MSP Apartments, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1187

MSP Apartments,
Appellant,

vs.

N.P.,
Respondent,

C.J.,
Respondent.

Filed April 13, 2026
Appeal dismissed
Smith, John, Judge*

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-21-1238

Christopher T. Kalla, Douglass E. Turner, Hanbery & Turner, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

N.P., St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

C.J., Columbia Heights, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Madeleine DeMeules, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for intervenor Attorney General Keith Ellison)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Bentley, Judge; and Smith, John,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, JOHN, Judge
We dismiss the appellant’s appeal from the district court’s order granting an eviction
expungement under Minnesota Statutes section 484.014, subdivision 3(a)(5) (2024),
because we conclude that the appellant lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of
the statute.
FACTS
Because this matter has been expunged, our discussion of the facts is limited to the
facts included in the parties’ public filings. We have reviewed the publicly inaccessible
records to ensure the facts are accurate.
In March 2021, appellant-landlord MSP Apartments initiated an eviction action
against tenant-respondent N.P ., alleging breach of lease. N.P. did not appear at the first
hearing. In April, the district court granted a default judgment for MSP Apartments,
entered a judgment of recovery, and issued a writ of recovery and order to vacate. In May,
the sheriff executed the writ of recovery.
In May 2025, over three years after the eviction judgment was entered, N.P. filed a
request for mandatory expungement of the eviction case pursuant to Minnesota Statutes
section 484.014, subdivision 3(a)(5). Shortly thereafter, the district court entered an order
expunging the eviction case from the court’s record pursuant to section 484.014 ,
subdivision 3(a)(5), because three years had passed since the eviction was ordered.
Nothing in the record indicates that MSP Apartments were notified of the expungement or
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were afforded an opportunity to respond. MSP Apartments appeals the district court’s
order expunging the eviction case from the court’s record.1
DECISION
As a threshold issue, intervenor attorney general argues that MSP Apartments does
not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the eviction expungement statute in
whole or in part. We agree.
“Standing is a jurisdictional doctrine, and the lack of standing bars consideration of
the claim by the court.” Richards v. Reiter, 796 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 2011). “We
review the existence of standing de novo.” Minn. Voters All. v. Hunt, 10 N.W.3d 163, 167
(Minn. 2024). “Standing is acquired in two ways: either the plaintiff has suffered some
injury-in-fact or the plaintiff is the beneficiary of some legislative enactment granting
standing.” Lorix v. Crompton Corp., 736 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Minn. 2007) (quotation
omitted).
“A party has suffered an injury-in-fact when there has been a concrete and
particularized invasion of a legally protected interest.” Minn. Voters All., 10 N.W.3d at
167 (quotation omitted). In other words, to be considered an aggrieved party, a “person
must be injuriously or adversely affected by [a decision] when [such decision] operates
on
. . . [their] personal interest.” Stansell v. City of Northfield, 618 N.W.2d 814, 818
(Minn. App. 2000) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 26, 2001). A litigant
challenging the constitutionality of a statute “must articulate a legally cognizable interest

1 Respondent did not file a brief in this appeal.
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that it has suffered because of the . . . action and that differs from injury to the interests of
other citizens generally.” Webb Golden Valley, LLC v. State, 865 N.W.2d 689, 693 (Minn.
2015) (quotation omitted). “An allegation of a merely possible or hypothetical injury is
inadequate.” Minn. Sands, LLC v. County of Winona, 940 N.W.2d 183, 192 (Minn. 2020)
(quotation omitted).
MSP Apartments asserts that it has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
entirety of Minnesota Statutes section 484.014, subdivision 3(a) (2024). The attorney
general asserts that MSP Apartments lacks standing to challenge subdivision 3(a) because
the district court’s order relies only on subdivision 3(a)(5), thus any asserted injuries
regarding subdivision 3(a) in its entirety are purely hypothetical. We agree. Because the
district court granted expungement solely based on subdivision 3(a)(5), “no constitutional
issues regarding the other provisions of subdivision 3(a) are before this court.”
Weidner Apartment Homes v. B.F., ___ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2026 WL 262167, at *2 (Minn.
App. Feb. 2, 2026) (concluding appellant- landlord lacks standing to challenge the
provisions of Minnesota Statutes section 484.014, subdivision 3(a) not relied on by the
district court in granting eviction expungement). Thus, any allegation of harm under the
other provisions of subdivision 3(a) is an inadequate “hypothetical injury.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
We now consider whether MSP Apartments has standing to challenge section
484.014, subdivision 3(a)(5), the provision upon which the district court relied in granting
N.P.’s request for expungement. The attorney general argues that MSP Apartments lacks
standing to challenge subdivision 3(a)(5) because it has not suffered an injury-in-fact as a
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result of the district court’s expungement of the eviction case. 2 MSP Apartments asserts
that it suffered an injury-in-fact because (1) it was a plaintiff in the underlying action,
(2) the eviction expungement cancelled the reconveyance of N.P.’s interest in the property
back to MSP Apartments, and (3) the eviction expungement deprived MSP Apartments of
“leverage over [t]enants to be compensated for the damage caused to the building.”
MSP Apartments first contends that it suffered an injury-in-fact such that it has
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the eviction expungement statute because of
its status as a plaintiff in the underlying action. But MSP fails to cite any authority for the
assertion that party status alone can confer standing. Whether a plaintiff suffered an injury-
in-fact—not party status—is the test for standing. 3 See Lorix, 736 N.W.2d at 624.

2 The attorney general also asserts that, because MSP Apartments did not raise any theory
of standing in its opening brief, it forfeited its ability to assert any arguments regarding
standing. Because standing is a jurisdictional issue that may be raised at any time,
Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 673 N.W.2d 528, 530 (Minn. App. 2004), we reject the attorney
general’s forfeiture argument.

3 The attorney general relies on In re Sandy Pappas Senate Comm. for the assertion that
party status alone does not confer standing. 488 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1992). But we
are not convinced that Sandy Pappas is controlling. In Sandy Pappas, the supreme court
rejected relator’s argument that he had standing to file a petition for a writ of certiorari,
thereby invoking judicial review of an agency decision, simply because he participated in
the underlying agency proceedings. Id. The supreme court reasoned that, while it was
certainly proper for relator as a registered voter to file a complaint with the Minnesota
Ethical Practices Board and to appear before the Board in an informal hearing, relator “did
not thereby acquire a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the Board’s
proceedings” because “standing cannot come into existence solely by participation in
agency proceedings.” Id. In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court likened relator’s
position in the agency proceeding to that of a crime victim or witness to a crime. Id. (stating
that relator “has no more standing to invoke judicial review then does a crime victim or
any witness to invoke judicial review” of an acquittal, a conviction, or a guilty plea). We
are not convinced that the agency proceedings in Sandy Pappas are analogous to an
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Accordingly, MSP Apartments’ participation in the eviction action against N.P. does not
automatically confer standing upon it to challenge the constitutionality of the eviction
expungement statute. See also Nordvick v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 610 N.W.2d 659, 662-
63 (Minn. App. 2000) (concluding appellants lacked standing to challenge constitutionality
of implied consent statute because appellants failed to demonstrate personal harm from the
challenged provisions). Rather, MSP Apartments must still establish that it is “aggrieved,”
which “depends on whether there is injury to a legally protected right.” Richards , 796
N.W.2d at 513.
MSP Apartments also contends that the requirement of an injury-in- fact to confer
standing “is not a requirement per se,” relying primarily on Phillips v. County of Blue Earth
(In re Improvement of County Ditch No. 86), 625 N.W.2d 813 (Minn. 2011). In Phillips,
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that appellants had standing to challenge benefits and
damages determinations to lands owned by others. Id. at 820. But Phillips is inapposite
because it deals exclusively with the question of statutory standing. Id. at 817 (“We must
decide . . . whether section 103E.091 permits appellants to appeal only the benefits of
nonowned lands.”). As stated earlier, there are two pathways to acquiring standing: either
the plaintiff has suffered an injury-in -fact or is the beneficiary of a legislative enactment
granting standing. State by Humphrey v. Phillip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 493 (Minn.
1996). Here, MSP Apartments has not shown that it is the beneficiary of any legislative
enactment granting standing. We are squarely in the realm of injury-in-fact standing,

eviction action in district court such that the reasoning in Sandy Pappas would directly
apply to this case.
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which requires MSP Apartments to establish “a concrete and particularized invasion of a
legally protected interest.” Minn. Voters All., 10 N.W.3d at 167 (quotation omitted).
MSP Apartments next asserts it has suffered an injury-in-fact because the eviction
expungement “cancelled” the “reconveyance” of N.P.’s interest in the property back to it.
MSP Apartments reasons that, because a lease is a conveyance of a real property interest,
and an eviction is a means to reclaim that interest, the expungement of the eviction deprived
MSP Apartments of its ability to reclaim the property interest that the lease transferred to
N.P. But this argument lacks merit. There is no evidence in the record that N.P. retains
any interest in the property. Instead, the record clearly reflects that a sheriff executed the
writ of recovery on the property in May 2021. Thus, it is not clear what property right
MSP Apartments is alleging that N.P. retains or somehow re-acquired following the
expungement order. Further, MSP Apartments fails to establish a connection between the
expungement of the eviction case and its rights in the property.
Minnesota Statutes 484.014, subdivision 1(1) (2024) defines “expungement” as “the
removal of evidence of the court file’s existence from the publicly accessible records.”
Section 484.014, subdivision 1(1) says nothing about undoing what the court legally
determined during the eviction proceedings. Because MSP Apartments has not established
how the district court’s expungement of the eviction case from its publicly accessible
records impacts MSP Apartments ’ property rights, this argument fails. See Webb, 865
N.W.2d at 693 (explaining that a party invoking standing to advance an appellate challenge
“must establish an injury-in-fact to have standing” when there is no “legislative grant of
standing”).
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MSP Apartments next asserts that it has suffered an injury-in -fact because the
expungement of the eviction cas e from the court’s publicly accessible records deprives it
“of the basis to assert res judicata as to those factual allegations contained in the eviction
complaint.” Specifically, MSP Apartments states that, “[t]o the extent that [it] might again
locate Tenants, the damage claims alleged in the eviction complaint would support a claim
[for] Tenants’ liability for monetary damages.” But MSP Apartments has not pursued an
action for damages against N.P., nor has it alleged any plans to pursue such an action.
Thus, this asserted injury is purely hypothetical, and a “hypothetical [injury] is not enough
to establish justiciability.” McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing, 808 N.W.2d 331, 338 (Minn.
2011) (quotation omitted).4
MSP Apartments also seems to invoke Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure
103.03 as a basis for standing. But rule 103.03 merely defines the type of orders and
judgments that are appealable. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03. Rule 103.03 has no
effect on the requirement that MSP Apartments must establish that it has standing as an
aggrieved party. See Richards, 796 N.W.2d at 513 (“That a party must be aggrieved in

4 MSP Apartments also asserts that it has standing because the eviction expungement
statute is “injurious to the entire collective of landlords.” This argument fails because
parties challenging the constitutionality of a statute “must show that it affects [their] rights
in an unconstitutional manner and not merely the rights of others.”
Minn. Ass’n of Pub. Schs. v. Hanson, 178 N.W.2d 846, 850 (Minn. 1970); see also
City of Minneapolis v. Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d 386, 393 (Minn. 1980) (“[T]here is no
standing to raise a constitutional challenge absent a direct and personal harm resulting from
the alleged denial of constitutional rights.”).

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order to appeal remains fundamental to the modern version of section 609.05, which is now
expressed in Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03.” (quotation omitted)).5
Finally, MSP Apartments asserts that, “[t]o take [i]ntervenor’s argument to its
logical conclusion would mean this statute is not reviewable —at all.” Our recent
precedential decision in Weidner demonstrates the flaw in this argument. In Weidner, we
concluded that appellant-landlord had standing to challenge the constitutionality of
Minnesota Statutes section 484.014, subdivision 3(a)(5) because, as a consequence of the
eviction expungement, the monetary judgment appellant-landlord had obtained against
tenant was vacated. Weidner, 2026 WL 262167, at *3. We reasoned that the appellant-
landlord’s deprivation of the ability to collect on this money judgment amounted to a “loss
of a property interest,” which we determined was a concrete, particularized injury traceable
to the district court’s decision. Id. As explained above, MSP Apartments has not
established an analogous or comparable injury-in-fact here.
In sum, MSP Apartments has failed to establish that it suffered an injury-in-fact as
a result of the district court’s order expunging N.P.’s eviction file from the publicly
accessible record. Accordingly, we conclude that MSP Apartments lacks standing to
challenge the constitutionality of Minnesota Statutes section 484.014, subdivision 3(a)(5),

5 MSP Apartments also asserts that “to the extent that this case does not come to the court
of appeals fashioned as a declaratory judgment action, that it could have been —and had it
been—Landlord would have standing.” MSP Apartments fails to explain how the standing
requirements would differ had it brought this challenge to the eviction expungement statute
as a declaratory judgment. And binding case law does not support this contention. See
Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 821 (Minn. 2005) (“It is a well-established rule in
Minnesota that a court only has jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment if there is a
justiciable controversy.”).
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and therefore dismiss this appeal without reaching the merits of MSP Apartments’
argument.
Appeal dismissed.