Tyler Andrew Nesbit, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1143

Tyler Andrew Nesbit,
Respondent,

vs.

Michelle Ilene Covel-Paulzine,
Appellant.

Filed March 9, 2026
Remanded
Bentley, Judge

Douglas County District Court
File No. 21-CV-23-4

Nicholas D. Henry, Dudley and Smith, P.A., Mendota Heights, Minnesota (for respondent)

Jevon C. Bindman, Annika C. Misurya, Maslon LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and
Worke, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BENTLEY, Judge
In this appeal from a district court judgment partitioning a property with a home,
appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering a partition by sale
rather than a partition in kind or another equitable method. Alternatively, she asks this court
to reverse and remand the partition by sale on the basis that the district court abused its
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discretion by allocating the proceeds of the sale between the parties inequitably. We
remand the matter to the district court for additional findings.
FACTS
The following facts derive from a court trial and the record before the district court
in the partition proceeding. Appellant Michelle Covel-Paulzine and respondent Tyler
Nesbit bought a home together in 2020, after several years in a romantic relationship. They
purchased the home for $250,000 as joint tenants. Nesbit provided $15,379.97 for a down
payment, and the parties secured a mortgage for the balance of the purchase price. The first
year in the home, Nesbit made the mortgage payments and Covel-Paulzine paid for the
utilities. Nesbit explained in his testimony that this split was intended to help Covel-
Paulzine with finances as she worked to start a daycare business in the home. After the first
year, they split the mortgage payments and Covel-Paulzine continued to pay the majority
of utilities and shared expenses with Nesbit contributing inconsistently.
Covel-Paulzine opened a daycare business in the home, which she still operated at
the time of trial. She pursued several home- improvement grants related to the daycare,
including a monthly grant for operating the business, and three large grants for a fence,
bedding, and flooring. Each large grant required Covel-Paulzine to continue operating the
business for a certain amount of time until the grant vested , or she would have to repay it.
At the time of the district court’s judgment, only one grant remained unvested. Nesbit knew
about the grants, but he “stayed out of that” and did not sign any associated paperwork.
3
In August 2022, Nesbit and Covel-Paulzine ended their relationship. Nesbit moved
out of the home in December 2022, at which time Covel-Paulzine began making all the
mortgage and utilities payments, though the parties did not formalize any arrangement.
Nesbit brought a partition action pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 558.01
(2024) against Covel-Paulzine in January 2023. In the complaint, Nesbit requested either
“a partition of the subject real property according to the respective rights of the parties,” or
alternatively, “a sale of said premises if physical partition cannot be had without great
prejudice to the owners.” Covel-Paulzine proposed in her answer that she instead assume
the mortgage and that a quit claim deed be executed “releasing [Nesbit] from the r eal
property.”
During the partition proceedings, Covel-Paulzine began experiencing significant
health problems that left her unable to work for several months and affected her ability to
afford the monthly mortgage payments. Covel-Paulzine worked out a forbearance
agreement with her home’s mortgage lender in late 2023 to pause payments until she was
able to return fully to work. Although Nesbit was aware of Covel-Paulzine’s health
challenges, Covel-Paulzine did not tell Nesbit about the forbearance. As part of the
forbearance agreement, in May 2024, Covel- Paulzine pursued a partial claim mortgage
modification to defer repayment of $18,895.40 to the end of the mortgage’s term. To
finalize the agreement, the servicers required Nesbit’s signature. Covel-Paulzine contacted
Nesbit for his signature, but he refused to sign the paperwork. Nesbit testified that his
hesitancy to sign came from his unfamiliarity with the documents and his lack of trust in
Covel-Paulzine. After several weeks without a signature, Covel-Paulzine’s counsel filed a
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letter with the district court requesting that the court order Nesbit to sign the partial claim.
That partial claim was denied after the paperwork was not timely signed by both Covel-
Paulzine and Nesbit, which resulted in the mortgage lender categorizing the unpaid
mortgage payments as missed payments. Covel-Paulzine then pursued a second partial
claim mortgage, which was properly signed and executed. In total, 14 months of payments
were missed, $31,261.91 was added to the end of the mortgage’s term, and both Nesbit’s
and Covel-Paulzine’s credit scores were harmed by the missed payments.
The district court held a court trial in March 2025. At trial, both Nesbit and Covel-
Paulzine testified, and they continued to disagree over how the home should be partitioned.
Nesbit testified that his ideal partition arrangement would be to sell the home, receive his
“down payment back,” and split the remaining sale proceeds equally between himself and
Covel-Paulzine. Covel-Paulzine stated that she still wanted to assume the mortgage herself,
but because of the damage to her credit from the missed payments, she “would have to wait
a little while before [she] would be able to assume the mortgage.”
1 She asked the court for
five years to work toward assuming the mortgage. Covel- Paulzine stated that she would
continue to make the monthly payments during that time and, if she was unable to afford
the payments or late to pay them, she would list the property for sale immediately. She also
noted a number of improvements that she made to the home for the court to consider,
including the flooring from the grant and a “number of different appliances,” including a

1 She also noted that refinancing was a potential option rather than assuming the mortgage,
but that would increase her interest rate to the point where she would be unable to afford
the monthly payments.
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new furnace and a water heater. In response to Covel-Paulzine’s proposed solution of
assuming the mortgage herself, Nesbit stated that he would accept that only if “she could
pay [him] out,” but he did not “feel like [he] should just walk away from this whole thing.”
The parties submitted written closing arguments. In Covel-Paulzine’s closing
argument, she introduced new arguments about the negative effect selling the home would
have on her three children, stating that “forcing a sale would mean displacing them from
the only home they have known .” She further asserted that selling the home would mean
the closure of her in-home daycare business. Nesbit responded that these arguments were
not supported by evidence introduced at trial.
The district court entered judgment on the case in June 2025. In its order, the district
court found that a partition in kind is not practicable because (1) “when [Covel-Paulzine]
agreed to be solely responsible for the mortgage, she missed fourteen (14) payments,
resulting in damage to both parties’ credit and additional sums added to the mortgage
balance”; (2) Covel-Paulzine “intentionally withheld information,” her “deceptive
behavior was willful and intentional,” and “the Court finds little ground to trust [her] to
make payments and communicate issues”; and (3) Covel-Paulzine did not provide
sufficient information to show that she could make mortgage payments or buy-out Nesbit’s
interest. It therefore concluded that an in-kind partition could not be achieved without great
prejudice to one or both of the parties. The court ordered the home to be listed for sale
within 90 days, and once sold, the proceeds should be allocated as follows: “(1) to all fees
and expenses of the sale; (2) payment of all outstanding mortgages, liens, and
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encumbrances upon the property; (3) the sum of $19,980.00 to [Nesbit]; and (4) the
balance, if any, to be divided equally between the parties.”2
Covel-Paulzine appeals.
DECISION
We review the district court’s partition decision for an abuse of discretion,
Glenwood Inv. Props., L.L.C. v. Britton Fam. Tr., 765 N.W.2d 112, 117 (Minn. App. 2009),
and the facts underlying a partition order for clear error, Anderson v. Anderson, 560
N.W.2d 729, 730 (Minn. App. 1997), rev. dismissed (Minn. May 28, 1997). “[F] indings
are clearly erroneous when they are manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or
not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney ,
963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). When reviewing findings of fact
for clear error, appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, reconcile conflicting evidence, or
engage in fact finding. Id. at 221-22. We will not set aside a finding unless we are “left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.” Beebout v. Beebout, 447
N.W.2d 465, 467 (Minn. App. 1989).
Covel-Paulzine argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering a
partition by sale, rather than a partition in kind or another equitable partition method .
Specifically, she challenges several factual findings in the order as clearly erroneous. She
also argues that the district court erred by not considering the prejudice she will experience

2 The $19,980.00 sum represented Nesbit’s mortgage payments for the first year of owning
the home and was set out in the court’s factual findings.
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if her home is sold, and she suggests that alternative partition options may minimize
prejudice to both parties.
Alternatively, she argues that, if partition by sale was proper, then the district court
abused its discretion in its allocation of sale proceeds. Because we remand for additional
findings with respect to her first argument, we do not reach her arguments about the
allocation of proceeds. We therefore turn to her challenges to the district court’s factual
findings and consideration of prejudice to the parties.
Factual Challenges
Covel-Paulzine challenges several factual findings in the district court’s order as
clearly erroneous. She argues that these erroneous findings led the district court to
improperly conclude that Nesbit would experience great prejudice if a partition by sale was
not ordered.
Covel-Paulzine first disputes the court’s findings related to her culpability in
increasing the mortgage balance and in harming Nesbit’s credit. The district court found,
“[W]hen [Covel-Paulzine] agreed to be solely responsible for the mortgage, she missed
fourteen (14) payments, resulting in damage to both parties’ credit and additional sums
added to the mortgage balance.” The district court also found that Covel- Paulzine
negotiated the partial claim agreements “[w]ithout [Nesbit’s] participation or knowledge,”
which resulted in the additional funds being added to the end of the mortgage.
We are not persuaded that those findings are clearly erroneous. At trial, Nesbit and
Covel-Paulzine each testified that they assumed that Covel- Paulzine would take over the
mortgage payments after Nesbit moved out. During the period whe n Covel-Paulzine was
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solely responsible for the mortgage, 14 monthly payments were not made, and those
payments are now considered missed by the mortgage company. We acknowledge that
fewer payments may have been missed if Nesbit had timely signed the initial partial claim
paperwork, and so his actions contributed somewhat to the increased mortgage balance.
But under a clear error standard of review, we do not reweigh evidence or reconcile
conflicting evidence. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-22. The record supports that Covel-
Paulzine was solely responsible for paying the mortgage for a period, and that 14 payments
were missed during that period, which increased the mortgage balance and harmed both
parties’ credit scores. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court’s findings to that
effect were not clearly erroneous.
Second, Covel-Paulzine challenges the district court’s factual findings about her
trustworthiness and the likelihood of her compliance with the terms of a partition in kind
or other equitable partition method. On this issue, the district court found that Covel-
Paulzine “intentionally withheld information from [Nesbit]” and that her “deceptive
behavior was willful and intentional.” Then, “[b]ased upon [Covel-Paulzine’s] prior
behavior,” the court stated that it “finds little ground to trust [Covel-Paulzine] to make
payments and communicate issues to [Nesbit].”
The fact-finder is in the best position to make credibility determinations about the
parties, In re Civ. Commitment of Ince, 847 N.W.2d 13, 24 (Minn. 2014), but when the
district court’s findings are not sufficient for meaningful appellate review, we may remand
for further findings, Gams v. Houghton, 869 N.W.2d 60, 65 (Minn. App. 2015) (“[R]emand
is the appropriate remedy when the district court has made insufficient findings to enable
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appellate review.”), aff’d as modified, 884 N.W.2d 611 (Minn. 2016). Here, we cannot
discern the basis for the district court’s finding that Covel-Paulzine was willfully and
intentionally deceptive. The record shows that, during the period when Covel-Paulzine was
solely responsible for the mortgage, she missed several payments because of illness and
did not tell Nesbit about the missed payments. At the same time, there is also evidence that
Covel-Paulzine timely contacted Nesbit for his signature on the par tial-claim paperwork
after negotiating with the lender to mitigate harm from the missed payment. And, although
Covel-Paulzine did not keep Nesbit informed about the mortgage, it is not apparent from
our review of the record that she intended to deceive him by withholding that information.
On record before us, we struggle to find support for the finding that Covel-Paulzine’s
conduct was willful and deceptive.
But given our deference to the district court regarding
credibility determinations, which are based on “observing the witnesses and judging their
credibility on a first hand basis,” Hollom v. Carey, 343 N.W.2d 701, 704 (Minn. App.
1984), and our ultimate conclusion that remand is required, we also conclude that it is
appropriate to allow the district court to make additional findings on remand with respect
to Covel-Paulzine’s trustworthiness to comply with a partition in kind or other equitable
partition method.
Prejudice Determinations
Covel-Paulzine’s next argument is that the district court abused its discretion in
failing to consider the prejudice she will experience if her home is sold. Specifically, she
argues that she will be prejudiced by a sale because she and her children currently live in
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the home and will be forced to move, and that she will have to close the daycare business
that she operates in the home and, consequently, lose her sole income source.
Partition in kind is favored over partition by sale. Swogger v. Taylor, 68 N.W.2d
376, 384 (Minn. 1955); see Minn. Stat. § 558.14 (2024) (stating the conditions under which
partition by sale may be ordered).3 A district court may order a sale in a partition action “if
it is alleged in the complaint and established by evidence that the property, or any part of
it, is so situated that partition [in kind] cannot be had without great prejudice to the owners.”
Minn. Stat. § 558.14. If a court orders a private sale of a property, it must be in “the best
interests of the owners of the property.” Minn. Stat. § 558.17. The party that asks for
partition by sale bears the burden of proving that partition in kind is impracticable.
Swogger, 68 N.W.2d at 384.
But in all partition actions, “[w]hatever mode of partition is adopted . . . must be
capable of execution without advancing the interests of one owner at the expense of the
others.” Id.; see also Glenwood Inv. Props., 765 N.W.2d at 117-18 (affirming a district
court’s partition order and noting that the court properly exercised its equitable powers and
weighed prejudice under Swogger); Neumann v. Anderson, 916 N.W.2d 41, 54-55 (Minn.
App. 2018) ( reversing and remanding where the district court’s order and weighing of
prejudice was inconsistent with Swogger) , rev. denied (Minn. July 17, 2018); Anderson,

3 This partition action was commenced before August 1, 2025, and is therefore governed
by Minnesota Statutes chapter 558. Minn. Stat. §§ 558.01-.32 (2024). The Minnesota
Partition Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 558A.01-.29 (Supp. 2025), governs partition actions
commenced on or after August 1, 2025, and establishes several factors courts must consider
when ordering a partition in kind. Minn. Stat. §§ 558A.02 (providing the effective
date), .11 (establishing factors courts shall consider when ordering a partition in kind).
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560 N.W.2d at 731 (concluding that a partition in kind with owelty was not an abuse of
discretion because partition in kind would “impair[] the value of the property” and partition
by sale “would be prejudicial to respondents”).
The district court concluded that partition in kind was not practicable because
Covel-Paulzine “failed to demonstrate she has the ability, now or in the near future, to
fulfill the terms of a partition in kind,” and as a result, a partition in kind “would likely
continue to diminish the equity in the property, accrue additional financial issues, and cause
great hardship to one or both parties.” But despite the court’s reference to hardship to both
parties, the district court’s decision does not specifically show that it considered possible
prejudice to Covel-Paulzine in the event of a partition by sale. Rather, the court’s analysis
focuses predominantly on Covel-Paulzine’s “deceptive” and “willful” behavior and its
potential impact on Nesbit’s interests.
Because the district court’s order focused only on the prejudice Nesbit will
experience in the event of a partition in kind, it is unclear whether the district court properly
considered both parties’ interests to ensure that one party does not benefit at the other’s
expense. See Swogger, 68 N.W.2d at 384. Absent additional findings explaining why sale
is the appropriate equitable solution, the district court’s decision appears to benefit Nesbit
to the detriment of Covel-Paulzine. See id.; Glenwood Inv. Props., 765 N.W.2d at 117-18;
Neumann, 916 N.W.2d at 54-55. We are unable to meaningfully review the district court’s
partition decision without additional explanation of the court’s basis for concluding that a
sale, and the associated allocation of proceeds, was in the best interest of both parties. See
Gams, 869 N.W.2d at 65.
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In sum, although we find some support for the district court’s conclusions in its
partition order, its findings and analysis are not sufficiently clear on Covel- Paulzine’s
trustworthiness, how her trustworthiness is relevant to its consideration of the prejudice to
both parties, and whether the court considered the effect of a sale of the property on Covel-
Paulzine’s interests. We therefore remand the order to the district court for additional
findings to facilitate our meaningful review.4
Remanded.

4 Covel-Paulzine argues also that the district court did not consider alternative partition
resolutions that would be more equitable to the parties. We do not reach this issue because
of the lack of sufficient findings supporting a sale. But we note that district courts have
broad equitable powers in partition actions, and they may “resort to the most advantageous
plans,” whether that is “accomplished by a division in kind, by sale, or by any practical
combination of both methods.” Swogger, 68 N.W.2d at 383. Accordingly, it is within the
district court’s discretion to consider alternative partition options on remand, if appropriate,
based on its additional findings.