Daniel Petsinger, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1198

Daniel Petsinger,
Appellant,

vs.

Steele County Recorder’s Office, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed May 11, 2026
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-CV-24-1313

Daniel Petsinger, Ellendale, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Elizabeth J. Vieira, Squires, Waldspurger & Mace, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondents)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Halbrooks,
Judge.∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
Daniel Petsinger sued the Steele County Attorney and the county’s recorder’s,
auditor’s, and assessor’s offices alleging violations of the Minnesota Government Data

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
Practices Act. The county defendants moved for summary judgment after Petsinger failed
to participate in discovery. The district court granted the motions as unopposed and
awarded attorney fees after Petsinger failed to timely respond. Petsinger appeals, asserting
various arguments supported by what appears in large part to be fictitious cases generated
from the hallucinations of artificial intelligence. We reject the arguments as flawed and
legally unsupported and therefore affirm.
FACTS
In this appeal by Daniel Petsinger from the district court’s summary-judgment order
dismissing his data-practices complaint, we present these facts in the light most favorable
to him as the nonmoving party. See Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623,
628 (Minn. 2017).
Keith Haskell visited the Steele County Recorder’s, Auditor’s, Assessor’s, and
Sheriff’s Offices on March 24, 2024, on Petsinger’s behalf. Haskell sought any public data
these offices held related to a Steele County lot that Petsinger had purchased about seven
years earlier. Unsatisfied with the responses, Haskell attempted the next day to email these
offices a written request with an eight- item list of specific documents or pieces of
information that he sought, but all except the email address of the assessor’s office included
typos, preventing a successful delivery. Staff at that office assembled responsive
documents within a week. Its records show that someone, although it is unclear who, paid
for and picked up the documents.
Petsinger went to the county’s Property Tax and Elections Department on July 19
and submitted a written data request for “[e]very [t]hing [a]bout” his lot. The county
3
administrator and county attorney reviewed Petsinger’s request and, on August 15,
contacted him through an agent, seeking a more specific description of the requested data.
Petsinger then sued the Steele County Recorder’s, Auditor’s, and Assessor’s Offices
and the Steele County Attorney the next day, alleging that they violated the Minnesota
Government Data Practices Act (DPA) by withholding public data from him. His complaint
demanded that the county turn over data that would satisfy Haskell’s March 25 data request
and any additional data the county defendants had regarding the lot. He also demanded
monetary damages.
Before the parties reached terms on a discovery plan, the county defendants
completed Petsinger’s July 19 data request. The county’s attorneys sent him digital copies
of the documents despite his failure to pay a $9 administrative fee. The documents included
those assembled in response to Haskell’s March 25 data request.
Petsinger failed to respond to the county defendants’ discovery requests, and they
moved for summary judgment. They argued that the county had fulfilled its obligations
under the DPA and that Petsinger had failed to demonstrate any injury. Petsinger did not
file a responsive brief within the deadline imposed by Minnesota General Rules of Practice
115.03(b). After the deadline, he submitted a 22-page “objection” to the county defendants’
motion. The county defendants urged the district court to treat their motion as unopposed.
The district court did so based on Petsinger’s failure to timely respond, dismissing his
complaint with prejudice. It also ordered Petsinger to pay the county defendants their
attorney fees authorized by the DPA.
4
The county defendants submitted details of the county’s incurred attorney fees,
requesting $29,679.50. P etsinger objected, accusing the county officials of “trying to
double-dip” by allowing multiple departments to bill for the same legal defense. The
district court reopened the record to receive an accounting from the county defendants. It
then found no evidence of improper accounting and ordered Petsinger to pay $28,863.50
in attorney fees. The district court reorganized the county defendants’ spreadsheet to
demonstrate the time for which the y could recover attorney fees and attached th e
spreadsheet to its order.
Petsinger appeals.
DECISION
Petsinger raises four arguments to challenge the district court’s summary-judgment
order. He argues that the district court was biased against him, that its attorney-fee award
was procedurally flawed, that it improperly refused to accept his untimely summary-
judgment response, and that genuine fact issues preclude summary judgment. He also asks
this court to sanction the county defendants, alleging frivolity. For the following reasons,
we affirm summary judgment and decline Petsinger’s request for sanctions.
I
We are unpersuaded by Petsinger’s argument that the district court acted partially
by allegedly creating evidence to support its fee award to aid the county defendants and by
not setting a filing deadline for their fee accounting. Due process entitles litigants to an
impartial judge. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); State v. Schlienz, 774
N.W.2d 361, 367 (Minn. 2009). When a party claims judicial bias for the first time on
5
appeal, we apply our plain-error-review framework. Schlienz, 774 N.W.2d at 365. We
review the judge’s conduct de novo to determine whether she erred by not acting
impartially. State v. Duol, 25 N.W.3d 135, 141 (Minn. 2025).
The record reveals no bias against Petsinger by the district court judge. Although a
judge must not independently investigate a case, id. at 142, the district court did not so
investigate here. It reorganized and summarized data the county defendants submitted in
their spreadsheet of attorney fees to aid the court in calculating a proper fee award. Contrary
to Petsinger’s contention that the district court devised reasons to support the fee award,
the district court was in fact explaining its legal reasoning for awarding fees on a factor of
its lodestar analysis. And we reject as mistaken Petsinger’s claim that the district court set
no deadline for the county defendants’ fee-accounting filing. The record informs us that it
ordered the defendants to file an accounting “by no later than May 30, 2025.” Petsinger
cites seven cases in support of his argument, but the citations do not track to cases that exist
or they include quoted language that does not appear in the referenced case. His bias claim
fails.
II
Petsinger unconvincingly argues that the district court violated statutory and rule-
based procedural requirements for awarding attorney fees. The county defendants correctly
point out that Petsinger forfeited these procedural challenges by raising them for the first
time on appeal. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). We therefore do not
consider the issue in substance.

6
III
Petsinger also unpersuasively contends that the district court erroneously deemed his
response to summary judgment untimely, asserting that the court overlooked a three-day
extension under “Minn. R. Civ. P. 6.05.” Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 6.05 was
abrogated in 2019 and is incorporated into rule 6.01(e). Minn. R. Civ. P. 6.04 cmt. This
rule provides:
Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or
take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the
service of a notice or other document upon the party, and the
notice or document is served upon the party by United States
Mail. 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period.
Minn. R. Civ. P. 6.01(e). While the county defendants are likely correct that Petsinger
forfeited this argument too, we exercise our discretion to address this argument to explain
why it fails on the merits. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04. The extension rule does not apply
to Petsinger’s summary-judgment response. Rule 6.01(e) applies when a party is served by
mail and the service itself marks a deadline before which the recipient “has the right . . . to
do some act.” The deadline for responding to a summary-judgment motion is instead set
by counting backward from the motion-hearing date. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.02; Minn. Gen.
R. Prac. 115.03(b). The district court did not err by not applying the extension rule to
salvage Petsinger’s tardy summary-judgment response.
IV
And we reject Petsinger’s argument that summary judgment was premature based
on genuine fact issues and on his allegedly denied opportunity to meaningfully participate
in discovery. We review de novo whether any genuine issues of material fact precluding
7
summary judgment remained, Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790
N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010), and for an abuse of discretion as to whether the timing of
the district court’s summary-judgment order denied the nonmovant a “meaningful
opportunity” to oppose it, Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v. Obermoller, 429 N.W.2d 251, 255
(Minn. App. 1988), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 26, 1988). Petsinger’s failure to oppose
summary judgment by providing admissible evidence defeats his disputed-facts argument,
particularly in the face of the evidence presented by the county defendants in affidavits
supporting summary judgment. See Hunt v. IBM Mid Am. Emps. Fed. Credit Union, 384
N.W.2d 853, 855 (Minn. 1986). And Petsinger’s complete failure to participate in
discovery during the scheduled discovery period (except for his attempt to issue an
unauthorized subpoena to the county attorney) defeats as unfounded his claim that the
district court precluded him from discovering relevant evidence.
V
There is no merit to Petsinger’s request that we sanction the county defendants for
“bad-faith litigation conduct.” We doubt the request is properly before this court. See Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 139.05, subd. 1 (establishing the process for seeking attorney fees on
appeal). Additionally, no facts support it. The county defendants efficiently disposed of
Petsinger’s complaint, which he failed to support.
Affirmed.