In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: D. N. C., A. L., and S. A. G., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1161

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
D. N. C., A. L., and S. A. G., Parents.

Filed January 20, 2026
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Brown County District Court
File No. 08-JV-25-22

Chris Reisdorfer, Nelson Oyen Torvik, PLLP, Montevideo, Minnesota (for appellant -
father A.L.)

Charles W. Hanson, Brown County Attorney, Jill M. Green, Assistant County Attorney,
New Ulm, Minnesota (for respondent Brown County Human Services)

Sarah M. Hollinger, Montevideo, Minnesota (for respondent-mother D.N.C.)

Elizabeth Lynn-Hayes Weinandt, Kohlmeyer Hagen Law Office, Mankato, Minnesota (for
respondent-father S.A.G.)

Heather Schwab, St. Peter, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and
Worke, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant-father challenges the district court’s termination of parental rights (TPR)
order, arguing that the record does not show that (1) father abandoned the child; (2) father
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failed to satisfy parental duties; (3) father failed to correct the conditions leading to
out-of-home placement; (4) the child is neglected and in foster care; (5) the county made
reasonable reunification efforts; and (6) TPR is in the child’s best interests. We affirm.
FACTS
In April 2024, respondent Brown County Human Services (the county) began
working with respondent-mother D.N.C. (mother) and her three children. Mother was not
married when the children were conceived nor when they were born and therefore had
custody by operation of law. Respondent-father S.A.G. is the adjudicated father of the two
younger children. Appellant-father A.L. (father) signed a recognition of parentage and is
the adjudicated father of the eldest child (the child).
In June 2024, the county filed a petition alleging that the children were children in
need of protection or services (CHIPS) and requesting out-of-home placement due to the
unsanitary condition of the home, neglect, and mother’s chemical-dependency and
mental-health needs . On June 14, 2024, the district court ordered the children into
out-of-home placement.
On March 19, 2025, the county filed a TPR petition. Shortly thereafter, mother
consented to the transfer of permanent legal and physical custody of the children.
Permanent legal and permanent physical custody of the two younger children was
transferred to S.A.G. The proposed custodian for the child was a relative who maintained
contact among the siblings.
The county proceeded with the TPR petition as it related to father and the child. The
county alleged that TPR was in the child’s best interests because (1) father abandoned the
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child, (2) father neglected his parental duties, (3) father failed to correct the conditions
leading to out-of -home placement despite the county’s reasonable-assistance efforts, and
(4) the child was neglected and in foster care. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(1),
(2), (4), (7) (2024).
The county claimed that father had had no contact with the child since the case
opened and that he had made no progress toward establishing himself as a permanency
option. The county claimed that it had attempted to create a case plan with father, but
father neither appeared for meetings nor maintained contact with the county. Father’s
case-plan goals included becoming a part of the child’s life, addressing legal issues,
establishing consistent communication with the county, participating in parent education,
abstaining from non- prescribed mood-altering substances, establishing appropriate
housing, and addressing mental-health needs. The county had attempted to assist father by
providing referrals for parenting education and sending him local career-force resources,
county benefits and services, mental-health resources, and a resource to apply for a free
government phone.
On April 23, 2025, the district court filed an order relieving the county of its duty
to provide reunification efforts based on father’s lack of participation or progress in his
case plan and lack of visits with the child over the ten months the CHIPS matter had been
opened. The district court stated that father could work his case plan on his own initiative.
On May 28, 2025, the district court held a trial. The county presented evidence
showing its efforts to reunify father with the child. For example, the county provided a
parenting education session to father. This session ended prematurely when father
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apparently lost his electronic connection. The county attempted to reengage with father,
but by the time of trial, father had not responded to the county or rescheduled parenting
education. The county also provided evidence that the child identified S.A.G. as his dad
and had briefly mentioned father only in stating that he had two dads.
Father testified that he lived with his father because he has no other place to go.
Father testified that he saw the child regularly until the county placed the child in
out-of-home placement. He testified that he is now employed and can utilize public
transportation. Father testified that he also has family members available to help him.
Father admitted that he did not follow his case plan. He did not maintain contact
with the county because “it’s kinda hard to get your life together [and] at the same time to
talk with [the county].” He stated that it would not have been in the child’s best interests
to be with him while he was getting his life together.
On June 20, 2025, the district court filed an order terminating father’s parental
rights. The district court found that, before the child’s out-of-home placement, father
exercised parenting time. S.A.G. had testified that, when he lived with mother, he took the
child to visit father every other weekend for about five hours, but father would show up
late or not at all. The district court found that the child called S.A.G. “dad,” and although
he knows that he has another dad, the child does not mention father. The district court
found that, when the county began working with the family, mother stated that father was
“largely uninvolved” in the child’s life, and she did not even have his contact information.
While the district court’s order includes findings regarding progress that father made
on his case plan, including that he told the county that he obtained employment, it also
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included numerous findings regarding father’s failure to meet with the county or attend
hearings, the county’s attempts to engage father in services, and father’s inability or
disinterest in participating in services. The district court also found that father had gone
almost an entire year without seeing the child—father had not seen the child from June
2024 through the date of trial. The district court concluded that the county proved the
statutory bases to terminate father’s parental rights, and that it was in the child’s best
interests to terminate father’s parental rights. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Father argues that the district court should not have terminated his parental rights.
This court reviews a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights for an abuse of
discretion. In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn. App. 2021),
rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021).
In reviewing a district court’s TPR order, we review the district court’s factual
findings for clear error. In re Welfare of Child. of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App.
2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). We review the district court’s determinations that
the county made reasonable reunification efforts and that TPR is in the child’s best interests
for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Minn.
App. 2015) (reasonable efforts), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015); J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at
905-06 (best interests).
“Parental rights are terminated only for grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare
of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). A district court may terminate parental
rights if at least one statutory ground for termination exists, the county made reasonable
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efforts to reunite the family or efforts were not required, and TPR is in the best interests of
the child. In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). The
county must provide clear and convincing evidence showing that the conditions supporting
TPR exist at the time of the hearing and will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.
In re Child. of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2005); J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 901-02.
Statutory Bases
Here, the district court determined that the county proved that statutory bases for
TPR exist —father had abandoned the child, father neglected his parental duties, the
conditions leading to the out-of-home placement were not corrected despite the county’s
reasonable efforts to assist father, and the child was neglected and in foster care. While
the record need only support the district court’s determination that at least one statutory
basis for TPR exists, the record here supports the district court’s determination that four
statutory bases support TPR. See S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385.
A statutory basis for TPR exists if “the parent has abandoned the child.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(1). “Abandonment is presumed when . . . the parent has had no
contact with the child on a regular basis and not demonstrated consistent interest in the
child’s well-being for six months and the [county] has made reasonable efforts to facilitate
contact.” Id., subd. 2(a)(1) (2024).
Here, father claims that he had regular contact with the child before the county’s
involvement. But he admitted that he did not have contact with the child for nearly one
year before the trial. He also claims that the county failed to facilitate contact between him
and the child. However, father testified that he was aware that the county was attempting
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to reach him to engage him in services, but he found it too difficult to talk to the county
and also get his life together. The record supports the determination that father abandoned
the child.
A statutory basis for TPR exists if
the parent has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly
refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon
that parent by the parent and child relationship, including but
not limited to providing the child with necessary food,
clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control
necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health
and development, if the parent is physically and financially
able, and either reasonable efforts by the [county] have failed
to correct the conditions that formed the basis of the petition or
reasonable efforts would be futile and therefore unreasonable.

Id., subd. 1(b)(2).

Father argues that he did not neglect his parental duties because the child had the
necessities when the child stayed with father and his financial hardship is not a basis to
support the neglect determination. But the district court determined that father “made next
to no progress on any of the aspects of the case plan.” Father admitted that he did not make
progress on his case plan. He had not completed mental-health or chemical-dependency
assessments, he did not have suitable housing, he had not completed parenting education,
he failed to be involved in the child’s therapy , and he was frequently out of contact with
the county. The record supports the district court’s determination that father substantially,
continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with his parental duties.
A statutory basis for TPR exists if reasonable efforts have failed to correct the
conditions leading to the child’s out-of-home placement. Id., subd. 1(b)(4).
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It is presumed that reasonable efforts . . . have failed upon a
showing that:
(i) a child has resided out of the parental home under
court order for a cumulative period of 12 months within the
preceding 22 months. In the case of a child under age eight at
the time the [CHIPS] petition was filed . . . the presumption
arises when the child has resided out of the parental home
under court order for six months unless the parent has
maintained regular contact with the child and the parent is
complying with the out-of-home placement plan;
(ii) the court has approved the out- of-home placement
plan . . . ;
(iii) conditions leading to the out- of-home placement
have not been corrected. It is presumed that conditions leading
to a child’s out-of-home placement have not been corrected
upon a showing that the parent . . . [has] not substantially
complied with the court’s orders and a reasonable case plan;
and
(iv) reasonable efforts have been made by the [county]
to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.
Id.

Here, it is presumed that reasonable efforts have failed. The child is under eight
years old and has been in out-of-home placement for more than six months. Father failed
to maintain regular contact or comply with his case plan. Father argues that the conditions
leading to the out- of-home placement were due to issues with mother—her unsanitary
home and her chemical dependency—not issues with him. But father had a case plan, and
he failed to comply with it. He claims that he complied as best as he could. But the record
shows that father’s efforts were minimal, and he did not prioritize reunifying with the child.
The record supports the district court’s determination that reasonable efforts failed to
correct the conditions leading to the child’s out-of-home placement.
A statutory basis for TPR exists when “the child is neglected and in foster care.”
Id., subd. 1(b)(7).
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Father concedes that the child is in foster care. However, he claims that it is possible
to return the child to him because the county failed to show that he failed to make
reasonable efforts to adjust his circumstances. Father claims that he can financially support
the child, he is employed, he has housing, and he took care of his outstanding warrant.
But the record shows that, at the time of trial, father had not made progress on his
case plan, he had no contact with the child, and he had no contact with the county. There
is nothing in the record showing that father took his case plan seriously. For example, at
one point, he told the county that parenting education should be optional and that it was
not necessary for him to complete. The record supports the district court’s determination
that father neglected the child while the child was in foster care.1
Reasonable Efforts
Before terminating parental rights, a district court must find that the county made
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunify the family or find that reasonable
efforts are not statutorily required. Id., subd. 8 (2024). Reasonable efforts are “services
that go beyond mere matters of form so as to include real, genuine assistance.” In re
Welfare of Child. of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted),
rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007). The efforts “must be aimed at alleviating the conditions

1 Father appears to misunderstand the district court’s TPR order as terminating his parental
rights under section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(6), which provides “that in the case of a
child born to a mother who was not married to the child’s father when the child was
conceived nor when the child was born the person is not entitled to notice of an adoption
hearing . . . and the person has not registered with the fathers’ adoption registry.” The
district court invoked this provision only to terminate rights to any other person, other than
father. Because the district court did not terminate father’s rights under this subdivision,
there is nothing for us to review.
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that gave rise to out -of-home placement, and they must conform to the problems
presented.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 88 (Minn. App. 2012).
Father argues that the county’s efforts were not reasonable because they focused on
mother’s conditions that led to the out-of-home placement. But the case plan offered to
father was aimed at the problems presented. First, father was a noncustodial parent. The
county had to ensure that he had safe and stable housing for the child. But father failed to
maintain contact with the county to show that he had a safe and stable environment.
Second, father had to show that he could properly parent the child. Father was to take
parenting-education courses, but he determined that the sessions were unnecessary. Third,
he had to show that he had a stable environment by completing mental-health and
chemical-dependency assessments. Father did not complete the assessments. Finally,
father had to address legal issues. But he did not address an outstanding warrant until
shortly before trial. The case plan was designed to address the issues relevant to father.
Best Interests
In considering the best interests of the child, the district court balances three factors:
“(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest
in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child.”
In re Welfare of R.T.B. , 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992) ; see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P.
58.04(c)(2)(ii) (listing these factors). A child’s competing interests include the need for a
stable environment, their health, and their preferences. R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d at 4. “During
this balancing process, the interests of the parent and child are not necessarily given equal
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weight.” Id. When the interests of parent and child conflict, “the interests of the child are
paramount.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7.
Father argues that it is not in the child’s best interests to terminate his parental rights
because the child recognizes that he is his father. But as the county argues, the child had
minimal contact with father. Testimony shows that the child mainly identified S.A.G. as
his “dad.” And in considering the competing interest of the child’s need for a stable
environment, the child is in a placement that is stable, living near S.A.G., and maintaining
regular contact with his siblings. His current environment is stable in comparison to father
testifying that, at the time of trial, he was essentially homeless. The district court did not
abuse its discretion by determining that TPR is in the child’s best interests.
Affirmed.