Nogodjouan Diomande, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1172

Nogodjouan Diomande,
Appellant,

vs.

Soualiho Diomande,
Respondent.

Filed May 4, 2026
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-FA-23-6007

Nogodjouan Diomande, St. Michael, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Soualiho Diomande, Monticello, Minnesota (self-represented respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bond, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.*
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
In this appeal following a marital dissolution, mother challenges the district court’s
determinations about (1) the children’s schooling and (2) the children’s name change and
raises other arguments concerning (3) due process; (4) access to nonfamilial babysitter

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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names; (5) a hearing transcript; (6) evidentiary determinations; and (7) a postorder child-
support determination. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-mother Nogodjouan Diomande and respondent-father Soualiho
Diomande have two children, both with the last name “Diomande”: a daughter born in
2019 and a son born in 2022. The parties filed their first joint petition for dissolution of
their marriage in November 2023. In March 2024, while the dissolution was pending, the
parties signed an informal dissolution agreement (the March 2024 agreement). They
agreed to, among other things, “[a]dd [mother’s] former last name, Kamagate, to children’s
last name.” The parties incorporated the March 2024 agreement into their second joint
petition for dissolution. In June 2024, the parties filed a third joint petition for dissolution
(the final dissolution petition) that removed all references to name changes, explaining that
these changes “will be requested outside of divorce court.”
The district court entered a judgment and decree (J&D) granting the parties’
dissolution. The J&D granted the parties joint legal and joint physical custody of the
children and set a parenting-time schedule. Father planned to be away from home to train
with the National Guard from July through December 2024, so the J&D also awarded
mother temporary physical custody and $1,000 of monthly temporary basic child support
while father was away. The district court reserved the issue of other child-support
payments, as requested by the final dissolution petition. The district court also noted that
“[n]ame changes for mother and children will be requested outside of divorce court,” as
requested by the final dissolution petition.
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While father was away, mother began homeschooling the parties’ daughter. In
January 2025, mother filed a separate civil application to change her name back to her
former name, Hadja Nogodjouan Kamagate, and to change the last name of the parties’
two children from “Diomande” to “Kamagate Diomande.” Father then filed a motion in
this dissolution case requesting, as relevant to this appeal, determinations on the children’s
schooling and the parties’ parenting time. Mother filed her first motion in this case
requesting name changes for herself and the children. She also requested additional child
support and disclosures of the names of nonfamilial babysitters.
The district court held a contested evidentiary hearing on the parties’ motions,
including mother’s separate civil application for name changes. The district court received
over thirty exhibits into evidence, all without objection. Both parties were self-represented
and provided testimony, questioned each other, and submitted financial affidavits.
Following the hearing, the district court issued an order granting father’s motion for
the parties’ children to attend traditional school rather than homeschool; granting mother’s
motion to change her own name; denying mother’s motion to change the children’s names;
and granting mother’s motion for a parenting -time provision that requires the parties to
disclose the names of nonfamilial babysitters. The district court reserved child support for
reasons not relevant to this appeal.
This appeal follows.1

1 Father did not file a brief in this court. This court ordered the appeal to proceed pursuant
to Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 142.03, which provides that, if the
respondent does not file and serve a brief, “the case shall be determined on the merits.”
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DECISION
Mother challenges the district court’s determinations regarding (1) the children’s
schooling and (2) the children’s last name, and raises other arguments concerning (3) due
process; (4) the disclosure of nonfamilial babysitter names; (5) the hearing transcript;
(6) the modification of parenting time; and ( 7) a postorder child-support determination.
We address each issue in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the
children’s best interests would be served by attending traditional schooling,
rather than homeschooling.2

Mother argues that the school-choice determination constituted an abuse of
discretion because the district court clearly erred by finding that (1) the “children would
receive the professional help needed” through traditional schooling and (2) the children
could not receive that support through homeschooling. We disagree.
“Decisions regarding school choice are educational decisions within the ambit of
legal custody . . . .” Wolf v. Oestreich, 956 N.W.2d 248, 254 (Minn. App. 2021), rev.
denied (Minn. May 18, 2021). This court reviews a district court’s factual findings on
custody issues for clear error. In re Welfare of C.F.N., 923 N.W.2d 325, 334 (Minn. App.
2018), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2019).
A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it is “ manifestly contrary to the weight of
the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Civ.

2 Although the parties’ son was not yet of school age, the district court determined that
“[o]nce [he] is of appropriate age, he shall also attend traditional school (not homeschool).”
While the district court determined that both children’s best interests favored traditional
schooling, mother challenges only specific findings about daughter.
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Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) ( quotation omitted).
Reviewing courts (1) “view the evidence in a light favorable to the findings,” (2) do not
find their own facts, (3) do not “reweigh the evidence,” and (4) do not “reconcile
conflicting evidence.” Id. at 221-22 (quotations omitted).
A. The district court did not clearly err by finding that the children could
receive the professional support that they needed through traditional
schooling.

The district court discussed the availability of professional support in light of the
children’s educational and developmental needs. The district court found that a “traditional
school is capable of providing the resources and support the children need or may need to
ensure the children catch up and continue to progress.”
Mother testified that, prior to homeschooling daughter, traditional schools “would
need [an] additional teacher to be able to assist with [daughter].” A January 2024 report
from a traditional school attended by daughter stated : “We have consistently needed a
fourth teacher to be able to provide [daughter] with one-on- one support.” The report
expressed willingness to continue to offer daughter support. The record supports the
district court’s finding that traditional schooling had resources to support daughter’s needs.
B. The district court did not clearly err by finding that the children could
not receive the professional support that they needed through
homeschooling.

The district court found that school professionals and other resources “are not
readily accessible to [mother] while homeschooling.” The district court discussed
daughter’s educational progress, explaining that daughter “only learned a few additional
numbers and letters” through homeschooling. It also cited a March 2025 assessment in
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which daughter “was deemed to be in the [bottom] tenth percentile of children in
kindergarten.”
Mother testified that, while homeschooling, she used both her own homeschooling
program and an online homeschooling program with its “own structure.” Although the
record shows that the parties discussed supplemental tutoring, mother testified that it was
“not needed” and there is no evidence that daughter worked with any tutors. The record
reflects that no additional professionals or resources were made available to daughter
through homeschooling.
In addition, both parties testified at the evidentiary hearing that, while daughter
made some educational progress in homeschooling, she remained below the average
educational level for her age. The March 2025 assessment discussed daughter’s academic
performance six months after she began homeschooling. The assessment indicated that,
for “oral reading fluency” and “letter sound fluency,” daughter was in approximately the
tenth percentile for kindergarten students. The record reflects that daughter made limited
progress through homeschooling.
The district court’s findings about schooling are reasonably supported by the
evidence. We therefore conclude that the district court did not clearly err by making those
findings and did not abuse its discretion by determining that traditional schooling would
serve the children’s best interests.

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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that denying
mother’s request to change the children ’s names served the children’s best
interests.

Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion to
change the children’s last name, challenging the district court’s (1) finding about the March
2024 agreement; (2) weighing of the children’s preferences; and (3) weighing of the
parties’ cultural considerations. We are not persuaded.
“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
[district] court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. But we
review a district court’ s ultimate decision on a request to change a child’s name for an
abuse of discretion. See Foster v. Foster, 802 N.W.2d 755, 756 (Minn. App. 2011). “A
district court abuses its discretion when evidence in the record does not support the factual
findings, the court misapplie[s] the law, or the court settles a dispute in a way that is against
logic and the facts on record.” Id. at 757 (quotation omitted).
When determining whether to change a child’s name, the district court must
consider the child’s best interests. See Minn. Stat. § 259.11(a) (2024) (allowing district
court to deny name-change application if it “finds that such name change is not in the best
interests of the child”). “[I]f a parent of the child opposes [a] name-change request, the
district court must examine the evidence and arguments of the parent opposing the
request.” Foster, 802 N.W.2d at 757. “The district court should grant a name-change
request over the objection of a parent with great caution.” Id. (quotation omitted).
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There are five nonexclusive Saxton factors, including the “children’s preference,”
for determining whether a name change is in a child’s best interests. See In re Saxton, 309
N.W.2d 298, 301 (Minn. 1981). The district court discussed all five Saxton factors and
two additional factors, the March 2024 agreement and the parties’ cultural testimony. It
determined that all Saxton factors had a neutral impact on the name-change analysis except
for the children’s preference, which weighed “slightly against” the name change.
A. March 2024 Agreement
Generally, courts favor stipulations in dissolution litigation and accord them “the
sanctity of binding contracts.” Toughill v. Toughill, 609 N.W.2d 634, 638 (Minn. App.
2000) (quotat ion omitted). But “[t]he district court is a third party to dissolution
proceedings and has the authority to refuse to accept the terms of a stipulation [by the
parties] in part or in toto.” Id. at 638 n.1 (quotation omitted).
The district court discussed the March 2024 agreement and found that father did not
sign the agreement “freely and voluntarily.” The district court therefore declined to
“consider” the agreement in its name-change analysis. In effect, the district court rejected
the March 2024 agreement’s name-change stipulation.
Even if we assume without deciding that mother is correct and father signed the
March 2024 agreement free from duress, the district court had the authority to reject the
name-change stipulation. See Toughill, 609 N.W.2d at 638 n.1. “[T]he district court is not
bound by a stipulation merely because the parties have entered it.” Id. Further, the parties’
final dissolution petition stated that it “contain[ed] the necessary facts and include[d] an
agreement on all issues before the court.” (Emphasis added.) It is undisputed that the final
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dissolution petition did not request any name changes and did not reference or attach the
March 2024 agreement.
Because the district court had the authority to reject the name-change stipulation,
and the final dissolution petition superseded the name-change stipulation, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to consider the March 2024
agreement. See, e.g., Cambern v. Hubbling, 238 N.W.2d 622, 624 (Minn. 1976) (affirming
district court on other grounds).
B. Children’s Preferences
The district court found that “[t]he children are not of a sufficient age to provide a
preference.” It explained: “[Mother] stated, herself, that if the children were older, she
would allow them to make the decision.” The district court determined that “[t]his [Saxton]
factor slightly weighs against the change.”
Mother challenges the district court’s weighing of this factor against the proposed
name change. However, mother acknowledged at the evidentiary hearing that the children
“do not know the concept of [a] last name” and would not be “aware of a change” to their
last name. At the time of the district court’s order, the children were five and two years
old, respectively.
Because logic and the record support the district court’s weighing of the children’s-
preference factor against the proposed name change, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion.

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C. Cultural Descriptions
The district court stated that the parties are from the same African country. It noted
that, while father asserted “that traditionally, the father gives the children their names,”
mother contended “that although they are from the same country in Africa, they do not
come from the same culture.” The district court implicitly determined that cultural
considerations had a neutral impact on the name-change analysis.
Mother first argues that the district court erred by not conducting its own research
into her cultural argument. We disagree. The district court was not required, or even
permitted, to conduct this research. See In re Guardianship of Doyle, 778 N.W.2d 342,
348 (Minn. App. 2010) (“Generally, district courts do not gather their own evidence.”); In
re Disciplinary Action Against Schaefer, 423 N.W.2d 680, 684 (Minn. 1988) (“Courts must
operate on proven facts and must use the written record to justify their decisions.”). The
district court properly considered only proven facts and the written record, acknowledging
the parties’ differing cultural descriptions.
Mother also challenges the district court’s weighing of culture in its analysis,
asserting that it relied on father’s “unverified statement” that implied that the parties shared
the same culture. Mother appears to misunderstand the district court’s order. It discussed
both parties’ testimony on the matter and did not weigh cultural considerations in favor of
either party. The district court properly examined father’s “evidence and arguments” as he
was the party opposing the name-change request. Foster, 802 N.W.2d at 757.
Because logic and the record support the district court’s neutral weighing of the
parties’ cultural testimony, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
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Ultimately, it is “the child’s welfare” that “is paramount to the question of whether
changing [their] name is proper.” Saxton, 309 N.W.2d at 301. After determining that the
name-change request was not in the children’s best interests, the district court acted within
its discretion to deny the request. See Minn. Stat. § 259.11(a).
III. Mother’s arguments about due process and nonfamilial babysitters are
inadequately briefed and insufficient to obtain relief on appeal.

Mother argues that the district court violated her due-process rights and failed to
address the topic of nonfamilial babysitters. We are not persuaded that either argument
merits relief.
Appellate courts need not address questions that are inadequately briefed. See In re
Civ. Commitment of Kropp, 895 N.W.2d 647, 653 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn.
June 20, 2017); Mathison v. Webb, 987 N.W.2d 597, 600 n.5 (Minn. App. 2023) (applying
Kropp in family law case). Appellate courts do not assume district court error. Loth v.
Loth, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949); see also Luthen v. Luthen, 596 N.W.2d 278, 283
(Minn. App. 1999) (applying Loth). We also “must disregard” harmless error. Minn. R.
Civ. P. 61.
We are not persuaded by mother’s due-process arguments. While mother asserts
that the district court violated her right to procedural due process by preventing her from
presenting certain evidence, she does not explain what evidence it prevented her from
presenting. In addition, she does not provide any caselaw to support her claim, and she
does not explain what prejudice she suffered. Mother also appears to argue that the district
court violated her right to substantive due process, although she does not use that term.
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Mother provides one sentence of argument on this point, contending that the school-choice
determination “is an unconstitutional infringement of [her] parental rights.” While she
does cite to the United States Constitution in that sentence, mother again does not point to
any caselaw to support her argument or request specific relief.
We are also not persuaded by mother’s nonfamilial-babysitter claim, in which she
contends that the district court did not “cover[]” that topic at the hearing and “included a
false statement” about the topic in its order. It is unclear why mother raises this claim when
the district court ultimately granted her request. Mother does not explain what prejudice
she suffered nor what relief she requests on appeal. Mother also does not cite to any
caselaw to support this argument.
Because these arguments are insufficient to obtain relief on appeal and inadequately
briefed, we decline to consider them.
IV. Mother’s remaining arguments fall outside the scope of this appeal.

Mother also challenges the district court’s hearing transcript, parenting-time
modification, and postorder child-support determination. None of these issues are properly
presented to this court.
First, mother argues that “[t]he transcript contains added and removed statements,
falsification of statements, and formatted statements.” Although generally unclear as to
her requested relief, in one instance mother requests that this court “verify” certain
statements in the transcript. Issues about the accuracy of a record must “be submitted to
and determined by the [district] court.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P 110.05. This court does not
resolve factual disputes about the transcript’s accuracy. See Doty v. Doty, 533 N.W.2d 72,
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75 (Minn. App. 1995) (stating that we do not determine whether existing record “truly
discloses what occurred in the trial court” (quotation omitted)).
Mother also argues that the district court “ignore[ed] evidence” of “child
endangerment” that required a restriction of father’s parenting time under Minn. Stat.
§ 518.175, subd. 1(b) (2024). Generally, appellate courts may consider only issues that
were presented to and considered by the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580,
582 (Minn. 1988); see also Smith v. Kessen, 996 N.W.2d 581, 590 (Minn. App. 2023)
(applying this aspect of Thiele to family law case), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 31, 2024). Nor
may a party raise an issue on appeal that was presented to the district court, but argue that
issue on a theory not presented to the district court. See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582. Mother
appears to conflate the terms “parenting time” and “custody.” See Minn. Stat. § 518.003,
subds. 3(c), 5 (2024) (defining “physical custody and residence” and “parenting time”).
Mother never asked the district court to restrict father’s parenting time but rather she
requested “sole physical custody with scheduled unsupervised visitation” for father.3
Because mother did not ask the district court to restrict parenting time, we decline to
consider this issue on appeal.
Lastly, mother challenges a child-support determination made by the district court
after the order underlying this appeal, arguing that it “does not reflect the formula from the
Minnesota Child Support Guidelines Statute. ” The record for an appeal is limited to the

3 The district court acknowledged mother’s concerns in its discussion of custody but
determined that “[mother’s] allegations regarding [father’s] conduct are not credible.” We
defer to that credibility determination. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (“[D]ue regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the [district] court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”).
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documents and exhibits that were before the district court when it made the determination
at issue on appeal, in addition to any transcript of the proceedings. See Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 110.01; In re Nelson, 495 N.W.2d 200, 202, 204 (Minn. 1993) (holding that appellate
court should not have considered letter sent to district court after that court made
determination at issue on appeal). Mother’s notice of appeal identified as the subject of
our review a June 2025 district court order. On this issue, mother attempts to challenge a
determination from a July 2025 order. Because that order is outside the record on appeal,
its child-support determination is outside of our scope of review.
All of these issues are outside the scope of this appeal. We therefore decline to
review them.
Affirmed.