
The impound report names the second officer and lists items found in the car, but that list
does not include the wallet, fanny pack, or ammunition.
After considering Jones’s petition and the attached exhibits, the postconviction court
denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. The court reasoned that—even
accepting Jones’s allegations as true—his underlying challenge to the inventory search was
unavailing, which made the trial counsel’s failure to challenge the search neither
unreasonable nor prejudicial. We reinstated the appeal.

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DECISION
I. The postconviction court did not err by summarily denying Jones’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.

Jones argues that the postconviction court erred by summarily denying his petition.
A postconviction court may deny a petition without a hearing if the allegations in the
petition and all records “conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.”
Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2024). In assessing whether to hold an evidentiary hearing,
the postconviction court “must presume that the facts alleged in the petition are true.”
Davis v. State, 15 N.W.3d 635, 642 (Minn. 2025). We review the summary denial of a
postconviction petition for an abuse of discretion, Munt v. State, 984 N.W.2d 242, 249
(Minn. 2023), and the merits of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim de novo,
Berry v. State, 33 N.W.3d 683, 693 (Minn. 2026).
We consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the traditional two-
step Strickland standard, which requires the defendant to show that (1) counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would have
been different. State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 266 (Minn. 2014) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). But where, as here, an ineffective-assistance
claim is premised on a failure to file a motion to suppress evidence , the defendant must
show that (1) the Fourth Amendment claim “is meritorious,” and (2) “there is a reasonable
probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence.”

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Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986). We , therefore, proceed to consider
the merits of Jones’s challenge to the inventory search.3
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 10
of the Minnesota Constitution protect “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. 4 A warrantless search is per se unreasonable—
and evidence obtained from it presumptively inadmissible—unless the search falls under
an established exception. Rohde, 852 N.W.2d at 263 (Minn. 2014). One such exception
is an “inventory search,” which police conduct when impounding a vehicle to document
the contents of the vehicle. Id. (citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987)).
Because the search serves to protect the owner’s property and to protect the police from
claims that they lost or damaged property, police need neither probable cause nor a warrant
to conduct an inventory search. State v. Holmes, 569 N.W.2d 181, 186 (Minn. 1997).
An inventory search is constitutionally valid if it satisfies three criteria. First, the
“underlying impoundment” must be reasonable. Rohde, 852 N.W.2d at 264. Second,

3 Although our analysis focuses on the merits of the underlying claim, we observe that both
of the attorneys who represented Jones at various times in this case advised him not to
pursue a suppression motion. These appear to be considered, strategic decisions to bring
the charges against Jones to a swift resolution. Although we generally do not review
strategic decisions for competence, State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 138 (Minn. 2009), we
need not address whether this was a strategic decision because we conclude that Jones’s
underlying Fourth Amendment claim is not meritorious.

4 Jones cites both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions in support of his argument.
He appropriately recognizes, however, that the Minnesota Supreme Court has “not held
that Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution is more protective than the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in the context of inventory searches.” State v. Rohde,
852 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn. 2014).

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police must follow “standard procedures” in conducting the search. Holmes, 569 N.W.2d
at 187 (emphasis omitted). Third, the search must be conducted, at least in part, “for the
purpose of obtaining an inventory.” State v. Ture, 632 N.W.2d 621, 629 (Minn. 2001).
We review the reasonableness of a search de novo. State v. Steeprock, 28 N.W.3d 417,
428 (Minn. 2025).
Jones does not dispute the first criterion—that the underlying impoundment of his
vehicle was reasonable. But he contends that the postconviction court erred by concluding
that the factual allegations and exhibits conclusively show that the other two inventory-
search criteria were satisfied.5 We address each one in turn.
A. The officers’ conduct complied with standard police procedures.

To satisfy the second inventory-search criterion, police must conduct the inventory
search in compliance with their department’s standard procedures. Holmes, 569 N.W.2d
at 187. This requirement limits the scope of the search to the caretaking purpose, even if
the department procedure affords officers discretion in how to perform the search. Id.
(citing Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375).

5 Jones asserts that the police conducted two separate searches of his car: one search by the
second officer and a second search by the third officer. Jones contends that the district
court erred by not accepting his two-search factual assertion as true. But whether a search
occurred—and, relatedly, whether there was one search or multiple searches—is a legal
determination. Ries v. State, 920 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Minn. 2018). And when police are
actively involved with the same matter, we generally consider the conduct of all officers
collectively. See State v. Jenkins , 782 N.W.2d 211, 221 (Minn. 2010) (stating
reasonableness of police action evaluated based on officers’ “collective knowledge”).
Jones identifies no authority for deviating from that approach here.

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Jones asserts that the police violated three provisions of the Elk River Police
Department’s procedures: (1) “Department members requesting towing of a vehicle shall
complete a Vehicle Impound and Inventory Report, including a description of property
within the vehicle”; (2) “All property in a stored or impounded vehicle shall be inventoried
and listed on the vehicle storage form”; and (3) “Members conducting inventory searches
should be as thorough and accurate as practicable in preparing an itemized inventory.”
Jones contends the police violated these provisions because the second officer did
not take notes during his search and did not complete an inventory report. But neither the
policy language that Jones recites, nor any other provision of the department’s impound
policy, requires an officer to take notes during an inventory search or prohibits multiple
officers from being involved in an inventory search and the resulting report. Instead, the
department’s policy requires an inventory report to be “as thorough and accurate as
practicable,” which affords police officers significant discretion. As such, the second
officer’s failure to take contemporaneous notes or personally complete the impound report
does not establish a deviation from established procedures.
Jones next argues that police violated department procedures because the report was
“misattributed” to the second officer when the third officer actually did the inventory
search and report. But the department’s policies do not require the inventory report to
identify the officer who conducted the inventory search. Putting the second officer’s name
on the inventory report
6 was not a deviation from standard department procedures.

6 We note that the second officer was the lead investigator and his name was listed next to
the case-file number on the inventory report.

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Jones asserts that the inventory report violated department policies because it did
not list the wallet, the fanny pack, or the ammunition found in the car. This argument is
unavailing. Department procedures only require property “in” or “within” an impounded
vehicle be listed on the inventory report. The wallet, fanny pack, and ammunition did not
need to be listed on the inventory report because they were not “in” or “within” the car.
Instead, officers returned the wallet to Jones and the fanny pack and ammunition were
collected to “preserve evidence” per department policy. As such, the failure to list those
items in the inventory report does not reflect noncompliance with standard procedures.
B. The officers conducted the search, in part, for inventory purposes.

To satisfy the third inventory-search criterion, police must conduct the search “for
the purpose of obtaining an inventory.” Ture, 632 N.W.2d at 629. An inventory search is
invalid if police search “in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation.” Holmes,
569 N.W.2d at 187 (quotation omitted). Several factors may indicate bad faith, such as:
that the search was conducted at the scene of the crime, that the
search was conducted by an officer responsible for criminal
investigations and not the officer responsible for the
safekeeping of impounded property, that no formal inventory
sheets were completed, that the officer did not make note of the
defendant’s personal effects, but instead focused only on
contraband, and the fact that the car was not actually
impounded.

Id. at 188 (quotation omitted). An inventory search is solely for purposes of investigation
if “an inventory search that otherwise would not have occurred is brought about.” Id. But
if police conducted the search “at least in part” for inventory purposes, it is a “reasonable
inventory search.” Id.

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Jones argues the postconviction court erred by determining that the third inventory-
search criterion was satisfied. But Jones does not dispute that the impoundment was proper
or that department policy required an inventory search. These two undisputed facts
establish that the search performed here was not a search “that otherwise would not have
occurred.” Id. The circumstances of the search also do not indicate a solely investigative
purpose as the car was actually inventoried and impounded. Rather, as a whole, these
circumstances show that the search that police conducted here was “at least in part” for
inventory purposes. Id.
In sum, the postconviction court did not err by determining that a motion
challenging the validity of the inventory search would not have prevailed. As such, the
court did not err by summarily denying Jones’s postconviction claim that his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to bring such a motion.
II. The evidence is sufficient to support Jones’s theft conviction.
Jones challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his felony theft
conviction. Theft involves “intentionally and without claim of right tak[ing], us[ing],
transfer[ring], conceal [ing] or retain[ing] possession of movable property of another
without the other’s consent and with intent to deprive the owner permanently of possession
of the property.” Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1) (2022). Jones disputes the sufficiency
of the evidence as to all aspects of the offense but principally focuses on intent.
Intent is a mental state typically proven by circumstantial evidence, so our review
follows the two-step process prescribed for review of circumstantial evidence. See
State v. Ulrich, 3 N.W.3d 1, 10-11 (Minn. 2024). At the first step, we “winnow down the

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evidence presented at trial by resolving all questions of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict,
which results in a subset of facts that constitute the circumstances proved.” State v. Firkus,
31 N.W.3d 468, 478 (Minn. 2026) (quotations omitted). Based on the jury’s guilty verdict,
the circumstances proved—in the light most favorable to the verdict —are:
• Jones went into the Home Depot, got a cart, and went straight to the section where
small power tools were on display.

• Jones quickly put more than $2,000 worth of merchandise —three chainsaws, two
leaf blowers, and a container of fuel—in his cart without looking at any prices.

• The Home Depot’s asset-protection specialist believed that not looking at the price
is not consistent with an interest in purchasing the merchandise.

• Jones actively monitored his surroundings in a manner unlike a “normal” customer.

• After placing the merchandise into the cart, Jones went to the door leading to the
outside garden area of the store.

• The garden area had un-staffed cash registers near the exit.

• Jones walked briskly through the garden area “directly” to the exit doors.

• Jones was in the store for four or five minutes.

• When Jones was about seven feet past the cash registers, “right at” the exit doors,
the asset-protection specialist confronted Jones and identified herself.

• Without saying anything or even breaking stride in his walk, Jones abandoned the
cart, ran into the parking lot, ran to a car, and then drove away.

• When stopped by law enforcement shortly thereafter, Jones initially denied having
been in Home Depot.

In the second step of our review of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, we
must consider “whether the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the
circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole and not as discrete, isolated facts, are

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consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis other than guilt.” Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 483 (quotation omitted). Here, the
above circumstances are consistent with a reasonable inference of guilt. Jones’s deliberate
movement through the store; rapid selection of duplicative, high-value merchandise; active
observation of his surroundings; transportation of the merchandise past the last point of
sale without any effort to pay for it; and immediate flight when confronted are all
circumstances that are consistent with Jones intentionally taking merchandise without a
claim of right and with the intent to permanently deprive Home Depot of that merchandise.
Jones asserts that these circumstances reasonably support an inference other than
guilt: that, as a business invitee, Home Depot consented to his temporary possession of the
merchandise in the shopping cart while in the store. Jones argues that since he never went
through the exit doors with the merchandise or removed the antitheft tags, it is reasonable
to infer that he did not intend to permanently deprive Home Depot of the merchandise.
These contentions are unavailing.
Jones’s conduct, as a whole, indicates that he exceeded any claim of right or consent
to possessing the merchandise. Jones moved over $2,000 worth of merchandise past the
final point of sale without attempting to pay. This was after having spent only a few
minutes in the store and placing several items in the shopping cart without looking at any
prices. When confronted by Home Depot’s asset-protection specialist, he abandoned the
merchandise and ran away, which showed his consciousness of guilt. As such, Jones’s
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his theft conviction fails.
Affirmed.