State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1157

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Darien Tyrell Randle,
Appellant.

Filed June 15, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Johnson, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-24-1141

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Zachary J. Kraemer, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Joseph McInnis, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Darien Tyrell Randle was convicted of first-degree driving while impaired (DWI).
At sentencing, the district court found that Randle’s criminal-history score is four, based
in part on two prior convictions in Illinois. We conclude that the district court erred in its
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finding of Randle’s criminal-history score because the state did not satisfy its burden of
proving the facts necessary to establish that Randle’s prior Illinois convictions should be
included in his criminal-history score. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
FACTS
In June 2024, the state charged Randle with first-degree driving while impaired, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (Supp. 2023 ). Randle pleaded guilty in
October 2024.
Before sentencing, a probation officer conducted a pre-sentence investigation (PSI).
The probation officer also prepared a sentencing worksheet, which stated that Randle had
four criminal-history points. That criminal-history score was based on four prior
convictions. One prior conviction included in the sentencing worksheet is a 2012
conviction in Illinois for burglary, for which the probation officer assigned one criminal-
history point. Another prior conviction included in the sentencing worksheet is a 2021
conviction in Illinois for aggravated fleeing from police, for which the probation officer
assigned one-half of a criminal-history point.
The district court conducted a sentencing hearing in April 2025. Randle did not
challenge the probation officer’s calculation of criminal-history points, and the state did
not present any evidence of Randle’s prior Illinois convictions. The district court imposed
a sentence of 60 months of imprisonment, which is within the presumptive guidelines
range, given a severity level of seven. The district court stayed execution of the prison
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sentence, ordered local confinement, and placed Randle on supervised probation. Randle
appeals.
DECISION
Randle argues that the district court erred by assigning him criminal-history points
for the 2012 Illinois burglary conviction and the 2021 Illinois fleeing conviction. He
contends that the state did not introduce evidence to prove that each of the two prior Illinois
convictions is equivalent to a Minnesota felony offense.1
In a felony case, a defendant’s presumptive sentence is determined by the severity
of the present offense and the defendant ’s criminal-history score. Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2 (Supp. 2023). A criminal- history score is the “sum of points” that are
assigned for, among other things, prior felony convictions and prior juvenile adjudications.
Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B. The number of criminal-history points assigned to a prior
felony conviction depends on the severity level of the prior offense. Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.B.1. Generally, “the offender is assigned a particular weight for every felony
conviction for which a felony sentence was stayed or imposed before the current
sentencing.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines cmt. 2.B.101.

1In his appellate brief, Randle first challenged the validity of his guilty plea by
arguing that there is an inadequate factual basis for a 2021 Wisconsin license revocation,
which was used to enhance the charge to first-degree DWI. After this case was submitted,
Randle filed a document entitled “Notice of Dismissal of Issue One of Appeal,” which he
personally signed, with a letter from his appellate attorney explaining that Randle had
decided that he no longer wishes to pursue his first argument. Accordingly, we will not
consider Randle’s first argument and will consider only his second argument.
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A prior conviction may be included in a defendant’s criminal-history score even if
it was not entered in a Minnesota state court. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.5.a.; State v.
Pruitt, 16 N.W.3d 856, 860 (Minn. App. 2025). “In any particular case, the district court
‘must make the final determination as to whether and how a prior non-Minnesota
conviction should be counted in the criminal history score.’” Pruitt , 16 N.W.3d at 860
(quoting Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.5.a (Supp. 2021)). A district court must consider
“whether the [non-Minnesota] offense is defined as a felony, gross misdemeanor, or
targeted misdemeanor in Minnesota” and “the sentence imposed” for the non-Minnesota
offense. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.5.b. “An offense may be counted as a felony” for
purposes of a defendant’s criminal-history score “only if it would both be defined as a
felony in Minnesota, and the offender received a sentence of 366 days or more, which
includes the equivalent of a stay of imposition.” Id. (emphasis omitted).2
“‘The State bears the burden of proof at sentencing to show that a prior conviction
qualifies for inclusion within the criminal- history score.’” Pruitt, 16 N.W.3d at 860
(quoting Williams v. State, 910 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 2018)). The state must “‘produce
evidence to establish by a fair preponderance of the evidence the validity of the prior
convictions, the fact that the defendant was the person involved, and that the crimes
constituted felonies in Minnesota. ’” State v. Johnson, 31 N.W.3d 566, 571 (Minn. App.

2The state cites Hill v. State, 483 N.W.2d 57 (Minn. 1992), in support of its assertion
that the definition of the non-Minnesota offense should be the “main focus” of the district
court’s analysis. As this court has noted, the Hill opinion applied the significantly different
language of the 1987 version of the sentencing guidelines and, thus, does not provide useful
guidance in applying the current version of the sentencing guidelines. Pruitt, 16 N.W.3d
at 862-63.
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2026) (quoting State v. Griffin, 336 N.W.2d 519, 525 (Minn. 1983)). This court applies an
abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s determination of a defendant’s
criminal-history score. Id. A district court abuses its discretion by including non-
Minnesota convictions in a defendant’s criminal-history score if the state did not satisfy its
burden of proof. See id.
In this case, Randle did not challenge his criminal-history score in the district court.
Nonetheless, he may argue for the first time on appeal that the state did not satisfy its
burden of proving the facts that support a criminal-history score. See State v. Strobel, 932
N.W.2d 303, 305-06 (Minn. 2019); State v. Scovel, 916 N.W.2d 550, 553 n.5 (Minn. 2018);
State v. Maurstad, 733 N.W.2d 141, 147-48 (Minn. 2007). If a defendant makes such an
argument for the first time on appeal, this court must examine the record to determine
whether it contains evidence supporting the district court’s calculation of criminal-history
points. See State v. Maley, 714 N.W.2d 708, 711-12 (Minn. App. 2006).
Randle argues that the evidentiary record of the sentencing hearing lacks evidence
necessary for the inclusion of his prior Illinois convictions in his criminal-history score.
With respect to the 2012 burglary conviction, Randle contends that “there is no evidence
in the record that Randle engaged in conduct that meets the elements of” burglary under
the Minnesota statute. With respect to the 2021 fleeing conviction, Randle con tends that
he “received the equivalent of a misdemeanor sentence.”
In response, the state admits that the record lacks some information about the prior
Illinois convictions. With respect to the 2012 burglary conviction, the state admits that the
record does not identify the Illinois statute that Randle violated or the facts of Randle’s
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underlying conduct. With respect to the 2021 fleeing conviction, the state admits that the
record does not identify the Illinois statute that Randle violated, the facts of his underlying
conduct, or whether Randle received a felony-level sentence.
It appears that t he unknown facts identified by the state are necessary for a
determination that the Illinois offenses “would . . . be defined as a felony in Minnesota”
and a determination that Randle “received a sentence of 366 days or more.” See Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.5.b. Accordingly, the state did not satisfy its burden of proving that
Randle’s prior Illinois convictions should be included in his criminal-history score. See
Johnson, 31 N.W.3d at 571; Pruitt, 16 N.W.3d at 860. Consequently, the district court
erred by assigning Randle one and one-half criminal-history points for the two Illinois
convictions.
Randle urges this court to order the district court to reduce his criminal-history score
by excluding the points associated with the two Illinois convictions. Randle cites no
authority for that remedy. The state argues that this court should reverse and remand so
that it may introduce additional evidence concerning Randle’s prior Illinois convictions.
This court has held that, if the state did not satisfy its burden of proof because an appellant
did not challenge the assignment of criminal- history points at sentencing, the appropriate
remedy is for the case to be reversed and remanded to allow the state to “further develop
the sentencing record so that the district court can appropriately make its determination.”
State v. Outlaw, 748 N.W.2d 349, 356 (Minn. App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn. July 15,
2008).
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Thus, we reverse the sentence imposed and remand to the district court for further
proceedings, with instructions to allow the state to further develop the sentencing record.
Reversed and remanded.